Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. A Pragmatist’s Guide to Epistemic Utility.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (4):613-638.
    We use a theorem from M. J. Schervish to explore the relationship between accuracy and practical success. If an agent is pragmatically rational, she will quantify the expected loss of her credence with a strictly proper scoring rule. Which scoring rule is right for her will depend on the sorts of decisions she expects to face. We relate this pragmatic conception of inaccuracy to the purely epistemic one popular among epistemic utility theorists.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.
    Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences. The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. Pettigrew looks to decision theory in order to ground his argument. He treats an agent's credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by different sets (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   254 citations  
  • Probabilistic Opinion Pooling.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2016 - In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Suppose several individuals (e.g., experts on a panel) each assign probabilities to some events. How can these individual probability assignments be aggregated into a single collective probability assignment? This article reviews several proposed solutions to this problem. We focus on three salient proposals: linear pooling (the weighted or unweighted linear averaging of probabilities), geometric pooling (the weighted or unweighted geometric averaging of probabilities), and multiplicative pooling (where probabilities are multiplied rather than averaged). We present axiomatic characterisations of each class of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  • An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):201-235.
    One of the fundamental problems of epistemology is to say when the evidence in an agent’s possession justifies the beliefs she holds. In this paper and its sequel, we defend the Bayesian solution to this problem by appealing to the following fundamental norm: Accuracy An epistemic agent ought to minimize the inaccuracy of her partial beliefs. In this paper, we make this norm mathematically precise in various ways. We describe three epistemic dilemmas that an agent might face if she attempts (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   157 citations  
  • Aggregating disparate estimates of chance.Daniel Osherson - manuscript
    We consider a panel of experts asked to assign probabilities to events, both logically simple and complex. The events evaluated by different experts are based on overlapping sets of variables but may otherwise be distinct. The union of all the judgments will likely be probabilistic incoherent. We address the problem of revising the probability estimates of the panel so as to produce a coherent set that best represents the group’s expertise.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Bayesian conditionalisation and the principle of minimum information.P. M. Williams - 1980 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (2):131-144.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   65 citations  
  • (1 other version)A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
    The pragmatic character of the Dutch book argument makes it unsuitable as an "epistemic" justification for the fundamental probabilist dogma that rational partial beliefs must conform to the axioms of probability. To secure an appropriately epistemic justification for this conclusion, one must explain what it means for a system of partial beliefs to accurately represent the state of the world, and then show that partial beliefs that violate the laws of probability are invariably less accurate than they could be otherwise. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   500 citations  
  • Groupthink.Jeffrey Sanford Russell, John Hawthorne & Lara Buchak - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1287-1309.
    How should a group with different opinions (but the same values) make decisions? In a Bayesian setting, the natural question is how to aggregate credences: how to use a single credence function to naturally represent a collection of different credence functions. An extension of the standard Dutch-book arguments that apply to individual decision-makers recommends that group credences should be updated by conditionalization. This imposes a constraint on what aggregation rules can be like. Taking conditionalization as a basic constraint, we gather (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • (1 other version)On the Accuracy of Group Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    We often ask for the opinion of a group of individuals. How strongly does the scientific community believe that the rate at which sea levels are rising has increased over the last 200 years? How likely does the UK Treasury think it is that there will be a recession if the country leaves the European Union? What are these group credences that such questions request? And how do they relate to the individual credences assigned by the members of the particular (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Graded Incoherence for Accuracy-Firsters.Glauber De Bona & Julia Staffel - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (2):189-213.
    This paper investigates the relationship between two evaluative claims about agents’ de- grees of belief: (i) that it is better to have more, rather than less accurate degrees of belief, and (ii) that it is better to have less, rather than more probabilistically incoherent degrees of belief. We show that, for suitable combinations of inaccuracy measures and incoherence measures, both claims are compatible, although not equivalent; moreover, certain ways of becoming less incoherent always guarantee improvements in accuracy. Incompatibilities between particular (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James M. Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 263-297.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   205 citations  
  • Conditionalization, cogency, and cognitive value.Graham Oddie - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (4):533-541.
