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  1. Making Up Our Minds: Imaginative Deconstruction in MathArt, 1920 – Present.Shanna Dobson & Chris Fields - manuscript
    The cognitive sciences tell us that the self is a construct. The visual arts illustrate this fact. Mathematics give it full expression, abstracting the self to a Grothendieck site. This self is a haecceity, an ephemeral this-ness and now-ness. We make up our minds and our histories. That our acts are public, that they communicate effectively, becomes a dialetheic paradox, a deep paradox for our times.
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  • Situating Mental Depth.Robert W. Clowes & Gloria Andrada - 2022 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 13 (1):1-30.
    Is the mind flat? Chater (2018) has recently argued that it is and that, contrary to traditional psychology and standard folk image, depth of mind is just an illusory confabulation. In this paper, we argue that while there is a kernel of something correct in Chater’s thesis, this does not in itself add up to a critique of mental depth per se. We use Chater’s ideas as a springboard for creating a new understanding of mental depth which builds upon findings (...)
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  • Neo-Ryleanism About Self-Understanding.Yair Levy - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The paper aims to defend the standard view of what it dubs ‘Self-understanding' — i.e., (very roughly) our knowledge of why we behave as we do — from the threat posed to it by Neo-Ryleanism. While the standard, entrenched view regards self-understanding as special in kind and status, the Neo-Rylean agrees with Gilbert Ryle that our method of understanding ourselves is much the same as our method of understanding others, involving self-interpretation on the basis of the available evidence. Neo-Ryleanism has (...)
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  • The Pre-reflective Situational Self.Robert W. Clowes & Klaus Gärtner - 2018 - Topoi 39 (3):623-637.
    It is often held that to have a conscious experience presupposes having some form of implicit self-awareness. The most dominant phenomenological view usually claims that we essentially perceive experiences as our own. This is the so called “mineness” character, or dimension of experience. According to this view, mineness is not only essential to conscious experience, it also grounds the idea that pre-reflective self-awareness constitutes a minimal self. In this paper, we show that there are reasons to doubt this constituting role (...)
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  • Twin Memory.Syed Ismyl Mahmood Rizvi - 2016 - International Journal of Mind, Brain and Cognition 7 (1-2):147-163.
    In this article, I examine a new concept of “Twin Memory’ which has emerged in memory classification research of conscious and unconscious memory representations. It is to analyse the presence of twin memory among the various memory systems, and also to provide a platform for the twin memory “anatomy” in the field of cognitive science, neuropsychology and neuroscience.
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  • A Unified Cognitive Model of Visual Filling-In Based on an Emergic Network Architecture.David Pierre Leibovitz - 2013 - Dissertation, Carleton University
    The Emergic Cognitive Model (ECM) is a unified computational model of visual filling-in based on the Emergic Network architecture. The Emergic Network was designed to help realize systems undergoing continuous change. In this thesis, eight different filling-in phenomena are demonstrated under a regime of continuous eye movement (and under static eye conditions as well). -/- ECM indirectly demonstrates the power of unification inherent with Emergic Networks when cognition is decomposed according to finer-grained functions supporting change. These can interact to raise (...)
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  • Explaining what?Elizabeth Irvine - unknown
    The Hard Problem is surrounded by a vast literature, to which it is increasingly hard to contribute to in any meaningful way. Accordingly, the strategy here is not to offer any new metaphysical or ‘in principle’ arguments in favour of the success of materialism, but to assume a Type Q(uinian) approach and look to contemporary consciousness science to see how the concept of consciousness fares there, and what kind of explanations we can hope to offer of it. It is suggested (...)
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  • Vision, Action, and Make‐Perceive.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):457-497.
    In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements—an (...)
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  • Prediction and unconscious attention operate synergistically to facilitate stimulus processing: An fMRI study.Guangming Ran, Xu Chen, Xiaojun Cao & Qi Zhang - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 44:41-50.
