A precise notion of ‘mathematical structure’ other than that given by model theory may prove fruitful in the philosophy of mathematics. It is shown how the language and methods of category theory provide such a notion, having developed out of a structural approach in modern mathematical practice. As an example, it is then shown how the categorical notion of a topos provides a characterization of ‘logical structure’, and an alternative to the Pregean approach to logic which is continuous with the (...) modern structural approach in mathematics. (shrink)

We define consciousness as the category of all conscious experiences. This immediately raises the question: What is the essence in which every conscious experience in the category of conscious experiences partakes? We consider various abstract essences of conscious experiences as theories of consciousness. They are: (i) conscious experience is an action of memory on sensation, (ii) conscious experience is experiencing a particular as an exemplar of a general, (iii) conscious experience is an interpretation of sensation, (iv) conscious experience is referring (...) sensation to an object as its cause, and (v) conscious experience is a model of stimulus. Corresponding to each one of these theories we obtain a category of models of conscious experiences: (i) category of actions, (ii) category of idempotents, (iii) category of two sequential maps, (iv) category of brain-generalized figures, and (v) functor categories with intuition as base and conceptual repertoire as exponent, respectively. For each theory of consciousness we also calculate its truth value object and characterize the objective logic intrinsic to the corresponding category of models of consciousness experiences. (shrink)

Cognition involves physical stimulation, neural coding, mental conception, and conscious perception. Beyond the neural coding of physical stimuli, it is not clear how exactly these component processes constitute cognition. Within mathematical sciences, category theory provides tools such as category, functor, and adjointness, which are indispensable in the explication of the mathematical calculations involved in acquiring mathematical knowledge. More speci cally, functorial semantics, in showing that theories and models can be construed as categories and functors, respectively, and in establishing the adjointness (...) between abstraction (of theories) and interpretation (to obtain models), mathematically accounts for knowing-within-mathematics. Here we show that mathematical knowing recapitulates--in an elementary form--ordinary cognition. The process of going from particulars (physical stimuli) to their concrete models (conscious percepts) via abstract theories (mental concepts) and measured properties (neural coding) is common to both mathematical knowing and ordinary cognition. Our investigation of the similarity between knowing-within-mathematics and knowing-in-general leads us to make a case for the development of the basic science of cognition in terms of the functorial semantics of mathematical knowing. (shrink)

We present a categorical/denotational semantics for the Lambek Syntactic Calculus , indeed for a λlD-typed version Curry-Howard isomorphic to it. The main novelty of our approach is an abstract noncommutative construction with right and left adjoints, called sequential product. It is defined through a hierarchical structure of categories reflecting the implicit permission to sequence expressions and the inductive construction of compound expressions. We claim that Lambek's noncommutative product corresponds to a noncommutative bi-endofunctor into a category, which encloses all categories of (...) such hierarchical structure. A soundness theorem for LSC is shown with respect to this semantical framework. (shrink)

In the present article two possible meanings of the term mathematical structure are discussed: a formal and a nonformal one. It is claimed that contemporary mathematics is structural only in the nonformal sense of the term. Bourbaki's definition of structure is presented as one among several attempts to elucidate the meaning of that nonformal idea by developing a formal theory which allegedly accounts for it. It is shown that Bourbaki's concept of structure was, from a mathematical point of view, a (...) superfluous undertaking. This is done by analyzing the role played by the concept, in the first place, within Bourbaki's own mathematical output. Likewise, the interaction between Bourbaki's work and the first stages of category theory is analyzed, on the basis of both published texts and personal documents. (shrink)

The proof-theoretic analysis of logical semantics undermines the received view of proof theory as being concerned with symbols devoid of meaning, and of model theory as the sole branch of logical theory entitled to access the realm of semantics. The basic tenet of proof-theoretic semantics is that meaning is given by some rules of proofs, in terms of which all logical laws can be justified and the notion of logical consequence explained. In this paper an attempt will be made to (...) unravel some aspects of the issue and to show that this justification as it stands is untenable, for it relies on a formalistic conception of meaning and fails to recognise the fundamental distinction between semantic definitions and rules of inference. It is also briefly suggested that the profound connection between meaning and proofs should be approached by first reconsidering our very notion of proof. (shrink)

