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The world as I found it. A subjectivist metaphysics of the mental.Giovanni Merlo - 2015 - Dissertation, Universitat de Barcelonadetails
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Fostering Liars.Paul M. Pietroski - 2020 - Topoi 40 (1):5-25.details
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Swahili conditional constructions in embodied Frames of Reference: Modeling semantics, pragmatics, and context-sensitivity in UML mental spaces.Roderick Fish - 2020 - Dissertation, Trinity Western Universitydetails
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Concepts, Belief, and Perception.Alex Byrne - 2020 - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schroder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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El conocimiento como una actividad colectiva.Angeles Eraña & Axel Barceló - 2016 - Tópicos 51 (51):9-35.details
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Exact Semantics for Indicative Conditionals.Hüseyin Güngör - 2017 - Dissertation, Bogazici Universitydetails
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Cut-off points for the rational believer.Lina Maria Lissia - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-19.details
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Context, Cognition and Conditionals.Chi-Hé Elder - 2019 - Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.details
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Ned Block “El Funcionalismo”.Joel Lorenzatti - 2018 - Cuadernos Filosóficos / Segunda Época 12:135--149.details
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Reasons and Normativity.Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2019 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
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Objectivity and Perspectival Content.Max Kölbel - 2019 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):137-159.details
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The Propositional Benacerraf Problem.Jesse Fitts - 2022 - In Chris Tillman & Adam Murray (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge.details
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The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience.Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):727-766.details
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Situations, alternatives, and the semantics of ‘cases’.Friederike Moltmann - 2019 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (1):1-41.details
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Communication and content.Prashant Parikh - 2019 - Berlin, Germany: Language Science Press.details
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Perspectivism.Jeremy Goodman & Harvey Lederman - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):623-648.details
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Minimal Rationality and the Web of Questions.Daniel Hoek - forthcoming - In Dirk Kindermann, Peter van Elswyk, Andy Egan & Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini (eds.), Unstructured Content. Oxford University Press.details
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Belief’s minimal rationality.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3263-3282.details
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A solution to the many attitudes problem.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2789-2813.details
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Lying and knowing.Ben Holguín - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5351-5371.details
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Extracting fictional truth from unreliable sources.Emar Maier & Merel Semeijn - 2021 - In Emar Maier & Andreas Stokke (eds.), The Language of Fiction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Attitudes We Can Have.Daniel Drucker - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):591-642.details
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Epistemic logic without closure.Stephan Leuenberger & Martin Smith - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4751-4774.details
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Veritism refuted? Understanding, idealization, and the facts.Tamer Nawar - 2021 - Synthese 198 (5):4295-4313.details
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Knowledge-first believing the unknowable.Simon Wimmer - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3855-3871.details
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El nominalisme en metafísica.Gonzalo Rodríguez-Pereyra - 2014 - Quaderns de Filosofia 1 (1).details
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Mistakes About Conventions and Meanings.Cosmo Grant - 2019 - Topoi 40 (1):71-85.details
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Presuppositions, Attitudes, and Why They Matter.Caleb Perl - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):363-381.details
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The Lump Sum: A Theory of Modal Parts.Meg Wallace - 2019 - Philosophical Papers 48 (3):403-435.details
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Semantic Indecision.Michael Caie - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):108-143.details
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Defending truth values for indicative conditionals.Kelly Weirich - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1635-1657.details
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Implicit bias.Michael Brownstein - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Interpersonal comparisons with preferences and desires.Jacob Barrett - 2019 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 18 (3):219-241.details
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Talking about worlds.Matthew Mandelkern - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):298-325.details
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Perception, nonconceptual content, and immunity to error through misidentification.Kristina Musholt & Arnon Cahen - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (7):703-723.details
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‘The Construction of Logical Space’, by Rayo, Agustín: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. xix + 220, £35 (hardback). [REVIEW]Tom Donaldson - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):605-608.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Imaginary Foundations.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.details
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Probability and nonclassical logic.Robert Williams - 2016 - In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.details
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The Tenseless Theory of Time and the Moodless Theory of Modality.Bradford Skow - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):506-524.details
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Once you think you’re wrong, you must be right: new versions of the preface paradox.John N. Williams - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1801-1825.details
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Credence as doxastic tendency.Dominik Kauss - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4495-4518.details
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Hyperintensional semantics: a Fregean approach.Mattias Skipper & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3535-3558.details
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Two-Dimensional Paradox.Giorgio Sbardolini - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):605-617.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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Affective Experience, Desire, and Reasons for Action.Declan Smithies & Jeremy Weiss - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (1):27-54.details
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