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  • Attentional Capture by Irrelevant Transients Leads to Perceptual Errors in a Competitive Change Detection Task.Daniel Schneider, Christian Beste & Edmund Wascher - 2012 - Frontiers in Psychology 3.
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  • Does Perceptual Consciousness Overflow Cognitive Access? The Challenge from Probabilistic, Hierarchical Processes.Steven Gross & Jonathan Flombaum - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (3):358-391.
    Does perceptual consciousness require cognitive access? Ned Block argues that it does not. Central to his case are visual memory experiments that employ post-stimulus cueing—in particular, Sperling's classic partial report studies, change-detection work by Lamme and colleagues, and a recent paper by Bronfman and colleagues that exploits our perception of ‘gist’ properties. We argue contra Block that these experiments do not support his claim. Our reinterpretations differ from previous critics' in challenging as well a longstanding and common view of visual (...)
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  • Psychophysical “blinding” methods reveal a functional hierarchy of unconscious visual processing.Bruno G. Breitmeyer - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 35:234-250.
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  • Anger superiority effect for change detection and change blindness.Pessi Lyyra, Jari K. Hietanen & Piia Astikainen - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 30:1-12.
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  • Testing the implicit processing hypothesis of precognitive dream experience.Milan Valášek, Caroline Watt, Jenny Hutton, Rebecca Neill, Rachel Nuttall & Grace Renwick - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 28:113-125.
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  • The change probability effect: Incidental learning, adaptability, and shared visual working memory resources.Amanda E. van Lamsweerde & Melissa R. Beck - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1676-1689.
    Statistical properties in the visual environment can be used to improve performance on visual working memory tasks. The current study examined the ability to incidentally learn that a change is more likely to occur to a particular feature dimension and use this information to improve change detection performance for that dimension . Participants completed a change detection task in which one change type was more probable than others. Change probability effects were found for color and shape changes, but not location (...)
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  • The thalamic dynamic core theory of conscious experience.Lawrence M. Ward - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):464-486.
    I propose that primary conscious awareness arises from synchronized activity in dendrites of neurons in dorsal thalamic nuclei, mediated particularly by inhibitory interactions with thalamic reticular neurons. In support, I offer four evidential pillars: consciousness is restricted to the results of cortical computations; thalamus is the common locus of action of brain injury in vegetative state and of general anesthetics; the anatomy and physiology of the thalamus imply a central role in consciousness; neural synchronization is a neural correlate of consciousness.
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  • Priming effects under correct change detection and change blindness.Corrado Caudek & Fulvio Domini - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):290-305.
    In three experiments, we investigated the priming effects induced by an image change on a successive animate/inanimate decision task. We studied both perceptual and conceptual priming effects, under correct change detection and change blindness . Under correct change detection, we found larger positive priming effects on congruent trials for probes representing animate entities than for probes representing artifactual objects. Under CB, we found performance impairment relative to a “no-change” baseline condition. This inhibition effect induced by CB was modulated by the (...)
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  • Visual working memory capacity: from psychophysics and neurobiology to individual differences.Steven J. Luck & Edward K. Vogel - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (8):391-400.
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  • (1 other version)Magic at the marketplace: Choice blindness for the taste of jam and the smell of tea.Lars Hall, Petter Johansson, Betty Tärning, Sverker Sikström & Thérèse Deutgen - 2010 - Cognition 117 (1):54-61.
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  • Towards a true neural stance on consciousness.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (11):494-501.
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  • Non-local Consciousness A Concept Based on Scientific Research on Near-Death Experiences During Cardiac Arrest.Pim van Lommel - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (1-2):1-2.
    In this article a concept of non-local consciousness will be described, based on recent scientific research on near-death experiences . Since the publication of several prospective studies on NDEs in survivors of cardiac arrest, with strikingly similar results and conclusions, the phenomenon of the NDE can no longer be scientifically ignored. In the last thirty years several theories have been proposed to explain an NDE. The challenge to find a common explanation for the cause and content of an NDE is (...)
