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  1. Avicenna on the Law of Non-contradiction.Behnam Zolghadr - 2019 - History and Philosophy of Logic 40 (2):105-115.
    Aristotle gave seven arguments for the law of non-contradiction. The first one is against a special case of dialetheism, the view that only some contradictions are true, and other six arguments are...
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  • Truth without contra(di)ction.Elia Zardini - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):498-535.
    The concept of truth arguably plays a central role in many areas of philosophical theorizing. Yet, what seems to be one of the most fundamental principles governing that concept, i.e. the equivalence between P and , is inconsistent in full classical logic, as shown by the semantic paradoxes. I propose a new solution to those paradoxes, based on a principled revision of classical logic. Technically, the key idea consists in the rejection of the unrestricted validity of the structural principle of (...)
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  • The Final Cut.Elia Zardini - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (6):1583-1611.
    In a series of works, Pablo Cobreros, Paul Égré, David Ripley and Robert van Rooij have proposed a nontransitive system (call it ‘_K__3__L__P_’) as a basis for a solution to the semantic paradoxes. I critically consider that proposal at three levels. At the level of the background logic, I present a conception of classical logic on which _K__3__L__P_ fails to vindicate classical logic not only in terms of structural principles, but also in terms of operational ones. At the level of (...)
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  • Closed without boundaries.Elia Zardini - 2020 - Synthese 199 (Suppl 3):641-679.
    The paper critically discusses two prominent arguments against closure principles for knowledge. The first one is the “argument from aggregation”, claiming that closure under conjunction has the consequence that, if one individually knows i premises, one also knows their i-fold conjunction—yet, every one of the premises might exhibit interesting positive epistemic properties while the i-fold conjunction might fail to do so. The second one is the “argument from concatenation”, claiming that closure under entailment has the consequence that, if one knows (...)
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  • Abharī’s Solution to the Liar Paradox: A Logical Analysis.Mohammad Saleh Zarepour - 2020 - History and Philosophy of Logic 42 (1):1-16.
    The medieval Islamic solutions to the liar paradox can be categorized into three different families. According to the solutions of the first family, the liar sentences are not well-formed truth-apt...
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  • Imagining fictional contradictions.Michel-Antoine Xhignesse - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3169-3188.
    It is widely believed, among philosophers of literature, that imagining contradictions is as easy as telling or reading a story with contradictory content. Italo Calvino’s The Nonexistent Knight, for instance, concerns a knight who performs many brave deeds, but who does not exist. Anything at all, they argue, can be true in a story, including contradictions and other impossibilia. While most will readily concede that we cannot objectually imagine contradictions, they nevertheless insist that we can propositionally imagine them, and regularly (...)
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  • The Self-Effacement Gambit.Jack Woods - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):113-139.
    Philosophical arguments usually are and nearly always should be abductive. Across many areas, philosophers are starting to recognize that often the best we can do in theorizing some phenomena is put forward our best overall account of it, warts and all. This is especially true in esoteric areas like logic, aesthetics, mathematics, and morality where the data to be explained is often based in our stubborn intuitions. -/- While this methodological shift is welcome, it's not without problems. Abductive arguments involve (...)
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  • Logical Partisanhood.Jack Woods - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1203-1224.
    A natural suggestion and increasingly popular account of how to revise our logical beliefs treats revision of logic analogously to the revision of scientific theories. I investigate this approach and argue that simple applications of abductive methodology to logic result in revision-cycles, developing a detailed case study of an actual dispute with this property. This is problematic if we take abductive methodology to provide justification for revising our logical framework. I then generalize the case study, pointing to similarities with more (...)
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  • A Sketchy Logical Conventionalism.Jack Woods - 2023 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 97 (1):29-46.
    Anti-realism about the foundations of logic are curiously absent from the literature. This is especially striking given natural analogies with moral anti-realis.
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  • Assertion, denial, content, and (logical) form.Jack Woods - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1667-1680.
