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``Knowing and Asserting".Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):1-14.details
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Gettier cases in epistemic logic.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):1-14.details
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Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and knowledge of knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.details
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Consistency and Realism.Bernard A. O. Williams - 1966 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 40 (1):1-22.details
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``Must we Know What we Say?".Matt Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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Are all conversational implicatures cancellable.Matthew Weiner - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):127-130.details
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Asserting and promising.Gary Watson - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):57-77.details
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Induction, Normality and Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects.Markos Valaris - 2016 - Ratio 29 (4).details
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Induction, Normality and Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects.Markos Valaris - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):137-148.details
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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.details
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Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
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Normality and Majority: Towards a Statistical Understanding of Normality Statements.Corina Strößner - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (4):793-809.details
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Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence.Julia Staffel - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1721-1734.details
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Value Matters in Epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (4):167-190.details
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Dubious assertions.David Sosa - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):269 - 272.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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The logic of epistemic justification.Martin Smith - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3857-3875.details
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Transmission Failure Explained.Martin Smith - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):164-189.details
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Entitlement and Evidence.Martin Smith - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):735-753.details
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Ceteris Paribus Conditionals and Comparative Normalcy.Martin Smith - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (1):97-121.details
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Scalar consequentialism the right way.Neil Sinhababu - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3131-3144.details
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Knowledge in the image of assertion.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):1-19.details
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Conditionals.Frank Jackson - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):266.details
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Degrees of Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics.Doug Reed - 2017 - Ancient Philosophy 37 (1):91-112.details
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Problems with Norms of Assertion.Peter Pagin - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):178-207.details
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Implications and Meaning.S. G. O'hair - 1969 - Theoria 35 (1):38-54.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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The foundations of epistemological probability.Paul K. Moser - 1988 - Erkenntnis 28 (2):231 - 251.details
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Perceptual Confidence.John Morrison - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):15-48.details
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Belief, Degrees of Belief, and Assertion.Peter Milne - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):331-349.details
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The rights and wrongs of consequentialism.Brian McElwee - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):393 - 412.details
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Supererogation Across Normative Domains.Brian McElwee - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):505-516.details
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Consequentialism and permissibility.Brian Mcelwee - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (2):171-183.details
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Truth and assertion: rules vs aims.Neri Marsili - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):638–648.details
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Bounded Modality.Matthew Mandelkern - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):1-61.details
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``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1964 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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Moral uncertainty and its consequences.Ted Lockhart - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities.David Lewis - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (3):297-315.details
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Erratum: Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities.David Lewis - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (4):561.details
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Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Assertion, practical reason, and pragmatic theories of knowledge.Janet Levin - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):359–384.details
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The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.details
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Reducing belief simpliciter to degrees of belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2013 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.details
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Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2009 - In P. Greenough & D. Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 140--160.details
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Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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