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Darwinian skepticism about moral realism.David Copp - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):186-206.details
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Justification and Explanation in Mathematics and Morality.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10.details
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Do the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs undermine moral knowledge?Kevin Brosnan - 2011 - Biology and Philosophy 26 (1):51-64.details
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Evolutionary Debunking: Can Moral Realists Explain the Reliability of Our Moral Judgments?Matthew Braddock - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):844-857.details
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Debunking Arguments from Insensitivity.Matthew Braddock - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (2):91-113.details
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Only All Naturalists Should Worry About Only One Evolutionary Debunking Argument.Tomas Bogardus - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):636-661.details
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Intuitive non-naturalism meets cosmic coincidence.Matthew S. Bedke - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):188-209.details
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You just believe that because….Roger White - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.details
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Epistemic Bootstrapping.Jonathan Vogel - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):518-539.details
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Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism.Katia Vavova - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (2):104-116.details
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Tell me you love me: bootstrapping, externalism, and no-lose epistemology.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):119-134.details
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How could a “blind” evolutionary process have made human moral beliefs sensitive to strongly universal, objective moral standards?William J. Talbott - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (5):691-708.details
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Reply to Copp: Naturalism, normativity, and the varieties of realism worth worrying about.Sharon Street - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):207-228.details
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Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism and Moral Knowledge.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1):1-38.details
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What Not to Multiply Without Necessity.Jonathan Schaffer - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):644-664.details
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Vision: Variations on Some Berkeleian Themes.Robert Schwartz & David Marr - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (3):411.details
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Evolution and Normative Scepticism.Karl Schafer - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):471-488.details
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Review of Michael Ruse: Taking Darwin Seriously: A Naturalistic Approach to Philosophy. [REVIEW]Michael Ruse - 1988 - Ethics 98 (2):400-402.details
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Folk Mereology is Teleological.David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):238-270.details
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What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.details
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