- Non-Ideal Decision Theory.Sven Neth - 2023 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeleydetails
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A Non-Identity Dilemma for Person-Affecting Views.Elliott Thornley - manuscriptdetails
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Normative uncertainty and information value.Riley Harris - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Adelaidedetails
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Embracing self‐defeat in normative theory.Samuel Fullhart - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):204-225.details
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Resource Rationality.Thomas F. Icard - manuscriptdetails
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Risk-taking and tie-breaking.Ryan Doody - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):2079-2104.details
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Second Thoughts about My Favourite Theory.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (3):448-470.details
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Pick the Sugar.Seamus Bradley - manuscriptdetails
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Credal imprecision and the value of evidence.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):684-721.details
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A plan-based causal decision theory.Gerard J. Rothfus - 2022 - Analysis 82 (2):264-272.details
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On a Causal Principle in an Argument for a Necessary Being.Noël Blas Saenz - 2022 - Analysis 82 (2):272-277.details
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Aggregation and Reductio.Patrick Wu - 2021 - Ethics 132 (2):508-525.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Climate Change and Individual Obligations: A Dilemma for the Expected Utility Approach, and the Need for an Imperfect View.Julia Nefsky - 2021 - In Budolfson Mark, McPherson Tristram & Plunkett David (eds.), Philosophy and Climate Change. Oxford University Press. pp. 201-221.details
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The consequentialist problem with prepunishment.Preston Greene - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):199-208.details
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Beyond Uncertainty: Reasoning with Unknown Possibilities.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2020 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Autonomy for Changing Selves.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - In Ben Colburn (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Autonomy. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Transfinitely Transitive Value.Kacper Kowalczyk - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):108-134.details
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(1 other version)The Tragedy of the Risk Averse.H. Orri Stefánsson - 2020 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):351-364.details
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Dynamic consistency in the logic of decision.Gerard J. Rothfus - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3923-3934.details
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An argument against causal decision theory.Jack Spencer - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):52-61.details
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Escaping the Cycle.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2022 - Mind 131 (521):99-127.details
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Democracy & Analogy: The Practical Reality of Deliberative Politics.Michael Seifried - 2015 - Dissertation, Columbia Universitydetails
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The Sequential Dominance Argument for the Independence Axiom of Expected Utility Theory.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):21-39.details
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Avoiding Risk and Avoiding Evidence.Catrin Campbell-Moore & Bernhard Salow - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):495-515.details
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So why can’t you intend to drink the toxin?Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):294-311.details
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Rational Choice and the Transitivity of Betterness.Toby Handfield - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):584-604.details
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Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics.Travis Timmerman & Yishai Cohen - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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If There Are No Diachronic Norms of Rationality, Why Does It Seem Like There Are?Ryan Doody - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):141-173.details
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Is risk aversion irrational? Examining the “fallacy” of large numbers.H. Orri Stefánsson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4425-4437.details
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(1 other version)The Ethics of Nudge.Luc Bovens - 2008 - In Mats J. Hansson & Till Grüne-Yanoff (eds.), Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology. Springer, Theory and Decision Library A. pp. 207-20.details
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Time, hope, and independence: an argument for more structure in decision theory.Goreti Faria - unknowndetails
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Risk writ large.Johanna Thoma & Jonathan Weisberg - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2369-2384.details
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Reconsidering Resolutions.Alida Liberman - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2):1-27.details
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Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel Goldstein - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (4):650-669.details
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Ordering and Independence.Edward F. McClennen - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (2):298-308.details
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Exploiting Cyclic Preference.Arif Ahmed - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):975-1022.details
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Evil and God's Toxin Puzzle.John Pittard - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):88-108.details
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What good is a diachronic will?Luca Ferrero - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):403-430.details
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Costs of abandoning the Sure-Thing Principle.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):827-840.details
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Decision Theory.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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'Along an imperfectly-lighted path': practical rationality and normative uncertainty.Andrew Sepielli - unknowndetails
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Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):665-683.details
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1. Ulysses and the Sirens.Bruno Verbeek - 2007 - In Fabienne Peter (ed.), rationality and commitment. Oxford University Press USA. pp. 150.details
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Gigerenzer's normative critique of Kahneman and Tversky.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2000 - Cognition 76 (3):179-193.details
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What are the minimal requirements of rational choice? Arguments from the sequential-decision setting.Katie Siobhan Steele - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (4):463-487.details
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The Common Structure of Kantianism and Act-Utilitarianism.Christopher Woodard - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (2):246-265.details
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Decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences.Adam Bales, Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):453-70.details
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Objective Consequentialism and Avoidable Imperfections.Rob van Someren Greve - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):481-492.details
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Reversing 30 years of discussion: why causal decision theorists should one-box.Wolfgang Spohn - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):95-122.details
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