Clinical Ethics Consultations are an important tool for physicians in solving difficult cases. They are extremely common in North America and to a lesser extent also present in Europe. However, there is little data on this practice in Poland. We present results of a survey of 521 physicians practising in Poland concerning their opinion on CECs and related practices. We analysed the data looking at such issues as CECs’ perceived availability, use of CECs, and perceived usefulness of such support. Physicians (...) in our study generally encounter hard ethics cases, even—surprisingly—those who do not work in hospitals. Most physicians have no CEC access, and those that do still do not employ CECs. However, physicians perceive this form of support as useful—even more so among actual users of CECs. We compared these findings with similar studies from other European countries and the North America. We point out peculiarities of our results as compared to those in other countries, with some possible explanations. We hope the results may encourage regulatory debate on the need to formally introduce CECs into the Polish healthcare system. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to introduce the work of Leopold Blaustein — philosopher and psychologist, who studied under Kazimierz Twardowski in Lvov and under Husserl in Freiburg im Breisgau. In his short academic career Blaustein developed an original philosophy that drew upon both phenomenology and Twardowski’s analytical approach. One of his main publications concerns Husserl’s early theory of intentional act and object, introduced in Logische Untersuchungen. In the first part of the article I briefly present Blaustein’s biography and (...) some general features of his philosophy. The second part provides an overview of Blaustein’s dissertation concerning Husserl’s early phenomenology. In the third and final part I summarize Blaustein’s research, including the critical remarks of Roman Ingarden. (shrink)

Eric Olson and David Shoemaker argue that our numerical identity over time is irrelevant to such practical issues as moral responsibility or self-concern. Being the same individual at different moments in time may, in our case, can be seen as the preservation of the relevant biological processes (e.g., according to Olson), while psychological continuity, independent of these processes, may be crucial for such issues. I will defend the view that, contrary to the above authors, any conception of our diachronic identity (...) has ethical implications, at least with regard to the aforementioned issues. My argument has two basic assumptions. (1) The dispute over identity of persons is a dispute over the conditions of our persistence in time as the same individuals, whether we consider being a person as our essential property or not (e.g., Olson maintains the latter). The question is under what conditions I am the same as a particular earlier or later individual. (2) The pronoun “I,” on the other hand, is an essential component of practical reasoning, so also of ethical one. Thus, the debate on the persistence of persons concerns the identity conditions of the individuals to whom/which we refer when planning our future actions, formulating our intentions. My rational self-concern or my moral responsibility for past actions regards the individual to whom the pronoun refers. An additional result of my argument is to undermine the influential strategy of defending positions on our diachronic identity against the charge of controversial ethical implications. It cannot be argued in the case of every such controversy that a given ethical issue only apparently involves our identity, while in fact what is relevant to it is a different relation binding persons at different moments in time. (shrink)

This paper concerns an important and exciting book by Marek Dobrzeniecki Ukrytość i Wcielenie. Teistyczna odpowiedź na argument Johna L. Schellenberga za nieistnieniem Boga [Hiddenness and the Incarnation: A Theistic Response to John L. Schellenberg’s Argument for Divine Nonexistence]. After a brief discussion of the content of the book’s chapters, critical remarks are presented. They concern the adopted method and approach to Schellenberg’s philosophy in general and the argument from hiddenness in particular. The conceptual framework serving as a typologization (...) of the propositional dimension of the phenomenon of theistic belief/faith is dubious and requires in-depth research. It is worth considering the possibility of asymmetry of the attitudes of belief/faith and unbelief, which requires consideration in the reasoning whose legitimacy would assume the transfer of features from one to the other and the negation functor. Regarding the voluntarism of belief in God, the paper suggests that extreme, purely intellectual, and purely volitional positions should be considered, as well as moderate and mixed ones. It is argued extensively that Dobrzeniecki’s criticism against the arguments of Rea and Mourad is not conclusive. Just the possibility of voluntariness of disbelief undermines the validity of Schellenberg’s argument and should therefore be ruled out as much as possible. The paper suggests supplementing Dobrzeniecki’s approach with a ‘trans-paradigmatic’ approach consisting of external criticism, which, in the light of Schellenberg’s arguments being probably incompatible with the described phenomenon of religious belief in God, leads to a modification of the theoretical apparatus of Schellenberg’s paradigm. Such a modification deprives the latter’s argument of justification. --- Niniejszy artykuł dotyczy ważnej i interesującej książki Marka Dobrzenieckiego Ukrytość i Wcielenie. Teistyczna odpowiedź na argument Johna L. Schellenberga za nieistnieniem Boga. Po krótkim omówieniu zawartości poszczególnych rozdziałów książki prezentuję swoje uwagi krytyczne. Dotyczą one przyjętej metody i podejścia do filozofii Schellenberga w ogólności, a argumentu z ukrytości w szczególności. Wątpliwa i wymagająca pogłębionego badania jest siatka pojęciowa pełniąca funkcję typologizacji propozycjonalnego wymiaru fenomenu wiary teistycznej. Warta rozważania jest możliwość niesymetryczności postaw wiary i niewiary, co wymaga uwzględnienia w rozumowaniach, których zasadność zakładałaby przenoszenie cech z jednej na drugą oraz funktora negacji. W sprawie woluntaryzmu wiary w Boga sugeruję, że należy rozpatrywać nie tylko stanowiska skrajne, czysto intelektualistyczne i czysto wolicjonalne, ale także u miarkowane i mieszane. Argumentuję szeroko, że krytyka Dobrzenieckiego skierowana przeciwko argumentom Rea i Mourada nie jest konkluzywna. Argumentuję, że samo możliwość woluntarności niewiary podważa zasadność argumentu Schellenberga i dlatego powinna ona być wykluczona w sposób maksymalnie możliwie uzasadniony. Sugeruję uzupełnienie podejścia Dobrzenieckiego o podejście ‘transparadygmatyczne’ polegające na rodzaju krytyki zewnętrznej, która w świetle nieprzystawania argumentacji Schellenberga do opisywanego fenomenu prowadzi do modyfikacji aparatu teoretycznego paradygmatu Schellenberga. Taka modyfikacja odbiera argumentowi tego ostatniego moc uzasadniającą. (shrink)