    I discuss Greg Restall’s attempt to generate an account of logical consequence from the incoherence of certain packages of assertions and denials. I take up his justification of the cut rule and argue that, in order to avoid counterexamples to cut, he needs, at least, to introduce a notion of logical form. I then suggest a few problems that will arise for his account if a notion of logical form is assumed. I close by sketching what I take to be (...)
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  • Observations on the Trivial World.Zach Weber & Hitoshi Omori - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):975-994.
    A world is trivial if it makes every proposition true all at once. Such a world is impossible, an absurdity. Our world, we hope, is not an absurdity. It is important, nevertheless, for semantic and metaphysical theories that we be able to reason cogently about absurdities—if only to see that they are absurd. In this note we describe methods for ‘observing’ absurd objects like the trivial world without falling in to incoherence, using some basic techniques from modal logic. The goal (...)
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  • Change of Logic, Change of Meaning.Jared Warren - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):421-442.
    Some philosophers have argued that putative logical disagreements aren't really disagreements at all since when you change your logic you thereby change the meanings of your logical constants. According to this picture classical logicians and intuitionists don't really disagree, they just mean different things by terms like “not” and “or”. Quine gave an infamous “translation argument” for this view. Here I clarify the change of logic, change of meaning (CLCM) thesis, examine and find fault with Quine's translation argument for the (...)
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  • One Heresy and One Orthodoxy: On Dialetheism, Dimathematism, and the Non-normativity of Logic.Heinrich Wansing - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (1):181-205.
    In this paper, Graham Priest’s understanding of dialetheism, the view that there exist true contradictions, is discussed, and various kinds of metaphysical dialetheism are distinguished between. An alternative to dialetheism is presented, namely a thesis called ‘dimathematism’. It is pointed out that dimathematism enables one to escape a slippery slope argument for dialetheism that has been put forward by Priest. Moreover, dimathematism is presented as a thesis that is helpful in rejecting the claim that logic is a normative discipline.
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  • Why Be Rational?Nicholas Waghorn - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (2):335-353.
    The question ‘Why be rational?’ could be calling into question a commitment to respond to the requirements of subjective rationality, or could be calling into question a commitment to respond to objective reasons. I examine the question in this second sense, placing it in the mouth of the arationalist — an individual who has not ruled out the possibility of not acting or believing on the basis of objective reasons. In evaluating responses to the arationalist’s question, I consider the replies (...)
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  • Substructural logics, pragmatic enrichment, and the inferential role of logical constants.Pilar Terrés Villalonga - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (6):628-654.
    ABSTRACT My aim in this paper is to present a pluralist thesis about the inferential role of logical constants, which embraces classical, relevant, linear and ordered logic. That is, I defend that a logical constant c has more than one correct inferential role. The thesis depends on a particular interpretation of substructural logics' vocabulary, according to which classical logic captures the literal meaning of logical constants and substructural logics encode a pragmatically enriched sense of those connectives. The paper is divided (...)
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  • Mathematical Perspectives on Liar Paradoxes.José-Luis Usó-Doménech, Josué-Antonio Nescolarde-Selva, Lorena Segura-Abad, Kristian Alonso-Stenberg & Hugh Gash - 2021 - Logica Universalis 15 (3):251-269.
    The liar paradox is a famous and ancient paradox related to logic and philosophy. It shows it is perfectly possible to construct sentences that are correct grammatically and semantically but that cannot be true or false in the traditional sense. In this paper the authors show four approaches to interpreting paradoxes that illustrate the influence of: the levels of language, their belonging to indeterminate compatible propositions or indeterminate propositions, being based on universal antinomy and the theory of dialetheism.
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  • Priest’s Anti-Exceptionalism, Candrakīrti and Paraconsistency.Koji Tanaka - 2019 - In Can Başkent & Thomas Macaulay Ferguson (eds.), Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag. pp. 127-138.
