- How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Credence for Epistemic Discourse.Paolo Santorio - manuscriptdetails
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A Theory of Epistemic Risk.Boris Babic - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (3):522-550.details
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A new puzzle about belief and credence.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.details
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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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Exploiting Cyclic Preference.Arif Ahmed - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):975-1022.details
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Fallibilism, Verisimilitude, and the Preface Paradox.Gustavo Cevolani - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):169-183.details
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Reconstructed Empiricism.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (1):95-113.details
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Understanding without Justification or Belief.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):239-254.details
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Epistemically Transformative Experience.Jane Friedman - manuscriptdetails
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(1 other version)Money Pumps and Diachronic Books.Isaac Levi - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S235-S247.details
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Locating IBE in the Bayesian Framework.Jonathan Weisberg - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):125-143.details
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The Concept of Inductive Probability.Patrick Maher - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):185-206.details
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Can there be a Bayesian explanationism? On the prospects of a productive partnership.Frank Cabrera - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1245–1272.details
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Chains of Inferences and the New Paradigm in the Psychology of Reasoning.Ulf Hlobil - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):1-16.details
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'Along an imperfectly-lighted path': practical rationality and normative uncertainty.Andrew Sepielli - unknowndetails
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Gigerenzer's normative critique of Kahneman and Tversky.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2000 - Cognition 76 (3):179-193.details
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Epistemic Decision Theory.Hilary Greaves - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):915-952.details
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Finite additivity, another lottery paradox and conditionalisation.Colin Howson - 2014 - Synthese 191 (5):1-24.details
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Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):897-908.details
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Intentionality and partial belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7).details
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Defeasible Conditionalization.Paul D. Thorn - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):283-302.details
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Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.details
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Must rational intentions maximize utility?Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):73-92.details
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Coming to Terms with our Human Fallibility: Christensen on the Preface.Mark Kaplan - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):1-35.details
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Multiple Studies and Evidential Defeat.Matthew Kotzen - 2011 - Noûs 47 (1):154-180.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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Dutch book arguments.Susan Vineberg - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Does murphy’s law apply in epistemology?David Christensen - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:3-31.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge, Bets, and Interests.Brian Weatherson - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 75--103.details
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The foundations of causal decision theory. [REVIEW]Mirek Janusz - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):296-300.details
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(1 other version)Survey article. Verisimilitude: the third period.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):1-29.details
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Representation theorems and the foundations of decision theory.Christopher Meacham & Jonathan Weisberg - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):641 - 663.details
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Three conceptions of explaining how possibly—and one reductive account.Johannes Persson - 2011 - In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 275--286.details
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After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method.Robert Nola & Howard Sankey (eds.) - 2000 - Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.details
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(1 other version)Coherence and analogy articles.Paul Thagard - manuscriptdetails
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Bayes' theorem.James Joyce - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
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Coherence as an ideal of rationality.Lyle Zynda - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):175 - 216.details
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Practical reasoning as figuring out what is best: Against constructivism.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Topoi 21 (1-2):139-152.details
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A bayesian way to make stopping rules matter.Daniel Steel - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (2):213--227.details
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Epistemic virtues, metavirtues, and computational complexity.Adam Morton - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):481–502.details
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The coherence argument against conditionalization.Matthias Hild - 1998 - Synthese 115 (2):229-258.details
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Resurrecting logical probability.James Franklin - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (2):277-305.details
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Plantinga’s Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism.Branden Fitelson & Elliott Sober - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2):115–129.details
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Logic and probability.Colin Howson - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (4):517-531.details
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Justifying conditionalization: Conditionalization maximizes expected epistemic utility.Hilary Greaves & David Wallace - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):607-632.details
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