- The Epistemic and the Deontic Preface Paradox.Lina M. Lissia & Jan Sprenger - manuscriptdetails
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Probabilifying reflective equilibrium.Finnur Dellsén - 2024 - Synthese 203 (2):1-24.details
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The Epistemological Subject(s) of Mathematics.Silvia De Toffoli - 2024 - In Bharath Sriraman (ed.), Handbook of the History and Philosophy of Mathematical Practice. Cham: Springer. pp. 1-27.details
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What is Structural Rationality?Wooram Lee - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):614-636.details
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Scepticism about epistemic blame.Tim Smartt - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1813-1828.details
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Getting Accurate about Knowledge.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Mind 132 (525):158-191.details
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Embracing Epistemic Dilemmas.David Christensen - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge.details
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Abstract rationality: the ‘logical’ structure of attitudes.Franz Dietrich, Antonios Staras & Robert Sugden - 2024 - Economics and Philosophy 40 (1):12-41.details
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(1 other version)Entrepreneurial beleifs and agency under Knightian uncertainty.Randall Westgren & Travis Holmes - 2021 - Philosophy of Management 22 (2):199-217.details
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n-1 Guilty Men.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Simon Kirchin (ed.), The Future of Normativity. Oxford:details
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The Skeptical Paradox and the Generality of Closure (and other principles).Yuval Avnur - 2022 - In Duncan Pritchard & Matthew Jope (ed.), New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure. Routledge.details
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Probing the Mind of God: Divine Beliefs and Credences.Elizabeth Jackson & Justin Mooney - 2022 - Religious Studies 58 (1):S61–S75.details
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Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.details
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Real and ideal rationality.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):879-910.details
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Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox.David James Barnett - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (2):227-262.details
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Reasons, basing, and the normative collapse of logical pluralism.Christopher Blake-Turner - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):4099-4118.details
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Moral Knowledge By Deduction.Declan Smithies - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):537-563.details
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(1 other version)Perception and probability.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):1-21.details
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Evidence-Coherence Conflicts Revisited.Alex Worsnip - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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Against Belief Closure.Lina M. Lissia - manuscriptdetails
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Why Credences Are Not Beliefs.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):360-370.details
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Ought-contextualism and reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.details
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Veritism and the normativity of logic.Nader Shoaibi - 2020 - Ratio 34 (1):7-19.details
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Good Guesses.Kevin Dorst & Matthew Mandelkern - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):581-618.details
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Functionalism and the role of psychology in economics.Christopher Clarke - 2020 - Journal of Economic Methodology 27 (4):292-310.details
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The Unity of Evidence and Coherence.Declan Smithies - forthcoming - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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The value of thinking and the normativity of logic.Manish Oza - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (25):1-23.details
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Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.details
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The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience.Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):727-766.details
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Two-state solution to the lottery paradox.Arturs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.details
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Betting against the Zen Monk: on preferences and partial belief.Edward Elliott - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3733-3758.details
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From probabilities to categorical beliefs: Going beyond toy models.Igor Douven & Hans Rott - 2018 - Journal of Logic and Computation 28 (6):1099-1124.details
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Comparativism and the Measurement of Partial Belief.Edward Elliott - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2843-2870.details
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Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627.details
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Modus Ponens and the Logic of Decision.Nate Charlow - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (3):859-888.details
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A Bitter Pill for Closure.Marvin Backes - 2019 - Synthese 196:3773-3787.details
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Transparency and Partial Beliefs.Weng Hong Tang - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):153-166.details
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The problem of logical omniscience, the preface paradox, and doxastic commitments.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):917-939.details
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Deductive Cogency, understanding, and acceptance.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3121-3141.details
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Understanding Conditionalization.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):767-797.details
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Reliabilism and the Suspension of Belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):362-377.details
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Preface Writers are Consistent.Roger Clarke - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3):362-381.details
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This paper surely contains some errors.Brian Kim - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1013-1029.details
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Intentionality and partial belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7).details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance.Jens Christian Bjerring, Jens Ulrik Hansen & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2014 - Synthese 191 (11):2445-2470.details
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Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.details
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Intuitions for inferences.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.details
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Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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