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  1. (1 other version)Introduction to Part II: The Epistemic Consequences of Religious Diversity.Katherine Dormandy & Oliver J. Wiertz - 2019 - In Peter Jonkers & Oliver J. Wiertz (eds.), Religious Truth and Identity in an Age of Plurality. Routledge.
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  • Desiderata for Rational, Non-doxastic Faith.Carl-Johan Palmqvist - 2022 - Sophia 61 (3):499-519.
    According to an increasingly popular view known as non-doxasticism, religious faith need not include belief, but only some cognitively weaker attitude. This view comes with great promises, as it offers a way for the agnostic to partake in religion. My concern is how such a non-doxastic faith might be understood as a rational attitude. I offer three desiderata for any account of rational, non-doxastic faith. These desiderata are based on general considerations regarding epistemic rationality and on major themes from current (...)
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  • The problem of the unknown attributes.Thaddeus Robinson - 2022 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 92 (1):3-14.
    For the theist, human knowledge of God’s nature is, at best, partial, and this implies that there are characteristics of God beyond our ken which I call ‘the unknown attributes’. However, this confessed ignorance, I argue, has largely unappreciated skeptical consequences for determining the scope of God’s power. Consider some mundane future state of affairs normally considered to be within the scope of God’s power. If it lies within the scope of God’s power, then it is consistent with God’s nature, (...)
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  • A Moral Defense of Prostitution.Rob Lovering - 2021 - New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
    Is prostitution immoral? In this book, Rob Lovering argues that it is not. Offering a careful and thorough critique of the many―twenty, to be exact―arguments for prostitution's immorality, Lovering leaves no claim unchallenged. Drawing on the relevant literature along with his own creative thinking, Lovering offers a clear and reasoned moral defense of the world's oldest profession. Lovering demonstrates convincingly, on both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist grounds, that there is nothing immoral about prostitution between consenting adults. The legal implications of this (...)
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  • The multifaceted role of imagination in science and religion. A critical examination of its epistemic, creative and meaning-making functions.Ingrid Malm Lindberg - 2021 - Dissertation, Uppsala University
    The main purpose of this dissertation is to examine critically and discuss the role of imagination in science and religion, with particular emphasis on its possible epistemic, creative, and meaning-making functions. In order to answer my research questions, I apply theories and concepts from contemporary philosophy of mind on scientific and religious practices. This framework allows me to explore the mental state of imagination, not as an isolated phenomenon but, rather, as one of many mental states that co-exist and interplay (...)
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  • How to make the problem of divine hiddenness worse.Aaron Rizzieri - 2021 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 90 (1):3-17.
    I present three versions of the argument from divine hiddenness that are grounded in moral considerations regarding how a just deity would act and auxiliary commitments that theists often have. First, I argue that the problem of hiddenness is made worse if one also holds that many will suffer in the afterlife due to not achieving a proper orientation towards God and the demands of morality in this life. Second, I argue that if any version of the moral argument for (...)
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  • God, Horrors, and Our Deepest Good.Bruce Langtry - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (1):77-95.
    J.L. Schellenberg argues that since God, if God exists, possesses both full knowledge by acquaintance of horrific suffering and also infinite compassion, the occurrence of horrific suffering is metaphysically incompatible with the existence of God. In this paper I begin by raising doubts about Schellenberg’s assumptions about divine knowledge by acquaintance and infinite compassion. I then focus on Schellenberg’s claim that necessarily, if God exists and the deepest good of finite persons is unsurpassably great and can be achieved without horrific (...)
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  • Debating the Significance of Disagreement: A Review of John Pittard's Diagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment. [REVIEW]Jonathan Matheson - 2020 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 9 (7):36-44.
    Richard Feldman’s “Reasonable Religious Disagreements” launched debates about the epistemic significance of disagreement that have been a dominant point of discussion in epistemology as of late. While most of these debates have been concerned with disagreement more generally, Feldman’s original focus was religious disagreement, and John Pittard returns the focus to religious disagreement in Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment. Pittard’s book delves deeply into debates about the significance of disagreement with a foot in both epistemology and philosophy of religion. It (...)
