In this paper we provide a detailed proof-theoretical analysis of a natural deduction system for classical propositional logic that (i) represents classical proofs in a more natural way than standard Gentzen-style natural deduction, (ii) admits of a simple normalization procedure such that normal proofs enjoy the Weak Subformula Property, (iii) provides the means to prove a Non-contamination Property of normal proofs that is not satisfied by normal proofs in the Gentzen tradition and is useful for applications, especially in formal argumentation, (...) (iv) naturally leads to defining a notion of depth of a proof, to the effect that, for every fixed natural k, normal k-depth deducibility is a tractable problem and converges to classical deducibility as k tends to infinity. (shrink)

Two common forms of natural deduction proof systems are found in the Gentzen–Prawitz and Jaśkowski–Fitch systems. In this paper, I provide translations between proofs in these systems, pointing out the ways in which the translations highlight the structural rules implicit in the systems. These translations work for classical, intuitionistic, and minimal logic. I then provide translations for classical S4 proofs.

How robust is a contraction-free approach to the semantic paradoxes? This paper aims to show some limitations with the approach based on multiplicative rules by presenting and discussing the significance of a revenge paradox using a predicate representing an alethic modality defined with infinitary rules.

This work contributes to the theory of judgement aggregation by discussing a number of significant non-classical logics. After adapting the standard framework of judgement aggregation to cope with non-classical logics, we discuss in particular results for the case of Intuitionistic Logic, the Lambek calculus, Linear Logic and Relevant Logics. The motivation for studying judgement aggregation in non-classical logics is that they offer a number of modelling choices to represent agents’ reasoning in aggregation problems. By studying judgement aggregation in logics that (...) are weaker than classical logic, we investigate whether some well-known impossibility results, that were tailored for classical logic, still apply to those weak systems. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

A comparison is given between two conditions used to define logical constants: Belnap's uniqueness and Hacking's deducibility of identicals. It is shown that, in spite of some surface similarities, there is a deep difference between them. On the one hand, deducibility of identicals turns out to be a weaker and less demanding condition than uniqueness. On the other hand, deducibility of identicals is shown to be more faithful to the inferentialist perspective, permitting definition of genuinely proof-theoretical concepts. This kind of (...) analysis is driven by exploiting the Curry–Howard correspondence. In particular, deducibility of identicals is shown to correspond to the computational property of eta expansion, which is essential in the characterization of propositional identity. (shrink)

Using labelled formulae, a cut-free sequent calculus for intuitionistic propositional logic is presented, together with an easy cut-admissibility proof; both extend to cover, in a uniform fashion, all intermediate logics characterised by frames satisfying conditions expressible by one or more geometric implications. Each of these logics is embedded by the Gödel–McKinsey–Tarski translation into an extension of S4. Faithfulness of the embedding is proved in a simple and general way by constructive proof-theoretic methods, without appeal to semantics other than in the (...) explanation of the rules. (shrink)

Tarski's Undefinability of Truth Theorem comes in two versions: that no consistent theory which interprets Robinson's Arithmetic (Q) can prove all instances of the T-Scheme and hence define truth; and that no such theory, if sound, can even express truth. In this note, I prove corresponding limitative results for validity. While Peano Arithmetic already has the resources to define a predicate expressing logical validity, as Jeff Ketland has recently pointed out (2012, Validity as a primitive. Analysis 72: 421-30), no theory (...) which interprets Q closed under the standard structural rules can define nor express validity, on pain of triviality. The results put pressure on the widespread view that there is an asymmetry between truth and validity, viz. that while the former cannot be defined within the language, the latter can. I argue that Vann McGee's and Hartry Field's arguments for the asymmetry view are problematic. (shrink)

Argumentation mining aims to automatically detect, classify and structure argumentation in text. Therefore, argumentation mining is an important part of a complete argumentation analyisis, i.e. understanding the content of serial arguments, their linguistic structure, the relationship between the preceding and following arguments, recognizing the underlying conceptual beliefs, and understanding within the comprehensive coherence of the specific topic. We present different methods to aid argumentation mining, starting with plain argumentation detection and moving forward to a more structural analysis of the detected (...) argumentation. Different state-of-the-art techniques on machine learning and context free grammars are applied to solve the challenges of argumentation mining. We also highlight fundamental questions found during our research and analyse different issues for future research on argumentation mining. (shrink)

The axiomatic presentation of modal systems and the standard formulations of natural deduction and sequent calculus for modal logic are reviewed, together with the difficulties that emerge with these approaches. Generalizations of standard proof systems are then presented. These include, among others, display calculi, hypersequents, and labelled systems, with the latter surveyed from a closer perspective.

