- Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.details
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Hume's problem: induction and the justification of belief.Colin Howson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Scientific realism: how science tracks truth.Stathis Psillos - 1999 - New York: Routledge.details
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The taming of the true.Neil Tennant - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The advancement of science: science without legend, objectivity without illusions.Philip Kitcher - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Contemporary theories of knowledge.John L. Pollock - 1986 - London: Hutchinson.details
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What conditional probability could not be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.details
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A new solution to the paradoxes of rational acceptability.Igor Douven - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):391-410.details
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Generalizing the lottery paradox.Igor Douven & Timothy Williamson - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779.details
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The preface paradox revisited.Igor Douven - 2003 - Erkenntnis 59 (3):389 - 420.details
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The a priori rules of rationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):113-131.details
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Can we do without pragmatic encroachment.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.details
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Fine-grained opinion, probability, and the logic of full belief.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (4):349-377.details
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(3 other versions)Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.details
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(1 other version)A confutation of convergent realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.details
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Knowledge, assertion and lotteries.Keith DeRose - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):568–580.details
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(2 other versions)Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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Withdrawal and contextualism.Jonathan E. Adler - 2006 - Analysis 66 (4):280–285.details
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Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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Moore’s paradox and self-knowledge.Sydney Shoemaker - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):211-28.details
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(1 other version)The paradox of the preface.David C. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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How to Believe a Conditional.D. H. Mellor - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (5):233-248.details
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A Principled Solution to Fitch’s Paradox.Igor Douven - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (1):47-69.details
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(1 other version)Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth.Stathis Psillos - 1999 - New York: Routledge.details
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Truth Without Paradox.David Johnson - 2004 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.details
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(1 other version)A Confutation of Convergent Realism.Larry Laudan - 2001 - In Yuri Balashov & Alexander Rosenberg (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 211.details
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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Epistemic possibilities.Keith DeRose - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.details
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Skepticism about rules and intentionalilty.John R. Searle - 2002 - In Consciousness and Language. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1964 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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(1 other version)Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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(2 other versions)``Assertion, Knowledge, and Context".Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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Commonplace Book, 1919-1953.George Edward Moore (ed.) - 1962 - New York: Routledge.details
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Consciousness and Language.John R. Searle - 2002 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Putting Logic in Its Place. [REVIEW]Igor Douven - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (1):123-126.details
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Betting on Theories.Patrick Maher - 1993 - Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.details
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Philosophical Theories of Probability.Donald A. Gillies - 2000 - New York: Routledge.details
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Theory of Probability. [REVIEW]Ernest Nagel - 1940 - Journal of Philosophy 37 (19):524-528.details
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The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of Belief.Richard Foley - 1992 - American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2):111 - 124.details
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Putting logic in its place: formal constraints on rational belief.David Phiroze Christensen - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Moorean absurdities and the nature of assertion.John N. Williams - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):135 – 149.details
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Fair bets and inductive probabilities.John G. Kemeny - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (3):263-273.details
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On the relation between categorical and probabilistic belief.Daniel Hunter - 1996 - Noûs 30 (1):75-98.details
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Knowledge and Evidence.Joseph Mendola - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (3):157-160.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.[author unknown] - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):269-272.details
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The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal.Igor Douven - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204-225.details
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``Conjunctivitis".Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1970 - In Marshall Swain (ed.), Induction, acceptance, and rational belief. Dordrecht,: Reidel. pp. 55-82.details
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