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  • Review of James Sterba, Is a Good God Logically Possible?: Palgrave MacMillan, 2019. [REVIEW]Felipe Leon - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1671-1678.
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  • Methodological naturalism in the sciences.Sandy C. Boucher - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 88 (1):57-80.
    Creationists have long argued that evolutionary science is committed to a dogmatic metaphysics of naturalism and materialism, which is based on faith or ideology rather than evidence. The standard response to this has been to insist that science is not committed to any such metaphysical doctrine, but only to a methodological version of naturalism, according to which science may only appeal to natural entities and processes. But this whole debate presupposes that there is a clear distinction between the natural and (...)
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  • Of Providence and Puppet Shows: Divine Hiddenness as Kantian Theodicy.Tyler Paytas - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (1):56-80.
    Although the free-will reply to divine hiddenness is often associated with Kant, the argument typically presented in the literature is not the strongest Kantian response. Kant’s central claim is not that knowledge of God would preclude the possibility of transgression, but rather that it would preclude one’s viewing adherence to the moral law as a genuine sacrifice of self-interest. After explaining why the Kantian reply to hiddenness is superior to standard formulations, I argue that, despite Kant’s general skepticism about theodicy, (...)
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  • The truth, but not yet: Avoiding naïve skepticism via explicit communication of metadisciplinary aims.Jake Wright - 2019 - Teaching in Higher Education 24 (3):361-377.
    Introductory students regularly endorse naïve skepticism—unsupported or uncritical doubt about the existence and universality of truth—for a variety of reasons. Though some of the reasons for students’ skepticism can be traced back to the student—for example, a desire to avoid engaging with controversial material or a desire to avoid offense—naïve skepticism is also the result of how introductory courses are taught, deemphasizing truth to promote students’ abilities to develop basic disciplinary skills. While this strategy has a number of pedagogical benefits, (...)
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  • On the Socratic Injunction to Follow the Argument Where it Leads.Jason Marsh - 2017 - In Paul Draper & J. L. Schellenberg (eds.), Renewing Philosophy of Religion: Exploratory Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-207.
    This chapter examines a common objection to the philosophy of religion, namely, that it has not sufficiently embraced the injunction of Socrates to follow the argument where it leads. Although a general version of this charge is unfair, one emerging view in the field, which I call religious Mooreanism, nonetheless risks running contrary to the Socratic injunction. According to this view, many people can quickly, easily, and reasonably deflect all known philosophical challenges to their core religious outlooks, including arguments from (...)
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  • Resolving Religious Disagreements.Katherine Dormandy - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (1):56-83.
    Resolving religious disagreements is difficult, for beliefs about religion tend to come with strong biases against other views and the people who hold them. Evidence can help, but there is no agreed-upon policy for weighting it, and moreover bias affects the content of our evidence itself. Another complicating factor is that some biases are reliable and others unreliable. What we need is an evidence-weighting policy geared toward negotiating the effects of bias. I consider three evidence-weighting policies in the philosophy of (...)
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  • Exaltation and atrocity: why kenotic humility can’t justify divine concurrence of evil.Jill Hernandez - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 79 (5):493-506.
    ABSTRACT‘Exaltation views’ of humility are grounded on a kenotic view of humility, such that divine blessing comes proportionate to the extent to which an agent humbles herself. This article rejects exaltation views of humility which define humility kenotically, justify their arguments from a divine hiddenness perspective, and which conclude that divine concurrence with evil is justified as long as all humble believers eventually are exalted and blessed. Rather, I will contend that exaltation views misunderstand the meaning of both ‘humility’ and (...)
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  • In Defence of the Epistemological Objection to Divine Command Theory.John Danaher - 2019 - Sophia 58 (3):381-400.