    Why should a Bayesian bother performing an experiment, one the result of which might well upset his own favored credence function? The Ramsey-Good theorem provides a decision theoretic answer. Provided you base your decision on expected utility, and the the experiment is cost-free, performing the experiment and then choosing has at least as much expected utility as choosing without further ado. Furthermore, doing the experiment is strictly preferable just in case at least one possible outcome of the experiment could alter (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   68 citations  
  • (1 other version)On the accuracy of group credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - In Oxford Studies in Epistemology Vol.6. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):236-272.
    One of the fundamental problems of epistemology is to say when the evidence in an agent’s possession justifies the beliefs she holds. In this paper and its prequel, we defend the Bayesian solution to this problem by appealing to the following fundamental norm: Accuracy An epistemic agent ought to minimize the inaccuracy of her partial beliefs. In the prequel, we made this norm mathematically precise; in this paper, we derive its consequences. We show that the two core tenets of Bayesianism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   150 citations  
  • Lehrer and the consensus proposal.Robert Laddaga - 1977 - Synthese 36 (4):473 - 477.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Peer Disagreement and Independence Preservation.Carl G. Wagner - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (2):277-288.
    It has often been recommended that the differing probability distributions of a group of experts should be reconciled in such a way as to preserve each instance of independence common to all of their distributions. When probability pooling is subject to a universal domain condition, along with state-wise aggregation, there are severe limitations on implementing this recommendation. In particular, when the individuals are epistemic peers whose probability assessments are to be accorded equal weight, universal preservation of independence is, with a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • (1 other version)Rational Credence and the Value of Truth.Allan Gibbard - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:143-164.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   60 citations  
  • (1 other version)Rational Credence and the Value of Truth.Allan Gibbard - 2007 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology:Volume 2: Volume 2. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  • Probabilistic coherence and proper scoring rules.Joel Predd, Robert Seiringer, Elliott Lieb, Daniel Osherson, H. Vincent Poor & Sanjeev Kulkarni - 2009 - IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 55 (10):4786-4792.
    We provide self-contained proof of a theorem relating probabilistic coherence of forecasts to their non-domination by rival forecasts with respect to any proper scoring rule. The theorem recapitulates insights achieved by other investigators, and clarifi es the connection of coherence and proper scoring rules to Bregman divergence.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   68 citations  
  • Updating Subjective Probability.Persi Diaconis & Sandy L. Zabell - 1982 - Journal of the American Statistical Association 77 (380):822-830.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   112 citations  
  • Allocation, Lehrer models, and the consensus of probabilities.Carl Wagner - 1982 - Theory and Decision 14 (2):207-220.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues.Alvin I. Goldman - 2002 - In Pathways to knowledge: private and public. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 51-72.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • Belief merging and the discursive dilemma: an argument-based account to paradoxes of judgment aggregation.Gabriella Pigozzi - 2006 - Synthese 152 (2):285-298.
    The aggregation of individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective decision on the same propositions is called judgment aggregation. Literature in social choice and political theory has claimed that judgment aggregation raises serious concerns. For example, consider a set of premises and a conclusion where the latter is logically equivalent to the former. When majority voting is applied to some propositions (the premises) it may give a different outcome than majority voting applied to another set of propositions (the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   66 citations  
  • Epistemic Accuracy and Subjective Probability.Marcello D'Agostino & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2010 - In M. Dorato M. Suàrez (ed.), Epsa Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer. pp. 95--105.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and Updating.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (3):413-424.
    Leitgeb and Pettigrew argue that (1) agents should minimize the expected inaccuracy of their beliefs and (2) inaccuracy should be measured via the Brier score. They show that in certain diachronic cases, these claims require an alternative to Jeffrey Conditionalization. I claim that this alternative is an irrational updating procedure and that the Brier score, and quadratic scoring rules generally, should be rejected as legitimate measures of inaccuracy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Probability amalgamation and the independence issue: A reply to Laddaga.Keith Lehrer & Carl Wagner - 1983 - Synthese 55 (3):339 - 346.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations