In sections 18 and 73 of Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language , Carnap famously presents what he understands to be decisive objections to Wittgenstein’s Tractarian distinction between saying and showing. However, Carnap has been criticized in recent literature for severely misinterpreting that distinction. Against this criticism it is argued that Carnap reads that distinction as applying to two distinct classes of expressions ( Unsinn and sinnlos ) that he holds to emerge from his reading of Tractatus 4.1212 and related Tractarian (...) theses. It is then argued that Carnap’s counterexamples to Wittgenstein’s theses are successful given his reading, and that our analysis of his counterexamples puts us in a unique position to reevaluate his conventionalism. (shrink)

Suele entenderse la Filosofía como el desarrollo de problemas guiados por un método que el autor del texto propone, siendo este generalmente un método racional. Pero la propuesta que aquí se hace es que los textos capitales de Miguel de Unamuno se configuran como una estrategia, para que el lector se implique con el autor en problemas y métodos que deben comprenderse en claves distintas a los usuales. Los textos de Unamuno entienden la tarea del lector como condición de posibilidad (...) para su propia comprensión. Y en este sentido necesitan al lector. Pero el tipo de lector que requiere no es un lector científico sino un lector mitológico. Mostrar esta propuesta, en la lectura Del sentimiento trágico de la vida, es lo que me propongo en este trabajo. (shrink)

The object of this paper is to throw light on the reciprocal exchanges between legal philosophy and the theory of speech acts (as developed by Austin and Searle). The first part concerns the contributions to legal philosophy made by the theory of speech acts with a view to developing new perspectives. The second part deals with the contributions of legal philosophy to speech act theory.

So-called evolutionary error theorists, such as Michael Ruse and Richard Joyce, have argued that naturalistic accounts of the moral sentiments lead us to adopt an error theory approach to morality. Roughly, the argument is that an appreciation of the etiology of those sentiments undermines any reason to think that they track moral truth and, furthermore, undermines any reason to think that moral truth actually exists. I argue that this approach offers us a false dichotomy between error theory and some form (...) of moral realism. While accepting the presuppositions of the evolutionary error theorist, I argue that contract-based approaches to morality can be sensitive to those presuppositions while still vindicating morality. Invoking Stephen Darwall’s distinction between contractualism and contractarianism, I go on to offer an evolutionary-based contractarianism. (shrink)

Philosophy has four forms: wonder, faith, doubt and scepticism. These are not separate categories, but separate ideal possibilities. Modern academic philosophy has fallen, for several centuries, into an error: which is the error of supposing that philosophy is only what I call doubt. Philosophy may be doubt: indeed, it is part of my argument that this is undeniably one element of, or one possibility in, philosophy; but doubt is only one of four points of the compass. In this essay I (...) indicate the nature of each point of the compass as it has been found in the history of philosophy. (shrink)

What we observe, through our usually limited lens, is that differential growing of space determines forms -characterized by their shape, size and coloration. As non-Euclidean geometrical mathematics have proclaimed: forms are manifestations of the curvature of space. Physics and other natural laws impose mathematical structural restrictions to biological forms. The molecules comprising any living form become arranged in specific ways in response to physical forces as well as chemical and biochemical conditions. Over time, such forms inherit additional historical restrictions that (...) make up their meaning, their semiotics. Color does not escape from this orthogenic reality. In this study, we present the colored pattern of the connexivum of Triatoma maculata, an insect vector of the etiologic agent of Chagas disease. This model is used as an example to appreciate mimicry under a heterodox and provocative approach. We unveil that beyond 1) mathematical and 2) historical semiotic restrictions of T. maculata mimesis of a yellowish-black alternating pattern, there are also 3) artistic interpretations; where metaphysics of life, beyond human perspective, is included. (shrink)

It has been commonplace to maintain of the phenomenon that occurred during classical times, the change from relying on myth to trusting in reason: (1) that the emergence of philosophy from myth was marked by an abrupt discontinuity; (2) that mythical thinking was left behind once philosophy was invented or discovered; and (3) that the ancient Greeks were the agents of this miracle. This paper suggests that the so-called “Greek miracle” was, in fact, a miracle manqué and, more importantly, that (...) close examination of this failed miracle offers valuable insight into the philosophical crisis facing the world today. (shrink)