    Divine command theories come in several different forms but at their core all of these theories claim that certain moral statuses exist in virtue of the fact that God has commanded them to exist. Several authors argue that this core version of the DCT is vulnerable to an epistemological objection. According to this objection, DCT is deficient because certain groups of moral agents lack epistemic access to God’s commands. But there is confusion as to the precise nature and significance of (...)
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  • Etiological information and diminishing justification.Paul Silva - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (2):1-25.
    Sometimes it’s reasonable to reduce confidence in a proposition in response to gaining etiological information. Suppose, for example, a theist learns that her theism is ‘due to’ her religious upbringing. There is a clear range of cases where it would be reasonable for her to respond by slightly decreasing her confidence in God’s existence. So long as reasonability and justification are distinct, this reasonability claim would appear consistent with the thesis that this kind of etiological information cannot, all by itself, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Humor and the Good Life in Modern Philosophy: Shaftesbury, Hamann, Kierkegaard.Lydia Amir - 2014 - Albany: State University of New York Press.
    _An exploration of philosophical and religious ideas about humor in modern philosophy and their secular implications._.
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  • Why AI Doomsayers are Like Sceptical Theists and Why it Matters.John Danaher - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (3):231-246.
    An advanced artificial intelligence could pose a significant existential risk to humanity. Several research institutes have been set-up to address those risks. And there is an increasing number of academic publications analysing and evaluating their seriousness. Nick Bostrom’s superintelligence: paths, dangers, strategies represents the apotheosis of this trend. In this article, I argue that in defending the credibility of AI risk, Bostrom makes an epistemic move that is analogous to one made by so-called sceptical theists in the debate about the (...)
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  • Divine Hiddenness and Affective Forecasting.Miles Andrews - 2014 - Res Cogitans 5 (1):102-110.
    In this paper I argue that J. L. Schellenberg’s Divine Hiddenness Argument is committed to a problematic implication that is weakened by research in cognitive psychology on affective forecasting. Schellenberg’s notion of a nonresistant nonbeliever logically implies that for any such person, it is true that she would form the proper belief in God if provided with what he calls “probabilifying” evidence for God’s existence. In light of Schellenberg’s commitment to the importance of both affective and propositional belief components for (...)
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  • Darwin and the Problem of Natural Nonbelief.Jason Marsh - 2013 - The Monist 96 (3):349-376.
    Problem one: why, if God designed the human mind, did it take so long for humans to develop theistic concepts and beliefs? Problem two: why would God use evolution to design the living world when the discovery of evolution would predictably contribute to so much nonbelief in God? Darwin was aware of such questions but failed to see their evidential significance for theism. This paper explores this significance. Problem one introduces something I call natural nonbelief, which is significant because it (...)
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  • God for All Time: From Theism to Ultimism.J. L. Schellenberg - 2016 - In Andrei A. Buckareff & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Alternative Concepts of God: Essays on the Metaphysics of the Divine. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
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  • Religious Diversity and Religious Skepticism.J. L. Schellenberg - 2015 - In Kevin Schilbrack (ed.), The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Religious Diversity. Wiley-Blackwell.
    In this paper I argue that given the present state of relevant inquiry, the facts of religious diversity justify religious skepticism. Because of the diversity of religious claims, the denial of any detailed religious proposition is equivalent to a large disjunction of alternative claims. The same is true of the denial of metaphysical naturalism. And having typically acquired no detailed understanding of the whole panoply of religious views, religious believers and metaphysical naturalists are rarely in a position to judge, of (...)
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  • Authentic faith and acknowledged risk: dissolving the problem of faith and reason.Daniel J. McKaughan - 2013 - Religious Studies 49 (1):101-124.
    One challenge to the rationality of religious commitment has it that faith is unreasonable because it involves believing on insufficient evidence. However, this challenge and influential attempts to reply depend on assumptions about what it is to have faith that are open to question. I distinguish between three conceptions of faith each of which can claim some plausible grounding in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Questions about the rationality or justification of religious commitment and the extent of compatibility with doubt look different (...)
