- How to expect a surprising exam.Brian Kim & Anubav Vasudevan - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3101-3133.details
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The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.details
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Reducing belief simpliciter to degrees of belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2013 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.details
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Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning.Hanti Lin & Kevin Kelly - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):957-981.details
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The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of Belief.Richard Foley - 1992 - American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (2):111 - 124.details
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The Virtues of Inconsistency.Peter Klein - 1985 - The Monist 68 (1):105-135.details
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(1 other version)``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1964 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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(1 other version)Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, CT, USA: Wesleyan University Press.details
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Working without a net: a study of egocentric epistemology.Richard Foley - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The epistemic virtues of consistency.Sharon Ryan - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):121-141.details
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Generalizing the lottery paradox.Igor Douven & Timothy Williamson - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779.details
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The preface paradox revisited.Igor Douven - 2003 - Erkenntnis 59 (3):389 - 420.details
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Two Approaches to Belief Revision.Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2018 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):487-518.details
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Impossibility Results for Rational Belief.Gerhard Schurz - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):134-159.details
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The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability.Hannes Leitgeb - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Putting Logic in Its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief.Henry E. Kyburg - 2005 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (4):534-535.details
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(1 other version)The paradox of the preface.David Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205.details
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Stability and Scepticism in the Modelling of Doxastic States: Probabilities and Plain Beliefs.Hans Rott - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (1):167-197.details
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The Badness of Being Certain of a Falsehood is at Least 1/(Log 4 − 1) Times Greater than the Value of Being Certain of a Truth. [REVIEW]Alexander R. Pruss - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (2):229-238.details
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Probability, Approximate Truth, and Truthlikeness: More Ways out of the Preface Paradox.Gustavo Cevolani & Gerhard Schurz - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):209-225.details
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Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):816-853.details
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I—The Humean Thesis on Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):143-185.details
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(2 other versions)Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Peter Krauss - 1961 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1):127.details
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Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction.John L. Pollock - 1990 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Probability and the logic of rational belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, Conn.,: Wesleyan University Press.details
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Two paradoxes of rational acceptance.PaulK Moser & Jeffrey Tlumak - 1985 - Erkenntnis 23 (2):127 - 141.details
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A new solution to the paradoxes of rational acceptability.Igor Douven - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):391-410.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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Truthlikeness and the Lottery Paradox via the Preface Paradox.Simon D'Alfonso - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):391-397.details
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(1 other version)Putting Logic in Its Place. Formal Constraints on Rational Belief.David Christensen - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (1):143-146.details
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Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis.Richard Foley - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 37-47.details
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The lottery paradox, epistemic justification and permissibility.Thomas Kroedel - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):57-60.details
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(1 other version)A geo-logical solution to the lottery paradox, with applications to conditional logic.Hanti Lin & Kevin Kelly - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):531-575.details
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Believing the improbable.Mark Kaplan - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):117 - 146.details
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A bayesian theory of rational acceptance.Mark Kaplan - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (6):305-330.details
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(1 other version)Nelkin on the Lottery Paradox.Igor Douven - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):395-404.details
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Complex declarative learning.Michelene Th Chi & Stellan Ohlsson - 2005 - In K. Holyoak & B. Morrison (eds.), The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.details
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Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction. [REVIEW]Henry E. Kyburg & John L. Pollock - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (1):115.details
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(1 other version)Nelkin on the lottery paradox.Igor Douven - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):395-404.details
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(1 other version)Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology.Richard Foley - 1998 - Noûs 32 (2):265-275.details
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(1 other version)Putting Logic in Its Place. Formal Constraints on Rational Belief.David Christensen - 2008 - Critica 40 (120):141-148.details
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