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  • Old Problems with New Measures in the Science of Consciousness.Elizabeth Irvine - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):627-648.
    Introspective and phenomenological methods are once again being used to support the use of subjective reports, rather than objective behavioural measures, to investigate and measure consciousness. Objective measures are often seen as useful ways of investigating the range of capacities subjects have in responding to phenomena, but are fraught with the interpretive problems of how to link behavioural capacities with consciousness. Instead, gathering subjective reports is seen as a more direct way of assessing the contents of consciousness. This article explores (...)
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  • Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access.Ned Block - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (12):567-575.
    One of the most important issues concerning the foundations ofconscious perception centerson thequestion of whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse. The overflow argument uses a form of ‘iconic memory’ toarguethatperceptual consciousnessisricher (i.e.,has a higher capacity) than cognitive access: when observing a complex scene we are conscious of more than we can report or think about. Recently, the overflow argumenthas been challenged both empirically and conceptually. This paper reviews the controversy, arguing that proponents of sparse perception are committed to the (...)
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  • Metacognitive judgment and denial of deficit: Evidence from frontotemporal dementia.Sandra E. Black - unknown
    Patients suffering from the behavioral variant of Frontotemporal Dementia (FTD-b) often exaggerate their abilities. Are those errors in judgment limited to domains in which patients under-perform, or do FTD-b patients overestimate their abilities in other domains? Is overconfidence in FTD-b patients domain-specific or domain-general? To address this question, we asked patients at early stages of FTD-b to judge their performance in two domains (attention, perception) in which they exhibit relatively spared abilities. In both domains, FTD-b patients overestimated their performance relative (...)
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  • Representing Metarepresentations: Is there Theory of Mind-specific cognition?Marc Egeth - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):244-254.
    What cognitive mechanisms do people use to represent other people's mental states? Do children who have difficulty processing other people's higher-level mental states such as beliefs also have difficulty processing higher-level non-mental representations such as meta-photographs? See the preprint here or find the final version in print or on the journal website.
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  • (1 other version)Keeping Track of Invisible Individuals While Exploring a Spatial Layout with Partial Cues: Location-based and Deictic Direction-based Strategies.Nicolas Bullot - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):15-46.
    In contrast to Constructivist Views, which construe perceptual cognition as an essentially reconstructive process, this article recommends the Deictic View, which grounds perception in perceptual-demonstrative reference and the use of deictic tracking strategies for acquiring and updating knowledge about individuals. The view raises the problem of how sensory-motor tracking connects to epistemic and integrated forms of tracking. To study the strategies used to solve this problem, we report a study of the ability to track distal individuals when only their directions (...)
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  • Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception.Robert Briscoe - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):423-460.
    Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the "two visual systems" hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in conscious visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver's bodily actions. In this paper, I review and assess three main sources (...)
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  • Change blindness, representations, and consciousness: Reply to Noe.Daniel J. Simons & Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (5):219.
    Our recent opinion article [1] examined what change blindness can and cannot tell us about visual representations. Among other things, we argued that change blindness can tell us a lot about how visual representations can be used, but little about their extent. We and others found the ‘sparse representations’ view appealing (and still do), and initially made the overly strong claim that change blindness supports the conclusion of sparse representations [2,3]. We wrote our article because change blindness continues to be (...)
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  • Metacognitive errors in change detection: Missing the gap between lab and life.Daniel Smilek, John D. Eastwood, Michael G. Reynolds & Alan Kingstone - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (1):52-57.
    Studies of change detection suggest that people tend to overestimate their ability to detect visual changes. In a recent laboratory study of change detection and human intention, Beck et al., found that individuals have an inadequate understanding that intention can improve change detection performance and that its importance increases with scene complexity. We note that these findings may be specific to unfamiliar situations such as those generated routinely in studies of change detection. In two questionnaire studies, we demonstrate that when (...)