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  • God and Evidence: Problems for Theistic Philosophers.Rob Lovering - 2013 - New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
    God and Evidence presents a new set of compelling problems for theistic philosophers. The problems pertain to three types of theistic philosopher, which Lovering defines here as 'theistic inferentialists,' 'theistic non-inferentialists,' and 'theistic fideists.' Theistic inferentialists believe that God exists, that there is inferential probabilifying evidence of God's existence, and that this evidence is discoverable not simply in principle but in practice. Theistic non-inferentialists believe that God exists, that there is non-inferential probabilifying evidence of God's existence, and that this evidence (...)
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  • God, free will, and time: the free will offense part II. [REVIEW]J. L. Schellenberg - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):1-10.
    God, free will, and time: the free will offense part II Content Type Journal Article Category Article Pages 1-10 DOI 10.1007/s11153-011-9328-z Authors J. L. Schellenberg, Mount Saint Vincent University, 166 Bedford Highway, Halifax, NS B3M2J6, Canada Journal International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Online ISSN 1572-8684 Print ISSN 0020-7047.
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  • Belief, Voluntariness and Intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):537-559.
    In this paper, I examine Alston's arguments for doxastic involuntarism. Alston fails to distinguish (i) between volitional and executional lack of control, and (ii) between compatibilist and libertarian control. As a result, he fails to notice that, if one endorses a compatibilist notion of voluntary control, the outcome is a straightforward and compelling case for doxastic voluntarism. Advocates of involuntarism have recently argued that the compatibilist case for doxastic voluntarism can be blocked by pointing out that belief is never intentional. (...)
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  • God and the Value of Free Will.Luke Teeninga - 2022 - Sophia 61 (3):643-657.
    It is standard practice to appeal to libertarian free will to explain how God’s existence might be compatible with much of the evil we see in the actual world. Libertarian free will has also been important to certain responses to the argument for atheism from divine hiddenness. But what is often neglected in appealing to libertarian free will, as others have pointed out, is an explanation of why God would create us with such free will in the first place. Laura (...)
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  • The Pre-eminent Good Argument.Alexander Bozzo - 2020 - Religious Studies 56 (4):596-610.
    According to J. L. Schellenberg, a perfectly loving God wouldn't permit the occurrence of non-resistant non-believers – that is, non-believers who are both capable of believing in and relating to God, but who fail to believe through no fault of their own. Since non-resistant non-believers exist, says Schellenberg, it follows that God doesn't. A popular response to this argument is some version or other of the greater good defence. God, it's argued, is justified in hiding himself when done for the (...)
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  • Re-evaluating the hiddenness argument from above.Kevin Vandergriff - 2019 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 85 (2):193-211.
    J. L. Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument for atheism assumes that God’s perpetual openness to a relationship with any finite person is consistent with their perpetual flourishing. However, I argue that if Aquinas-Stump’s account of the nature of love is true, then any finite person flourishes the most only if they attain the greatest degree of union among God and all relevant parties. Moreover, if Humean externalism is true, then any finite person might not have their greatest attainable degree of union among (...)
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  • Divine hiddenness and the one sheep.Travis Dumsday - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79 (1):69-86.
    Next to the problem of evil, the problem of divine hiddenness has become the most prominent argument for atheism in the current literature. The basic idea is that if God really existed, He would make sure that anyone able and willing to engage in relationship with Him would have a rationally indubitable belief in Him at all times. But as a matter of fact we see that the world includes nonresistant nonbelievers. Therefore God doesn’t exist. Here I propose a reply (...)
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  • Divine hiddenness and the opiate of the people.Travis Dumsday - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76 (2):193-207.
    The problem of divine hiddenness has become one of the most prominent arguments for atheism in the current philosophy of religion literature. Schellenberg (Divine hiddenness and human reason 1993), one of the problem’s prominent advocates, holds that the only way to prevent completely the occurrence of nonresistant nonbelief would be for God to have granted all of us a constant awareness of Him (or at least a constant availability of such awareness) from the moment we achieved the age of reason. (...)
