- Kant on Freedom.Owen Ware - 2023 - Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press.details
|
|
A Plea for Exemptions.Timothy Kearl - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (5):2013-2030.details
|
|
Praise.Daniel Telech - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (10):1-19.details
|
|
Natural Compatibilists Should Be Theological Compatibilists.Taylor Cyr - 2022 - In Leigh Vicens & Peter Furlong (eds.), Theological Determinism: New Perspectives. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. pp. 119-132.details
|
|
The Philosophy of Online Manipulation.Michael Klenk & Fleur Jongepier (eds.) - 2022 - Routledge.details
|
|
Kane and the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection: A Reply to Moore.John Lemos - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (5):2597-2615.details
|
|
Michael S. Moore: Mechanical Choices. The Responsibility of the Human Machine: New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. E-book (ISBN 9780190864019). 589 pages.1 hardback (ISBN: 9780190863999) 64 £. 616 pages. [REVIEW]Sofia M. I. Jeppsson - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (3):499-502.details
|
|
“Let’s build an Anscombe box”: assessing Anscombe’s rebuttal of the statistics objection against indeterminism-based free agency.Thomas Müller - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-22.details
|
|
Responsibility and Situationism.Brandon Warmke - 2022 - In Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 468-493.details
|
|
(1 other version)Against Legal Punishment.Nathan Hanna - 2022 - In Matthew C. Altman (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook on the Philosophy of Punishment. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 559-78.details
|
|
Sizing Up Free Will: The Scale of Compatibilism.Stuart Doyle - 2021 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 42 (3 & 4):271-289.details
|
|
Blame, deserved guilt, and harms to standing.Gunnar Björnsson - 2022 - In Andreas Carlsson (ed.), Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press. pp. 198–216.details
|
|
The Free Agent, Luck, and Character.Zahra Khazaei - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 23 (3):173-192.details
|
|
Is “Free Will” an Emergent Property of Immaterial Soul? A Critical Examination of Human Beings’ Decision-Making Process(es) Followed by Voluntary Actions and Their Moral Responsibility.Satya Sundar Sethy & M. Suresh - 2021 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 38 (3):491-505.details
|
|
The Three-Case Argument against the Moral Justificatory Significance of Basic Desert.Aleksandr Mishura - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (3):1327-1340.details
|
|
Intuitions About Free Will and the Failure to Comprehend Determinism.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Samuel Murray & Elise Dykhuis - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2515-2536.details
|
|
How Is Criminal Punishment Forward-Looking?Katrina L. Sifferd - 2021 - The Monist 104 (4):540-553.details
|
|
The Four-Case Argument and the Existential/Universal Effect.Andrew J. Latham & Hannah Tierney - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2379-2389.details
|
|
The Essential Superficiality of the Voluntary and the Moralization of Psychology.Matthieu Queloz - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1591-1620.details
|
|
Libertarian Free Will and the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection.Dwayne Moore - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (1):159-182.details
|
|
Free Will in Context.Patrick Grim - 2007 - Behavioral Science and the Law 25:183-201.details
|
|
Freedom to Choose Between Good and Evil: Theological Anthropology in Discussion with Philosophy.Matej Kováčik - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (4):95-115.details
|
|
From Neuroscience to Law: Bridging the Gap.Tuomas K. Pernu & Nadine Elzein - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.details
|
|
Carving a Life from Legacy: Frankfurt’s Account of Free Will and Manipulation in Greg Egan’s “Reasons to Be Cheerful”.Taylor W. Cyr - 2018 - Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy 1:1-15.details
|
|
Self-Forming Acts and Other Miracles.László Bernáth - 2014 - Hungarian Philosophical Review 1 (58):104-116.details
|
|
Free Will and Luck: Compatibilism versus Incompatibilism.Alfred R. Mele - 2020 - The Monist 103 (3):262-277.details
|
|
