- When statistical evidence is not specific enough.Marcello Di Bello - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12251-12269.details
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Trial by Statistics: Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough to Convict?Marcello Di Bello - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1045-1084.details
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Proof Paradoxes and Normic Support: Socializing or Relativizing?Marcello Di Bello - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1269-1285.details
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Pritchard Versus Pritchard on Luck.Job De Grefte - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (1-2):3-15.details
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The Epistemology of Cognitive Enhancement.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (2):220-242.details
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(1 other version)On Behalf of a Bi-Level Account of Trust.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies:1-24.details
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(1 other version)On behalf of a bi-level account of trust.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2299-2322.details
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The Myth of Stochastic Infallibilism.Adam Michael Bricker - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):523-538.details
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Neural phase: a new problem for the modal account of epistemic luck.Adam Michael Bricker - 2019 - Synthese (8):1-18.details
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Epistemic Judgments are Insensitive to Probabilities.Adam Michael Bricker - 2020 - Metaphilosophy 51 (4):499-521.details
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Do Judgements about Risk Track Modal Ordering?Adam Michael Bricker - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):200-208.details
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Propositional epistemic luck, epistemic risk, and epistemic justification.Patrick Bondy & Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3811-3820.details
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Sensitivity, Causality, and Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):102-112.details
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Statistical Evidence, Normalcy, and the Gatecrasher Paradox.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):563-578.details
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Reverse-Engineering Risk.Angela O’Sullivan & Lilith Mace - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-26.details
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Probability, Normalcy, and the Right against Risk Imposition.Martin Smith - 2024 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 27 (3).details
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Meta-uncertainty and the proof paradoxes.Katie Steele & Mark Colyvan - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):1927-1950.details
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Corroboration.Georgi Gardiner - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2):131-148.details
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An objection to the modal account of risk.Martin Smith - 2023 - Synthese 201 (5):1-9.details
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Deepfakes, Fake Barns, and Knowledge from Videos.Taylor Matthews - 2023 - Synthese 201 (2):1-18.details
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The safe, the sensitive, and the severely tested: a unified account.Georgi Gardiner & Brian Zaharatos - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-33.details
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Epistemic anxiety and epistemic risk.Lilith Newton - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-23.details
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Probability of Guilt.Mario Günther - manuscriptdetails
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Knowledge and Legal Proof.Sarah Moss - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
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Justification, excuse, and proof beyond reasonable doubt.Hock Lai Ho - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):146-166.details
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Evidence, Risk, and Proof Paradoxes: Pessimism about the Epistemic Project.Giada Fratantonio - 2021 - International Journal of Evidence and Proof:online first.details
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Justice in epistemic gaps: The ‘proof paradox’ revisited.Lewis Ross - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):315-333.details
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Epistemic Entitlement, Epistemic Risk and Leaching.Luca Moretti & Crispin Wright - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):566-580.details
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Legal proof and statistical conjunctions.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2021-2041.details
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Reconsidering the Rule of Consideration: Probabilistic Knowledge and Legal Proof.Tim Smartt - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):303-318.details
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Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk.Georgi Gardiner - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):481-511.details
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Anti-luck epistemology and pragmatic encroachment.Duncan Pritchard - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):715-729.details
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Autonomy, Rationality, and Contemporary Bioethics.Jonathan Pugh - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Recent work on the proof paradox.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12667.details
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Against the Alleged Insufficiency of Statistical Evidence.Sam Fox Krauss - 2020 - Florida State University Law Review 47:801-825.details
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Rehabilitating Statistical Evidence.Lewis Ross - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):3-23.details
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Varieties of Risk.Philip A. Ebert, Martin Smith & Ian Durbach - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):432-455.details
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(2 other versions)Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.Guy Axtell - 2018 - Lanham, MD, USA & London, UK: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.details
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Entitlement, epistemic risk and scepticism.Luca Moretti - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):576-586.details
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Luck as Risk.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York: Routledge.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Luck and the Extended Mind.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York: Routledge.details
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Anti-luck epistemology and the Gettier problem.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):93-111.details
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(2 other versions)The Modal Account of Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):594-619.details
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Risk.Sven Ove Hansson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Metaphysics of risk and luck.Jaakko Hirvelä - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Pritchard, Luck, Risk, and a New Problem for Safety-Based Accounts of Knowledge.James Simpson - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-14.details
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Risk, Responsibility, and Their Relations.Adriana Placani & Stearns Broadhead - 2023 - In Adriana Placani & Stearns Broadhead (eds.), _Risk and Responsibility in Context_. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-28.details
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Risk and Responsibility in Context.Adriana Placani & Stearns Broadhead (eds.) - 2023 - New York: Routledge.details
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Decision theory and de minimis risk.Martin Smith - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (6):2169-2192.details
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In defence of the modal account of legal risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-16.details
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