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  • (1 other version)Philosophy of religion.Charles Taliaferro - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Divine hiddenness and the problem of no greater goods.Luke Teeninga - 2021 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 89 (2):107-123.
    John Schellenberg argues that God would never withhold the possibility of conscious personal relationship with Him from anyone for the sake of greater goods, since there simply would not be greater goods than a conscious personal relationship with God. Given that nonresistant nonbelief withholds the possibility of such relationship, this entails that God would not allow nonresistant nonbelief for the sake of greater goods. Thus, if Schellenberg is right, all greater goods responses to the hiddenness argument must fail in principle. (...)
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  • The epistemic benefits of religious disagreement.Katherine Dormandy - 2020 - Religious Studies 56 (3):390-408.
    Scientific researchers welcome disagreement as a way of furthering epistemic aims. Religious communities, by contrast, tend to regard it as a potential threat to their beliefs. But I argue that religious disagreement can help achieve religious epistemic aims. I do not argue this by comparing science and religion, however. For scientific hypotheses are ideally held with a scholarly neutrality, and my aim is to persuade those who arecommittedto religious beliefs that religious disagreement can be epistemically beneficial for them too.
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  • Divine Hiddenness and Divine Humility.Travis Dumsday - 2014 - Sophia 53 (1):51-65.
    If God exists, and if our ultimate well-being depends on having a positive relationship with Him (which requires as a first step that we believe He exists), why doesn't He make sure that we all believe in Him? Why doesn't He make His existence obvious? This traditional theological question is today much-used as an argument for atheism. In this paper I argue that the answer may have something to do with God's character, specifically God's humility.
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  • Who Must Benefit 1 f rom Divine Hiddenness?Luke Teeninga - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (3):329-345.
    Some have argued that God would not allow some person S to be the victim of an evil for the sake of some good G unless G benefits S in particular, not just someone else. Is this true and, if so, is a similar principle true regarding divine hiddenness? That is, would God remain hidden from some person S for the sake of some good G only if G benefits S? I will argue that this principle has a number of (...)
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  • Religious naturalism and its rivals.Mikael Stenmark - 2013 - Religious Studies 49 (4):529-550.
    The aim of this article is to explore where and why religious naturalism differs from its rivals, and also to consider some of the challenges religious naturalism faces. I argue that religious naturalism is best conceived as a reaction against both theists who are religious and naturalists who are atheists: the best option is taken to be a naturalist who is religious. Nevertheless, it is quite difficult to say more exactly what claims the view contains. In fact, it is argued, (...)
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  • Agnosticism I: Language, perspectives and evidence.Sylwia Wilczewska - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12666.
    The subject of agnosticism about the existence of God has emerged in many of the major conversations within analytic philosophy of religion, such as the debate on the nature of evidence for and against religious beliefs. In this article, I outline a map of the debate on agnosticism in religious epistemology—especially in relation to evidentialism—highlighting the significance of the problem of the ambiguity of evidence and connecting said problem to discussions of religious language and peer disagreement.
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  • Three Ways to Improve Religious Epistemology.J. L. Schellenberg - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81:1-18.
    Religious epistemology is widely regarded as being in a flourishing condition. It is true that some very sharp analytical work on religion has been produced by philosophers in the past few decades. But this work, for various cultural and historical reasons, has been kept within excessively narrow bounds, and the result is that the appearance of flourishing is to a considerable extent illusory. Here I discuss three important ways in which improvements to this situation might be made.
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  • God and Gratuitous Evil (Part II).Klaas J. Kraay - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):913-922.
    In contemporary analytic philosophy, the problem of evil refers to a family of arguments that attempt to show, by appeal to evil, that God does not exist. Some very important arguments in this family focus on gratuitous evil. Most participants in the relevant discussions, including theists and atheists, agree that God is able to prevent all gratuitous evil, and that God would do so. On this view, of course, the occurrence of even a single instance of gratuitous evil falsifies theism. (...)