John Dewey points out in A Common Faith (1934) that what stands in the way of religious belief for many is the apparent commitment of Western religious traditions to supernatural phenomena and questionable historical claims. We are to accept claims that in any other context we would find laughable. Are we to believe that water can be turned into wine without the benefit of the fermentation process? Are we to swallow the claim that there is such a phenomenon as the (...) spontaneous conception of a child without the intervention of the traditional technique? Were we to confront these claims in any but a religious context, we would dismiss them as the workings of an overactive imagination or simple cover for an overactive sex life. But for the devout believer, there is no doubt even with a paucity of evidence. At the same time, the rise of science has forcibly suggested the idea that the natural world is self-contained and, if explainable, that explanation will come from within. There seems to be no room for the traditional God and, much as one might wish otherwise, nothing for him to do. Perhaps... (shrink)

W artykule analizuję pewną odmianę kosmologicznej argumentacji za istnieniem Boga – „dowód ze skończoności”. W punkcie wyjścia opieram się na intuicjach Georga W.F. Hegla, które rozwijam. W swoich heglowskich inspiracjach ograniczam się do Wykładów z filozofii religii. W konkluzji wskazuję na niebezpieczeństwo pomieszania porządku poznawczego z porządkiem ontycznym. --------------- Zgłoszono: 30/10/2020. Zrecenzowano: 17/12/2020. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 24/04/2021.

Dainton and Robinson’s Companion traces lines of descent of analytic philosophy from ancestors. They characterize analytic philosophy as a movement, a tradition, a style, and a commitment to the va...

Marc Lange offers a stale anthology that reflects the sad state of affairs in the camp of analytic philosophy. It is representative in a few respects, even in its maltreatment of Russell, Wittgenstein, and Popper. Despite its neglect of Wittgenstein, it shows again that Wittgenstein is the patron saint of the analytic school despite the fact that it does not abide by his theory of metaphysics as inherently meaningless.

Einstein considered fallibilist methodology obvious and metaphysics the challenging heuristic of physics. This philosophy is a minority view in academic philosophy. Most commentators on Einstein reject it and either refuse to ascribe it to him or declare it an impediment to his researches, his own opinion to the contrary notwithstanding.

Inducing aspect-experiences – the sudden seeing of something anew, as when a face suddenly strikes us as familiar – can be used as a philosophical method. In seeing aspects, I argue, we let ourselves experience what it would be like to conceptualize something in a particular way, apart from any conceptual routine. We can use that experience to examine our ways of conceptualizing things, and re-evaluate the ways we make sense of them. I claim that we are not always passive (...) with regard to these experiences, and explain how we can actively induce them. I distinguish this method from other standard Wittgensteinian philosophical methods. (shrink)

I defend the view that aspect-perception – seeing as a duck, or a face as courageous – typically involves concept-application. Seemingly obvious, this is contested by Avner Baz: ‘aspects may not aptly be identified with, or in terms of, empirical concepts […]’ – In opposition, I claim that they may. Indeed, in many cases there is no other way to identify aspects.I review the development in Baz’s view, from his early criticism of Stephen Mulhall, to his recent recruitment of the (...) discussion about aspects to criticize John McDowell’s conceptualism, and his claim: ‘the dawning of Wittgensteinian aspects reveals our power to perceive unity and sense that are not aptly thought of as conceptual’.I accept many of Baz’s claims against Mulhall and McDowell. However, his arguments go too far. Aspect-perception, I argue, typically involves a special kind of application of concepts. Denying that is denying much of what is important and of interest in the phenomena of aspect. The world revealed in aspect-perception is not the conceptualized world of science; but it is also not the pre-conceptualized ‘phenomenal’ world which, according to Baz, we normally have in perception, and which he wants to bring into view. (shrink)