Hellman [2003] raises interesting challenges to categorical structuralism. He starts citing Awodey [1996] which, as Hellman sees, is not intended as a foundation for mathematics. It offers a structuralist framework which could denned in any of many different foundations. But Hellman says Awodey's work is 'naturally viewed in the context of Mac Lane's repeated claim that category theory provides an autonomous foundation for mathematics as an alternative to set theory' (p. 129). Most of Hellman's paper 'scrutinizes the formulation of category (...) theory' specifically in 'its alleged role as providing a foundation' (p. 130). I will also focus on the foundational question. Page numbers in parentheses are page references to Hellman [2003]. (shrink)

After defining, for each many-sorted signature Σ = (S, Σ), the category Ter(Σ), of generalized terms for Σ (which is the dual of the Kleisli category for $${\mathbb {T}_{\bf \Sigma}}$$, the monad in Set S determined by the adjunction $${{\bf T}_{\bf \Sigma} \dashv {\rm G}_{\bf \Sigma}}$$ from Set S to Alg(Σ), the category of Σ-algebras), we assign, to a signature morphism d from Σ to Λ, the functor $${{\bf d}_\diamond}$$ from Ter(Σ) to Ter(Λ). Once defined the mappings that assign, respectively, (...) to a many-sorted signature the corresponding category of generalized terms and to a signature morphism the functor between the associated categories of generalized terms, we state that both mappings are actually the components of a pseudo-functor Ter from Sig to the 2-category Cat. Next we prove that there is a functor TrΣ, of realization of generalized terms as term operations, from Alg(Σ) × Ter(Σ) to Set, that simultaneously formalizes the procedure of realization of generalized terms and its naturalness (by taking into account the variation of the algebras through the homomorphisms between them). We remark that from this fact we will get the invariance of the relation of satisfaction under signature change. Moreover, we prove that, for each signature morphism d from Σ to Λ, there exists a natural isomorphism θ d from the functor $${{{\rm Tr}^{\bf {\bf \Lambda}} \circ ({\rm Id} \times {\bf d}_\diamond)}}$$ to the functor $${{\rm Tr}^{\bf \Sigma} \circ ({\bf d}^* \times {\rm Id})}$$, both from the category Alg(Λ) × Ter(Σ) to the category Set, where d* is the value at d of the arrow mapping of a contravariant functor Alg from Sig to Cat, that shows the invariant character of the procedure of realization of generalized terms under signature change. Finally, we construct the many-sorted term institution by combining adequately the above components (and, in a derived way, the many-sorted specification institution), but for a strict generalization of the standard notion of institution. (shrink)

We shall address from a conceptual perspective the duality between algebra and geometry in the framework of the refoundation of algebraic geometry associated to Grothendieck’s theory of schemes. To do so, we shall revisit scheme theory from the standpoint provided by the problem of recovering a mathematical structure A from its representations \ into other similar structures B. This vantage point will allow us to analyze the relationship between the algebra-geometry duality and the structure-semiotics duality. Whereas in classical algebraic geometry (...) a certain kind of rings can be recovered by considering their representations with respect to a unique codomain B, Grothendieck’s theory of schemes permits to reconstruct general rings by considering representations with respect to a category of codomains. The strategy to reconstruct the object from its representations remains the same in both frameworks: the elements of the ring A can be realized—by means of what we shall generally call Gelfand transform—as quantities on a topological space that parameterizes the relevant representations of A. As we shall argue, important dualities in different areas of mathematics can be understood as particular cases of this general pattern. In the wake of Majid’s analysis of the Pontryagin duality, we shall propose a Kantian-oriented interpretation of this pattern. We shall use this conceptual framework to argue that Grothendieck’s notion of functor of points can be understood as a “relativization of the a priori” that generalizes the relativization already conveyed by the notion of domain extension to more general variations of the corresponding domains. (shrink)

Let L be a commutative residuated lattice and let f : Lk → L a function. We give a necessary and sufficient condition for f to be compatible with respect to every congruence on L. We use this characterization of compatible functions in order to prove that the variety of commutative residuated lattices is locally affine complete. Then, we find conditions on a not necessarily polynomial function P(x, y) in L that imply that the function x ↦ min{y є L (...) | P(x, y) ⪯ y} is compatible when defined. In particular, Pn(x, y) = yn → x, for natural number n, defines a family, Sn, of compatible functions on some commutative residuated lattices. We show through examples that S1> and S2, defined respectively from P1 and P2, are independent as operations over this variety; i.e. neither S1 is definable as a polynomial in the language of L enriched with S2 nor S2 in that enriched with S1. (shrink)

This paper takes as a starting point certain notions from Peirce's writings and uses them to propose a picture of the part of mathematical practice that consists of hypothesis formation. In particular, three processes of hypothesis formation are considered: abstraction, generalisation, and an abductive-like inference. In addition Peirce's pragmatic conception of truth and existence in terms of higher-order concepts are used in order to obtain a kind of pragmatic realist picture of mathematics.

