- Close Error, Visual Perception, and Neural Phase: A Critique of the Modal Approach to Knowledge.Adam Michael Bricker - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1123-1152.details
|
|
Practical reasoning and degrees of outright belief.Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8069-8090.details
|
|
Divine Hiddenness and Other Evidence.Charity Anderson & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2013 - In L. Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Lucky Ignorance, Modality and Lack of Knowledge.Oscar A. Piedrahita - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (3).details
|
|
Is Epistemic Competence a Skill?David Horst - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):509-523.details
|
|
Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
|
|
Defeating Fake News: On Journalism, Knowledge, and Democracy.Brian Ball - 2021 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 8 (1):5-26.details
|
|
Scientific Conclusions Need Not Be Accurate, Justified, or Believed by their Authors.Haixin Dang & Liam Kofi Bright - 2021 - Synthese 199:8187–8203.details
|
|
Does Success Entail Ability?David Boylan - 2021 - Noûs 56 (3):570-601.details
|
|
Meaning and Emotion: The Extended Gricean Model and What Emotional Signs Mean.Constant Bonard - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Geneva and University of Antwerpdetails
|
|
From the agent’s point of view: the case against disjunctivism about rationalisation.Edgar Phillips - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):262-280.details
|
|
Probabilistic Proofs, Lottery Propositions, and Mathematical Knowledge.Yacin Hamami - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):77-89.details
|
|
Games: Agency as Art. By C. THI NGUYEN. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. viii + 244. Price £22.99, US $35.00.). [REVIEW]Trystan S. Goetze - 2022 - The Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):240-243.details
|
|
Ghazālī's Transformative Answer to Scepticism.Reza Hadisi - 2021 - Theoria 88 (1):109-142.details
|
|
(1 other version)Not So Phenomenal!John Hawthorne & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (1):1-43.details
|
|
Logic and science: science and logic.Marcus Rossberg & Stewart Shapiro - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6429-6454.details
|
|
Introspection Is Signal Detection.Jorge Morales - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
|
|
Fragmentation and Old Evidence.Will Fleisher - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):542-567.details
|
|
(1 other version)Perception and probability.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):1-21.details
|
|
Mechanistic reasoning and the problem of masking.Michael Wilde - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):1-16.details
|
|
A Bayesian Account of Establishing.Jon Williamson - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (4):903-925.details
|
|
Externalism Explained.Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Themes in Plato, Aristotle, and Hellenistic Philosophy, Keeling Lectures 2011-2018, OPEN ACCESS.Fiona Leigh (ed.) - 2021 - University of Chicago Press.details
|
|
Delusional Evidence-Responsiveness.Carolina Flores - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6299-6330.details
|
|
Be modest: you're living on the edge.Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):611-621.details
|
|
Debunking, Epistemic Achievement, and Undermining Defeat.Michael Klenk - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):43-60.details
|
|
Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5687-5718.details
|
|
Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry.Yasha Sapir & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5837-5859.details
|
|
The normality of error.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2509-2533.details
|
|
How to Make Norms Clash.Eva Schmidt - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):46-55.details
|
|
Emotion, Epistemic Assessability, and Double Intentionality.Tricia Magalotti & Uriah Kriegel - 2021 - Topoi 41 (1):183-194.details
|
|
How many stripes are on the tiger in my dreams?Sascha Benjamin Fink - manuscriptdetails
|
|
MAKING Metaphysics.Thomas Byrne - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (20).details
|
|
El conocimiento de la propia mente: Donald Davidson sobre autoridad de la primera persona, externalismo y racionalidad.Marc Jiménez Rolland - 2012 - Dissertation, Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecasdetails
|
|
The Ineffability of Induction.David Builes - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):129-149.details
|
|
Knowledge-First Evidentialism and the Dilemmas of Self-Impact.Paul Silva Jr & Eyal Tal - 2021 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge.details
|
|
A Abordagem Ecológica das Habilidades e a Epistemologia dos eixos.Carvalho Eros - 2022 - In Plinio J. Smith & Nara Figueiredo (eds.), A epistemologia dos eixos: uma introdução e debate sobre as certezas de Wittgenstein. Porto Alegre: Editora Fênix. pp. 101-123.details
|
|
Reconsidering the Alleged Cases of Knowledge from Falsehood.Kok Yong Lee - 2020 - Philosophical Investigations 44 (2):151-162.details
|
|
Surprising Suspensions: The Epistemic Value of Being Ignorant.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswickdetails
|
|
The Dispositional Nature of Phenomenal Properties.Simone Gozzano - 2018 - Topoi 39 (5):1045-1055.details
|
|
Against philosophical proofs against common sense.Louis Doulas & Evan Welchance - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):207–215.details
|
|
Certainty and Assertion.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2022 - Dialectica 999 (1).details
|
|
Uniqueness and Modesty: How Permissivists Can Live on the Edge.Darren Bradley - forthcoming - Mind.details
|
|
Incentivizing Replication Is Insufficient to Safeguard Default Trust.Hugh Desmond - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (5):906-917.details
|
|
Radical Externalism.Amia Srinivasan - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (3):395-431.details
|
|
Publishing without (some) belief.Will Fleisher - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):237-246.details
|
|
Perceptual consciousness plays no epistemic role.Jacob Berger - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):7-23.details
|
|
Possessing reasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach.Paul Silva - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2925-2947.details
|
|
A Modest Argument Against Scepticism.Tobies Grimaltos Mascaros & Carlos J. Moya Espí - 2020 - Quaderns de Filosofia 7 (1):33-43.details
|
|