We argue that abduction does not work in isolation from other inference mechanisms and illustrate this through an inference scheme designed to evaluate multiple hypotheses. We use game theory to relate the abductive system to actions that produce new information. To enable evaluation of the implications of this approach we have implemented the procedures used to calculate the impact of new information in a computer model. Experiments with this model display a number of features of collective belief-revision leading to consensus-formation, (...) such as the influence of bias and prejudice. The scheme of inferential calculations invokes a Peircian concept of ‘belief’ as the propensity to choose a particular course of action. (shrink)

Customary interpretations state that Tractarian thoughts are pictures, and, a fortiori, facts. I argue that important difficulties are unavoidable if we assume this standard view, and I propose a reading of the concept taking advantage of an analogy that Wittgenstein introduces, namely, the analogy between thoughts and projective geometry. I claim that thoughts should be understood neither as pictures nor as facts, but as acts of geometric projection in logical space. The interpretation I propose thus removes the root of the (...) identified difficulties. Moreover, it allows important clarification concerning some central aspects of the Tractarian theory of representation, and it yields a unifying elucidation regarding Wittgenstein’s remarks on the solipsistic thesis. (shrink)

Pensamiento, tecnología, lenguaje y nuevas narrativas virtuales constituyen formas de realidad virtual. Según los aportes conceptuales de David Deutsch en su texto La estructura de la realidad, la tecnología tiene como punto de inicio y concepción los procesos de pensamiento, imaginación y creación, que desde la perspectiva del aporte de este trabajo se irán articulando con el campo literario como expresión de ficcionalización y virtualización del conocimiento en el ciberespacio o metaverso.La propuesta de este trabajo es mostrar cómo literatura urbana (...) y cyberpunk, a partir del uso de las Nuevas Tecnologías de la Información y la Comunicación, han planteado nuevas formas de relacionamiento, comunicación y narrativas, las cuales han permitido pasar del texto lineal al hipertexto, el cual propone el uso de imágenes, sonidos y enlaces dinámicos como nuevas formas de lenguaje.Para poder entender las nuevas narrativas virtuales como formas de pensamiento y lenguaje abstracto, se analizarán dos obras del género literario cyberpunk: Snow crash de Neal Stephenson y Ygdrasil de Jorge Baradit. De esta manera se podrá ubicar espacial y temporalmente los inicios del cyberpunk en los Estados Unidos, para luego entender cuál ha sido el impacto de este género en el contexto latinoamericano.El metaverso es un nuevo escenario que constituye un entorno digital simbólico que se aproxima a la idea de una metáfora del mundo real. Este “no-lugar” ubicado en Internet propone nuevas formas de narración, así como la destemporalización y desterritorialización de las relaciones sociales, y la democratización del acceso a los saberes, conocimientos, pluralidad de textos, tecnología, filosofía y representaciones artísticas, como nuevas formas de metarelatos en el ciberespacio.El enfoque epistemológico que se sustentará el trabajo de las nuevas narrativas virtuales será el aporte del filósofo Ludwig Wittgenstein, que versa sobre el desarrollo del pensamiento a partir del lenguaje y el análisis de las proposiciones como oraciones o núcleos conceptuales que posibilitan la aclaración del lenguaje lógico y la consolidación de la estructura de la realidad. (shrink)

En Investigaciones filosóficas y otros escritos postractarianos Wittgenstein rechazó la concepción de lo mental que incorpora la Tesis de Brentano. Ese rechazo, dirigido específicamente contra la idea de que los pensamientos representan la realidad conteniendo representaciones que concuerdan con ella, denuncia una confusión gramatical: los objetos a los que se dirigirían los pensamientos son sombras proyectadas por la gramática del lenguaje. Autores como Hacker y Glock consideran que esa confusión se produce al asimilar las oraciones mediante las cuales se adscriben (...) estados mentales a oraciones transitivas sin verbos psicológicos. El presente trabajo argumenta a favor de una imagen mucho más compleja de los medios utilizados por Wittgenstein para rechazar la Tesis de Brentano. Se defiende también que en la visión corregida de la intencionalidad de lo mental desempeñan un papel decisivo los requisitos de inocencia semántica, expresivismo, sistematicidad del significado y del lenguaje como vehículo del pensamiento, ignorados hasta el momento. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on alternative logics. It discusses a hierarchy of logical reform. It presents case studies that illustrate particular aspects of the logical revisionism discussed in the chapter. The first case study is of intuitionistic logic. The second case study turns to quantum logic, a system proposed on empirical grounds as a resolution of the antinomies of quantum mechanics. The third case study is concerned with systems of relevance logic, which have been the subject of an especially detailed reform (...) program. Finally, the fourth case study is paraconsistent logic, perhaps the most controversial of serious proposals. (shrink)