Fibring has been shown to be useful for combining logics endowed withtruth-functional semantics. However, the techniques used so far are unableto cope with fibring of logics endowed with non-truth-functional semanticsas, for example, paraconsistent logics. The first main contribution of thepaper is the development of a suitable abstract notion of logic, that mayalso encompass systems with non-truth-functional connectives, and wherefibring can still be dealt with. Furthermore, it is shown that thisextended notion of fibring preserves completeness under certain reasonableconditions. This completeness transfer (...) result, the second main contributionof the paper, generalizes the one established in Zanardo et al. (2001) butis obtained using new techniques that explore the properties of a suitablemeta-logic (conditional equational logic) where the (possibly)non-truth-functional valuations are specified. The modal paraconsistentlogic of da Costa and Carnielli (1988) is studied in the context of this novel notionof fibring and its completeness is so established. (shrink)

The standard presentation of topological spaces relies heavily on (naïve) set theory: a topology consists of a set of subsets of a set (of points). And many of the high-level tools of set theory are required to achieve just the basic results about topological spaces. Concentrating on the mathematical structures, category theory offers the possibility to look synthetically at the structure of continuous transformations between topological spaces addressing specifically how the fundamental notions of point and open come about. As a (...) byproduct of this, one may look at the different approaches to topology from an external perspective and compare them in a unified way. Technically, the category of sober topological spaces can be seen as consisting of (co)algebraic structures in the exact completion of the elementary category of sets and relations. Moreover, the same abstract construction of taking the exact completion, when applied to the category of topological spaces and continuous functions produces an extension of it which is cartesian closed. In other words, there is one general mathematical construction that, when applied to a very elementary category, generates the category of topological spaces and continuous functions, and when applied to that category produces a very suitable category where to deal with all sorts functions spaces. Yet, via such free constructions it is possible to give a new meaning to Marshall Stone’s dictum: “always topologize” as the category of sets and relations is the most natural way to give structure to logic and the category of topological spaces and continuous functions is obtained from it by a good mix of free – i.e. syntactic – constructions. (shrink)

The current conception of the plurality of worlds is founded on a set theoretic understanding of possibilia. This paper provides an alternative category theoretic conception and argues that it is at least as serviceable for our understanding of possibilia. In addition to or instead of the notion of possibilia conceived as possible objects or possible individuals, this alternative to set theoretic modal realism requires the notion of possible morphisms, conceived as possible changes, processes or transformations. To support this alternative conception (...) of the plurality of worlds, I provide two examples where a category theoretic account can do work traditionally done by the set theoretic account: one on modal logic and another on paradoxes of size. I argue that the categorial account works at least as well as the set theoretic account, and moreover suggest that it has something to add in each case: it makes apparent avenues of inquiry that were obscured, if not invisible, on the set theoretic account. I conclude with a plea for epistemological humility about our acceptance of either a category-like or set-like realist ontology of modality. (shrink)