In the article I discuss functionalist interpretations of Husserlian phenomenology. The first one was coined in the discussion between Hubert Dreyfus and Ronald McIntyre. They argue that Husserl’s phenomenology shares similarities with computational functionalism, and the key similarity is between the concept of noema and the concept of mental representation. I show the weaknesses of that reading and argue that there is another available functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology. I propose to shift perspective and approach the relation between phenomenology and (...) functionalism from a methodological perspective, specifically taking into account the functionalist explanatory strategy called functional analysis. I discuss the notion of function in Husserl’s works and Husserl’s idea of functional phenomenology. The key argument I develop is that in functional phenomenology we can find an explanatory strategy which is analogous to the strategy of functional decomposition used in functional analysis. I conclude that the proposed functionalist reading of phenomenology opens a new approach to the integration of phenomenology with cognitive sciences. (shrink)

PETER KNAUER'S CONCEPTION OF MORAL CHOICE ON THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL CREAITVENESS IN MODERN MORAL THEOLOGY Summary The author undertakes a critical analysis of the ethical views of Peter Knauer who is one of the most influential theological moralist today. The author tends to show the consequences of Knauer's theory which consequences are destructive for morality. The first part of the paper presents Knauer's standpoint in view of the conception of moral choice and shows three crucial points of his system. They are (...) the following: the definition of moral good (lightness) in its relation to physical good; the reinterpretation of the principle of double effect which reinterpretation reduces that principle to its "Ideological explanation"; and, finally, the conception of the so-called non-counterproductivity which decides whether an activity is right. That non-counterproductivity is comprehended as an all-embracing correspondence between the goals which the subject has chosen and means which the subject has taken in order to accomplish the goals. In the second critical part one finds some questions related to the immanent critique of the discussed theory and some consequences of Knauer's claims. If one applies his assumptions strictly, it turns out that in his model of morality there is no place for such an activity of man which, at the same time, would be both rational and free, i.e., sensu stricto moral. In view of Knauer's system the criteria of moral evaluation, which criteria he proposed, do not hold sense. Thus morality and ethics lose their essential normative character. Consequently, the system under scrutiny leads to an antipersonalistic vision of both an individual and society, and in terms of eternity it seems to dismiss the possibility of recognizing the existence of Absolute. The theory rejects values for the sake of which it was construed. Translated by Jan Kłos. (shrink)

Wersja przedostatnia, z 2010 roku. Proszę cytować wersję opublikowaną. Pre-final version, from 2010. Please, quote the published version.

Descriptions of bodies within the literature of the enactive approach to cognitive science exhibit an interesting dialectical tension. On the one hand, a body is considered to be a unity which instantiates an identity, forming an intrinsic basis for value. On the other, a living body is in a reciprocally defining relationship with the environment, and is therefore immersed and entangled with, rather than distinct from, its environment. In this paper I examine this tension, and its implications for the enactive (...) approach, particularly the enactive conceptions of life and bodies. Following the lead of others, I argue that enactive cognitive science can benefit from a deeper reading and integration with extant work on the complexity and multiplicity of the living body within feminist philosophy and feminist science studies. (shrink)

According to The Consensus Gentium Argument from the premise: “Everyone believes that God exists” one can conclude that God does exist. In my paper I analyze two ways of defending the claim that somebody’s belief in God is a prima facie reason to believe. Kelly takes the fact of the commonness of the belief in God as a datum to explain and argues that the best explanation has to indicate the truthfulness of the theistic belief. Trinkaus Zagzebski grounds her defence (...) on rationality of epistemic trust in others. In the paper I argue that the second line of reasoning is more promising and I propose its improved version. (shrink)

In the last two decades, major cities in Malaysia have witnessed a spate of urban redevelopment including commercial and retail complexes, and residential estates. The current urban transformations taking place in Malaysian cities are mainly market-driven and characterized by fast-track development with a strong priority on the road infrastructure. This is a typical example of an intensive property-led development that is becoming a central driver of the national economy. This article provides a deeper understanding of the complexity of urban development (...) in Malaysia. Here, the major aim is to understand the Malaysian cities' transitions in the trajectory of their colonial past, national identity, multi-cultural community, culture, and religion. Focusing on South East Asian urbanism, this article determines how internal and external forces and global trends such as neoliberalism and property-led development affect the transformation of urban landscapes and expansions in Malaysia. The outcomes of this paper will indicate how much property-led development and globalisation have affected the traditional and tropical climate-responsive urban environment in Malaysia. It will also identify sustainable design and planning measures that should be implemented in the cities of Malaysia to combat the ill-effects of globalisation. (shrink)

On Relation between the Individual Character of Propositional Knowledge and Its Value -/- The paper presents two aspects of human propositional knowledge, objective and subjective. The former is based on the truth condition, and the latter on the belief condition. Then several problems of the value of knowledge are briefly presented. The last part contains two arguments for the sine qua non belief condition of knowledge, one of which concerns the problem of epistemic luck assumed in virtue.

Two competing models of metaaxiological justification of politics are analyzed. Politics is understood broadly, as actions which aim at organizing social life. I will be, first of all, interested in law making activities. When I talk about metaaxiological justification I think not so much about determinations of what is good, but about determinations refering to the way the good is founded, in short: determinations which answer the question why something is good. In the first model, which is described here as (...) objectivistic, it is assumed that determining that which is good is a matter of cognition; in the second model, which could be described here as voluntaristic or excedingly liberal, it is assumed that determining good is not a matter of cognition but of will – something is good because it is wanted. In the latter model, the cognoscibility of good is rejected and therefore the objective criteria for evaluation of which ‘will’ is better and which is worse are rejected. As a consequence, negative freedom becomes the fundamental value of social order and the basic requirement is that of maximizing the sphere of individual’s free actions, the sphere which is free from interference of other individuals or institutions. I am going to argue that none of these models is acceptable as a basis of oragnizing social life, and at least because of one reason. Each of them leads to a certain version of totalitarianism. In the conclusion I am going to present a mixed model, which, in my opinion, reflexes well the practice of democratic states. Analysis of these three models allows, first of all, to identify more clearly some of the problems appearing in making law, including procedural questions. By pointing at the interdependence of the foundations of good and law making procedures it is argued that the choice of the concept of good (a metaaxiological choice) is primary to the choice of law making procedures. (shrink)

