- (1 other version)Rational Credence and the Value of Truth.Allan Gibbard - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:143-164.details
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(1 other version)On the Accuracy of Group Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
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(1 other version)On the accuracy of group credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - In Oxford Studies in Epistemology Vol.6. Oxford University Press.details
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A Pragmatist’s Guide to Epistemic Utility.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (4):613-638.details
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Graded Incoherence for Accuracy-Firsters.Glauber De Bona & Julia Staffel - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (2):189-213.details
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Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Groupthink.Jeffrey Sanford Russell, John Hawthorne & Lara Buchak - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1287-1309.details
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Probabilistic Opinion Pooling.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2016 - In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and Updating.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (3):413-424.details
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Updating Subjective Probability.Persi Diaconis & Sandy L. Zabell - 1982 - Journal of the American Statistical Association 77 (380):822-830.details
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Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James M. Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 263-297.details
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An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):236-272.details
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An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):201-235.details
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Belief merging and the discursive dilemma: an argument-based account to paradoxes of judgment aggregation.Gabriella Pigozzi - 2006 - Synthese 152 (2):285-298.details
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(1 other version)Rational Credence and the Value of Truth.Allan Gibbard - 2007 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology:Volume 2: Volume 2. Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Accuracy and Subjective Probability.Marcello D'Agostino & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2010 - In M. Dorato M. Suàrez (ed.), Epsa Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer. pp. 95--105.details
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Peer Disagreement and Independence Preservation.Carl G. Wagner - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (2):277-288.details
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Lehrer and the consensus proposal.Robert Laddaga - 1977 - Synthese 36 (4):473 - 477.details
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Conditionalization, cogency, and cognitive value.Graham Oddie - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (4):533-541.details
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(1 other version)A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.details
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Probabilistic coherence and proper scoring rules.Joel Predd, Robert Seiringer, Elliott Lieb, Daniel Osherson, H. Vincent Poor & Sanjeev Kulkarni - 2009 - IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 55 (10):4786-4792.details
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Aggregating disparate estimates of chance.Daniel Osherson - manuscriptdetails
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Bayesian conditionalisation and the principle of minimum information.P. M. Williams - 1980 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (2):131-144.details
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Allocation, Lehrer models, and the consensus of probabilities.Carl Wagner - 1982 - Theory and Decision 14 (2):207-220.details
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Probability amalgamation and the independence issue: A reply to Laddaga.Keith Lehrer & Carl Wagner - 1983 - Synthese 55 (3):339 - 346.details
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The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues.Alvin I. Goldman - 2002 - In Pathways to knowledge: private and public. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 51-72.details
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