A proof-theoretical treatment of collectively accepted group beliefs is presented through a multi-agent sequent system for an axiomatization of the logic of acceptance. The system is based on a labelled sequent calculus for propositional multi-agent epistemic logic with labels that correspond to possible worlds and a notation for internalized accessibility relations between worlds. The system is contraction- and cut-free. Extensions of the basic system are considered, in particular with rules that allow the possibility of operative members or legislators. Completeness with (...) respect to the underlying Kripke semantics follows from a general direct and uniform argument for labelled sequent calculi extended with mathematical rules for frame properties. As an example of the use of the calculus we present an analysis of the discursive dilemma. (shrink)

A variety of projects in proof theory of relevance to the philosophy of mathematics are surveyed, including Gödel's incompleteness theorems, conservation results, independence results, ordinal analysis, predicativity, reverse mathematics, speed-up results, and provability logics.

This paper provides a proof-theoretic study of quantified non-normal modal logics. It introduces labelled sequent calculi based on neighbourhood semantics for the first-order extension, with both varying and constant domains, of monotone NNML, and studies the role of the Barcan formulas in these calculi. It will be shown that the calculi introduced have good structural properties: invertibility of the rules, height-preserving admissibility of weakening and contraction and syntactic cut elimination. It will also be shown that each of the calculi introduced (...) is sound and complete with respect to the appropriate class of neighbourhood frames. In particular, the completeness proof constructs a formal derivation for derivable sequents and a countermodel for non-derivable ones, and gives a semantic proof of the admissibility of cut. (shrink)

Intra-theoretical logical pluralism is a form of meaning-invariant pluralism about logic, articulated recently by Hjortland :355–373, 2013). This version of pluralism relies on it being possible to define several distinct notions of provability relative to the same logical calculus. The present paper picks up and explores this theme: How can a single logical calculus express several different consequence relations? The main hypothesis articulated here is that the divide between the internal and external consequence relations in Gentzen systems generates a form (...) of intra-theoretical logical pluralism. (shrink)

Logical orthodoxy has it that classical first-order logic, or some extension thereof, provides the right extension of the logical consequence relation. However, together with naïve but intuitive principles about semantic notions such as truth, denotation, satisfaction, and possibly validity and other naïve logical properties, classical logic quickly leads to inconsistency, and indeed triviality. At least since the publication of Kripke’s Outline of a theory of truth , an increasingly popular diagnosis has been to restore consistency, or at least non-triviality, by (...) restricting some classical rules. Our modest aim in this note is to briefly introduce the main strands of the current debate on paradox and logical revision, and point to some of the potential challenges revisionary approaches might face, with reference to the nine contributions to the present volume.For a recent introduction to non-classical theories of truth and other semantic notions, see the excellent Beall a .. (shrink)

First, we describe a psychological experiment in which the participants were asked to determine whether sentences of first-order logic were true or false in finite graphs. Second, we define two proof systems for reasoning about truth and falsity in first-order logic. These proof systems feature explicit models of cognitive resources such as declarative memory, procedural memory, working memory, and sensory memory. Third, we describe a computer program that is used to find the smallest proofs in the aforementioned proof systems when (...) capacity limits are put on the cognitive resources. Finally, we investigate the correlation between a number of mathematical complexity measures defined on graphs and sentences and some psychological complexity measures that were recorded in the experiment. (shrink)

Various sources in the literature claim that the deduction theorem does not hold for normal modal or epistemic logic, whereas others present versions of the deduction theorem for several normal modal systems. It is shown here that the apparent problem arises from an objectionable notion of derivability from assumptions in an axiomatic system. When a traditional Hilbert-type system of axiomatic logic is generalized into a system for derivations from assumptions, the necessitation rule has to be modified in a way that (...) restricts its use to cases in which the premiss does not depend on assumptions. This restriction is entirely analogous to the restriction of the rule of universal generalization of first-order logic. A necessitation rule with this restriction permits a proof of the deduction theorem in its usual formulation. Other suggestions presented in the literature to deal with the problem are reviewed, and the present solution is argued to be preferable to the other alternatives. A contraction-and cut-free sequent calculus equivalent to the Hubert system for basic modal logic shows the standard failure argument untenable by proving the underivability of DA from A. (shrink)

The method of Socratic proofs (SP-method) simulates the solving of logical problem by pure questioning. An outcome of an application of the SP-method is a sequence of questions, called a Socratic transformation. Our aim is to give a method of translation of Socratic transformations into trees. We address this issue both conceptually and by providing certain algorithms. We show that the trees which correspond to successful Socratic transformations—that is, to Socratic proofs—may be regarded, after a slight modification, as Gentzen-style proofs. (...) Thus proof-search for some Gentzen-style calculi can be performed by means of the SP-method. At the same time the method seems promising as a foundation for automated deduction. (shrink)

We conducted a computer-based psychological experiment in which a random mix of 40 tautologies and 40 non-tautologies were presented to the participants, who were asked to determine which ones of the formulas were tautologies. The participants were eight university students in computer science who had received tuition in propositional logic. The formulas appeared one by one, a time-limit of 45 s applied to each formula and no aids were allowed. For each formula we recorded the proportion of the participants who (...) classified the formula correctly before timeout and the mean response time among those participants. We propose a new proof formalism for modeling propositional reasoning with bounded cognitive resources. It models declarative memory, visual memory, working memory, and procedural memory according to the memory model of Atkinson and Shiffrin and reasoning processes according to the model of Newell and Simon. We also define two particular proof systems, T and NT, for showing propositional formulas to be tautologies and non-tautologies, respectively. The accuracy was found to be higher for non-tautologies than for tautologies ( p T was.89 and for non-tautologies the correlation between latency and minimum proof length in NT was.87. (shrink)

This paper concentrates on how to capture harmony in sequent calculi. It starts by considering a proposal made by Tennant and some objections to it which have been presented by Steinberger. Then it proposes a different analysis which makes use of a double-line presentation of sequent calculi in the style of Dosen and it shows that this proposal is able to dismiss disharmonious operators without thereby adopting any global criterion.

This paper presents and defends a way to add a transparent truth predicate to classical logic, such that and A are everywhere intersubstitutable, where all T-biconditionals hold, and where truth can be made compositional. A key feature of our framework, called STTT (for Strict-Tolerant Transparent Truth), is that it supports a non-transitive relation of consequence. At the same time, it can be seen that the only failures of transitivity STTT allows for arise in paradoxical cases.

An answer to the following question is presented: given a proof in classical propositional logic, for what small set of propositional variables p does it suffice to add all the formulae to Γ in order to intuitionistically prove A? This answer is an improvement of Ishihara's result for some cases.

Proof-theoretic semantics is an alternative to model-theoretic semantics. It aims at explaining the meaning of the logical constants in terms of the inference rules that govern their behaviour in proofs. We argue that this must be construed as the task of explaining these meanings relative to a logic, i.e., to a consequence relation. Alas, there is no agreed set of properties that a relation must have in order to qualify as a consequence relation. Moreover, the association of a consequence relation (...) to a logical calculus is not as straightforward as it may seem. We show that these facts are problematic for the proof-theoretic project but the problems can be solved. Our thesis is that the consequence relation relevant for proof-theoretic semantics is the one given by the sequent-to-sequent derivability relation in Gentzen systems. (shrink)

A proof-theoretic test for paradoxicality was famously proposed by Tennant: a paradox must yield a closed derivation of absurdity with no normal form. Drawing on the remark that all derivations of a given proposition can be transformed into derivations in normal form of a logically equivalent proposition, we investigate the possibility of paradoxes in normal form. We compare paradoxes à la Tennant and paradoxes in normal form from the viewpoint of the computational interpretation of proofs and from the viewpoint of (...) proof-theoretic semantics. (shrink)

We give a simple sequent calculus presentation of R.B. Angell’s logic of analytic containment, recently championed by Kit Fine as a plausible logic of partial content.

An erotetic calculus for a given logic constitutes a sequent-style proof-theoretical formalization of the logic grounded in Inferential Erotetic Logic ). In this paper, a new erotetic calculus for Classical Propositional Logic ), dual with respect to the existing ones, is given. We modify the calculus to obtain complete proof systems for the propositional part of paraconsistent logic CLuN and its extensions CLuNs and mbC. The method is based on dual resolution. Moreover, the resolution rule is non-clausal. According to the (...) authors knowledge, this is the first account of resolution for mbC. Last but not least, as the method is grounded in IEL, it constitutes an important tool for the so-called question-processing. (shrink)

We investigate incomplete symbols, i.e. definite descriptions with scope-operators. Russell famously introduced definite descriptions by contextual definitions; in this article definite descriptions are introduced by rules in a specific calculus that is very well suited for proof-theoretic investigations. That is to say, the phrase ‘incomplete symbols’ is formally interpreted as to the existence of an elimination procedure. The last section offers semantical tools for interpreting the phrase ‘no meaning in isolation’ in a formal way.