Problem of Axiological Legitimization of the Universal System of the Protection of Human Rights Summary In this paper it is argued that legitimization of the universal system of the protection of human rights depends primary not from the content of values recognised as fundamental but rather from metaaxiological solutions related to the way of existence and to the possibility of cognition of these values. Legitimisation is based on the recognition of an objective nature and of cognoscibility of basic values. Realisation (...) of the primary aim of this paper is linked to the problem of different meanings of the notion of universality, used in the context of the universal system of the protection of human rights. First, descriptive and normative meanings have to be distinguished. In the case of normative sense, there are moral and legal meanings of “universality”. An axiological justification of the universality of human rights in the legal sense leads to the legitimisation of the universal system. It is shown that modifications of – broadly accepted in the Polish theory of law – definitions of an axiological justification of legal norms are needed. These definitions base such a justification on the valuations made by particular groups of subjects. It is argued that it is much more convenient to refer to valuations understood as meanings of sentences of certain kind. -/- Streszczenie W artykule zmierza się do uzasadnienia tezy, że legitymizacja uniwersalnego systemu ochrony praw człowieka jest oparta nie tyle na treści wartości uznawanych w tym systemie, ale na uznanych w nich rozstrzygnięciach metaaksjologicznych, dotyczących tego, jak istnieją wartości podstawowe dla tego systemu i czy są one poznawalne. Walor legitymizacyjny posiada przede wszystkim uznanie obiektywnego charakteru tych wartości i ich poznawalności. Realizacja zasadniczego celu zakłada uporządkowanie podstawowych pojęć dotyczących problematyki powszechności praw człowieka – termin „powszechność” stosowany w odniesieniu do praw człowieka w kontekście uniwersalnego systemu ochrony ma wiele znaczeń. Przede wszystkim odróżnić trzeba powszechność w aspekcie opisowym i w aspekcie normatywnym. W przypadku powszechności w aspekcie normatywnym w grę może wchodzić powszechność w sensie ideowym i powszechność w sensie pozytywnoprawnym. Uzasadnienie tej ostatniej jest też uzasadnieniem poszukiwanej tu legitymizacji uniwersalnego systemu ochrony praw człowieka. Prowadzone analizy prowadza także do sformułowania postulatów dotyczących sposobu definiowania uzasadnienia aksjologicznego norm prawnych. Modyfikacji wymagają powszechnie przyjmowane w polskiej teorii prawa definicje relatywizujące takie uzasadnienie do ocen przyjmowanych przez konkretne podmioty oceniające lub ich grupy. (shrink)

W NINIEJSZYM opracowaniu analizuję klauzulę dobra wspólnego zawartą w art. 1 Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 2 kwietnia 1997 r., zmierzając do uwyraźnienia, w jakim sensie można mówić o jej prawnonaturalnym charakterze (zatem i do zarysowania możliwych znaczeń zwrotu "prawnonaturalny charakter klauzuli dobra wspólnego") oraz do ujawnienia „momentów" prawnonaturalnych, które mogą wchodzić w grę przy interpretacji tej klauzuli.

The article deals with relations between the individual and human rights on the one hand, and the State on the other, in the context of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The author poses the question whether the idea of subordination of the State to the individual is really a central idea of that constitution. He puts forward many arguments against such suggestion. These arguments relate, above all, to the arrangement of the constitution: a chapter concerning human rights is (...) chapter II, while chapter I deals with foundation of the State; the goals of the State are specified in the preamble including the following initial phrase “the existence and future of Poland as our Homeland” and in Article 5 where human rights are as subject of protection by the State is mentioned after independence and integrity of [its] territory; a general concept of human rights protection adopted in the constitution is dominated by the structures typical of law in its objective sense; the way of regulation admissible limitations on human rights differs from international standards; possibility of claiming human rights is constitutionally guaranteed, mostly by constitutional complaint which is above all aimed at correction of legal system, rather than claiming of rights by the individual; Article 1 (“The Republic of Poland shall be the common good of all its citizens”) interpreted as referring to Article 1 paragraph 1 of the April Constitution of 1935, one of the main ideas of which was precedence of the State over the individual. He also analyses the arguments in favour of the recognition of the idea of subordination of the State. Nevertheless, they cannot be accepted as resolving the question of whether it is a central idea of the constitution. These arguments include in particular: the principle of subsidiarity contained in the preamble, even if it has not been appropriately emphasized there; recognition of inherent and inalienable dignity of the person, but it was not until Article 30 that this provision has been contained and it does not determine the relations between the human dignity and rights and the State. The author suggests that the only conclusive way to justify the subordination of the State in relation to the individual as a central idea of the constitution is by means of Article 1. Taking into account, above all, preparatory work, we should reject the interpretation of that article referring to the April (1935) Constitution. Essential interpretative context may be found in preparatory work and social teachings of the Catholic Church, referred to therein. In that case, the common good means the entirety of the conditions of social life which favour the human development. These conditions include above all the respect for human dignity. Such interpretation of Article 1 gives priority to proposals on what the State should be to serve the individual rather than to safeguard obligations of citizens in relation to the State. (shrink)

The article provides an analysis of the European Court of Human Rights judgments in the case of Lautsi v. Italy (application no. 30814/06), also known as the Italian crucifix case. The applicant claimed that displaying crucifixes in the Italian State-school classrooms attended by her children was contrary to the principle of secularism, by which she wished to bring up her children, and therefore infringed her right to ensure their education and teaching in conformity with her religious and philosophical convictions, and (...) also breached her freedom of conviction and religion, as protected by Article 9 of the Convention. In its judgment of November 3, 2009, the seven-judge Chamber declared that there had been a violation of Article 2 (right to education) of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights taken together with Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion) of the Convention. The judgment was given unanimously and none of the judges appended a separate opinion. The Italian Government asked for the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber by virtue of Article 43 of the Convention. In the judgment of the Grand Chamber, delivered on March 18, 2011, the Court held, by fifteen votes to two (and with separate opinions of six judges), that there had been no violation of Protocol No. 1 and no violation of the Convention itself. The analysis in the article is focused on selected principal factors determining the Court's decision. It shows that the proposal for the Court to recognize secular convictions as those protected by Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 or Article 9 of the Convention has no sufficient basis in the Convention itself and in earlier Court's case-law and, even, may be considered as promotion of religious intolerance, threatening the freedom to publicly manifest a religion or belief, as guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention. -/- Opracowanie zawiera analizę wyroków Europejskiego Trybunału, które zapadły w sprawie Soile Lautsi (app. 30814/06), zwaną „włoska sprawa krzyża” (Italian Crucifix Case). W sprawie tej skarżąca zarzucała, że okazywanie znaku krzyża w klasach włoskich szkół państwowych, do których uczęszczały jej dzieci, jest sprzeczne z zasadą sekularyzmu, zgodnie z którą chciała ona wychować swoje dzieci i dlatego stanowi naruszenie jej prawa do wychowania i nauczania zgodnego z jej religijnymi i filozoficznymi (moralnymi) przekonaniami, oraz stanowi naruszenie wolności religijnej, gwarantowanej art. 9 Konwencji. W wyroku siedmioosobowej izby ogłoszonym 3 listopada 2009 r. izba uznała naruszenie art. 2 (Prawo do nauki) Protokołu dodatkowego nr 1 do Konwencji o ochronie praw człowieka i podstawowych wolności w powiązaniu z art. 9 (Wolność myśli, sumienia i wyznania) Konwencji. Wyrok zapadł jednomyślnie i żaden z sędziów nie dołączył do wyroku swoich uwag. Rząd Włoch złożył wniosek w trybie przewidzianym art. 43 Konwencji o przekazanie sprawy do Wielkiej Izby. W wyroku Wielkiej Izby ogłoszonym 18 marca 2011 r. Trybunał uznał zdecydowaną większością głosów – 15 za wobec 2 przeciw (sześciu sędziów dołączyło swoje uwagi), że nie doszło do naruszenia ani Protokołu nr 1, ani samej Konwencji. Analizy koncentrują się na wybranych zagadnieniach, kluczowych dla argumentacji Trybunału. Analizy te pokazują, że postulowanie przez izbę uznania za prawo podmiotowe radykalnie pojętej negatywnej wolności religijnej, oraz postulowanie - tak przez izbę, jak i przez Wielką Izbę - ochrony przekonań sekularystycznych jako przekonań chronionych art. 2 Protokołu dodatkowego nr 1 lub art. 9 Konwencji, nie posiada należytego uzasadnienia ani w samej Konwencji, ani w dotychczasowym orzecznictwie Trybunału, a co więcej – może być uznane za propagowanie nietolerancji religijnej, godzącej przede wszystkim chronioną art. 9 Konwencji wolność publicznego uzewnętrzniania przekonań religijnych i filozoficznych. (shrink)

In contemporary positive law there are legal institutions, such as conscientious objection in the context of military service or “conscience clauses” in medical law, which for the sake of respect for judgments of conscience aim at restricting legal obligations. Such restrictions are postulated to protect human freedom in general. On the basis of Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy, it shall be argued that human dignity, understood as the existential perfection of a human being based on special unity, provides a foundation for imposing (...) limitations on the scope of legal obligations in general. Human freedom plays a crucial role in understanding dignity as perfection based on the special individuality of a personal being, which in turn is based on the free choice to pursue a unique way of life. Therefore, Aquinas’ argumentation is, at its core, liberal – the perfection rather than the imperfection of a human being underlies the requirement to limit legal obligations. Dignity understood as the special unity of a person also provides the basis for limiting obligations in the case of conscientious objection; however, in that case, such limitations aim at safeguarding internal integrity rather than the individualisation of a given way of life. _This project was financed with funds from the National Science Centre allocated on the basis of the decision number DEC-2013/09/B/HS5/04232._. (shrink)

W niniejszym opracowaniu zamierzam zwrócić uwagę na powiązanie roszczenia uniwersalności z potrzebą dostosowywania formułowanych standardów do odmiennych i zmiennych warunków życia, a następnie zidentyfikować rozstrzygnięcia filozoficzne skorelowane z uznaniem takiego powiązania. Akcent zamierzam przy tym położyć na problematykę metaaksjologiczną, dotyczącą nie tyle tego, jakie wartości zostały uznane, ale tego, jak uznane wartości są ugruntowane, co nie jest bez znaczenia dla określenia sposobów ich poznawania i ustalania. Rozstrzygnięcia te, jako zawarte m. in. w artykule 1, okazują się jednocześnie należeć do przyjętych (...) w Deklaracji fundamentalnych rozstrzygnięć filozoficznych w ogóle. (shrink)

The fact of religious diversity is vital for the philosopher of religion but also, to some extent, for the believer of a given faith. It takes place in such a dimension in which the views of a given believer or the meaning of the practice of a given religion presupposes the truthfulness of specific claims concerning a given religion or the beliefs included in it. If now on the part of the philosopher of religion or the followers of another religion, (...) there is a direct or indirect challenge to such a key proposition, religious disagreement with epistemic dimension is involved. At the same time, it is not the case that any religious diversity is a case of epistemically significant religious dissent. The paper, by distinguishing different aspects of religions and functions performed by religion, tries to show in which situations religious diversification leads to religious disagreement. Both the follower of religion and the philosopher of religion can and should seek the truth in matters of crucial importance to religion. The difference is that the follower of a given religion is more interested in the salvific and practical functions of religion, along with the associated sense of value and meaningfulness of life and, to a lesser degree, the theoretical certainty that her religion is correct at crucial points. On the other hand, the achievement of ‘the soteriological’ purpose of religion based on false belief is impossible, just as the meaningfulness of life 'based on the sand and not on the rock’. It is because the false foundation is devoid of higher value. That is why there is a community of a philosopher of religion and a follower of a given religion to search for the truth of it. (shrink)

Dawkins’ Ballet in the Garden of Theology. A Critical Assessment of Richard Dawkins’ Epistemological Theses on Theistic Beliefs from the God Delusion. Part II My paper presents an analysis and assessment of Richard Dawkins’ assumption from his book The God Delusion that there are no reason against treating belief in God as a scientific hypothesis, because even if the God existence is not disprovable, we could and maybe should ask if His existence is probable or highly improbable. My first aim (...) is to examine Dawkins' argumentation against if he is aware multiple possible ways interpretation of the claim that religious belief in God, construed as the hypothesis that existence of Creator may be treated as a scientific kind of hypothesis. My second aim is to show a nature of relation between his scientific God-hypothesis and his criticism of Thomas Henry Huxley agnosticism. I maintain that the he can't treat his probabilistic account of theism/atheism controversy as a ground for possible evidence for his controversial claim, that scientific knowledge could solve the problem of God's existence. As the matter of facts , things are just the opposite. I argue for claim that his construal of belief in God in terms of probabilistic scientific hypothesis is normatively weak and he can't use it in argumentation against rationality of belief in God even if he would be succesfully show that God-hypothesis is very weak and improbable explanation of origins and complexity of life. (shrink)

POLITICO Studio speaks with Ricardo Marek, President Europe and Canada at Takeda Pharmaceuticals, on why rare diseases need to be a public health priority, and how Europe can remain a leader in life sciences.

This study aims to identify various meanings of the expression (name) “dignity”, with particular emphasis on the meanings of this expression as it appears in the text of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The meaning of the name “dignity” is the concept of dignity; in turn, the different concepts of dignity encompass dignity of particular types. Twelve different meanings of the expression “dignity” are indicated – twelve different concepts of dignity, and thus twelve types of dignity. Half of (...) them are meanings (concepts) that recognize dignity as something belonging to a human being as a subject of law. They were considered in the essay Godność jako właściwość osoby. Typy godności – propozycja systematyzacji [Dignity as a Quality of Person – a Proposed Systematisation]. This group of meanings includes three concepts of dignity which recognize dignity as something constitutive of being a person: (1) inherent dignity of the person, (2) dignity established by qualities specific to a thinking being, and (3) dignity as a historically emergent social status of all human beings. The second group of meanings, treating dignity as something with which the human being (the person) is endowed, includes concepts which encompass (4) personal dignity (honour and good reputation), (5) dignity as moral excellence, and (6) dignity as appropriateness of attitude or behaviour. -/- Dignity as an attribute of collective entities and dignity as an institutionally grounded attribute are a subject of this paper. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland speaks of (1) the dignity of the Nation, (2) the dignity of office or function, and (3) public dignity. The expression “the dignity of the Nation” can be understood in four different ways: (i) analogously to the understanding of dignity of the person, (ii) of personal dignity, (iii) of dignity as moral excellence, and (iv) of dignity as appropriateness of attitude or behaviour. The expression “dignity” when designating something institutionally grounded can designate (4) the dignity of social roles, (5) the dignity of a profession, and – specifically to the Polish language – (6) dignity meaning a surname. -/- The author argues that it is unacceptable to ascribe different concepts of dignity to the expression “dignity” appearing in a specific legal provision. (shrink)

The study aims at making explicit the three spheres or planes, essential from the point of view of semiotics, on which the discourse regarding dignity takes place, and at clarifying the relations between these planes. The analysis uses the conception of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. There are three principal areas in which the discourse on dignity is conducted – the plane of linguistic expressions on which the name “dignity” is used; the plane of meanings on which the notion of dignity is placed; (...) and the plane of objects on which there is dignity itself. There is a relationship of meaning between the different concepts of dignity and the expression “dignity”, a relationship of signification between expression “dignity” and dignity as its referent, and a relationship of apprehension between the concepts of dignity and their referents. (shrink)

Artykuł przedstawia polskie regulacje prawne z lat 1998-2007 będące podstawą lustracji. Analizuje szereg aktów prawnych prezentując zakładane cele lustracji, jej zakres, procedury i przewidywane sankcje karne. Celem autora jest identyfikacja aksjologicznych podstaw regulacji prawnych dotyczących lustracji. W trakcie analiz wskazuje on m. in. na brak proporcji między sankcjami karnymi a winą jednostek, zwłaszcza w niektórych przypadkach penalizacji oświadczeń lustracyjnych niezgodnych z prawdą lub penalizacji niezłożenia oświadczeń. Autor argumentuje także, że analizowane rozwiązania zakładały – wbrew deklarowanym celom – przeniesienie odpowiedzialności za (...) zło systemu politycznego z jego aktywnych twórców na jednostki wbrew woli poddane działaniu tego systemu. Ponadto argumentuje, że lustracja oparta na przeprowadzanym przez państwo „teście moralności” radykalnie ingeruje w wewnętrzną sferę moralności jednostki i stąd zakłada elementy typowe dla aksjologii systemów totalitarnych; państwo nakazuje dokonać działania, które bezpośrednio i wprost zmierza do realizacji ściśle wewnętrznej wartości moralnej opartej na zgodności oświadczenia z przekonaniami, i jednocześnie państwo ustanawia siebie nie tylko obserwatorem i sędzią realizacji tej wartości, ale także autorem wzorca przekonań, z którymi oświadczenie ma być zgodne. (shrink)

The article analyzes and criticizes the assumptions of Peter Van Inwagen’s argument for the alleged contradiction of the foreknowledge of God and human freedom. The argument is based on the sine qua non condition of human freedom defined as access to possible worlds containing such a continuation of the present in which the agent implements a different action than will be realized de facto in the future. The condition also contains that in every possible continuation of the present state of (...) affairs, the same propositions about the ‘present past’ (the past before the present moment) are true as are true in the present state of affairs. The paper argues that Van Inwagen’s reasoning is inconclusive, it contains the type of mistake of confusing conditional impossibility with unconditional and presents a methodologically wrong method of solving a philosophical problem. It is because in the very construction of the problem determining the available solution. The article points to the possibility that the human freedom of some action is not excluded by the fact that specific past facts logically entail that this event will occur. (shrink)

Studie se věnuje čtyřem astronomickým pomůckám, které vytvořil a užíval Gerbert z Aurillacu, remešský a ravennský arcibiskup, opat v Bobbiu a v letech 999–1003 papež. Gerbert vyučoval quadrivium především v Remeši a od jeho žáka Richera z Remeše a z Gerbertových dopisů víme o čtyřech jeho přístrojích, které poskytovaly srozumitelný a názorný úvod do geocentrického výkladu veškerenstva: 1. glóbus světové sféry s nastavitelným horizontem; 2. pozorovací hemisféra s pěti rovnoběžnými kruhy světové sféry ; 3. armilární sféra s vnitřním umístěním ekliptiky (...) a oběžných drah planet; 4. armilární sféra s vnějším umístěním hvězd a souhvězdí. (shrink)

