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Sets of probability distributions, independence, and convexity.Fabio G. Cozman - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):577-600.details
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Hypothetical revision and matter-of-fact supposition.Horacio Arló Costa - 2001 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 11 (1-2):203-229.details
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Being Realist about Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind.Matteo Colombo, Lee Elkin & Stephan Hartmann - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):185-220.details
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Bayesian Cognitive Science, Monopoly, and Neglected Frameworks.Matteo Colombo & Stephan Hartmann - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2):451–484.details
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Time-Slice Epistemology for Bayesians.Lisa Cassell - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Higher-Order Beliefs and the Undermining Problem for Bayesianism.Lisa Cassell - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (2):197-213.details
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Bayesian coherentism.Lisa Cassell - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9563-9590.details
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Probability, coherent belief and coherent belief changes.John Cantwell & Hans Rott - 2019 - Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 87 (3):259-291.details
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Learning from experience and conditionalization.Peter Brössel - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2797-2823.details
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The kinematics of belief and desire.Richard Bradley - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):513-535.details
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Radical probabilism and bayesian conditioning.Richard Bradley - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (2):342-364.details
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Becker’s thesis and three models of preference change.Richard Bradley - 2009 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8 (2):223-242.details
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Attitudes, deliberation and decisions.Richard Bradley - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-18.details
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Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.details
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Weighted averaging, Jeffrey conditioning and invariance.Denis Bonnay & Mikaël Cozic - 2018 - Theory and Decision 85 (1):21-39.details
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On the Formal Consistency of the Principal Principle.Gergei Bana - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):988-1001.details
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Rational Aversion to Information.Sven Neth - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
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Epistemic Probability and Coherent Degrees of Belief.Colin Howson - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 97--119.details
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Diachronic Coherence and Radical Probabilism.Brian Skyrms - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 253--261.details
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Non-additive degrees of belief.Rolf Haenni - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 121--159.details
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Superconditioning.Simon M. Huttegger - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (4):811-833.details
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Non-Ideal Decision Theory.Sven Neth - 2023 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeleydetails
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Assessing Scientific Theories: The Bayesian Approach.Stephan Hartmann & Radin Dardashti - 2019 - In Dawid Richard, Dardashti Radin & Thebault Karim (eds.), Epistemology of Fundamental Physics: Why Trust a Theory? Cambridge University Press. pp. 67–83.details
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Uncertainty, Rationality, and Agency.Wiebe van der Hoek - 2006 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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Beyond Uncertainty: Reasoning with Unknown Possibilities.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2021 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Old evidence and new theories.Lyle Zynda - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):67 - 95.details
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Radical Probabilism Revisited.Lyle Zynda - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):969-980.details
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Probability and time.Marco Zaffalon & Enrique Miranda - 2013 - Artificial Intelligence 198 (C):1-51.details
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Conditionalizing on knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):89-121.details
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Indifference, neutrality and informativeness: generalizing the three prisoners paradox.Sergio Wechsler, L. G. Esteves, A. Simonis & C. Peixoto - 2005 - Synthese 143 (3):255-272.details
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Peer Disagreement and Independence Preservation.Carl G. Wagner - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (2):277-288.details
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Probability kinematics and commutativity.Carl G. Wagner - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (2):266-278.details
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Is Conditioning Really Incompatible with Holism?Carl Wagner - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):409-414.details
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Generalized probability kinematics.Carl G. Wagner - 1992 - Erkenntnis 36 (2):245 - 257.details
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On the Ecological and Internal Rationality of Bayesian Conditionalization and Other Belief Updating Strategies.Olav Benjamin Vassend - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Updating Probability: Tracking Statistics as Criterion.Bas C. van Fraassen & Joseph Y. Halpern - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv027.details
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Conditional Learning Through Causal Models.Jonathan Vandenburgh - 2020 - Synthese (1-2):2415-2437.details
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Testimony as Evidence: More Problems for Linear Pooling. [REVIEW]Katie Steele - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):983-999.details
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Learning and Pooling, Pooling and Learning.Rush T. Stewart & Ignacio Ojea Quintana - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):1-21.details
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Another Approach to Consensus and Maximally Informed Opinions with Increasing Evidence.Rush T. Stewart & Michael Nielsen - 2018 - Philosophy of Science (2):236-254.details
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Updating, supposing, and maxent.Brian Skyrms - 1987 - Theory and Decision 22 (3):225-246.details
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The structure of radical probabilism.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):285 - 297.details
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Maximum entropy inference as a special case of conditionalization.Brian Skyrms - 1985 - Synthese 63 (1):55 - 74.details
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Dynamic coherence and probability kinematics.Brian Skyrms - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (1):1-20.details
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Languages and Designs for Probability Judgment.Glenn Shafer & Amos Tversky - 1985 - Cognitive Science 9 (3):309-339.details
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Jeffrey's rule of conditioning.Glenn Shafer - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (3):337-362.details
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Changing minds in a changing world.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):219-239.details
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Expert deference as a belief revision schema.Joe Roussos - 2020 - Synthese (1-2):1-28.details
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