Starting from a proof-theoretic perspective, where meaning is determined by the inference rules governing logical operators, in this paper we primarily aim at developing a proof-theoretic alternative to the model-theoretic meaning-invariant logical pluralism discussed in Beall and Restall. We will also outline how this framework can be easily extended to include a form of meaning-variant logical pluralism. In this respect, the framework developed in this paper—which we label two-level proof-theoretic pluralism—is much broader in scope than the one discussed in Beall (...) and Restall’s book. (shrink)

According to logical inferentialists, the meanings of logical expressions are fully determined by the rules for their correct use. Two key proof-theoretic requirements on admissible logical rules, harmony and separability, directly stem from this thesis—requirements, however, that standard single-conclusion and assertion-based formalizations of classical logic provably fail to satisfy :1035–1051, 2011). On the plausible assumption that our logical practice is both single-conclusion and assertion-based, it seemingly follows that classical logic, unlike intuitionistic logic, can’t be accounted for in inferentialist terms. In (...) this paper, I challenge orthodoxy and introduce an assertion-based and single-conclusion formalization of classical propositional logic that is both harmonious and separable. In the framework I propose, classicality emerges as a structural feature of the logic. (shrink)

The standard approach to what I call “proof-theoretic semantics”, which is mainly due to Dummett and Prawitz, attempts to give a semantics of proofs by defining what counts as a valid proof. After a discussion of the general aims of proof-theoretic semantics, this paper investigates in detail various notions of proof-theoretic validity and offers certain improvements of the definitions given by Prawitz. Particular emphasis is placed on the relationship between semantic validity concepts and validity concepts used in normalization theory. It (...) is argued that these two sorts of concepts must be kept strictly apart. (shrink)

By using the notions of exact truth and exact falsity, one can give 16 distinct definitions of classical consequence. This paper studies the class of relations that results from these definitions in settings that are paracomplete, paraconsistent or both and that are governed by the Strong Kleene schema. Besides familiar logics such as Strong Kleene logic, the Logic of Paradox and First Degree Entailment, the resulting class of all Strong Kleene generalizations of classical logic also contains a host of unfamiliar (...) logics. We first study the members of our class semantically, after which we present a uniform sequent calculus that is sound and complete with respect to all of them. Two further sequent calculi and \ calculus) will be considered, which serve the same purpose and which are obtained by applying general methods to construct sequent calculi for many-valued logics. Rules and proofs in the SK calculus are much simpler and shorter than those of the \ and the \ calculus, which is one of the reasons to prefer the SK calculus over the latter two. Besides favourably comparing the SK calculus to both the \ and the \ calculus, we also hint at its philosophical significance. (shrink)

This paper is a sequel to Beall (2011), in which I both give and discuss the philosophical import of a result for the propositional (multiple-conclusion) logic LP+. Feedback on such ideas prompted a spelling out of the first-order case. My aim in this paper is to do just that: namely, explicitly record the first-order result(s), including the collapse results for K3+ and FDE+.

Much has been said about intuitionistic and classical logical systems since Gentzen’s seminal work. Recently, Prawitz and others have been discussing how to put together Gentzen’s systems for classical and intuitionistic logic in a single unified system. We call Prawitz’ proposal the Ecumenical System, following the terminology introduced by Pereira and Rodriguez. In this work we present an Ecumenical sequent calculus, as opposed to the original natural deduction version, and state some proof theoretical properties of the system. We reason that (...) sequent calculi are more amenable to extensive investigation using the tools of proof theory, such as cut-elimination and rule invertibility, hence allowing a full analysis of the notion of Ecumenical entailment. We then present some extensions of the Ecumenical sequent system and show that interesting systems arise when restricting such calculi to specific fragments. This approach of a unified system enabling both classical and intuitionistic features sheds some light not only on the logics themselves, but also on their semantical interpretations as well as on the proof theoretical properties that can arise from combining logical systems. (shrink)

