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Listening to algorithms: The case of self‐knowledge.Casey Doyle - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.details
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Two kinds of curiosity.Daniela Dover - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Knowledge and Practical Reasoning.Igor Douven - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (1):101-118.details
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In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno.Igor Douven & Christoph Kelp - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (2):289-297.details
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Generalizing the lottery paradox.Igor Douven & Timothy Williamson - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779.details
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Can We Be Self-Deceived about What We Believe? Self-Knowledge, Self-Deception, and Rational Agency.Mathieu Doucet - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (S1):E1-E25.details
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Clarity about concessive knowledge attributions: reply to Dodd.Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):395-403.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Against philosophical proofs against common sense.Louis Doulas & Evan Welchance - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):207–215.details
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Distinguishing Knowledge Possession and Knowledge Attribution: The Difference Metaphilosophy Makes.Kristie Dotson - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):475-482.details
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Resolving Religious Disagreements.Katherine Dormandy - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (1):56-83.details
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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
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Knowing against the odds.Cian Dorr, Jeremy Goodman & John Hawthorne - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):277-287.details
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How vagueness could cut out at any order.Cian Dorr - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):1-10.details
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Embedding Epistemic Modals.Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):867-914.details
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Be modest: you're living on the edge.Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):611-621.details
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Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.details
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Consequences of Comparability.Cian Dorr, Jacob M. Nebel & Jake Zuehl - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):70-98.details
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Can the Knowledge Norm Co‐Opt the Opt Out?Kevin Dorst - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):273-282.details
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Describing Law.Raff Donelson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 33 (1):85-106.details
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Epistemic perspectives on imagination.Jérôme Dokic - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1 (1):99-118.details
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Are there a posteriori conceptual necessities?Daniel Dohrn - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):181-197.details
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Solving the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Sinan Dogramaci - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):107-128.details
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The ordinary language argument against skepticism—pragmatized.Sinan Dogramaci - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):879-896.details
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A problem for rationalist responses to skepticism.Sinan Dogramaci - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):355-369.details
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Does my total evidence support that I’m a Boltzmann Brain?Sinan Dogramaci - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3717-3723.details
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Safety, Skepticism, and Lotteries.Dylan Dodd - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):95-120.details
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Hope, knowledge, and blindspots.Jordan Dodd - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2):531-543.details
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Belief and certainty.Dylan Dodd - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4597-4621.details
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Against Fallibilism.Dylan Dodd - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):665 - 685.details
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What’s wrong with epistemic trespassing?Joshua DiPaolo - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):223-243.details
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Second best epistemology: fallibility and normativity.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2043-2066.details
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Indoctrination Anxiety and the Etiology of Belief.Joshua DiPaolo & Robert Mark Simpson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10):3079-3098.details
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Taste, traits, and tendencies.Alexander Dinges & Julia Zakkou - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1183-1206.details
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On Deniability.Alexander Dinges & Julia Zakkou - 2023 - Mind 132 (526):372-401.details
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Beliefs don’t simplify our reasoning, credences do.Alexander Dinges - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):199-207.details
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Strange-but-true: a (quick) new argument for contextualism about ‘know’.Paul Dimmock - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):2005-2015.details
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Ethical Evidence.Steven Diggin - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-24.details
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Science Generates Limit Paradoxes.Eric Dietrich & Chris Fields - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (4):409-432.details
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Reasons and factive emotions.Christina H. Dietz - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1681-1691.details
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Emotions, evidence, and safety.Christina H. Dietz - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2027-2050.details
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Doxastic Cognitivism: An Anti-Intellectualist Theory of Emotion.Christina H. Dietz - 2020 - Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):27-52.details
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Conditional emotions.Christina Hope Dietz - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):145-163.details
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Closure and the Lottery.Simon Dierig - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (3):405-419.details
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Are all reasons causes?Christina H. Dietz - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1179-1190.details
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The Essential Connection Between Epistemology and the Theory of Reference.Imogen Dickie - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):99-129.details
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How Proper Names Refer.Imogen Dickie - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):43-78.details
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Can probability theory explain why closure is both intuitive and prone to counterexamples?Marcello Di Bello - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2145-2168.details
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Epistemic closure, assumptions and topics of inquiry.Marcello Di Bello - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3977-4002.details
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