    Priest holds anti-exceptionalism about logic. That is, he holds that logic, as a theory, does not have any exceptional status in relation to the theories of empirical sciences. Crucial to Priest’s anti-exceptionalism is the existence of ‘data’ that can force the revision of logical theory. He claims that classical logic is inadequate to the available data and, thus, needs to be revised. But what kind of data can overturn classical logic? Priest claims that the data is our intuitions about the (...)
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  • Logical Pluralism and Interpretations of Logical Systems.Diego Tajer & Camillo Fiore - 2022 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 31:1-26.
    Logical pluralism is a general idea that there is more than one correct logic. Carnielli and Rodrigues [2019a] defend an epistemic interpretation of the paraconsistent logic N4, according to which an argument is valid in this logic just in case it necessarily preserves evidence. The authors appeal to this epistemic interpretation to briefly motivate a kind of logical pluralism: “different accounts of logical consequence may preserve different properties of propositions”. The aim of this paper is to study the prospect of (...)
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  • Intuitions in logic: a moderate proposal.Diego Tajer - 2020 - Humanities Journal of Valparaiso 16:239-253.
    Intuitions play a significant role in debates about logic. In this paper, I analyze how legitimate is that practice. In the first part of the paper, I distinguish between theoretical and pretheoretical intuitions, and argue that some pretheoretical intuitions are not to be taken into account in logic. Particularly, our pretheoretical intuitions about the concept of validity are not of much importance, since we don’t have a uniform or clear concept of validity in the natural language to be elucidated. Nevertheless, (...)
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  • Categoricity Problem for LP and K3.Selcuk Kaan Tabakci - forthcoming - Studia Logica:1-35.
    Even though the strong relationship between proof-theoretic and model-theoretic notions in one’s logical theory can be shown by soundness and completeness proofs, whether we can define the model-theoretic notions by means of the inferences in a proof system is not at all trivial. For instance, provable inferences in a proof system of classical logic in the logical framework do not determine its intended models as shown by Carnap (Formalization of logic, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1943), i.e., there are non-Boolean models (...)
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  • How Tolerant Can You Be? Carnap on Rationality.Florian Steinberger - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):645-668.
    In this paper I examine a neglected question concerning the centerpiece of Carnap's philosophy: the principle of tolerance. The principle of tolerance states that we are free to devise and adopt any well-defined form of language or linguistic framework we please. A linguistic framework defines framework-internal standards of correct reasoning that guide us in our first-order scientific pursuits. The choice of a linguistic framework, on the other hand, is an ‘external’ question to be settled on pragmatic grounds and so not (...)
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  • Disagreement about logic from a pluralist perspective.Erik Stei - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3329-3350.
    Logical pluralism is commonly described as the view that there is more than one correct logic. It has been claimed that, in order for that view to be interesting, there has to be at least a potential for rivalry between the correct logics. This paper offers a detailed assessment of this suggestion. I argue that an interesting version of logical pluralism is hard, if not impossible, to achieve. I first outline an intuitive understanding of the notions of rivalry and correctness. (...)
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  • Consequence and Normative Guidance.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):306-328.
    Logic, the tradition has it, is normative for reasoning. But is that really so? And if so, in what sense is logic normative for reasoning? As Gilbert Harman has reminded us, devising a logic and devising a theory of reasoning are two separate enterprises. Hence, logic's normative authority cannot reside in the fact that principles of logic just are norms of reasoning. Once we cease to identify the two, we are left with a gap. To bridge the gap one would (...)
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  • Commandments Thou Shalt Not Break.Roy Sorensen - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (3):1643-1662.
    Commanders gain authority from obedience and lose authority from disobedience. We should expect commanders to therefore devise commands that reduce the probability of disobedience. To aid recognition of these techniques for reducing the risk of disobedience, I focus on the extreme of case of commands that reduce the probability to zero. Each of my ten commandments illustrates a logical technique for engineering out disobedience. Once you master these safety measures, you can confidently legislate your own universal maxims. Your innovations will (...)
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  • Disbelief is a distinct doxastic attitude.Joshua Smart - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11797-11813.