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  • Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
    How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their (...)
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  • Recognition and the perception–cognition divide.Greyson Abid - 2021 - Mind and Language 37 (5):770-789.
    Recent discussions have fixated on the distinction between perception and cognition. How should recognition be understood in light of this distinction? The relevant sense of recognition involves a sensitivity to particulars from one's past. Recognizing the face of a familiar friend is one instance of this phenomenon, as is recognizing an object or place that one has viewed before. In this article, I argue that recognition is an interface capacity that straddles the border between perception and cognition.
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  • Generality and content-specificity in the study of the neural correlates of perceptual consciousness.Tomas Marvan - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (2).
    The present paper was written as a contribution to ongoing methodological debates within the NCC project. We focus on the neural correlates of conscious perceptual episodes. Our claim is that the NCC notion, as applied to conscious perceptual episodes, needs to be reconceptualized. It mixes together the processing related to the perceived contents and the neural substrate of consciousness proper, i.e. mechanisms making the perceptual contents conscious. We thus propose that the perceptual NCC be divided into two constitutive subnotions. The (...)
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  • Contour Integration in Dynamic Scenes: Impaired Detection Performance in Extended Presentations.Axel Grzymisch, Cathleen Grimsen & Udo A. Ernst - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • Confabulation does not undermine introspection for propositional attitudes.Adam J. Andreotta - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4851-4872.
    According to some, such as Carruthers (2009, 2010, 2011, 2015), the confabulation data (experimental data showing subjects making false psychological self-ascriptions) undermine the view that we can know our propositional attitudes by introspection. He believes that these data favour his interpretive sensory-access (ISA) theory—the view that self-knowledge of our propositional attitudes always involves self-interpretation of our sensations, behaviour, or situational cues. This paper will review some of the confabulation data and conclude that the presence and pattern of these data do (...)
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  • Gorillas in the missed (but not the unseen): Reevaluating the evidence for attention being necessary for consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (3):299-316.
    The idea that attention is necessary for consciousness (the “Necessity Thesis”) is frequently advocated by philosophers and psychologists alike. Experiments involving inattentional and change blindness are thought to support the Necessity Thesis, but they do so only if subjects failing to notice the target stimulus are also not conscious of it. This article uses commonsense phenomenological observations supplemented with empirical data to argue that some subjects failing to notice the target stimulus nonetheless experience its color. Since subjects not noticing the (...)
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  • Change Blindness Is Influenced by Both Contrast Energy and Subjective Importance within Local Regions of the Image.Wietske Zuiderbaan, Jonathan van Leeuwen & Serge O. Dumoulin - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • Virtualist representation.Robert W. Clowes & Ron Chrisley - 2012 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (2):503-522.
    This paper seeks to identify, clarify, and perhaps rehabilitate the virtual reality metaphor as applied to the goal of understanding consciousness. Some proponents of the metaphor apply it in a way that implies a representational view of experience of a particular, extreme form that is indirect, internal and inactive (what we call “presentational virtualism”). In opposition to this is an application of the metaphor that eschews representation, instead preferring to view experience as direct, external and enactive (“enactive virtualism”). This paper (...)
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  • Invisibility and interpretation.Michael H. Herzog, Frouke Hermens & Haluk Öğmen - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • Individual differences in change blindness.Katharina Verena Bergmann - unknown
    The present work shows the existence of systematic individual differences in change blindness. It can be concluded that the sensitivity for changes is a trait. That is, persons differ in their ability to detect changes, independent from the situation or the measurement method. Moreover, there are two explanations for individual differences in change blindness: a) capacity differences in visual selective attention that may be influenced by top-down activated attention helping to focus attention onto relevant stimuli b) differences in working memory (...)
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  • Solely Generic Phenomenology.Ned Block - 2015 - Open MIND 2015.
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  • Experience of and in Time.Ian Phillips - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (2):131-144.