"Dignity as a Quality of Person: Types of Dignity – a Proposed Systematisation" This study aims to identify various meanings of the expression (name) “dignity”, with particular emphasis on the meanings of the expression as it appears in the text of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The meaning of the name “dignity” is the concept of dignity; in turn, the concept of dignity encompasses dignity of particular types. Twelve different meanings of the expression “dignity” are indicated – twelve (...) different concepts of dignity, and thus twelve types of dignity. Half of them are meanings (concepts) that recognize dignity as something belonging to a human being as a subject of law, and this essay is devoted to this group of meanings. This group of meanings includes three concepts of dignity which encompass dignity as something constitutive of being a person: (1) inherent dignity of the person, (2) dignity established by qualities specific to a thinking being, and (3) dignity as a historically emergent social status of all human beings. Only the first of these three concepts of dignity is adequate to the interpretation of the preamble and art. 30 of the Polish Constitution. The second group of meanings, treating dignity as something with which the human being is endowed, includes concepts which encompass (4) personal dignity (honour and good reputation), (5) dignity as moral excellence, and (6) dignity as appropriateness of attitude or behaviour. The other half of the meanings take dignity as something that belongs to something. These meanings will be considered in the forthcoming essay Godność jako cecha podmiotów zbiorowych i godność jako cecha ugruntowana instytucjonalnie. Typy godności – propozycja systematyzacji [Dignity as an Attribute of Collective Entities and Dignity as an Institutionally Grounded Attribute: Types of Dignity – a Proposed Systematisation]. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland speaks of (1) the dignity of the Nation, (2) the dignity of office or function, and (3) public dignity. The expression “dignity” when designating something belonging to something can also designate (4) the dignity of social status based on belonging to a social group, (5) the dignity of a profession, and – specifically to the Polish language – (6) dignity meaning a surname. The author argues that it is unacceptable to ascribe different concepts of dignity to the expression “dignity” appearing in a specific legal provision. STRESZCZENIE Opracowanie zmierza do identyfikacji różnych znaczeń wyrażenia (nazwy) „godność”, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem znaczeń tego wyrażenia występującego w tekście Konstytucji RP. Znaczeniem nazwy „godność” jest pojęcie godności; z kolei pojęcie godności ujmuje samą godność danego typu. Wskazanych zostaje dwanaście różnych znaczeń wyrażenia „godność” – dwanaście różnych pojęć godności, zatem i dwanaście jej typów. Połowa z nich to znaczenia (pojęcia), które ujmują godność jako coś przynależnego człowiekowi jako podmiotowi i tym znaczeniom (i odpowiadającym im typom godności) poświęcone jest niniejsze opracowanie. W tej grupie znaczeń odróżnione zostają trzy pojęcia godności, które ujmują godność jako coś konstytutywnego dla bycia osobą – (1) przyrodzoną i niezbywalną godność osobową, (2) godność opartą na obserwowalnych i zmiennych cechach specyficznych dla istoty rozumnej i (3) godność opartą na historycznie ukształtowanym statusie społecznym przypisanym wszystkim ludziom. Jedynie pierwsze z tych pojęć jest adekwatne do interpretacji preambuły i art. 30 Konstytucji RP. W drugiej grupie znaczeń ujmujących godność jako coś przysługującego człowiekowi są pojęcia ujmujące godność jako cechę osoby – (4) godność osobistą (cześć i dobre imię), (5) godność osobowościową (poziom moralny) oraz (6) godność jako dyspozycja do stosownego sposobu bycia. Druga połowa znaczeń ujmuje godność jako coś przynależnego czemuś lub jako coś o charakterze konwencjonalnym, instytucjonalnym. Te znaczenia będą omawiane w kolejnym opracowaniu Godność jako cecha podmiotów zbiorowych lub cecha ugruntowana instytucjonalnie. Typy godności – Propozycja systematyzacji – Część 2. Konstytucja RP mówi o (1) godności Narodu, (2) godności urzędu lub funkcji, oraz o (3) godności publicznej (godnościach publicznych. Wyrażenie „godność” jako desygnujące coś przynależnego czemuś może także desygnować (4) godność statusu społecznego opartego na przynależności do jakiejś grupy społecznej, (5) godność zawodu oraz – co specyficzne dla języka polskiego – (6) godność jako nazwisko. Autor argumentuje, że niedopuszczalne jest przypisywanie wyrażeniu „dignity” występującym w danym przepisie prawnym, różnych pojęć godności. (shrink)

STRESZCZENIE Opracowanie zmierza do udzielenia odpowiedzi na pytanie, czym – z punktu widzenia struktury procesu wykładni i struktury wchodzących w grę wartości konstytucyjnych – różni się ograniczanie wolności i praw w ramach stosowania „zwykłych środków konstytucyjnych”, od ograniczania wolności i praw dopuszczalnego w stanach nadzwyczajnych. Podjęta zostaje problematyka dotyczącą kwestii materialnych, a poza zakresem rozważanych zagadnień pozostają kwestie dotyczące formalnych warunków dopuszczalności ograniczeń, jak publiczne ogłoszenie zagrożenia czy możliwość wprowadzania ograniczeń w aktach podustawowych. Stawiane tezy są polemiczne wobec poglądów, że (...) zawieszenie wolności lub praw jest skrajnym typem ograniczania i następuje wtedy, gdy wolności czy prawa „już nie ma”, lub że zawieszenie zakłada ograniczenie istoty wolności lub prawa. Okazuje się, że można sensownie mówić o zawieszaniu wolności lub praw także wówczas, gdy są one ograniczane w niewielkim tylko stopniu. Ponadto, możliwe jest zawieszanie, które nie prowadzi do ograniczenia istoty wolności lub prawa. Argumentuje się, że istotą zawieszania wolności lub praw w stanach nadzwyczajnych jest zakwestionowanie podstawowego ich przymiotu, jakim jest – uznawana w prawie międzynarodowym – nienaruszalność „całych” poszczególnych praw człowieka, która jest czymś innym od nienaruszalności ich istoty. Przy okazji prowadzona jest refleksja teoretycznoprawna nad zagadnieniem zawieszania wolności lub praw. Zawieszenie okazuje się czymś istotnie różnym od czasowej utraty mocy obowiązującej przepisów dotyczących wolności czy praw. Ich ciągłe obowiązywanie znajduje wyraz, na przykład, w zasadzie proporcjonalności mającej zastosowanie do zawieszanych wolności lub praw. -/- Extraordinary Measures and Restrictions of Constitutional Freedoms and Rights ABSTRACT The study aims to answer the question on the difference between limitation of freedoms and rights in ordinary situations and their suspension (derogation) when extraordinary measures are introduced. This question is considered from the point of view of the structure of the interpretation process and the structure of the constitutional values. Consideration is given to issues relating to material aspects. However, issues relating to formal conditions for the admissibility of restrictions, such as public announcement of a threat or the possibility of introducing restrictions in sub-statutory acts, are not examined. The theses put forward are critical of the view that suspension of freedoms or rights is an extreme type of limitation and a freedom or a right "is no longer there", and of the view that suspension presupposes violation of the essence of freedom or right. It can be argued that it makes sense to talk about the suspension of freedoms or rights also when they are only slightly restricted. Moreover, it is possible to suspend a freedom or a right without violating their essence. It is argued that suspension of freedoms or rights leads to questioning of their basic characteristic that is their inviolability as recognized in international law. However, this inviolability of freedoms or rights is something different from the inviolability of their essence. In terms of the theory of law, the suspension of freedoms or rights turns out to be something significantly different from the temporary loss of the binding force of the respective provisions. Their continued validity is reflected, for example, in the application of the principle of proportionality to the suspended freedoms or rights. (shrink)

