- Reasoning Through Narrative.A. K. Flowerree - 2023 - Episteme 20 (4):912-926.details
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A Modal Criterion for Epistemic Argumentation.Job de Grefte - 2022 - Informal Logic 42 (2):389-415.details
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Saving the armchair by experiment: what works in economics doesn’t work in philosophy.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2483-2508.details
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Why Nearly Everything Is Knowable A Priori.Brian Cutter - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):80-100.details
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Thought Experiments Outside Science. [REVIEW]Daniel Cohnitz - 2013 - Metascience 22 (2):1-5.details
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Intuitions as Evidence, Philosophical Expertise and the Developmental Challenge.Steve Clarke - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (2):175-207.details
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What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.details
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Evidence and intuition.Yuri Cath - 2012 - Episteme 9 (4):311-328.details
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Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise.Wesley Buckwalter - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):378-410.details
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The Presidential Address: Philosophical Scepticism and the Aims of Philosophy.Helen Beebee - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (1):1-24.details
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Who knows?Avner Baz - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):201-223.details
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Who Knows?Avner Baz - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):201-223.details
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Recent Attempts to Defend the Philosophical Method of Cases and the Linguistic (Re)turn.Avner Baz - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):105-130.details
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On going nowhere with our words: New skepticism about the philosophical method of cases.Avner Baz - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):64-83.details
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Must Philosopherss Rely On Intuitions?Avner Baz - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (4):316-337.details
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Social externalism and first-person authority.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):287 - 300.details
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The multifaceted role of imagination in science and religion. A critical examination of its epistemic, creative and meaning-making functions.Ingrid Malm Lindberg - 2021 - Dissertation, Uppsala Universitydetails
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The Genesis of the Ordinary Language Philosophy and Some Modern Strategies of Criticism.Pavlo Sobolievskyi - 2023 - Bulletin of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv Philosophy 2 (9):50-53.details
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Thin, fine and with sensitivity: a metamethodology of intuitions.James Andow - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-21.details
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Is experimental philosophy philosophically significant?Joshua Alexander - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):377-389.details
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Accentuate the Negative.Joshua Alexander, Ronald Mallon & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):297-314.details
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Analytic epistemology and experimental philosophy.Joshua Alexander & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):56–80.details
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A model for thought experiments.Sören Häggqvist - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):pp. 55-76.details
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Bringing Thought Experiments Back into the Philosophy of Science.Arnon Levy & Adrian Currie - forthcoming - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science.details
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How to Use Thought Experiments.Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Intuitions are inclinations to believe.Joshua Earlenbaugh & Bernard Molyneux - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (1):89 - 109.details
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Imagination.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Creativity.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - In Explaining Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 262-296.details
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There are no i-beliefs or i-desires at work in fiction consumption and this is why.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - In Explaining Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 210-233.details
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Thought Experiments: State of the Art.Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach Fehige & James Robert Brown - 2018 - In Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach Fehige & James Robert Brown (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments. London: Routledge. pp. 1-28.details
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Explaining Imagination.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Dispositionalism and the Modal Operators.David Yates - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):411-424.details
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Indicative versus subjunctive conditionals, congruential versus non-hyperintensional contexts.Timothy Williamson - 2006 - Philosophical Issues 16 (1):310–333.details
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Order effects in moral judgment.Alex Wiegmann, Yasmina Okan & Jonas Nagel - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):813-836.details
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The Methodological Necessity of Experimental Philosophy.Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2015 - Discipline Filosofiche 25 (1):23-42.details
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Are philosophers expert intuiters?Jonathan M. Weinberg, Chad Gonnerman, Cameron Buckner & Joshua Alexander - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):331-355.details
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Intentional Action Without Knowledge.Romy Vekony, Alfred Mele & David Rose - 2020 - Synthese 197:1-13.details
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The Reliability of Armchair Intuitions.Krist Vaesen, Martin Peterson & Bart Van Bezooijen - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (5):559-578.details
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Moral Intuitions: Are Philosophers Experts?Kevin Tobia, Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen Stich - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):629-638.details
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Counterfactuals and Modal Epistemology.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):93–115.details
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The folk conception of knowledge.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2012 - Cognition 124 (3):272-283.details
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Expert or Esoteric? Philosophers Attribute Knowledge Differently Than All Other Academics.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (7):e12850.details
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Carving Intuition at its Joints.Jason Schukraft - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (3):326-352.details
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Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals: Lewis versus Williamson on modal knowledge.Andrea Sauchelli - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):345-359.details
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Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals: Lewis versus Williamson on modal knowledge.Andrea Sauchelli - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):345-359.details
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Neo-Confucianism, experimental philosophy and the trouble with intuitive methods.Hagop Sarkissian - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (5):812-828.details
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Logical Consequence for Nominalists.Marcus Rossberg & Daniel Cohnitz - 2009 - Theoria 24 (2):147-168.details
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Intentional action without knowledge.David Rose, Alfred Mele & Romy Vekony - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1231-1243.details
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Folk Mereology is Teleological.David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):238-270.details
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Anti-Intellectualism.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):437-466.details
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