- Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
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Is there a place in Bayesian confirmation theory for the Reverse Matthew Effect?William Roche - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1631-1648.details
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Rationality & Second‐Order Preferences.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2018 - Noûs 52 (1):196-215.details
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Assessing theories, Bayes style.Franz Huber - 2008 - Synthese 161 (1):89-118.details
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Intentions are Optimality Beliefs – But Optimizing What?Christoph Lumer - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (2):235-262.details
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Peer Disagreement: A Call for the Revision of Prior Probabilities.Sven Rosenkranz & Moritz Schulz - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (4):551-586.details
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Do bets reveal beliefs?Jean Baccelli - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3393-3419.details
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Hume and the Independent Witnesses.Arif Ahmed - 2015 - Mind 124 (496):1013-1044.details
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Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):816-853.details
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Confirmation, increase in probability, and partial discrimination: A reply to Zalabardo.William Roche - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (1):1-7.details
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The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory.Jason Konek & Ben Levinstein - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):69-107.details
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Counterfactual Desirability.Richard Bradley & H. Orii Stefansson - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2):485-533.details
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Causal Decision Theory and EPR correlations.Arif Ahmed & Adam Caulton - 2014 - Synthese 191 (18):4315-4352.details
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Uncertainty Without All the Doubt.Aaron Norby - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (1):70-94.details
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Triviality Pursuit.Alan Hájek - 2011 - Topoi 30 (1):3-15.details
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Counterfactual Triviality: A Lewis‐Impossibility Argument for Counterfactuals.J. Robert & G. Williams - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):648-670.details
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Types of Uncertainty.Richard Bradley & Mareile Drechsler - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1225-1248.details
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Inductive Logic.Franz Huber - 2008 - In J. Lachs R. Talisse (ed.), Encyclopedia of American Philosophy. Routledge.details
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What You Can't Expect When You're Expecting'.L. A. Paul - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):1-23.details
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Causal Decision Theory: A Counterexample.Arif Ahmed - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (2):289-306.details
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Counterfactual Triviality: A Lewis-Impossibility Argument for Counterfactuals.Robert Williams - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):648-670.details
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Subjective Probabilities Need Not be Sharp.Jake Chandler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1273-1286.details
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Intuitions for inferences.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.details
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A problem for the alternative difference measure of confirmation.Nevin Climenhaga - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):643-651.details
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Must rational intentions maximize utility?Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):73-92.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
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Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
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Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy.Crupi Vincenzo, Fitelson Branden & Tentori Katya - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182-199.details
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A unified Bayesian decision theory.Richard Bradley - 2007 - Theory and Decision 63 (3):233-263,.details
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Arntzenius on ‘Why ain’cha rich?’.Arif Ahmed & Huw Price - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):15-30.details
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Decision-theoretic paradoxes as voting paradoxes.Rachael Briggs - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):1-30.details
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Causal reasoning and backtracking.James M. Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):139 - 154.details
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Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Mind 120 (479):587-635.details
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A Survey of Ranking Theory.Wolfgang Spohn - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer.details
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Causality.Jessica M. Wilson - 2005 - In Sahotra Sarkar & Jessica Pfeifer (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. New York: Routledge. pp. 90--100.details
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Is the conjunction fallacy tied to probabilistic confirmation?Jonah N. Schupbach - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):13-27.details
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What Is the Point of Confirmation?Franz Huber - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1146-1159.details
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Understanding Deutsch's probability in a deterministic universe.Hilary Greaves - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35 (3):423-456.details
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Hempel's Raven paradox: A lacuna in the standard bayesian solution.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):545-560.details
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The plausibility-informativeness theory.Franz Huber - 2007 - In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Aldershot, England and Burlington, VT, USA: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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The two-envelope paradox: An axiomatic approach.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2005 - Mind 114 (454):239-248.details
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Varieties of Bayesianism.Jonathan Weisberg - 2011details
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The Logic of Theory Assessment.Franz Huber - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (5):511-538.details
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The Chances of Choices.Reuben Stern - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Probing the quantitative–qualitative divide in probabilistic reasoning.Duligur Ibeling, Thomas Icard, Krzysztof Mierzewski & Milan Mossé - 2024 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 175 (9):103339.details
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The Logic of Action and Control.Leona Mollica - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (5):1237-1268.details
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Comparative Opinion Loss.Benjamin Eva & Reuben Stern - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (3):613-637.details
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Actual value in decision theory.Andrew Bacon - 2022 - Analysis 82 (4):617-629.details
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Confession of a causal decision theorist.Adam Elga - 2022 - Analysis 82 (2):203-213.details
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