Práce se zaměřuje na metodologicko-historické aspekty vývoje neurologie. V roce 2001 přišel Marcus Raichle s překvapujícím objevem, který je nyní obecně známý jako teorie Default Mode Network. DMN s sebou kromě nových poznatků o mozkové aktivitě přináší i kompletní přehodnocení dosavadních přesvědčení o mozku. Vědecká komunita předpokládala, že mozek je „reflexivním" nástrojem k vnějšímu prostředí a od tohoto přesvědčení odvíjela neurologický výzkum. DMN však přichází s pojetím neurální aktivity, jež není závislá na aktivní stimulaci mozku, což je v přímém protikladu (...) s předchozí výzkumnou tradicí. Současné výzkumy DMN vedou ke zcela novým poznatkům, které nebyly dosažitelné v rámci předchozího paradigmatu. Radikální proměna pojetí aktivity mozku s sebou přináší i nutnost přehodnocení neurologického výzkumu z hlediska metodologie. Stať se zabývá otázkou, zda lze považovat DMN za vědeckou revoluci a nové paradigma neurovědy v kontextu analýzy historických událostí, jež formovaly předchozí a stávající neurovědecký výzkum. (shrink)

Truth seems to be an indispensable element of authority which presents itself as being based on more than just power and efficiency. In the domain of law,there is not only and primarily the problem of establishing the truth about the facts which are to be judged; there is also the problem of norms—does their authority rest solely on the act of establishing them, or is there “something behind”, a truth which contributes to the strength of law, and which provides legitimacy (...) to both legislator and to the legal norms themselves. In theoretical reflection, the very possibility of talking about true norms or true evaluations is under challenge, and this view dominates in the academic education of lawyers and other professionals. At the basis of this project lies the conviction that the problem of true norms, and the more general problem of the place of truth in law, is worth re-examining. In the course of such a re-examination, it is also worth returning to certain points in the tradition of thinking about the foudations of law. In the tradition recalled by the papers presented here—by both Italian and Polish authors—a prominent place is occupied by Polish thinkers such as Leon Petrażycki, Czesław Znamierowski, and Zygmunt Ziembiński. The book consists of three major parts. The titles—Tradition, Theory, Practice mark important points of reference in the reflection on truth in the context of law. The contributions relate to these points in different degrees, and each, though placed in one of these parts, also refer to the others. (shrink)

Perceptual modalities have been traditionally considered the product of dedicated biological systems producing information for higher cognitive processing. Psychological and neuropsychological evidence is offered which undermines this point of view and an alternative account of modality from the enactive approach to understanding cognition is suggested. Under this view, a perceptual modality is a stable form of perception which is structured not just by the biological sensitivities of the agent, but by their goals and the set of skills or expertise which (...) they are deploying at a given time. Such a view suggests that there is no such thing as an experience that is purely visual, auditory, or otherwise modal and that our attempts to understand consciousness and the mind must be conducted within a framework that provides an account of embodied, goal-directed adaptive coping with the world. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to show that some parts of J. M. Bocheński’s account of the logic of religion are useful for epistemological investigation of a religious belief, particularly for the questions of realistic and cognitive interpretations of a religious discourse, the problems of justification and warrant of a religious belief and for the problem of the place of criticism in a religious discourse. Referring to Bocheński's understanding of the structure of religious/theological thinking, I present the criteria for (...) the gradual rationality of religion and claim that religions may differ in rationality and that there may be a rational and critical religion that uses the achievements of science and philosophy - contrary to what the New Atheists claim. (shrink)

There are three chief aims of the paper. First, it presents in short the beginning of the analytic philosophy of religion, its development, issues, and methods. Second, it puts forward a hypothesis that in the last five decades analytic philosophy of religion has been dominated by the epistemological paradigm, i.e. in most cases, any problem in question has been studied as part of the general problem of rationality of religious belief. That situation is changing slowly towards achieving more balance between (...) the issues of epistemology of religion and those concerned with philosophical theology. Third, the paper provides criteria for the classification of the different ways to understand the rationality of religious belief: the rationalistic and evidentialist approach, the natural theology approach, the Wittgensteinian fideism and Reformed epistemology approaches. A brief description of each of those four positions in epistemology of religion is included. (shrink)

Tato studie se snaží o filosofickou analýzu problematických aspektů neurogeneze. V první řadě se zaměřuje na moderní historii neurogeneze, která je obecně považována za historii dogmatického přesvědčení, které předpokládalo, že v mozku dospělého savce nemohou vzniknout nové neurony. Tato konvence přežívala v neurovědě po několik desítek let a její kořeny sahají až do dob Ramóna y Cajala. Důležitá část této filosofické analýzy se zaměřuje na aspekt tzv. zaštiťování dogmatu pomocí ad hoc hypotéz. Analýza se dále věnuje implicitním definicím, které hrají (...) roli axiomů neurovědy, a problematice falsifikace potenciálních falsifikátorů. Na konci této filosofické analýzy jsou prezentovány argumenty, které dospívají k tomu, že historie neurogeneze není historií dogmatického uvažování, jak většina autorů předpokládá, ale že jde o historii vědeckého pragmatismu. (shrink)

