- Modus Ponens and the Logic of Decision.Nate Charlow - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (3):859-888.details
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Don’t Look Now.Bernhard Salow & Arif Ahmed - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2):327-350.details
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The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):209-226.details
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Transparency and Partial Beliefs.Weng Hong Tang - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):153-166.details
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The problem of logical omniscience, the preface paradox, and doxastic commitments.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):917-939.details
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Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3121-3141.details
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Probability, Approximate Truth, and Truthlikeness: More Ways out of the Preface Paradox.Gustavo Cevolani & Gerhard Schurz - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):209-225.details
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Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.details
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Fallibilism, Verisimilitude, and the Preface Paradox.Gustavo Cevolani - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):169-183.details
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Explosion and the Normativity of Logic.Florian Steinberger - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):385-419.details
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Understanding Conditionalization.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):767-797.details
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Making Ranking Theory Useful for Psychology of Reasoning.Niels Skovgaard Olsen - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Konstanzdetails
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Preface Writers are Consistent.Roger Clarke - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3):362-381.details
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This paper surely contains some errors.Brian Kim - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1013-1029.details
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Epistemology Idealized.Robert Pasnau - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):987-1021.details
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What’s the matter with epistemic circularity?David James Barnett - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):177-205.details
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Intentionality and partial belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7).details
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Success Semantics and Partial Belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Research 39:17-22.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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Rational Faith and Justified Belief.Lara Buchak - 2014 - In Laura Frances Callahan & Timothy O'Connor (eds.), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 49-73.details
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On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance.Jens Christian Bjerring, Jens Ulrik Hansen & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2014 - Synthese 191 (11):2445-2470.details
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Intuitions for inferences.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.details
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A Defense of Temperate Epistemic Transparency.Eleonora Cresto - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):923-955.details
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Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making1.James M. Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.details
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Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
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Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
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The Epistemic and the Deontic Preface Paradox.Lina M. Lissia & Jan Sprenger - manuscriptdetails
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The Epistemological Subject(s) of Mathematics.Silvia De Toffoli - 2024 - In Bharath Sriraman (ed.), Handbook of the History and Philosophy of Mathematical Practice. Cham: Springer. pp. 1-27.details
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Permission to believe: Descriptive and prescriptive beliefs in the Clifford/James debate.Christopher Paul Lawrence - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Cape Towndetails
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What is Structural Rationality?Wooram Lee - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):614-636.details
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Scepticism about epistemic blame.Tim Smartt - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1813-1828.details
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Getting Accurate about Knowledge.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Mind 132 (525):158-191.details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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Bridge Principles and Epistemic Norms.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field & Bruno Jacinto - 2022 - Erkenntnis:1-53.details
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Time-Slice Epistemology for Bayesians.Lisa Cassell - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Coherence in Science: A Social Approach.Sanford C. Goldberg & Kareem Khalifa - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3489-3509.details
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What is the aim of models in formal epistemology?Matheus de Lima Rui - 2022 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 26 (1):135-152.details
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Entrepreneurial Beliefs and Agency under Knightian Uncertainty.Randall E. Westgren & Travis L. Holmes - 2021 - Philosophy of Management 21 (2):199-217.details
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Credal accuracy and knowledge.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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Thomas Reid, the Internalist.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 4 (1):10.details
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Abstract rationality: the ‘logical’ structure of attitudes.Franz Dietrich, Antonios Staras & Robert Sugden - 2024 - Economics and Philosophy 40 (1):12-41.details
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Dependent philosophical majorities and the skeptical argument from disagreement.Rasmus Jaksland - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-24.details
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n-1 Guilty Men.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Simon Kirchin (ed.), The Future of Normativity. Oxford:details
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Logical Form and the Limits of Thought.Manish Oza - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Torontodetails
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Scientific Progress Without Justification.Finnur Dellsén - 2022 - In Insa Lawler, Kareem Khalifa & Elay Shech (eds.), Scientific Understanding and Representation: Modeling in the Physical Sciences. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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The Skeptical Paradox and the Generality of Closure (and other principles).Yuval Avnur - 2022 - In Duncan Pritchard & Matthew Jope (ed.), New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure. Routledge.details
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Probing the Mind of God: Divine Beliefs and Credences.Elizabeth Jackson & Justin Mooney - 2022 - Religious Studies 58 (1):S61–S75.details
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