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Do pragmatic arguments show too much?Martin Peterson - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (2):165-172.details
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Three conceptions of explaining how possibly—and one reductive account.Johannes Persson - 2009 - In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 275--286.details
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Causation, Probability, and the Continuity Bind.Anthony F. Peressini - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (3):881-909.details
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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
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Rescuing Reflection.Ilho Park - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (4):473-489.details
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A solution to a problem for bayesian confirmation theory.Richard Otte - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):764-769.details
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Bas van Fraassen's Philosophy of Science and His Epistemic Voluntarism.Kathleen Okruhlik - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (9):653-661.details
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Is believing at will 'conceptually impossible'?Nikolaj Nottelman - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (2):105-124.details
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Speed-Optimal Induction and Dynamic Coherence.Michael Nielsen & Eric Wofsey - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (2):439-455.details
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A New Argument for Kolomogorov Conditionalization.Michael Nielsen - 2021 - Review of Symbolic Logic 14 (4):1-16.details
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How the twins do it: STR and the clock paradox.G. Nerlich - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):21-29.details
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Epistemic values and the value of learning.Wayne C. Myrvold - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):547-568.details
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Global Constraints on Imprecise Credences: Solving Reflection Violations, Belief Inertia, and Other Puzzles.Sarah Moss - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):620-638.details
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Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):665-683.details
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Sleeping beauty and the forgetful bayesian.Bradley Monton - 2002 - Analysis 62 (1):47–53.details
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Tough enough? Robust satisficing as a decision norm for long-term policy analysis.Andreas L. Mogensen & David Thorstad - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-26.details
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Rational updating at the crossroads.Silvia Milano & Andrés Perea - 2024 - Economics and Philosophy 40 (1):190-211.details
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Nonrational Belief Paradoxes as Byzantine Failures.Ryan Miller - 2022 - Logos and Episteme 13 (4):343-358.details
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Bayesian Beauty.Silvia Milano - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):657-676.details
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Sleeping beauty and the dynamics of de se beliefs.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):245-269.details
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Perspectives on Self-Deception.Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.) - 1988 - University of California Press.details
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Re presenting vague opinion.Daniel J. McKaughan & John M. Drake - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (2):341-344.details
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Memory and epistemic conservatism.Matthew McGrath - 2007 - Synthese 157 (1):1-24.details
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Regression to the Mean and Judy Benjamin.Randall G. McCutcheon - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1343-1355.details
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Why we Believe.Thalos Mariam - 1999 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 30 (2):317-339.details
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Reflective coherence and Newcomb problems: A simple solution.Gary Malinas - 1993 - Theory and Decision 35 (2):151-166.details
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XIII—Dutch Book and Accuracy Theorems.Anna Mahtani - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (3):309-327.details
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Dutch Books, Coherence, and Logical Consistency.Anna Mahtani - 2015 - Noûs 49 (3):522-537.details
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Diachronic Dutch Book Arguments.Anna Mahtani - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):443-450.details
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Diachronic rationality.Patrick Maher - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (1):120-141.details
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Deference, respect and intensionality.Anna Mahtani - 2016 - Philosophical Studies:1-21.details
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Basic‐Know And Super‐Know.Anna Mahtani - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):375-391.details
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Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning.Hanti Lin & Kevin Kelly - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):957-981.details
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Credence and self-location.Peter J. Lewis - 2010 - Synthese 175 (3):369-382.details
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Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):342-370.details
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Accuracy, Deference, and Chance.Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (1):43-87.details
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A Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Credences.Benjamin Lennertz - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.details
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People with Common Priors Can Agree to Disagree.Harvey Lederman - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):11-45.details
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“I'm onto Something!” Learning about the World by Learning What I Think about It.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2015 - Analytic Philosophy 56 (4):267-297.details
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Do chances receive equal treatment under the laws? Or: Must chances be probabilities?Marc Lange - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):383-403.details
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The two antirealisms of Bas van Fraassen.Andre Kukla - 1995 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 26 (3):431-454.details
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On a Moorean solution to instability puzzles.Frederick W. Kroon - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (4):455 – 461.details
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The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.details
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Doxastic paradoxes without self-reference.Robert C. Koons - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):168 – 177.details
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Radically Insensitive Theists.Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini - 2019 - Religious Studies 55 (2):169-188.details
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Sleeping Beauty and shifted Jeffrey conditionalization.Namjoong Kim - 2009 - Synthese 168 (2):295-312.details
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Avoiding certain frustration, reflection, and the cable guy paradox.Brian Kierland, Bradley Monton & Samuel Ruhmkorff - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):317 - 333.details
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Modelling vagueness: what can we ignore?Rosanna Keefe - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (3):453-470.details
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