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  • Anti-Theism and the Problem of Divine Hiddenness.Travis Dumsday - 2016 - Sophia 55 (2):179-195.
    While most discussions in natural theology focus on the existence and nature of God, recently the axiological implications of theism have been taken up by such authors as Kahane, Kraay and Dragos, Davis, McLean, Penner and Lougheed, and Penner. Rather than asking whether God exists, they ask whether God’s existence would be a good thing or a bad thing. That general question breaks down into more precise sub-questions, with a wide variety of possible positions resulting. Here, I argue that one (...)
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  • Chrześcijaństwo i problem ukrytości. Krytyka obrony z Wcielenia / Christianity and the problem of divine hiddenness: A critique of the defence from the Incarnation.Stanisław Ruczaj - 2022 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 70 (2):71-85.
    Argument z ukrytości Johna L. Schellenberga jest współcześnie jednym z najżywiej dyskutowanych argumentów za ateizmem. Rozumowanie kanadyjskiego filozofa wskazuje na problematyczność zjawiska niezawinionej niewiary w istnienie Boga przy założeniu, że doskonale kochający Bóg istnieje. W książce Ukrytość i wcielenie. Teistyczna odpowiedź na argument Johna L. Schellenberga za nieistnieniem Boga, Marek Dobrzeniecki zaproponował nowatorską obronę przed tym argumentem, wykorzystującą chrześcijańską doktrynę o wcieleniu Syna Bożego. W artykule wykazuję, że obrona z Wcielenia nie odnosi sukcesu. Błędna jest bowiem jej kluczowa teza, iż (...)
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  • Divine Hiddenness, Greater Goods, and Accommodation.Luke Teeninga - 2017 - Sophia 56 (4):589-603.
    J.L. Schellenberg argues that one reason to think that God does not exist is that there are people who fail to believe in Him through no fault of their own. If God were all loving, then He would ensure that these people had evidence to believe in Him so that they could enter into a personal relationship with Him. God would not remain ‘hidden’. But in the world, we actually do find people who fail to believe that God exists, and (...)
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  • An Examination of John Schellenberg’s Austere Ultimism:: Review of J. L. Schellenberg: 1) Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, 2005 ISBN: 978-0801443589, hb, 242pp.; 2) The Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism, 2007, ISBN: 978-0801445545, hb, 342pp.; and 3) The Will to Imagine: A Justification of Skeptical Religion, 2009, ISBN: 978-0801447808, hb, 288pp.; Ithaca: Cornell University Press. [REVIEW]Peter Forrest - 2013 - Sophia 52 (3):535-551.
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  • Incarnation and the Divine Hiddenness Debate.Hunter Brown - 2013 - Heythrop Journal 54 (2):252-260.
    This paper examines the debate that has arisen in connection with J. L. Schellenberg's work on divine hiddenness. It singles out as especially deserving of attention Paul Moser's proposal that the debate distinguish more clearly between classical theism and Hebraic theisms. This worthwhile proposal, I argue, will be unlikely to exert its full potential influence upon the debate unless certain features of Christian incarnation belief are recognized and addressed in connection with it.
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  • Précis of Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment.John Pittard - 2023 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (4):269-279.
    This paper summarizes Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment. The book’s central question is whether confident (ir)religious commitment can be rationally maintained in the face of systematic religious disagreement. Part i develops an account of the epistemic significance of disagreement and considers the implications of this account for religious belief. This part argues against the commitment of “strong conciliationists” to a rigorous form of epistemic impartiality, a commitment that underlies the strongest argument for disagreement-motivated religious skepticism. Part ii considers the implications (...)
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  • The Character Development Defense to the Argument from Evil Is Logically Inconsistent.Randall S. Firestone - 2018 - Open Journal of Philosophy 8 (5):444-465.
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