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Reasonable religious disagreements.Richard Feldman - 2010 - In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. Oup Usa. pp. 194-214.details
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A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance.David K. Lewis - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 263-293.details
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Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.details
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How to Disagree about How to Disagree.Adam Elga - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 175-186.details
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Moral Particularism.Jonathan Dancy - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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A priority as an evaluative notion.Hartry Field - 2000 - In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Internalism Explained.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):349-369.details
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Choosing Normative Concepts.Matti Eklund - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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Rational Illogicality.J. Robert G. Williams - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):127-141.details
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Moral Generalism: Enjoy in Moderation.Pekka Väyrynen - 2006 - Ethics 116 (4):707-741.details
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Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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Kantian Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant’s Ethical Theory.Jens Timmermann - 2013 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 95 (1):36-64.details
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Experientially defeasible a priori justification.Joshua Thurow - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):596–602.details
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Modest a priori knowledge.Donna M. Summerfield - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):39-66.details
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What Not to Multiply Without Necessity.Jonathan Schaffer - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):644-664.details
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The scope of instrumental reason.Mark Schroeder - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):337–364.details
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Scope for rational autonomy.Mark Schroeder - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):297-310.details
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Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.details
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The Right and the Good.Some Problems in Ethics.W. D. Ross & H. W. B. Joseph - 1933 - Journal of Philosophy 30 (19):517-527.details
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The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.details
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Criteria and our knowledge of the material world.John L. Pollock - 1967 - Philosophical Review 76 (1):28-60.details
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When Other Things Aren’t Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from Vacuity.Paul Pietroski & Georges Rey - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1):81-110.details
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Immodest inductive methods.David Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (1):54-63.details
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Generics: Cognition and acquisition.Sarah-Jane Leslie - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (1):1-47.details
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
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Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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Norms of intentionality: norms that don’t guide.Benjamin W. Jarvis - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):1-25.details
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Direct realism and the brain-in-a-vat argument.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):397-413.details
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Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):397-413.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
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Options and the subjective ought.Brian Hedden - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):343-360.details
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Basic Logical Knowledge.Bob Hale - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:279-304.details
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Epistemological Open Questions.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):509-523.details
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Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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Impartial reason.Stephen L. Darwall - 1983 - Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press.details
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Impartial Reason by Stephen Darwall. [REVIEW]Onora O'Neill - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):60-64.details
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Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Defending the Right.Jonathan Dancy - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):85-98.details
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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.details
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Review of A Priori Justification. [REVIEW]Joel Pust - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):124-128.details
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Albert Casullo, A Priori Justification. [REVIEW]Jennifer Nagel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):251-255.details
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How the Laws of Physics Lie.Malcolm R. Forster - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (3):478-480.details
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How the laws of physics lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Rules.Paul A. Boghossian - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):472-500.details
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Hale on some arguments for the necessity of necessity.Arif Ahmed - 2000 - Mind 109 (433):81-91.details
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Reasons as Defaults.John F. Horty - 2012 - Oxford, England: Oup Usa.details
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Principled ethics: generalism as a regulative ideal.Sean McKeever & Michael Ridge - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Michael R. Ridge.details
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