    While epistemologists routinely employ disbelief talk, it is not clear that they really mean it, given that they often equate disbelieving p with believing ¬p. I argue that this is a mistake—disbelief is a doxastic attitude of rejection and is distinct from belief. I first clarify this claim and its opposition, then show that we must distinguish disbelieving p from believing ¬p in order to account for the fact that we continue to hold doxastic attitudes toward propositions that we reject. (...)
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  • Can Worsnip's strategy solve the puzzle of misleading higher-order apparent evidence?Paul Silva - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):339-351.
    ABSTRACT It is plausible to think that we're rationally required to follow our total evidence. It is also plausible to think that there are coherence requirements on rationality. It is also plausible to think that higher order evidence can be misleading. Several epistemologists have recognized the puzzle these claims generate, and the puzzle seems to have only startling and unattractive solutions that involve the rejection of intuitive principles. Yet Alex Worsnip has recently argued that this puzzle has a tidy, attractive (...)
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  • What is logical deflationism? Two non-metalinguistic conceptions of logic.Lionel Shapiro - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-28.
    This paper compares two ways of holding that logic is special among the sciences in that it has no restricted class of entities as its subject matter, but instead concerns all entities alike. One way is Williamson’s explanation of how inquiry into logical consequence and logical truth only superficially concerns the linguistic or conceptual entities that bear these properties. Williamson draws on ideas familiar from deflationism about truth, and his account has been called “deflationary.” I argue that the analogy is (...)
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  • The very idea of a substructural approach to paradox.Lionel Shapiro - 2016 - Synthese 199 (Suppl 3):767-786.
    This paper aims to call into question the customary division of logically revisionary responses to the truth-theoretic paradoxes into those that are “substructural” and those that are “ structural.” I proceed by examining, as a case study, Beall’s recent proposal based on the paraconsistent logic LP. Beall formulates his response to paradox in terms of a consequence relation that obeys all standard structural rules, though at the price of the language’s lacking a detaching conditional. I argue that the same response (...)
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  • Further Reflections on Quasi-factivism: A Reply to Baumann.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Logos and Episteme 13 (2):207-215.
    This paper is a response to Baumann's comments on "Can Knowledge Really be Non-fative?" In this paper Baumann's suggestions for how those who deny the factivty of knowledge might deal with the argument from inconsistency and explosion are addressed.
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  • Expressibility and the Liar's Revenge.Lionel Shapiro - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):297-314.
    There is a standard objection against purported explanations of how a language L can express the notion of being a true sentence of L. According to this objection, such explanations avoid one paradox (the Liar) only to succumb to another of the same kind. Even if L can contain its own truth predicate, we can identify another notion it cannot express, on pain of contradiction via Liar-like reasoning. This paper seeks to undermine such ‘revenge’ by arguing that it presupposes a (...)
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  • Does Logical Pluralism Imply, or Suggest, Truth Pluralism, or Vice Versa?Stewart Shapiro & Michael Lynch - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4925-4936.
    The answers to the questions in the title depend on the kind of pluralism one is talking about. We will focus here on our own views. The purpose of this article is to trace out some possible connections between these kinds of pluralism. We show how each of them might bear on the other, depending on how certain open questions are resolved.
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  • How to water a thousand flowers. On the logic of logical pluralism.Andrea Sereni & Maria Paola Sforza Fogliani - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
    How many logics do logical pluralists adopt, or are allowed to adopt, or ought to adopt, in arguing for their view? These metatheoretical questions lurk behind much of the discussion on logical pluralism, and have a direct bearing on normative issues concerning the choice of a correct logic and the characterization of valid reasoning. Still, they commonly receive just swift answers – if any. Our aim is to tackle these questions head on, by clarifying the range of possibilities that logical (...)
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  • Truthmaking for Meinongians.Maciej Sendłak - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-20.
