- Anomalous monism.Steven Yalowitz - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Aspects of Blame: In which the nature of blame, blameworthiness, standing to blame and proportional blame are discussed.Marta Johansson Werkmäster - 2023 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
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Agency in Mental Illness and Cognitive Disability.Dominic Murphy & Natalia Washington - 2022 - In Manuel Vargas & John Doris (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. pp. 893-910.details
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Responsibility and the emotions.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - 2023 - In Maximilian Kiener (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Responsibility. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.details
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Group Responsibility and Historicism.Stephanie Collins & Niels de Haan - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (3):754-776.details
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Epistemic control without voluntarism.Timothy R. Kearl - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):95-109.details
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A Comparative Defense of Self-initiated Prospective Moral Answerability for Autonomous Robot harm.Marc Champagne & Ryan Tonkens - 2023 - Science and Engineering Ethics 29 (4):1-26.details
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Abilities, freedom, and inputs: a time traveller's tale.Olivia Coombes - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Edinburghdetails
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Scepticism about epistemic blame.Tim Smartt - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1813-1828.details
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Risk and Responsibility in Context.Adriana Placani & Stearns Broadhead (eds.) - 2023 - New York: Routledge.details
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Cognitive dissonance and the logic of racism.Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2020 - In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Group Agents and the Phenomenology of Joint Action.Jordan Baker & Michael Ebling - 2024 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 23 (3):525-549.details
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Actual Control - Demodalising Free Will.David Heering - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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Emotion.Charlie Kurth - 2022 - New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Alternative semantics for normative reasoning with an application to regret and responsibility.Daniela Glavaničová & Matteo Pascucci - 2021 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 30 (4):653-679.details
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Foundational Grounding and Creaturely Freedom.Kenneth L. Pearce - 2021 - Mind 131 (524):1108-1130.details
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Technological Answerability and the Severance Problem: Staying Connected by Demanding Answers.Daniel W. Tigard - 2021 - Science and Engineering Ethics 27 (5):1-20.details
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Praising Without Standing.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (2):229-246.details
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Epistemic Consent and Doxastic Justification.Luis Oliveira - 2022 - In Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on their Nature and Significance. New York: Routledge. pp. 286-312.details
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Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication.Christopher Gauker - 2021 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 173-187.details
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Trust and commitment in collective testimony.Leo Townsend - 2021 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 39-58.details
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Carving a Life from Legacy: Frankfurt’s Account of Free Will and Manipulation in Greg Egan’s “Reasons to Be Cheerful”.Taylor W. Cyr - 2018 - Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy 1:1-15.details
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Hypocrisy is Vicious, Value-Expressing Inconsistency.Benjamin Rossi - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (1):57-80.details
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Cognitive Dissonance and the Logic of Racism.Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2020 - In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds. New York: Routledge. pp. 219-243.details
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It’s Up to You.Randolph Clarke - 2020 - The Monist 103 (3):328-341.details
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Responsibility: the State of the Question Fault Lines in the Foundations.David Shoemaker - 2020 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):205-237.details
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Hypocrisy, Standing to Blame and Second‐Personal Authority.Adam Piovarchy - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4):603-627.details
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I’ll Show You: Spite as a Reactive Attitude.Krista K. Thomason - 2020 - The Monist 103 (2):163-175.details
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The Walk and the Talk.Daniela Dover - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (4):387-422.details
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Sharing Responsibility: Responsibility for Health Is Not a Zero-Sum Game.Marcel Verweij & Angus Dawson - 2019 - Public Health Ethics 12 (2):99-102.details
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Desert, Free Will, and Our Moral Responsibility Practices.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (3):265-275.details
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Manipulation and constitutive luck.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2381-2394.details
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Responsibility Beyond Belief: The Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility.Christopher Michael Cloos - 2018 - Dissertation, details
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Moral Distress as a Symptom of Dirty Hands.Daniel W. Tigard - 2019 - Res Publica 25 (3):353-371.details
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Vocations, Exploitation, and Professions in a Market Economy.Daniel Koltonski - 2018 - Social Theory and Practice 44 (3):323-347.details
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The Hard Problem of Responsibility.Victoria McGeer & Philip Pettit - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Alternative Possibilities, Volitional Necessities, and Character Setting.Benjamin Matheson - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):287-307.details
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On (not) Accepting the Punishment for Civil Disobedience.Piero Moraro - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):503-520.details
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Does God Have the Moral Standing to Blame?Patrick Todd - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (1):33-55.details
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Response-Dependent Responsibility; or, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Blame.David Shoemaker - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (4):481-527.details
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Moral Responsibility, Luck, and Compatibilism.Taylor W. Cyr - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):193-214.details
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Good Selves, True Selves: Moral Ignorance, Responsibility, And The Presumption Of Goodness.David Faraci & David Shoemaker - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):606-622.details
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Responsibility Without Identity.David Shoemaker - 2012 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 18 (1):109-132.details
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Agency and Inner Freedom.Michael Garnett - 2017 - Noûs 51 (1):3-23.details
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Exemplars as evaluative ideals in Nietzsche’s philosophy of value.Jonanthan Mitchell - unknowndetails
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Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community: Is Moral Responsibility Essentially Interpersonal?Michael J. Zimmerman - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):247-263.details
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Doxastic Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):127-155.details
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The Structure of Cognitive Agency.Daniel Breyer - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):285-296.details
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Responsibility.Neal A. Tognazzini - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell. pp. 4592-4602.details
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The Strains of Involvement.Neal A. Tognazzini - 2015 - In Randolph K. Clarke, Michael McKenna & Angela M. Smith (eds.), The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-44.details
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