در برابر تفسیر سنتی از تراکتاتوس، که مطابق آن گزاره‌های بی‌معنای تراکتاتوس به دو دستۀ بی‌معنای گمراه‌کننده و بی‌معنای روشنگر تقسیم می‌شوند، در دهۀ 1980 تفسیر جدیدِ درمانگرانه از تراکتاتوس شکل گرفت که به مخالفت با این ایدۀ مرکزی تفسیر سنتی پرداخت و گفت اولاً تراکتاتوس میان گزاره‌های بی‌معنا هیچ تفکیکی قائل نمی‌شود و همۀ بی‌معناها را بی‌معنای محض می‌داند و در یک دسته قرار می‌دهد، ثانیاً هدف تراکتاتوس نه انتقال یک معرفت نظری، بلکه القای یک بینش عملی است. جیمز (...) کونانت، به عنوان یکی از مهم‌ترین چهره‌های این نوع از تفسیر، معتقد است که ویتگنشتاین متقدم و کرکگور به نحوی بنیادین همسو هستند و تراکتاتوس را باید کاملاً هم‌راستا با کتاب آخرین پی‌نوشت غیرعلمی کرکگور در نظر گرفت و فهمید. در این مقاله، ضمن توضیح برخی از مهم‌ترین مفردات تفسیر درمانگرانه از تراکتاتوس، دیدگاه کونانت در مورد خوانش کرکگوری از ویتگنشتاین متقدم را بیان خواهم کرد، که مطابق آن ویتگنشتاین و کرکگور قول به «حقایق بیان‌ناپذیر» را ناسازگار می‌دانند و آن را همچون نوعی بیماری تلقی می‌کنند که باید به درمان آن پرداخت. در پایان نیز به ارزیابی این تفسیر از ویتگنشتاین متقدم خواهم پرداخت و نشان خواهم داد که اولاً این تفسیر در درک مراد ویتگنشتاین از «بی‌معنا» به خطا رفته، و ثانیاً به آن معنایی که خود این تفسیر به مفهوم «بی‌معنا» نسبت می‌دهد نمی‌تواند پایبند بماند. (shrink)

According to MODERATISM, perceptual justification requires that one independently takes for granted propositional hinges like <There is an external world>, <I am not a brain in a vat (BIV)>, and so on. This view faces the truth problem: to offer an account of truth for hinges that is not threatened by skepticism. Annalisa Coliva has tried to solve the truth problem by combining the claim that external world propositions have a substantive truth property like correspondence with the claim that hinges (...) have a deflationary truth property. I argue that the resulting view cannot offer a coherent characterization of ‘skeptical switch scenarios’ while providing an effective anti-skeptical strategy. In a more positive vein, I defend an approach that combines a correspondence conception of truth with epistemological disjunctivism. (shrink)

In theTractatus, Wittgenstein advocates two major notational innovations in logic. First, identity is to be expressed by identity of the sign only, not by a sign for identity. Secondly, only one logical operator, called “N” by Wittgenstein, should be employed in the construction of compound formulas. We show that, despite claims to the contrary in the literature, both of these proposals can be realized, severally and jointly, in expressively complete systems of first-order logic. Building on early work of Hintikka’s, we (...) identify three ways in which the first notational convention can be implemented, show that two of these are compatible with the text of theTractatus, and argue on systematic and historical grounds, adducing posthumous work of Ramsey’s, for one of these as Wittgenstein’s envisaged method. With respect to the second Tractarian proposal, we discuss how Wittgenstein distinguished between general and non-general propositions and argue that, claims to the contrary notwithstanding, an expressively adequate N-operator notation is implicit in theTractatuswhen taken in its intellectual environment. We finally introduce a variety of sound and complete tableau calculi for first-order logics formulated in a Wittgensteinian notation. The first of these is based on the contemporary notion of logical truth as truth in all structures. The others take into account the Tractarian notion of logical truth as truth in all structures over one fixed universe of objects. Here the appropriate tableau rules depend on whether this universe is infinite or finite in size, and in the latter case on its exact finite cardinality.As it is obviously easy to express how propositions can be constructed by means of this operation and how propositions are not to be constructed by means of it, this must be capable of exact expression.5.503. (shrink)