    How must experience of time be structured in time? In particular, does the following principle, which I will call inheritance, hold: for any temporal property apparently presented in perceptual experience, experience itself has that same temporal property. For instance, if I hear Paul McCartney singing ‘Hey Jude’, must my auditory experience of the ‘Hey’ itself precede my auditory experience of the ‘Jude’, or can the temporal order of these experiences come apart from the order the words are experienced as having? (...)
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  • Measures of Consciousness.Elizabeth Irvine - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (3):285-297.
    Consciousness is now a hot topic in both philosophy and the cognitive sciences, yet there is much controversy over how to measure it. First, it is not clear whether biased subjective reports should be taken as adequate for measuring consciousness, or if more objective measures are required. Ways to benefit from the advantages of both these measures in the form of ‘Type 2’ metacognitive measures are under development, but face criticism. Research into neurophysiological measures of consciousness is potentially very valuable, (...)
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  • Two Kinds of Time-Consciousness and Three Kinds of Content.Jan Almäng - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (1):61-80.
    This paper explores the distinction between perceiving an object as extended in time, and experiencing a sequence of perceptions. I argue that this distinction cannot be adequately described by any present theory of time-consciousness and that in order to solve the puzzle, we need to consider perceptual content as having three distinct constituents: Explicit content, which has a particular phenomenal character, modal content, or the kind of content that is contributed by the psychological mode, and implicit content, which lacks phenomenal (...)
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  • The cognitive and neural correlates of “tactile consciousness”: A multisensory perspective.Alberto Gallace & Charles Spence - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):370-407.
    People’s awareness of tactile stimuli has been investigated in far less detail than their awareness of stimuli in other sensory modalities. In an attempt to fill this gap, we provide an overview of studies that are pertinent to the topic of tactile consciousness. We discuss the results of research that has investigated phenomena such as “change blindness”, phantom limb sensations, and numerosity judgments in tactile perception, together with the results obtained from the study of patients affected by deficits that can (...)
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  • Is a pre-change object representation weakened under correct detection of a change?☆.Yei-Yu Yeh & Cheng-Ta Yang - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):91-102.
    We investigated whether a pre-change representation is inhibited or weakened under correct change detection. Two arrays of six objects were rapidly presented for change detection in three experiments. After detection, the perceptual identification of degraded stimuli was tested in Experiments 1 and 2. The weakening of a pre-change representation was not observed under correct detection. The repetition priming effect was observed for a pre-change object and the magnitude was equivalent to the effect for a post-change object. Under change blindness, repetition (...)
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  • On the applications of change blindness.Ronald A. Rensink - 2008 - Psychologia 51:100-106.
    An overview is presented of the ways that change blindness has been applied to the study of various issues in perception and cognition. Topics include mechanisms of change perception, allocation of attention, nonconscious perception, and cognitive beliefs. Recent work using change blindness to investigate these topics is surveyed, along with a brief discussion of some of the ways that these approaches may further develop over the next few years.
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  • The Modeling and Control of Visual Perception.Ronald A. Rensink - 2007 - In Wayne D. Gray (ed.), Integrated Models of Cognitive Systems. Oxford University Press. pp. 132-148.
    Recent developments in vision science have resulted in several major changes in our understanding of human visual perception. For example, attention no longer appears necessary for "visual intelligence"--a large amount of sophisticated processing can be done without it. Scene perception no longer appears to involve static, general-purpose descriptions, but instead may involve dynamic representations whose content depends on the individual and the task. And vision itself no longer appears to be limited to the production of a conscious "picture"--it may also (...)
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  • Concepts and definitions of consciousness.David Rosenthal - 2009 - In P W. Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness: A - L. Elsevier.
    in Encyclopedia of Consciousness, ed. William P. Banks, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming in 2009.
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  • Evaluating the explanatory power of the Conscious Turing Machine.Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup, Jakob Stenseke & Morten S. Overgaard - 2024 - Consciousness and Cognition 124 (C):103736.
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