A novel conceptual framework is introduced for the Complexity Levels Theory in a Categorical Ontology of Space and Time. This conceptual and formal construction is intended for ontological studies of Emergent Biosystems, Super-complex Dynamics, Evolution and Human Consciousness. A claim is defended concerning the universal representation of an item’s essence in categorical terms. As an essential example, relational structures of living organisms are well represented by applying the important categorical concept of natural transformations to biomolecular reactions and relational structures that (...) emerge from the latter in living systems. Thus, several relational theories of living systems can be represented by natural transformations of organismic, relational structures. The ascent of man and other living organisms through adaptation, is viewed in novel categorical terms, such as variable biogroupoid representations of evolving species. Such precise but flexible evolutionary concepts will allow the further development of the unifying theme of local-to-global approaches to highly complex systems in order to represent novel patterns of relations that emerge in super- and ultra-complex systems in terms of compositions of local procedures. Solutions to such local-to-global problems in highly complex systems with ‘broken symmetry’ might be possible to be reached with the help of higher homotopy theorems in algebraic topology such as the generalized van Kampen theorems (HHvKT). Categories of many-valued, Łukasiewicz-Moisil (LM) logic algebras provide useful concepts for representing the intrinsic dynamic ‘asymmetry’ of genetic networks in organismic development and evolution, as well as to derive novel results for (non-commutative) Quantum Logics. Furthermore, as recently pointed out by Baianu and Poli (Theory and applications of ontology, vol 1. Springer, Berlin, in press), LM-logic algebras may also provide the appropriate framework for future developments of the ontological theory of levels with its complex/entangled/intertwined ramifications in psychology, sociology and ecology. As shown in the preceding two papers in this issue, a paradigm shift towards non-commutative, or non-Abelian, theories of highly complex dynamics—which is presently unfolding in physics, mathematics, life and cognitive sciences—may be implemented through realizations of higher dimensional algebras in neurosciences and psychology, as well as in human genomics, bioinformatics and interactomics. (shrink)

We address a recent proposal concerning ‘surplus structure’ due to Nguyen et al.. We argue that the sense of ‘surplus structure’ captured by their formal criterion is importantly different from—and in a sense, opposite to—another sense of ‘surplus structure’ used by philosophers. We argue that minimizing structure in one sense is generally incompatible with minimizing structure in the other sense. We then show how these distinctions bear on Nguyen et al.’s arguments about Yang-Mills theory and on the hole argument.

This paper deals with the varieties of monadic Heyting algebras, algebraic models of intuitionistic modal logic MIPC. We investigate semisimple, locally finite, finitely approximated and splitting varieties of monadic Heyting algebras as well as varieties with the disjunction and the existence properties. The investigation of monadic Heyting algebras clarifies the correspondence between intuitionistic modal logics over MIPC and superintuitionistic predicate logics and provides us with the solutions of several problems raised by Ono [35].

In this paper we continue the investigation of monadic Heyting algebras which we started in [2]. Here we present the representation theorem for monadic Heyting algebras and develop the duality theory for them. As a result we obtain an adequate topological semantics for intuitionistic modal logics over MIPC along with a Kripke-type semantics for them. It is also shown the importance and the effectiveness of the duality theory for further investigation of monadic Heyting algebras and logics over MIPC.

In this paper (a sequel to [4]) I put forward a "local" interpretation of mathematical concepts based on notions derived from category theory. The fundamental idea is to abandon the unique absolute universe of sets central to the orthodox set-theoretic account of the foundations of mathematics, replacing it by a plurality of local mathematical frameworks - elementary toposes - defined in category-theoretic terms.

Mathematicians, physicists, and philosophers of physics often look to the symmetries of an object for insight into the structure and constitution of the object. My aim in this paper is to explain why this practice is successful. In order to do so, I present a collection of results that are closely related to (and in a sense, generalizations of) Beth’s and Svenonius’ theorems.

In the categorical approach to the foundations of quantum theory, one begins with a symmetric monoidal category, the objects of which represent physical systems, and the morphisms of which represent physical processes. Usually, this category is taken to be at least compact closed, and more often, dagger compact, enforcing a certain self-duality, whereby preparation processes (roughly, states) are interconvertible with processes of registration (roughly, measurement outcomes). This is in contrast to the more concrete “operational” approach, in which the states and (...) measurement outcomes associated with a physical system are represented in terms of what we here call a convex operational model: a certain dual pair of ordered linear spaces–generally, not isomorphic to one another. On the other hand, state spaces for which there is such an isomorphism, which we term weakly self-dual, play an important role in reconstructions of various quantum-information theoretic protocols, including teleportation and ensemble steering. In this paper, we characterize compact closure of symmetric monoidal categories of convex operational models in two ways: as a statement about the existence of teleportation protocols, and as the principle that every process allowed by that theory can be realized as an instance of a remote evaluation protocol—hence, as a form of classical probabilistic conditioning. In a large class of cases, which includes both the classical and quantum cases, the relevant compact closed categories are degenerate, in the weak sense that every object is its own dual. We characterize the dagger-compactness of such a category (with respect to the natural adjoint) in terms of the existence, for each system, of a symmetric bipartite state, the associated conditioning map of which is an isomorphism. (shrink)

