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The nature of moral philosophy.G. E. Moore - 1961 - In John Langshaw Austin (ed.), Philosophical Papers. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.details
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Who’s Responsible for This? Moral Responsibility, Externalism, and Knowledge about Implicit Bias.Natalia Washington & Daniel Kelly - 2016 - In Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.details
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Freedom and reason.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1963 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press.details
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Identification, situational constraint, and social cognition: Studies in the attribution of moral responsibility.Robert L. Woolfolk, John M. Doris & John M. Darley - 2006 - Cognition 100 (2):283-301.details
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A model of dual attitudes.Timothy D. Wilson, Samuel Lindsey & Tonya Y. Schooler - 2000 - Psychological Review 107 (1):101-126.details
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On an argument for incompatibilism.David Widerker - 1986 - Analysis 46 (4):37-41.details
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On an argument for incompatibilism.David Widerker - 1987 - Analysis 47 (January):37-41.details
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Frankfurt on 'Ought implies Can' and alternative possibilities.David Widerker - 1991 - Analysis 51 (4):222.details
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I Ought, Therefore I Can.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167-216.details
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Values and the heart's command.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (1):5-19.details
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Some Thoughts on An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 2015 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 22:16-30.details
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An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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An Essay on Free Will by Peter van Inwagen. [REVIEW]Michael Slote - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (6):327-330.details
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Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.details
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Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition.John Turri - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S3):403-424.details
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The Best Argument for 'Ought Implies Can' Is a Better Argument Against 'Ought Implies Can'.Brian Talbot - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.details
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'Ought' and 'can'.Michael Stocker - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):303 – 316.details
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What time travelers cannot not do (but are responsible for anyway).Joshua Spencer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):149-162.details
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The empirical case for two systems of reasoning.Steven A. Sloman - 1996 - Psychological Bulletin 119 (1):3-22.details
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`Ought' conversationally implies `can'.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (2):249-261.details
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Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.details
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Scepticism and Implicit Bias.Jennifer Saul - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (37):243-263.details
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Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.details
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Moral dilemmas and consistency.Ruth Barcan Marcus - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):121-136.details
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Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias.Eric Mandelbaum - 2015 - Noûs 50 (3):629-658.details
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Neither Fish nor Fowl: Implicit Attitudes as Patchy Endorsements.Neil Levy - 2014 - Noûs 49 (4):800-823.details
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Implicit Bias and Moral Responsibility: Probing the Data.Neil Levy - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):3-26.details
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Moral Responsibility and Consciousness.Matt King & Peter Carruthers - 2012 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):200-228.details
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Racial cognition and the ethics of implicit bias.Daniel Kelly & Erica Roedder - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):522–540.details
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A Reconsideration of an Argument against Compatibilism.Thomas J. McKay & David Johnson - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):113-122.details
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When is the Will Free?Peter van Inwagen - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:399 - 422.details
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Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):525-544.details
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Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument.Michael Huemer - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):525.details
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Responsibility for Implicit Bias.Jules Holroyd - 2012 - Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (3):274-306.details
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Responsibility for implicit bias.Jules Holroyd - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (3).details
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Freedom and Reason.F. E. Sparshott - 1964 - Philosophical Quarterly 14 (57):358-367.details
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Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes.Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji - 1995 - Psychological Review 102 (1):4-27.details
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'Ought' and Ability.P. A. Graham & Peter Graham - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (3):337-382.details
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Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing.Miranda Fricker - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing * by Miranda Fricker. [REVIEW]M. Brady - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):380-382.details
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Miranda Fricker, ‘Epistemic Injustice – Power and the Ethics of Knowing’: Oxford University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-19-823790-7, £ 27.50 (hardback). [REVIEW]Kristian Høyer Toft - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (1):117-119.details
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'Ought-implies-can', causal determinism and moral responsibility.J. M. Fischer - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):244-250.details
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Doing the Best We Can. An Essay in Informal Deontic Logic.Jeroen van Rijen - 1993 - Noûs 27 (2):264-267.details
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Doing the Best We Can. An Essay in Informal Deontic Logic.David Makinson - 1987 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 52 (4):1050-1051.details
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Doing the Best We Can: An Essay in Informal Deontic Logic.Fred Feldman - 1986 - D. Reidel Publishing Company.details
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In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (10):454-459.details
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'Ought' implies 'can' and the derivation of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.David Copp - 2008 - Analysis 68 (1):67-75.details
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Blame, not ability, impacts moral “ought” judgments for impossible actions: Toward an empirical refutation of “ought” implies “can”.Vladimir Chituc, Paul Henne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2016 - Cognition 150 (C):20-25.details
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