- A Case for Machine Ethics in Modeling Human-Level Intelligent Agents.Robert James M. Boyles - 2018 - Kritike 12 (1):182–200.details
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John Cook Wilson.Mathieu Marion - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Expressivism, Minimalism and Moral Doctrines.Christine Tiefensee - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Cambridgedetails
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Critical Notice of Epistemic Consequentialism (eds. Ahlstrom-Vij and Dunn). [REVIEW]Kurt Sylvan - forthcoming - Analysis.details
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Introduction.[author unknown] - 2007 - Introduction 2 (23):153-160.details
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Introduction.[author unknown] - 2007 - Introduction 2 (23):153-160.details
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Rationalization as performative pretense.Jason D'Cruz - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):980-1000.details
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Rationalization, Evidence, and Pretense.Jason D'Cruz - 2014 - Ratio 28 (3):318-331.details
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Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):337-355.details
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Disclaiming epistemic Akrasia: arguments and commentaries.Veronica S. Campos - 2020 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 24 (2).details
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The epistemology of science—a bird’s-eye view.Alexander Bird - 2010 - Synthese 175 (S1):5-16.details
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The aim of belief and the aim of science.Alexander Bird - 2019 - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 34 (2):171.details
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Justified judging.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81–110.details
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The signaling function of sharing fake stories.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2021 - Mind and Language (1):64-80.details
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No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Episteme:1-16.details
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No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):337-352.details
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Weighing Aims in Doxastic Deliberation.C. J. Atkinson - 2019 - Synthese (5):4635-4650.details
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The Aim of Belief and Suspended Belief.C. J. Atkinson - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (4):581-606.details
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Reconceiving Direction of Fit.Avery Archer - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):171-180.details
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Defending Exclusivity.Sophie Archer - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):326-341.details
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What is reliance?Facundo M. Alonso - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):163-183.details
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Does belief (only) aim at the truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.details
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Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
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A Minimalist Threshold for Epistemically Irrational Beliefs.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), What is Belief? Oxford University Press.details
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Judgment's aimless heart.Matthew Vermaire - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Debunking Doxastic Transparency.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A3)5-24.details
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What Do We Aim At When We Believe?Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.details
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A Practice-based Account of The Truth Norm of Belief.Xintong Wei - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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The Motivational Role of Belief.D. S. Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219-246.details
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Non‐Moral Evil.Allan Hazlett - 2012 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 36 (1):18-34.details
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The Motivational Role of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219 - 246.details
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What can we Learn from Buridan's Ass?Ruth Weintraub - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):281-301.details
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Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication.Christopher Gauker - 2021 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 173-187.details
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Fictional persuasion, transparency, and the aim of belief.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Lisa Bortolotti - 2017 - In Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Helen Bradley & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Art and Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 153-73.details
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Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 281-296.details
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Determinism and Judgment. A Critique of the Indirect Epistemic Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Luca Zanetti - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):33-54.details
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Deflationism about Truth-Directedness.Luca Zanetti - 2023 - Manuscrito 46 (4):2022-0069.details
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Should I Believe the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):213-224.details
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Epistemic subjectivism.Roger White - 2007 - Episteme 4 (1):115-129.details
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The Communication Argument and the Pluralist Challenge.Shawn Tinghao Wang - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (5):384-399.details
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Defending Evidence-Resistant Beliefs.Nikolai Viedge - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):517-537.details
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Aiming at Truth: Doxastic vs. Epistemic Goals.Hamid Vahid - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (2):303-335.details
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Epistemic Consequentialism and its Aftermath.Kurt Sylvan - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):773-783.details
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Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function?Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3453-3476.details
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Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):94-110.details
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Aims and Exclusivity.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):721-731.details
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A defence of Owens' exclusivity objection to beliefs having aims.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):453-457.details
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Another Defence of Owen’s Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):147-153.details
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Weighing the aim of belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):395-405.details
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Weighing the Aim of Belief Again.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):141-145.details
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