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Visual qualia and visual content.Michael Tye - 1992 - In Paul F. Snowdon (ed.), The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 158--176.details
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There are no phenomenal concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.details
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Externalism and the Gappy Content of Hallucination.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 291.details
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