- What is a Reason to Act?Kieran Setiya - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235.details
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Reply to Bratman and Smith.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):531-540.details
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Explaining action.Kieran Setiya - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):339-393.details
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Against internalism.Kieran Setiya - 2004 - Noûs 38 (2):266–298.details
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Moral uncertainty and fetishistic motivation.Andrew Sepielli - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2951-2968.details
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Moral Seriousness: Socratic Virtue as a Way of Life.D. Seiple - 2020 - Metaphilosophy 51 (5):727-746.details
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Religious language.Michael Scott - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (6):505-515.details
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Weighting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Noûs 41 (1):110–132.details
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The scope of instrumental reason.Mark Schroeder - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):337–364.details
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The hypothetical imperative?Mark Schroeder - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):357 – 372.details
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The Difference Between Moral and Rational “Oughts”: An Expressivist Account.Peter Schulte - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):159-174.details
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Reflective equilibrium and antitheory.François Schroeter - 2004 - Noûs 38 (1):110–134.details
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Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics 1 : Realism and Constructivism in a Kantian Context.Karl Schafer - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (10):690-701.details
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Moral responsibility and tourette syndrome.Timothy Schroeder - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):106–123.details
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Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling, by Neil Sinhababu.Karl Schafer - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):919-928.details
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Direct vs. Indirect Moral Enhancement.G. Owen Schaefer - 2015 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 25 (3):261-289.details
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Desire.Tim Schroeder - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 (6):631-639.details
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Christian Wolff über motivierende Gründe und handlungsrelevante Irrtümer.Sonja Schierbaum - 2022 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 104 (1):131-163.details
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Being Realistic About Reasons, by T.M. Scanlon: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. x + 132, US$35. [REVIEW]Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):195-198.details
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Being Realistic About Reasons, by T.M. Scanlon: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. x + 132, US$35. [REVIEW]Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):195-198.details
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A slim semantics for thin moral terms?Laura Schroeter & Francois Schroeter - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):191 – 207.details
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Voodoo dolls and angry lions: how emotions explain arational actions.Andrea Scarantino & Michael Nielsen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2975-2998.details
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Minds and morals.Sarah Sawyer - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):393-408.details
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What is Moral Reasoning?Leland F. Saunders - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (1):1-20.details
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Social Intuitionism and the Psychology of Moral Reasoning.Hanno Sauer - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (10):708-721.details
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Reason and Emotion, Not Reason or Emotion in Moral Judgment.Leland F. Saunders - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations (3):1-16.details
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Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment?Hanno Sauer - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.details
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No excuses for moral realism.Hanno Sauer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):553-578.details
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Semantic blindness and error theorizing for the ambiguity theory of ‘knows’.Mark Satta - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):275-284.details
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Modeling intentional agency: a neo-Gricean framework.Matti Sarkia - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7003-7030.details
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Folk Platitudes as the Explananda of Philosophical Metaethics: Are They Accurate? And Do They Help or Hinder Inquiry?Hagop Sarkissian - 2017 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3):565-575.details
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The Structure of Unpleasantness.Abraham Sapién - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):805-830.details
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A Frege‐Geach Style Objection to Cognitivist Judgment Internalism.Thorsten Sander - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (3):391-408.details
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Stakeholder Participation as a Means to Produce Morally Justified Environmental Decisions.Lars Samuelsson & Lucy Rist - 2016 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 19 (1):76-90.details
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Moral laws and moral worth.Elliot Salinger - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (7):2347-2360.details
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Aiming at the good.Amir Saemi - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):197-219.details
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The disunity of moral judgment: Evidence and implications.David Sackris & Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 1:1-20.details
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A Dilemma for De Dicto Halakhic Motivation: Why Mitzvot Don’t Require Intention.Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - 2022 - Journal of Analytic Theology 10:76-97.details
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Moral philosophy and moral psychology in mencius.James A. Ryan - 1998 - Asian Philosophy 8 (1):47 – 64.details
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IIA, rationality, and the individuation of options.Tina Rulli & Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):205-221.details
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So why can’t you intend to drink the toxin?Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):294-311.details
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Normatively Enriched Moral Meta‐Semantics.Michael Rubin - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):386-410.details
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The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):802-831.details
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The intelligibility of moral intransigence: A dilemma for cognitivism about moral judgment.Richard Rowland - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):266-275.details
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Mythic religious naturalism.William A. Rottschaefer - 2007 - Zygon 42 (2):369-408.details
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Sensibility theory and conservative complancency.Peter W. Ross & Dale Turner - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):544–555.details
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Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay , Ethical Naturalism. Current Debates, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 270 pp., €50.00 , ISBN 9780521192422. [REVIEW]Mauro Rossi - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (2):257-264.details
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Patients with ventromedial frontal damage have moral beliefs.Adina Roskies - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):617 – 627.details
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Platitudes against paradox.Sven Rosenkranz & Arash Sarkohi - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (3):319 - 341.details
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Platitudes against Paradox.Sven Rosenkranz & Arash Sarkohi - 2007 - Erkenntnis 65 (3):319-341.details
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