Moral Agents or Mindless Machines? A Critical Appraisal of Agency in Artificial Systems.Fabio Tollon - 2019 - Hungarian Philosophical Review 4 (63):9-23.details
|
|
The Block Universe: A Philosophical Investigation in Four Dimensions.Pieter Thyssen - 2020 - Dissertation, Ku Leuvendetails
|
|
Natural Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Intrusive Metaphysics.Thomas Nadelhoffer, David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & Shaun Nichols - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (8):e12873.details
|
|
Moral Responsibility.Matthew Talbert - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
(1 other version)Neuroenhancement, the Criminal Justice System, and the Problem of Alienation.Jukka Varelius - 2019 - Neuroethics 13 (3):325-335.details
|
|
The Problem of Luck and the Contradictory Nature of Moral Responsibility in the Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Aleksandr S. Mishura - 2019 - Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences 62 (10):102-120.details
|
|
For Whom Does Determinism Undermine Moral Responsibility? Surveying the Conditions for Free Will Across Cultures.Ivar R. Hannikainen, Edouard Machery, David Rose, Stephen Stich, Christopher Y. Olivola, Paulo Sousa, Florian Cova, Emma E. Buchtel, Mario Alai, Adriano Angelucci, Renatas Berniûnas, Amita Chatterjee, Hyundeuk Cheon, In-Rae Cho, Daniel Cohnitz, Vilius Dranseika, Ángeles Eraña Lagos, Laleh Ghadakpour, Maurice Grinberg, Takaaki Hashimoto, Amir Horowitz, Evgeniya Hristova, Yasmina Jraissati, Veselina Kadreva, Kaori Karasawa, Hackjin Kim, Yeonjeong Kim, Minwoo Lee, Carlos Mauro, Masaharu Mizumoto, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Jorge Ornelas, Barbara Osimani, Carlos Romero, Alejandro Rosas López, Massimo Sangoi, Andrea Sereni, Sarah Songhorian, Noel Struchiner, Vera Tripodi, Naoki Usui, Alejandro Vázquez del Mercado, Hrag A. Vosgerichian, Xueyi Zhang & Jing Zhu - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.details
|
|
(1 other version)Nietzsche and Moral Psychology.Daniel Telech & Brian Leiter - 2016 - In Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 103-115.details
|
|
Agency and Responsibility.Pamela Hieronymi - 2022 - In Luca Ferrero (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 221–225.details
|
|
On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect.Colin McLear - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:35-104.details
|
|
Responsibility and the limits of good and evil.Robert H. Wallace - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2705-2727.details
|
|
The Free Will Debate and Basic Desert.Michael McKenna - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (3):241-255.details
|
|
Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):224-256.details
|
|
Justice Without Retribution: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Stakeholder Views and Practical Implications.Farah Focquaert, Gregg Caruso, Elizabeth Shaw & Derk Pereboom - 2018 - Neuroethics 13 (1):1-3.details
|
|
Agent-Causation Revisited: Origination and Contemporary Theories of Free Will.Thad Botham - 2008 - Berlin, Germany: Verlag D Müller.details
|
|
Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology.Antti Kauppinen - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Helsinkidetails
|
|
The innocence of becoming: Nietzsche against guilt.Brian Leiter - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (1):70-92.details
|
|
Desperately seeking sourcehood.Hannah Tierney & David Glick - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):953-970.details
|
|
Agent-causal libertarianism, statistical neural laws and wild coincidences.Jason D. Runyan - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4563-4580.details
|
|
What Are the Odds that Everyone is Depraved?Scott Hill - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (3):299-308.details
|
|
(In)compatibilism.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2023 - In Joe Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.), Wiley-Blackwell: A Companion to Free Will. Wiley. pp. 58-83.details
|
|
Manipulation and Degrees of Blameworthiness.Martin Montminy & Daniel Tinney - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (3-4):265-281.details
|
|
Incapacitation, Reintegration, and Limited General Deterrence.Derk Pereboom - 2018 - Neuroethics 13 (1):87-97.details
|
|
When is an alternative possibility robust?Simon Kittle - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):199-210.details
|
|