The period from 1900 to 1935 was particularly fruitful and important for the development of logic and logical metatheory. This survey is organized along eight "itineraries" concentrating on historically and conceptually linked strands in this development. Itinerary I deals with the evolution of conceptions of axiomatics. Itinerary II centers on the logical work of Bertrand Russell. Itinerary III presents the development of set theory from Zermelo onward. Itinerary IV discusses the contributions of the algebra of logic tradition, in particular, Löwenheim (...) and Skolem. Itinerary V surveys the work in logic connected to the Hilbert school, and itinerary V deals specifically with consistency proofs and metamathematics, including the incompleteness theorems. Itinerary VII traces the development of intuitionistic and many-valued logics. Itinerary VIII surveys the development of semantical notions from the early work on axiomatics up to Tarski's work on truth. (shrink)

According to the received view the later Wittgenstein subscribed to the thesis that speaking a language requires being guided by rules (thesis RG). In this paper we question the received view. On its most intuitive reading, we argue, (RG) is very much at odds with central tenets of the later Wittgenstein. Giving up on this reading, however, threatens to deprive the notion of rule-following of any real substance. Consequently, the rule-following considerations cannot charitably be read as a deep and subtle (...) defense of (RG) against the threat of paradox, as proponents of the received view are wont to do. Instead, we argue, the rule-following considerations provide Wittgenstein's deep and subtle reasons for rejecting the very idea that speaking a language involves rule-guidance. Although Wittgenstein subscribed to (RG) during his middle period writings, his later remarks on rules, far from being a clarification and elaboration of his earlier views, are directed against the claim of the middle period that speaking a language is an essentially rule-guided activity. (shrink)

This three-part chapter explores a higher-order logic we call ‘Classicism’, which extends a minimal classical higher-order logic with further axioms which guarantee that provable coextensiveness is sufficient for identity. The first part presents several different ways of axiomatizing this theory and makes the case for its naturalness. The second part discusses two kinds of extensions of Classicism: some which take the view in the direction of coarseness of grain (whose endpoint is the maximally coarse-grained view that coextensiveness is sufficient for (...) identity), and some which take the view in the direction of fineness of grain (whose endpoint is the maximally fine-grained theory containing all distinctness claims compatible with Classicism). The third part introduces some techniques for constructing models of Classicism, and uses them to prove the consistency of many of the extensions of Classicism introduced in the second part. (shrink)

A perspective in the philosophy of mathematics is developed from a consideration of the strengths and limitations of both logicism and platonism, with an early focus on Frege’s work. Importantly, although many set-theoretic structures may be developed each of which offers limited isomorphism with the system of natural numbers, no one of them may be identified with it. Furthermore, the timeless, ever present nature of mathematical concepts and results itself offers direct access, in the face of a platonist account which (...) generates a supposed problem of access. Crucially too, pure mathematics has its own distinctive method of confirming or validating results - mathematical proof - which supplies a higher level of confidence and objectivity than that available elsewhere. The dichotomy of invention and discovery is too jejune a framework for analysing creative mathematical activity. The Gödelian platonist perspective is evaluated and queried through scrutiny of the part played by mathematical resources and constraints in relation to human activity. It appears that there can be non-causal mathematical explanations and mathematical constraint on purely natural processes. Valuable implications of Quine’s naturalism are explored, but one must be cautious of his thesis of confirmational holism. The distinction between algebraic and non-algebraic mathematical theories usefully contributes to our understanding of the internally differentiated nature of the subject. (shrink)