Quine often argued for a simple, untyped system of logic rather than the typed systems that were championed by Russell and Carnap, among others. He claimed that nothing important would be lost by eliminating sorts, and the result would be additional simplicity and elegance. In support of this claim, Quine conjectured that every many-sorted theory is equivalent to a single-sorted theory. We make this conjecture precise, and prove that it is true, at least according to one reasonable notion of theoretical (...) equivalence. Our clarification of Quine’s conjecture, however, exposes the shortcomings of his argument against many-sorted logic. (shrink)

In his book Philosophy of Logic, Putnam (1971) presents a short argument which reads like—and indeed, can be reconstructed as—a formal proof that a nominalistic physics is impossible. The aim of this paper is to examine Putnam’s proof and show that it is not compelling. The precise way in which the proof fails yields insight into the relation that a nominalistic physics should bear to standard physics and into Putnam’s indispensability argument.

LandryElaine, * ed. Categories for the Working Philosopher. Oxford University Press, 2017. ISBN 978-0-19-874899-1 ; 978-0-19-106582-8. Pp. xiv + 471.

In this article, I examine whether or not the Hamiltonian and Lagrangian formulations of classical mechanics are equivalent theories. I do so by applying a standard for equivalence that was recently introduced into philosophy of science by Halvorson and Weatherall. This case study yields three general philosophical payoffs. The first concerns what a theory is, while the second and third concern how we should interpret what our physical theories say about the world. 1Introduction 2When Are Two Theories Equivalent? 3Preliminaries on (...) Classical Mechanics 3.1Hamiltonian mechanics 3.2Lagrangian mechanics 4Are Hamiltonian and Lagrangian Mechanics Equivalent Theories? 4.1Tangent bundle versus cotangent bundle 4.2Tangent bundle versus symplectic manifold 4.3Lagrangian vector field versus Hamiltonian vector field 5Conclusion Appendix. (shrink)

An overview of the following three related papers in this issue presents the Emergence of Highly Complex Systems such as living organisms, man, society and the human mind from the viewpoint of the current Ontological Theory of Levels. The ontology of spacetime structures in the Universe is discussed beginning with the quantum level; then, the striking emergence of the higher levels of reality is examined from a categorical—relational and logical viewpoint. The ontological problems and methodology aspects discussed in the first (...) two papers are followed by a rigorous paper based on Category Theory, Algebraic Topology and Logic that provides a conceptual and mathematical basis for a Categorical Ontology Theory of Levels. The essential links and relationships between the following three papers of this issue are pointed out, and further possible developments are being considered. (shrink)

While quantum theory cannot be described by a local hidden variable model, it is nevertheless possible to construct such models that exhibit features commonly associated with quantum mechanics. These models are also used to explore the question of \-ontic versus \-epistemic theories for quantum mechanics. Spekkens’ toy theory is one such model. It arises from classical probabilistic mechanics via a limit on the knowledge an observer may have about the state of a system. The toy theory for the simplest possible (...) underlying system closely resembles stabilizer quantum mechanics, a fragment of quantum theory which is efficiently classically simulable but also non-local. Further analysis of the similarities and differences between those two theories can thus yield new insights into what distinguishes quantum theory from classical theories, and \-ontic from \-epistemic theories. In this paper, we develop a graphical language for Spekkens’ toy theory. Graphical languages offer intuitive and rigorous formalisms for the analysis of quantum mechanics and similar theories. To compare quantum mechanics and a toy model, it is useful to have similar formalisms for both. We show that our language fully describes Spekkens’ toy theory and in particular, that it is complete: meaning any equality that can be derived using other formalisms can also be derived entirely graphically. Our language is inspired by a similar graphical language for quantum mechanics called the ZX-calculus. Thus Spekkens’ toy bit theory and stabilizer quantum mechanics can be analysed and compared using analogous graphical formalisms. (shrink)

In an earlier paper the authors discussed some super-tasks by means of a kinematical interpretation. In the present paper we show a semi-formal way that a more abstract treatment is possible. The core idea of our approach is simple: if a super-task can be considered as a union of (finite) tasks, it is natural to define the effect of the super-task as the union of the effects of the finite tasks it consists of. We show that this approach enables us (...) to handle two of the three super-tasks that we discussed earlier. We also argue that recent objections against our original kinematical interpretation do not hold water. One of our arguments is based on the construction of an elegant correspondence between the first of those three super-tasks and Zeno's Achilles and the Tortois. (shrink)