Entailment relations, introduced by Scott in the early 1970s, provide an abstract generalisation of Gentzen’s multi-conclusion logical inference. Originally applied to the study of multi-valued logics, this notion has then found plenty of applications, ranging from computer science to abstract algebra. In particular, an entailment relation can be regarded as a constructive presentation of a distributive lattice and in this guise it has proven to be a useful tool for the constructive reformulation of several classical theorems in commutative algebra. In (...) this paper, motivated by these concrete applications, we state and prove a cut-elimination result for inductively generated entailment relations. We analyse some of its consequences and describe the existing connections with analogous results in the literature. (shrink)

The work is concerned with the so called display property of display logic. The motivation behind it is discussed and challenged. It is shown using one display calculus for intuitionistic logic as an example that the display property can be abandoned without losing subformula, cut elimination and completeness properties in such a way that results in additional expressive power of the system. This is done by disentangling structural connectives so that they are no longer context-sensitive. A recipe for characterizing structural (...) extensions of display calculi is provided. (shrink)

We present two proof systems for first-order logic with identity and without function symbols. The first one is an extension of the Rasiowa-Sikorski system with the rules for identity. This system is a validity checker. The rules of this system preserve and reflect validity of disjunctions of their premises and conclusions. The other is a Tableau system, which is an unsatisfiability checker. Its rules preserve and reflect unsatisfiability of conjunctions of their premises and conclusions. We show that the two systems (...) are dual to each other. The duality is expressed in a formal way which enables us to define a transformation of proofs in one of the systems into the proofs of the other. (shrink)

Canonical Propositional Gentzen-type systems are systems which in addition to the standard axioms and structural rules have only pure logical rules with the sub-formula property, in which exactly one occurrence of a connective is introduced in the conclusion, and no other occurrence of any connective is mentioned anywhere else. In this paper we considerably generalize the notion of a “canonical system” to first-order languages and beyond. We extend the Propositional coherence criterion for the non-triviality of such systems to rules with (...) unary quantifiers and show that it remains constructive. Then we provide semantics for such canonical systems using 2-valued non-deterministic matrices extended to languages with quantifiers, and prove that the following properties are equivalent for a canonical system G: (1) G admits Cut-Elimination, (2) G is coherent, and (3) G has a characteristic 2-valued non-deterministic matrix. (shrink)

Charles Peirce’s alpha system \ is reformulated into a deep inference system where the rules are given in terms of deep graphical structures and each rule has its symmetrical rule in the system. The proof analysis of \ is given in terms of two embedding theorems: the system \ and Brünnler’s deep inference system for classical propositional logic can be embedded into each other; and the system \ and Gentzen sequent calculus \ can be embedded into each other.

Richard Heck has recently drawn attention on a new version of the Liar Paradox, one which relies on logical resources that are so weak as to suggest that it may not admit of any “truly satisfying, consistent solution”. I argue that this conclusion is too strong. Heck's Liar reduces to absurdity principles that are already rejected by consistent paracomplete theories of truth, such as Kripke's and Field's. Moreover, the new Liar gives us no reasons to think that (versions of) these (...) principles cannot be consistently retained once the structural rule of contraction is restricted. I suggest that revisionary logicians have independent reasons for restricting such a rule. (shrink)

The proof of correctness and completeness of a logical calculus w.r.t. a given semantics can be read as telling us that the tautologies (or, more gen erally, the relation of consequence) specified in a model theoretic way can be equally well specified in a proof theoretic way, by means of the calculus (as the theorems, resp. the relation of inferability of the calculus). Thus we know that both for the classical propositional calculus and for the clas sical predicate calculus theorems (...) and tautologies represent two sides of the same coin. We also know that the relation of inference as instituted by any of the common axiom systems of the classical propositional calculus coin cides with the relation of consequence defined in terms of the truth tables; whereas the situation is a little bit more complicated w.r.t. the classical predicate calculus (the coincidence occurs if we restrict ourselves to closed ∀xFx is inferable from Fx without being its conse formulas; otherwise.. (shrink)

General-elimination harmony articulates Gentzen’s idea that the elimination-rules are justified if they infer from an assertion no more than can already be inferred from the grounds for making it. Dummett described the rules as not only harmonious but stable if the E-rules allow one to infer no more and no less than the I-rules justify. Pfenning and Davies call the rules locally complete if the E-rules are strong enough to allow one to infer the original judgement. A method is given (...) of generating harmonious general-elimination rules from a collection of I-rules. We show that the general-elimination rules satisfy Pfenning and Davies’ test for local completeness, but question whether that is enough to show that they are stable. Alternative conditions for stability are considered, including equivalence between the introduction- and elimination-meanings of a connective, and recovery of the grounds for assertion, finally generalizing the notion of local completeness to capture Dummett’s notion of stability satisfactorily. We show that the general-elimination rules meet the last of these conditions, and so are indeed not only harmonious but also stable. (shrink)