    This paper aims to introduce Meinongian Abstractionism (MA), i.e. a view on the metaphysics of truthmaking and modality. This approach is based on the notion of objectives—one of the key elements of Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects. In the light of it, worlds are interpreted in terms of sets of subsistent and non-subsistent objectives. This—along with Meinong’s characterization of objectives—provides a ground for possible as well as impossible worlds. One of the consequences of Meinongain Abstractionism is a reformulation of the (...)
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  • On the Methodological Restriction of the Principle of Characterization.Maciej Sendłak - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):807-825.
    The subject of this article is the Principle of Characterization—the most controversial principle of Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects. The aim of this text is twofold. First of all, to show that Bertrand Russell’s well-known objection to the Principle of Characterization can be reformulated against contemporary unrestricted interpretations of it. Second, to propose an alternative formulation of this principle. This refers to the methodology of metaphysics and is based on the distinction between pre-theoretical and theoretical languages. The proposed formulation fits (...)
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  • On the Methodological Restriction of the Principle of Characterization.Maciej Sendłak - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):807-825.
    The subject of this article is the Principle of Characterization—the most controversial principle of Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects. The aim of this text is twofold. First of all, to show that Bertrand Russell’s well-known objection to the Principle of Characterization can be reformulated against contemporary unrestricted interpretations of it. Second, to propose an alternative formulation of this principle. This refers to the methodology of metaphysics and is based on the distinction between pre-theoretical and theoretical languages. The proposed formulation fits (...)
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  • Counterpossibles, story prefix and trivialism.Maciej Sendłak - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7283-7301.
    The aim of this paper is to argue in favor of the view that some counterpossibles are false. This is done indirectly by showing that accepting the opposite view, i.e., one that ascribes truth to each and every counterpossible, results in the claim that every necessarily false theory has exactly the same consequences. Accordingly, it is shown that taking every counterpossible to be true not only undermines the value of debates over various alternative theories and their consequences, but also puts (...)
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  • Truth, Revenge, and Internalizability.Kevin Scharp - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):597-645.
    Although there has been a recent swell of interest in theories of truth that attempt solutions to the liar paradox and the other paradoxes affecting our concept of truth, many of these theories have been criticized for generating new paradoxes, called revenge paradoxes. The criticism is that the theories of truth in question are inadequate because they only work for languages lacking in the resources to generate revenge paradoxes. Theorists facing these objections offer a range of replies, and the matter (...)
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  • On Richard’s When Truth Gives Out. [REVIEW]Kevin Scharp & Stewart Shapiro - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):455-463.
    On Richard’s When Truth Gives Out Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9796-0 Authors Kevin Scharp, Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 350 University Hall, 230 North Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210, USA Stewart Shapiro, Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, 350 University Hall, 230 North Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  • (What) Is Feminist Logic? (What) Do We Want It to Be?Catharine Saint-Croix & Roy T. Cook - 2024 - History and Philosophy of Logic 45 (1):20-45.
    ‘Feminist logic’ may sound like an impossible, incoherent, or irrelevant project, but it is none of these. We begin by delineating three categories into which projects in feminist logic might fall: philosophical logic, philosophy of logic, and pedagogy. We then defuse two distinct objections to the very idea of feminist logic: the irrelevance argument and the independence argument. Having done so, we turn to a particular kind of project in feminist philosophy of logic: Valerie Plumwood's feminist argument for a relevance (...)
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  • Logical Nihilism: Could There Be No Logic?Gillian Russell - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):308-324.
    Logical monists and pluralists disagree about how many correct logics there are; the monists say there is just one, the pluralists that there are more. Could it turn out that both are wrong, and that there is no logic at all?
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  • Logic isn’t normative.Gillian Russell - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):371-388.
    Some writers object to logical pluralism on the grounds that logic is normative. The rough idea is that the relation of logical consequence has consequences for what we ought to think and h...
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  • Deviance and Vice: Strength as a Theoretical Virtue in the Epistemology of Logic.Gillian Russell - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):548-563.