Several logical operators are defined as dual pairs, in different types of logics. Such dual pairs of operators also occur in other algebraic theories, such as mathematical morphology. Based on this observation, this paper proposes to define, at the abstract level of institutions, a pair of abstract dual and logical operators as morphological erosion and dilation. Standard quantifiers and modalities are then derived from these two abstract logical operators. These operators are studied both on sets of states and sets of (...) models. To cope with the lack of explicit set of states in institutions, the proposed abstract logical dual operators are defined in an extension of institutions, the stratified institutions, which take into account the notion of open sentences, whose satisfaction is parametrised by sets of states. A hint on the potential interest of the proposed framework for spatial reasoning is also provided. (shrink)

What is mathematics about? And if it is about some sort of mathematical reality, how can we have access to it? This is the problem raised by Plato, which still today is the subject of lively philosophical disputes. This book traces the history of the problem, from its origins to its contemporary treatment. It discusses the answers given by Aristotle, Proclus and Kant, through Frege's and Russell's versions of logicism, Hilbert's formalism, Gödel's platonism, up to the the current debate on (...) Benacerraf's dilemma and the indispensability argument. Through the considerations of themes in the philosophy of language, ontology, and the philosophy of science, the book aims at offering an historically-informed introduction to the philosophy of mathematics, approached through the lenses of its most fundamental problem. (shrink)

This volume covers a wide range of topics in the most recent debates in the philosophy of mathematics, and is dedicated to how semantic, epistemological, ontological and logical issues interact in the attempt to give a satisfactory picture of mathematical knowledge. The essays collected here explore the semantic and epistemic problems raised by different kinds of mathematical objects, by their characterization in terms of axiomatic theories, and by the objectivity of both pure and applied mathematics. They investigate controversial aspects of (...) contemporary theories such as neo-logicist abstractionism, structuralism, or multiversism about sets, by discussing different conceptions of mathematical realism and rival relativistic views on the mathematical universe. They consider fundamental philosophical notions such as set, cardinal number, truth, ground, finiteness and infinity, examining how their informal conceptions can best be captured in formal theories. The philosophy of mathematics is an extremely lively field of inquiry, with extensive reaches in disciplines such as logic and philosophy of logic, semantics, ontology, epistemology, cognitive sciences, as well as history and philosophy of mathematics and science. By bringing together well-known scholars and younger researchers, the essays in this collection – prompted by the meetings of the Italian Network for the Philosophy of Mathematics (FilMat) – show how much valuable research is currently being pursued in this area, and how many roads ahead are still open for promising solutions to long-standing philosophical concerns. Promoted by the Italian Network for the Philosophy of Mathematics – FilMat. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new approach to the investigation into aesthetics. Specifically, it~argues that it is possible to explain the aesthetic and its underlying dynamic relations with an~axiomatic structure (the octahedral axiom-derived category) based on contemporary mathematics (namely category theory), and through this argument suggests the possibility for discussion about the mathematical structure of the aesthetic. If there were a way to describe the structure of the aesthetic with the language of mathematical structures and mathematical axioms---a~language completely devoid of arbitrariness---then (...) we would make possible a universal argument about the essential human activity of ``the aesthetic'', and we would also gain a new method and viewpoint into the philosophy and meaning of the act of creating a work of art and artistic activities. This paper presents one mathematical structure as a foundation in constructing the science of dynamic aesthetics based on axiomatic functionalism, which is in turn based on a new interdisciplinary investigation into the generative structure of the aesthetic. (shrink)

This article is about Avicenna’s account of syllogisms comprising opposite premises. We examine the applications and the truth conditions of these syllogisms. Finally, we discuss the relation between these syllogisms and the principle of non-contradiction.

