- Intentions and instability: a defence of causal decision theory.Adam Bales - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):793-804.details
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A Counterexample to Three Imprecise Decision Theories.Seamus Bradley - 2018 - Theoria 85 (1):18-30.details
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Risk aversion and the long run.Johanna Thoma - 2018 - Ethics 129 (2):230-253.details
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Parity, prospects, and predominance.Ryan Doody - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):1077-1095.details
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Equal Opportunity and Newcomb’s Problem.Ian Wells - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):429-457.details
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Ensemble prospectism.Kim Kaivanto - 2017 - Theory and Decision 83 (4):535-546.details
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Risk writ large.Johanna Thoma & Jonathan Weisberg - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2369-2384.details
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Decision Theory with a Human Face.Richard Bradley - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Smokers, Psychos, and Decision-Theoretic Uncertainty.William MacAskill - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (9):425-445.details
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A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making1.James Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.details
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What Is Risk Aversion?H. Orii Stefansson & Richard Bradley - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):77-102.details
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Transformative Experience.Laurie Paul - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Newcomb’s problem and two principles of choice.Robert Nozick - 1969 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Essays in honor of Carl G. Hempel. Dordrecht,: Reidel. pp. 114–46.details
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(1 other version)The Logic of Decision.Henry E. Kyberg - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (2):250.details
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Costs of abandoning the Sure-Thing Principle.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):827-840.details
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Le Comportement de L’Homme Rationnel Devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de L’École Américaine.Maurice Allais - 1953 - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 21:503--546.details
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(2 other versions)Making Comparisons Count.Ruth Chang - 2001 - New York: Routledge.details
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A New Problem with Mixed Decisions, Or: You’ll Regret Reading This Article, But You Still Should.Benjamin Plommer - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (2):349-373.details
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The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation.Brian Skyrms - 1990 - Harvard University Press.details
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Decision-Making Under Indeterminacy.J. Robert G. Williams - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.details
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Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):665-683.details
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Causal Decision Theory and the Fixity of the Past.Arif Ahmed - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (4):665-685.details
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Causation, Chance, and the Rational Significance of Supernatural Evidence.Huw Price - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (4):483-538.details
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Decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences.Adam Bales, Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):453-70.details
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Decision-theoretic paradoxes as voting paradoxes.Rachael Briggs - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):1-30.details
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Some counterexamples to causal decision theory.Andy Egan - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (1):93-114.details
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Gandalf’s solution to the Newcomb problem.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2643–2675.details
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No regrets, or: Edith piaf revamps decision theory.Frank Arntzenius - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (2):277-297.details
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Decision-Theoretic Pluralism.Adam Bales - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (273):801-818.details
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Why Take Both Boxes?Jack Spencer & Ian Wells - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):27-48.details
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Imprecise Probabilities and Unstable Betting Behaviour.Anna Mahtani - 2014 - Noûs 52 (1):69-87.details
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A Representation Theorem for Frequently Irrational Agents.Edward Elliott - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (5):467-506.details
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Revisiting Risk and Rationality: a reply to Pettigrew and Briggs.Lara Buchak - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):841-862.details
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(2 other versions)Making Comparisons Count.Ruth Chang - 2001 - New York: Routledge.details
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Prospectism and the weak money pump argument.Martin Peterson - 2015 - Theory and Decision 78 (3):451-456.details
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Evidence, Decision and Causality.Arif Ahmed - 2014 - United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.details
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Should subjective probabilities be sharp?Seamus Bradley & Katie Siobhan Steele - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):277-289.details
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A forward looking decision rule for imprecise credences.Rohan Sud - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):119-139.details
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Risk and Tradeoffs.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S6):1091-1117.details
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Unsharp Sharpness.Nils-Eric Sahlin & Paul Weirich - 2013 - Theoria 80 (1):100-103.details
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Causal Decision Theory: A Counterexample.Arif Ahmed - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (2):289-306.details
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Subjective Probabilities Need Not be Sharp.Jake Chandler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1273-1286.details
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Push the Button.Arif Ahmed - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (3):386-395.details
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Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp.Adam Elga - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.details
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Causal decision theory.David Lewis - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.details
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A Decision Theory for Imprecise Probabilities.Susanna Rinard - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.details
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A critique of benchmark theory.Robert Bassett - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):241-267.details
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Unexpected Expectations.Alan Hájek - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):533-567.details
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Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Regret and instability in causal decision theory.James M. Joyce - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):123-145.details
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