In 1968, Orevkov presented proofs of conservativity of classical over intuitionistic and minimal predicate logic with equality for seven classes of sequents, what are known as Glivenko classes. The proofs of these results, important in the literature on the constructive content of classical theories, have remained somehow cryptic. In this paper, direct proofs for more general extensions are given for each class by exploiting the structural properties of G3 sequent calculi; for five of the seven classes the results are strengthened (...) to height-preserving statements, and it is further shown that the constructive and minimal proofs are identical in structure to the classical proof from which they are obtained. (shrink)

In this paper we are applying certain strategy described by Negri and Von Plato :418–435, 1998), allowing construction of sequent calculi for axiomatic theories, to Suszko’s Sentential calculus with identity. We describe two calculi obtained in this way, prove that the cut rule, as well as the other structural rules, are admissible in one of them, and we also present an example which suggests that the cut rule is not admissible in the other.

Conditional logics were originally developed for the purpose of modeling intuitively correct modes of reasoning involving conditional—especially counterfactual—expressions in natural language. While the debate over the logic of conditionals is as old as propositional logic, it was the development of worlds semantics for modal logic in the past century that catalyzed the rapid maturation of the field. Moreover, like modal logic, conditional logic has subsequently found a wide array of uses, from the traditional (e.g. counterfactuals) to the exotic (e.g. conditional (...) obligation). Despite the close connections between conditional and modal logic, both the technical development and philosophical exploitation of the latter has outstripped that of the former, with the result that noticeable lacunae exist in the literature on conditional logic. My dissertation addresses a number of these underdeveloped frontiers, producing new technical insights and philosophical applications. -/- I contribute to the solution of a problem posed by Priest of finding sound and complete labeled tableaux for systems of conditional logic from Lewis' V-family. To develop these tableaux, I draw on previous work on labeled tableaux for modal and conditional logic; errors and shortcomings in recent work on this problem are identified and corrected. While modal logic has by now been thoroughly studied in non-classical contexts, e.g. intuitionistic and relevant logic, the literature on conditional logic is still overwhelmingly classical. Another contribution of my dissertation is a thorough analysis of intuitionistic conditional logic, in which I utilize both algebraic and worlds semantics, and investigate how several novel embedding results might shed light on the philosophical interpretation of both intuitionistic logic and conditional logic extensions thereof. -/- My dissertation examines deontic and connexive conditional logic as well as the underappreciated history of connexive notions in the analysis of conditional obligation. The possibility of interpreting deontic modal logics in such systems (via embedding results) serves as an important theoretical guide. A philosophically motivated proscription on impossible obligations is shown to correspond to, and justify, certain (weak) connexive theses. Finally, I contribute to the intensifying debate over counterpossibles, counterfactuals with impossible antecedents, and take—in contrast to Lewis and Williamson—a non-vacuous line. Thus, in my view, a counterpossible like "If there had been a counterexample to the law of the excluded middle, Brouwer would not have been vindicated" is false, not (vacuously) true, although it has an impossible antecedent. I exploit impossible (non-normal) worlds—originally developed to model non-normal modal logics—to provide non-vacuous semantics for counterpossibles. I buttress the case for non-vacuous semantics by making recourse to both novel technical results and theoretical considerations. (shrink)

A sequent root-first proof-search procedure for intuitionistic propositional logic is presented. The procedure is obtained from modified intuitionistic multi-succedent and classical sequent calculi, making use of Glivenko’s Theorem. We prove that a sequent is derivable in a standard intuitionistic multi-succedent calculus if and only if the corresponding prefixed-sequent is derivable in the procedure.

The decision problem for positively quantified formulae in the theory of linearly ordered Heyting algebras is known, as a special case of work of Kreisel, to be solvable; a simple solution is here presented, inspired by related ideas in Gödel-Dummett logic.

We show that if the structural rules are admissible over a set \ of atomic rules, then they are admissible in the sequent calculus obtained by adding the rules in \ to the multisuccedent minimal and intuitionistic \ calculi as well as to the classical one. Two applications to pure logic and to the sequent calculus with equality are presented.