Proof theory and category theory were first drawn together by Lambek some 30 years ago but, until now, the most fundamental notions of category theory have not been explained systematically in terms of proof theory. Here it is shown that these notions, in particular the notion of adjunction, can be formulated in such as way as to be characterised by composition elimination. Among the benefits of these composition-free formulations are syntactical and simple model-theoretical, geometrical decision procedures for the commuting of (...) diagrams of arrows. Composition elimination, in the form of Gentzen's cut elimination, takes in categories, and techniques inspired by Gentzen are shown to work even better in a purely categorical context than in logic. An acquaintance with the basic ideas of general proof theory is relied on only for the sake of motivation, however, and the treatment of matters related to categories is also in general self contained. Besides familiar topics, presented in a novel, simple way, the monograph also contains new results. It can be used as an introductory text in categorical proof theory. (shrink)

Our manuscript addresses the foundational question of cognitive science: how do we know? Specifically, examination of the mathematics of acquiring mathematical knowledge revealed that knowing-within-mathematics is reflective of knowing-in-general. Based on the correspondence between ordinary cognition (involving physical stimuli, neural sensations, mental concepts, and conscious percepts) and mathematical knowing (involving objective particulars, measured properties, abstract theories, and concrete models), we put forward the functorial semantics of mathematical knowing as a formalization of cognition. Our investigation of the similarity between mathematics and (...) cognition led us to argue against the compartmentalization of scientific knowledge and ordinary cognition, and make a case for the understanding of the basic science of knowing in terms of functorial semantics. Recognizing functorial semantics as an elementary form of cognition can help advance cognitive science the way calculus helped in the advancement of physics. (shrink)

We develop a category theoretical scheme for the comprehension of the information structure associated with a complex system, in terms of families of partial or local information carriers. The scheme is based on the existence of a categorical adjunction, that provides a theoretical platform for the descriptive analysis of the complex system as a process of functorial information communication.

Using the concept of adjunction, for the comprehension of the structure of a complex system, developed in Part I, we introduce the notion of covering systems consisting of partially or locally defined adequately understood objects. This notion incorporates the necessary and sufficient conditions for a sheaf theoretical representation of the informational content included in the structure of a complex system in terms of localization systems. Furthermore, it accommodates a formulation of an invariance property of information communication concerning the analysis of (...) a complex system. (shrink)

We develop a categorical scheme of interpretation of quantum event structures from the viewpoint of Grothendieck topoi. The construction is based on the existence of an adjunctive correspondence between Boolean presheaves of event algebras and Quantum event algebras, which we construct explicitly. We show that the established adjunction can be transformed to a categorical equivalence if the base category of Boolean event algebras, defining variation, is endowed with a suitable Grothendieck topology of covering systems. The scheme leads to a sheaf (...) theoretical representation of Quantum structure in terms of variation taking place over epimorphic families of Boolean reference frames. (shrink)

I argue that the Hole Argument is based on a misleading use of the mathematical formalism of general relativity. If one is attentive to mathematical practice, I will argue, the Hole Argument is blocked.

I argue that the hole argument is based on a misleading use of the mathematical formalism of general relativity. If one is attentive to mathematical practice, I will argue, the hole argument is blocked. _1._ Introduction _2._ A Warmup Exercise _3._ The Hole Argument _4._ An Argument from Classical Spacetime Theory _5._ The Hole Argument Revisited.

I argue that a criterion of theoretical equivalence due to Glymour :227–251, 1977) does not capture an important sense in which two theories may be equivalent. I then motivate and state an alternative criterion that does capture the sense of equivalence I have in mind. The principal claim of the paper is that relative to this second criterion, the answer to the question posed in the title is “yes”, at least on one natural understanding of Newtonian gravitation.

A category theoretic generalization of the theory of algebraizable deductive systems of Blok and Pigozzi is developed. The theory of institutions of Goguen and Burstall is used to provide the underlying framework which replaces and generalizes the universal algebraic framework based on the notion of a deductive system. The notion of a term -institution is introduced first. Then the notions of quasi-equivalence, strong quasi-equivalence and deductive equivalence are defined for -institutions. Necessary and sufficient conditions are given for the quasi-equivalence and (...) the deductive equivalence of two term -institutions, based on the relationship between their categories of theories. The results carry over without any complications to institutions, via their associated -institutions. The -institution associated with a deductive system and the institution of equational logic are examined in some detail and serve to illustrate the general theory. (shrink)

Structuralist foundations of mathematics aim for an ‘invariant’ conception of mathematics. But what should be their basic objects? Two leading answers emerge: higher groupoids or higher categories. I argue in favor of the former over the latter. First, I explain why to choose between them we need to ask the question of what is the correct ‘categorified’ version of a set. Second, I argue in favor of groupoids over categories as ‘categorified’ sets by introducing a pre-formal understanding of groupoids as (...) abstract shapes. This conclusion lends further support to the perspective taken by the Univalent Foundations of mathematics. (shrink)