This book is the first comprehensive study of Plato’s conception of justice. The universality of human rights and the universality of human dignity, which is recognised as their source, are among the crucial philosophical problems in modern-day legal orders and in contemporary culture in general. If dignity is genuinely universal, then human beings also possessed it in ancient times. Plato not only perceived human dignity, but a recognition of dignity is also visible in his conception of justice, which forms the (...) core of his philosophy. Plato’s Republic is consistently interpreted here as a treatise on justice, relating to an individual and not to the state. The famous myth of the cave is a story about education taking place in the world here and now. The best activity is not contemplation, but acting for the benefit of others. Not ideas, but individuals are the proper objects of love. Plato’s philosophy may provide foundations for modern-day human rights protection rather than for totalitarian orders. (shrink)

Sprawiedliwość jako cecha działającego podmiotu jest w swej istocie doskonałością całości, doskonałością jego istnienia. Taka doskonałość („dzielność”) całości zakłada sprawność każdego zasadniczego elementu naszego wnętrza – intelektu, woli i uczuć, choć nie jest po prostu sumą doskonałości tych elementów, jest czymś jakościowo różnym. Niemniej jednak Platona ujęcie doskonalenia elementów „wnętrza” człowieka prowadzi do refleksji nad powiązaniem sprawiedliwości z pozostałymi uniwersalnymi wartościami konstytucyjnymi – prawdą, dobrem i pięknem. Dzielnością (cnotą) właściwą intelektowi, symbolizowanemu przez władców Platońskiego państwa, jest mądrość, a ta nie (...) może się obyć bez prawdy. Dzielnością woli, symbolizowanej przez żołnierzy i policjantów, jest odwaga pojmowana przez Platona jako postępowanie zgodne z własnymi, rozumnymi przekonaniami, a takie postępowanie jest fundamentem dobra (moralnego). Uczucia – symbolizowane przez wytwórców – ukierunkowywane, „pociągane” są przez piękno. Krótko, wiedza – ma być prawdziwa, działanie – dobre, a to, co wytwarzane – piękne. To przesłanie Platona dotyczące naszych uniwersalnych wartości konstytucyjnych. To też przesłanie dotyczące celów, których realizacji powinna służyć kultura duchowa – nauka zmierza do prawdy, moralność do dobra, sztuka do piękna. Platon każe przy tym pamiętać, że rozwój kultury nie jest celem samym w sobie, ale służyć powinien tworzeniu warunków rozwoju konkretnego człowieka, w tym tworzeniu warunków do bycia sprawiedliwym. (shrink)

Thought experiments are frequently vague and obscure hypothetical scenarios that are difficult to assess. The paper proposes a simple model of thought experiments. In the first part, I introduce two contemporary frameworks for thought experiment analysis: an experimentalist approach that relies on similarities between real and thought experiment, and a reasonist approach focusing on the answers provided by thought experimenting. Further, I articulate a minimalist approach in which thought experiment is considered strictly as doxastic mechanism based on imagination. I introduce (...) the basic analytical tool that allows us to differentiate an experimental core from an attached argumentation. The last section is reserved for discussion. I address several possible questions concerning adequacy of minimalistic definition and analysis. (shrink)

En la Constitución de la República de Polonia del 2 de abril de 19971 se reconocía el carácter objetivo de ciertos valores y un cognoscitivismo axiológico. Si tomamos las disposiciones constitucionales en serio tenemos que aceptar que algunas valoraciones morales o que algunas proferencias [utterances] valorativas pueden ser verdaderas o falsas y que nos informan acerca de una realidad objetiva. Por otro lado, en la teoría del derecho polaca y en los cursos universitarios de lógica para abogados se encuentran definiciones (...) de la justificación axiológica de las normas y de normas axiológicas (normas que poseen una justificación axiológica) que presuponen que ningún valor es objetivo y que no pueden ser conocidos — se presupone un no-cognoscitivismo axiológico. De acuerdo con el no-cognoscitivismo, ninguna valoración y ninguna proferencia valorativa puede ser verdadera o falsa, ni puede informar acerca de la realidad. En este trabajo se analiza la concepción no-cognoscitivista de Zygmunt Ziembiński tal y como ha sido formulada en su libro de texto lógica práctica [Logika praktyczna] — el cual ha formado intelecTraduddo del inglés por Jorge Cerdio; título original: «True Norms in the Light of Axiological Justification of Norms». Relectura: Germán Sucar. La Constitución de la República de Polonia [Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej] del 2 de abril de 1997, Dziennik Ustaw, 1997. No. 78, item 483. Versión en inglés en Gierach, 2009: 21. 6S6 Mark Piechowiak tualmente a dos generaciones de abogados polacos y ha establecido el estándar bajo el que se entienden las justificaciones axiológicas y las normas axiológicas2. Su definición de valoración y de normas excluyen la posibilidad misma de un discurso significativo acerca de las valoraciones o acerca de las normas en términos de verdad o falsedad. (shrink)

I argue that Ireneusz Ziemiński doesn't justify his skepticism about knowledge of existence of God. First, he reduces a question to metaphysical one - do we have sound, valid proofs of God's existence and imposes too heavy conditions on arguments for God. Second, he doesn't show that disagreement between philosophers in that question justify his negative assessment of arguments. Third, Ziemiński omits epistemological question what is knowledge of God's existence, especially in its direct form as well as externalistic account's of (...) knowledge of God, for example Plantinga's and Alston's. (shrink)

The paper refers to the argument from hiddenness as presented in John Schellenberg’s book The Hiddenness Argument and the philosophical views expressed there, making this argument understandable. It is argued that conditionals (1) and (2) are not adequately grounded. Schellenberg has not shown that we have the knowledge necessary to accept the premises as true. His justifications referring to relations between people raise doubts. The paper includes an argument that Schellenberg should substantiate its key claim that God has the resources (...) to accommodate the possible consequences of openness to a relationship with finite persons, making them compatible with the flourishing of all concerned and of any relationship that may come to exist between them. At the end of the text, I propose to treat the argument as a rejection of an anthropomorphic God. (shrink)