- Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.Timothy Bowen - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
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Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy.Crupi Vincenzo, Fitelson Branden & Tentori Katya - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182-199.details
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Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
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Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
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A Survey of Ranking Theory.Wolfgang Spohn - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer.details
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Intuitions for inferences.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.details
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Formal and Empirical Methods in Philosophy of Science.Vincenzo Crupi & Stephan Hartmann - 2009 - In Friedrich Stadler et al (ed.), The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 87--98.details
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Independent Tests and the Log‐Likelihood‐Ratio Measure of Confirmation.Alexander R. Pruss - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):124-135.details
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How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence.James M. Joyce - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153-179.details
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Causalism Without Causation.Carolina Sartorio - 2023 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 18 (1):185-199.details
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The Chances of Choices.Reuben Stern - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Subjective causal networks and indeterminate suppositional credences.Jiji Zhang, Teddy Seidenfeld & Hailin Liu - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 27):6571-6597.details
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Philosophy Without Belief.Zach Barnett - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):109-138.details
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Representational Scepticism: The Bubble Puzzle.J. Robert G. Williams - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):419-442.details
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Law-Abiding Causal Decision Theory.Timothy Luke Williamson & Alexander Sandgren - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (4):899-920.details
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Confirmation, Increase in Probability, and the Likelihood Ratio Measure: a Reply to Glass and McCartney.William Roche - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (4):491-513.details
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Causal Decision Theory is Safe from Psychopaths.Timothy Luke Williamson - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):665-685.details
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New theory about old evidence. A framework for open-minded Bayesianism.Sylvia9 Wenmackers & Jan-Willem Romeijn - 2016 - Synthese 193 (4).details
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Equal Opportunity and Newcomb’s Problem.Ian Wells - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):429-457.details
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Must rational intentions maximize utility?Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):73-92.details
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Rationality as a Virtue.Ralph Wedgwood - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):319-338.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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Doxastic Correctness.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):217-234.details
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How we know what ought to be.Ralph Wedgwood - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):61–84.details
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Hempel's Raven paradox: A lacuna in the standard bayesian solution.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):545-560.details
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Confirmation and the ordinal equivalence thesis.Olav B. Vassend - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1079-1095.details
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Interventionist decision theory.Reuben Stern - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):4133-4153.details
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An Interventionist’s Guide to Exotic Choice.Reuben Stern - 2021 - Mind 130 (518):537-566.details
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Laws, ceteris paribus conditions, and the dynamics of belief.Wolfgang Spohn - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (3):373-394.details
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Why Take Both Boxes?Jack Spencer & Ian Wells - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):27-48.details
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Rational monism and rational pluralism.Jack Spencer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1769-1800.details
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No Crystal Balls.Jack Spencer - 2018 - Noûs 54 (1):105-125.details
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An argument against causal decision theory.Jack Spencer - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):52-61.details
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Objects of Choice.Wolfgang Schwarz - forthcoming - Mind.details
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Niche construction, adaptive preferences, and the differences between fitness and utility.Armin W. Schulz - 2014 - Biology and Philosophy 29 (3):315-335.details
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Lost memories and useless coins: revisiting the absentminded driver.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):3011-3036.details
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Is the conjunction fallacy tied to probabilistic confirmation?Jonah N. Schupbach - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):13-27.details
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Fixing Stochastic Dominance.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - forthcoming - The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Evidential Support and Contraposition.Hans Rott - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-19.details
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A plan-based causal decision theory.Gerard J. Rothfus - 2022 - Analysis 82 (2):264-272.details
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Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas.Jacob Ross - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):411-447.details
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Peer Disagreement: A Call for the Revision of Prior Probabilities.Sven Rosenkranz & Moritz Schulz - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (4):551-586.details
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Causal modeling semantics for counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents.Giuliano Rosella & Jan Sprenger - forthcoming - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic.details
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Is there a place in Bayesian confirmation theory for the Reverse Matthew Effect?William Roche - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1631-1648.details
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Confirmation, increase in probability, and partial discrimination: A reply to Zalabardo.William Roche - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (1):1-7.details
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Counterfactual Triviality: A Lewis‐Impossibility Argument for Counterfactuals.J. Robert & G. Williams - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):648-670.details
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Causation, Chance, and the Rational Significance of Supernatural Evidence.Huw Price - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (4):483-538.details
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Rationality & Second‐Order Preferences.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2018 - Noûs 52 (1):196-215.details
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From outcomes to acts: A non-standard axiomatization of the expected utility principle.Martin Peterson - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (4):361-378.details
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Structural Counterfactuals: A Brief Introduction.Judea Pearl - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (6):977-985.details
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