    This paper is about the putative theoretical virtue of strength, as it might be used in abductive arguments to the correct logic in the epistemology of logic. It argues for three theses. The first is that the well-defined property of logical strength is neither a virtue nor a vice, so that logically weaker theories are not—all other things being equal—worse or better theories than logically stronger ones. The second thesis is that logical strength does not entail the looser characteristic of (...)
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  • Against a Metaphysical Understanding of Rejection.Mariela Rubin & Ariel Roffé - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (1):189-202.
    In this article, we defend that incorporating a rejection operator into a paraconsistent language involves fully specifying its inferential characteristics within the logic. To do this, we examine a recent proposal by Berto for a paraconsistent rejection, which — according to him — avoids paradox, even when introduced into a language that contains self-reference and a transparent truth predicate. We will show that this proposal is inadequate because it is too incomplete. We argue that the reason it avoids trouble is (...)
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  • Negation, Denial, and Rejection.David Ripley - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (9):622-629.
    At least since [Frege, 1960] and [Geach, 1965], there has been some consensus about the relation between negation, the speech act of denial, and the attitude of rejection: a denial, the consensus has had it, is the assertion of a negation, and a rejection is a belief in a negation. Recently, though, there have been notable deviations from this orthodox view. Rejectivists have maintained that negation is to be explained in terms of denial or rejection, rather than vice versa. Some (...)
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  • Paradoxes and Failures of Cut.David Ripley - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):139 - 164.
    This paper presents and motivates a new philosophical and logical approach to truth and semantic paradox. It begins from an inferentialist, and particularly bilateralist, theory of meaning---one which takes meaning to be constituted by assertibility and deniability conditions---and shows how the usual multiple-conclusion sequent calculus for classical logic can be given an inferentialist motivation, leaving classical model theory as of only derivative importance. The paper then uses this theory of meaning to present and motivate a logical system---ST---that conservatively extends classical (...)
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  • Generality and existence 1: Quantification and free logic.Greg Restall - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (1):1-29.
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  • Swyneshed, Aristotle and the Rule of Contradictory Pairs.Stephen Read - 2020 - Logica Universalis 14 (1):27-50.
    Roger Swyneshed, in his treatise on insolubles, dating from the early 1330s, drew three notorious corollaries from his solution. The third states that there is a contradictory pair of propositions both of which are false. This appears to contradict what Whitaker, in his iconoclastic reading of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, dubbed “The Rule of Contradictory Pairs”, which requires that in every such pair, one must be true and the other false. Whitaker argued that, immediately after defining the notion of a contradictory (...)
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  • What If? The Exploration of an Idea.Graham Priest - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Logic 14 (1).
    A crucial question here is what, exactly, the conditional in the naive truth/set comprehension principles is. In 'Logic of Paradox', I outlined two options. One is to take it to be the material conditional of the extensional paraconsistent logic LP. Call this "Strategy 1". LP is a relatively weak logic, however. In particular, the material conditional does not detach. The other strategy is to take it to be some detachable conditional. Call this "Strategy 2". The aim of the present essay (...)
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  • Logical Pluralism: Another Application for Chunk and Permeate.Graham Priest - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S2):331-338.
    A motivation behind one kind of logical pluralism is the thought that there are different kinds of objects, and that reasoning about situations involving these different kinds requires different kinds of logics. Given this picture, a natural question arises: what kind of logical apparatus is appropriate for situations which concern more than one kind of objects, such as may arise, for example, when considering the interactions between the different kinds? The paper articulates an answer to this question, deploying the methodology (...)
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  • Logical abductivism and non-deductive inference.Graham Priest - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3207-3217.
    Logic, in one of the many sense of that term, is a theory about what follows from what and why. Arguably, the correct theory has to be determined by abduction. Over recent years, so called logical anti-exceptionalists have investigated this matter. Current discussions have been restricted to deductive logic. However, there are also, of course, various forms of non-deductive reasoning. Indeed, abduction itself is one of these. What is to be said about the way of choosing the best theory of (...)
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