Many interpreters of the Tractatus accept that the book endorses an argument for simples based on the reflection that, since complexes exist only contingently, if names referred to complexes the propositions in which they figure would lack sense if their referents went out of existence. More specifically, most interpreters read 2.0211-2.0212 as putting forward this argument. My main goal in this paper is to attack this reading and to put forward an alternative. I argue that there is no good reason (...) for thinking that the Tractatus advances this argument. I argue that 2.0211-2, in particular, should not be read in this way, and put forward an alternative reading of the passage. (shrink)

Wittgenstein held that Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment fails to explain an atomic judgment’s representation of entities as combined. He demonstrated this failure as follows. Under the multiple relation theory, an atomic judgment is a complex whose relating relation is judgment, the universal, and whose terms include the entities the judgment represents as combined. Taking such a complex we may arrive through the substitution of constituents at a complex whose relating relation is again judgment but whose terms do not (...) include entities which are logically suited for combination. This second judgment complex will not represent any of its terms as combined, for entities that are logically uncombinable are unrepresentable as combined. Russell’s theory does not, however, explain how the original judgment differs from the complex arrived at by the substitution of constituents such that the former but not the latter represents certain of its terms as combined. (shrink)

Review of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy in 1929, edited by Florian Franken Figueiredo.

I argue that on very weak assumptions about truth (in particular, that there are coherent norms governing the use of "true"), there is a proposition absolutely inexpressible with conventional language, or something very close. I argue for this claim "constructively": I use a variant of the Berry Paradox to reveal a particular thought for my readership to entertain that very strongly resists conventional expression. I gauge the severity of this expressive limitation within a taxonomy of expressive failures, and argue that (...) despite its strength there is nothing incoherent about admitting its existence. The argument forms part of a project of clarifying precisely what trade-offs are required to secure the kinds of expressive power truth theorists typically want, in the process showing that the admission of very strong expressive limitations may ultimately prove to be the lesser of two evils. (shrink)

This paper reveals two fallacies in Turing's undecidability proof of first-order logic (FOL), namely, (i) an 'extensional fallacy': from the fact that a sentence is an instance of a provable FOL formula, it is inferred that a meaningful sentence is proven, and (ii) a 'fallacy of substitution': from the fact that a sentence is an instance of a provable FOL formula, it is inferred that a true sentence is proven. The first fallacy erroneously suggests that Turing's proof of the non-existence (...) of a circle-free machine that decides whether an arbitrary machine is circular proves a significant proposition. The second fallacy suggests that FOL is undecidable. (shrink)

Die Simmel-Cassirer-Kontroverse behandelt den grundlegenden technikphilosophischen Gegensatz zwischen Kulturpessimismus und Kulturoptimismus. Diesen virtuellen Dialog beider Denker arbeitet Oliver Honer neu auf und entwickelt in einem aufsteigenden Reflexionsgang die Simmel'sche Rede von der »kulturellen Logik der Objekte« zum Begriff. Damit modelliert er das Verhältnis agierender Individuen zu ihren jeweiligen Möglichkeitsräumen und zeigt deren prekären Subjektstatus in diesen Räumen auf. Die dabei freigelegten Verhältnisse eröffnen angesichts technisch induzierter Eigenlogiken neue Wege einer dialektischen Kulturkritik.

Gaining information can be modelled as a narrowing of epistemic space . Intuitively, becoming informed that such-and-such is the case rules out certain scenarios or would-be possibilities. Chalmers’s account of epistemic space treats it as a space of a priori possibility and so has trouble in dealing with the information which we intuitively feel can be gained from logical inference. I propose a more inclusive notion of epistemic space, based on Priest’s notion of open worlds yet which contains only those (...) epistemic scenarios which are not obviously impossible. Whether something is obvious is not always a determinate matter and so the resulting picture is of an epistemic space with fuzzy boundaries. (shrink)

