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Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Logic for equivocators.David Lewis - 1982 - Noûs 16 (3):431-441.details
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Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):141-161.details
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Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.details
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Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.details
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The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge.Ernest Sosa - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):3-26.details
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How to Disagree about How to Disagree.Adam Elga - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 175-186.details
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Dispositional Evaluations and Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 91–115.details
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``A Plethora of Epistemological Theories".John Pollock - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 93-115.details
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Doubt truth to be a liar.Graham Priest - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Normative Externalism.Brian Weatherson - 2019 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance * By MICHAEL J. ZIMMERMAN. [REVIEW]Michael Zimmerman - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):785-787.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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Ambiguous rationality.Timothy Williamson - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):263-274.details
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The Cone Model of Knowledge.Peter Unger - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (1):125-178.details
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The Cone Model of Knowledge.Peter Unger - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (1):125-178.details
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Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.details
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Ideal rationality and logical omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.details
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Respecting all the evidence.Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.details
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The scope of instrumental reason.Mark Schroeder - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):337–364.details
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Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):223 - 248.details
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A Dilemma for Calibrationism.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):425-455.details
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The Myth of Instrumental Rationality.Joseph Raz - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (1):28.details
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The logic of paradox.Graham Priest - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):219 - 241.details
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In contradiction: a study of the transconsistent.Graham Priest - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Metanormative Contextualism and Normative Uncertainty.John Pittard & Alex Worsnip - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):155-193.details
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Cognitive islands and runaway echo chambers: problems for epistemic dependence on experts.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2803-2821.details
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
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Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):597-632.details
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Subjective justification.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1984 - Mind 93 (369):71-84.details
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Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.details
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Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.details
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Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (7):186.details
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Anti-exceptionalism about logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658.details
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Does moral ignorance exculpate?Elizabeth Harman - 2011 - Ratio 24 (4):443-468.details
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Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Truth and correct belief.Allan Gibbard - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):338–350.details
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It's OK to Make Mistakes: Against the Fixed Point Thesis.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2019 - Episteme 16 (2):175-185.details
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Giving Up the Enkratic Principle.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2021 - Logos and Episteme 12 (1):7-28.details
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Anti-Exceptionalism About Requirements of Epistemic Rationality.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):423-441.details
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Epistemic obligations.Richard Feldman - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:235-256.details
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Concepts of Epistemic Justification.William P. Alston - 1985 - The Monist 68 (1):57-89.details
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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.details
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Is Rationality Normative?John Broome - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (23):161-178.details
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The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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