The thesis of self-elusiveness says, roughly, that the self fails to be phenomenally manifest from the first-person perspective. This thesis has a long history. Yet many who endorse it do so only in a very specific sense. They say that the self fails to be phenomenally manifest as an object from the first-person perspective; they say that self-experience is not a species of ‘object-consciousness’. Yet if consciousness outstrips object-consciousness, then we are left with the possibility that there is another sense (...) in which the self is phenomenally manifest. Alas, efforts to articulate just what this form of self-experience comes to—often a holy grail of sorts for those in, and influenced by, the phenomenological tradition—have remained stubbornly obscure. This essay attempts a partial remedy. Taking a cue from Bernard Lonergan, I suggest that self-experience, while not a species of object-consciousness, is nonetheless partially grounded in it. The result is a view that is compatible with self-experience being representational and relational, contra tradition. (shrink)

La trayectoria intelectual de Marcuse está acompañada de un compromiso constante con las formas de la crítica filosófica heredadas de la tradición occidental, desde la forma en la cual aparece la negación de lo dado a través del diálogo socrático hasta la manera en que se configura la crítica del sistema capitalista en el siglo XX. Esto no quiere decir que Marcuse haya sido un erudito que absorbió y comprendió a cabalidad todos los sistemas e ideas filosóficas y que las (...) utilizó al servicio de su propia consideración crítica del mundo; más bien resalta que entre sus elaboraciones han estado presentes algunos de los contextos e ideas más potentes del pensamiento que ha entendido de manera crítica la estructura de las sociedades humanas. (shrink)

This is the most comprehensive book ever published on philosophical methodology. A team of thirty-eight of the world's leading philosophers present original essays on various aspects of how philosophy should be and is done. The first part is devoted to broad traditions and approaches to philosophical methodology. The entries in the second part address topics in philosophical methodology, such as intuitions, conceptual analysis, and transcendental arguments. The third part of the book is devoted to essays about the interconnections between philosophy (...) and neighbouring fields, including those of mathematics, psychology, literature and film, and neuroscience. (shrink)

A response to a recent critique by Cem Bozşahin of the theory of syntactic semantics as it applies to Helen Keller, and some applications of the theory to the philosophy of computer science.

Distinctively mathematical explanations (DMEs) explain natural phenomena primarily by appeal to mathematical facts. One important question is whether there can be an ontic account of DME. An ontic account of DME would treat the explananda and explanantia of DMEs as ontic structures and the explanatory relation between them as an ontic relation (e.g., Pincock 2015, Povich 2021). Here I present a conventionalist account of DME, defend it against objections, and argue that it should be considered ontic. Notably, if indeed it (...) is ontic, the conventionalist account seems to avoid a convincing objection to other ontic accounts (Kuorikoski 2021). (shrink)

Although Wittgenstein’s most extensive discussion of aspect‐recognition appears in Part II of the Philosophical Investigations, aspect‐recognition was of interest to Wittgenstein almost from the beginning of his engagement with philosophy at Cambridge in 1912. However, the nature of that interest changes upon his return to Cambridge in 1929, and that change in turn is connected with the inter‐related ideas that philosophical clarity rests on recognising aspects of our grammar and that mathematical proof leads us to recognise new aspects of mathematical (...) expressions. (shrink)

Offers a revised understanding of human subjectivity that avoids the extremes of both traditional humanism and cultural relativism.“Acknowledging the importance of the ‘middle voice’ of rhetoric is a worthwhile endeavor. For this, Vivian’s goals are to be applauded.” — Rhetoric and Public Affairs.

We need to understand the impossible. Francesco Berto and Mark Jago start by considering what the concepts of meaning, information, knowledge, belief, fiction, conditionality, and counterfactual supposition have in common. They are all concepts which divide the world up more finely than logic does. Logically equivalent sentences may carry different meanings and information and may differ in how they're believed. Fictions can be inconsistent yet meaningful. We can suppose impossible things without collapsing into total incoherence. Yet for the leading philosophical (...) theories of meaning, these phenomena are an unfathomable mystery. To understand these concepts, we need a metaphysical, logical, and conceptual grasp of situations that could not possibly exist: Impossible Worlds. This book discusses the metaphysics of impossible worlds and applies the concept to a range of central topics and open issues in logic, semantics, and philosophy. It considers problems in the logic of knowledge, the meaning of alternative logics, models of imagination and mental simulation, the theory of information, truth in fiction, the meaning of conditional statements, and reasoning about the impossible. In all these cases, impossible worlds have an essential role to play. (shrink)