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  1. Ranking judgments in Arrow’s setting.Daniele Porello - 2010 - Synthese 173 (2):199-210.
    In this paper, I investigate the relationship between preference and judgment aggregation, using the notion of ranking judgment introduced in List and Pettit. Ranking judgments were introduced in order to state the logical connections between the impossibility theorem of aggregating sets of judgments and Arrow’s theorem. I present a proof of the theorem concerning ranking judgments as a corollary of Arrow’s theorem, extending the translation between preferences and judgments defined in List and Pettit to the conditions on the aggregation procedure.
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  • Local Supermajorities.Fabrizio Cariani - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (2):391-406.
    This paper explores two non-standard supermajority rules in the context of judgment aggregation over multiple logically connected issues. These rules set the supermajority threshold in a local, context sensitive way—partly as a function of the input profile of opinions. To motivate the interest of these rules, I prove two results. First, I characterize each rule in terms of a condition I call ‘Block Preservation’. Block preservation says that if a majority of group members accept a judgment set, then so should (...)
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  • The Logic of Group Decisions: Judgment Aggregation.Gabriella Pigozzi - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):755-769.
    Judgment aggregation studies how individual opinions on a given set of propositions can be aggregated to form a consistent group judgment on the same propositions. Despite the simplicity of the problem, seemingly natural aggregation procedures fail to return consistent collective outcomes, leading to what is now known as the doctrinal paradox. The first occurrences of the paradox were discovered in the legal realm. However, the interest of judgment aggregation is much broader and extends to political philosophy, epistemology, social choice theory, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Social Choice Theory.Christian List - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Social choice theory is the study of collective decision processes and procedures. It is not a single theory, but a cluster of models and results concerning the aggregation of individual inputs (e.g., votes, preferences, judgments, welfare) into collective outputs (e.g., collective decisions, preferences, judgments, welfare). Central questions are: How can a group of individuals choose a winning outcome (e.g., policy, electoral candidate) from a given set of options? What are the properties of different voting systems? When is a voting system (...)
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  • A generalized model of judgment and preference aggregation.Ismat Beg - 2013 - Fuzzy Economic Review (1).
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  • Truth approximation, belief merging, and peer disagreement.Gustavo Cevolani - 2014 - Synthese 191 (11):2383-2401.
    In this paper, we investigate the problem of truth approximation via belief merging, i.e., we ask whether, and under what conditions, a group of inquirers merging together their beliefs makes progress toward the truth about the underlying domain. We answer this question by proving some formal results on how belief merging operators perform with respect to the task of truth approximation, construed as increasing verisimilitude or truthlikeness. Our results shed new light on the issue of how rational (dis)agreement affects the (...)
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  • Acceptance, Aggregation and Scoring Rules.Jake Chandler - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):201-217.
    As the ongoing literature on the paradoxes of the Lottery and the Preface reminds us, the nature of the relation between probability and rational acceptability remains far from settled. This article provides a novel perspective on the matter by exploiting a recently noted structural parallel with the problem of judgment aggregation. After offering a number of general desiderata on the relation between finite probability models and sets of accepted sentences in a Boolean sentential language, it is noted that a number (...)
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  • Epistemology in Group Agency: Six objections in search of the truth. [REVIEW]Fabrizio Cariani - 2012 - Episteme 9 (3):255-269.
    List and Pettit's Group Agency is an extremely important book, spearheading a new wave of work on the metaphysics, epistemology and ethics of group agents. In this article, I focus on the epistemological thread in their discussion. After introducing the apparatus they use in analyzing the epistemic performance of groups, I criticize some elements and point to some ways in which the very same apparatus could be redirected to address them.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first (...)
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  • The Doctrinal Paradox, the Discursive Dilemma, and Logical Aggregation theory.Philippe Mongin - 2012 - Theory and Decision 73 (3):315-355.
    Judgment aggregation theory, or rather, as we conceive of it here, logical aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of merely preference judgments. It derives from Kornhauser and Sager’s doctrinal paradox and List and Pettit’s discursive dilemma, two problems that we distinguish emphatically here. The current theory has developed from the discursive dilemma, rather than the doctrinal paradox, and the final objective of the paper is to give the latter (...)
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  • Methods for distance-based judgment aggregation.M. K. Miller & D. Osherson - unknown
    Judgment aggregation theory, which concerns the translation of individual judgments on logical propositions into consistent group judgments, has shown that group consistency generally cannot be guaranteed if each proposition is treated independently from the others. Developing the right method of abandoning independence is thus a high-priority goal. However, little work has been done in this area outside of a few simple approaches. To fill the gap, we compare four methods based on distance metrics between judgment sets. The methods generalize the (...)
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  • Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2013 - Social Choice and Welfare 40 (4):1067-1095.
    In the theory of judgment aggregation, it is known for which agendas of propositions it is possible to aggregate individual judgments into collective ones in accordance with the Arrow-inspired requirements of universal domain, collective rationality, unanimity preservation, non-dictatorship and propositionwise independence. But it is only partially known (e.g., only in the monotonic case) for which agendas it is possible to respect additional requirements, notably non-oligarchy, anonymity, no individual veto power, or implication preservation. We fully characterize the agendas for which there (...)
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  • Deliberation, single-peakedness, and the possibility of meaningful democracy: evidence from deliberative polls.Christian List, Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin & Iain McLean - 2013 - Journal of Politics 75 (1):80–95.
    Majority cycling and related social choice paradoxes are often thought to threaten the meaningfulness of democracy. But deliberation can prevent majority cycles – not by inducing unanimity, which is unrealistic, but by bringing preferences closer to single-peakedness. We present the first empirical test of this hypothesis, using data from Deliberative Polls. Comparing preferences before and after deliberation, we find increases in proximity to single-peakedness. The increases are greater for lower versus higher salience issues and for individuals who seem to have (...)
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  • Introduction to judgment aggregation.Christian List & Ben Polak - 2010 - Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2):441-466.
    This introduces the symposium on judgment aggregation. The theory of judgment aggregation asks how several individuals' judgments on some logically connected propositions can be aggregated into consistent collective judgments. The aim of this introduction is to show how ideas from the familiar theory of preference aggregation can be extended to this more general case. We first translate a proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem into the new setting, so as to motivate some of the central concepts and conditions leading to analogous (...)
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  • (6 other versions)The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review.Christian List - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):179-207.
    This paper provides an introductory review of the theory of judgment aggregation. It introduces the paradoxes of majority voting that originally motivated the field, explains several key results on the impossibility of propositionwise judgment aggregation, presents a pedagogical proof of one of those results, discusses escape routes from the impossibility and relates judgment aggregation to some other salient aggregation problems, such as preference aggregation, abstract aggregation and probability aggregation. The present illustrative rather than exhaustive review is intended to give readers (...)
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  • Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.
    Decision-making typically requires judgments about causal relations: we need to know the causal effects of our actions and the causal relevance of various environmental factors. We investigate how several individuals' causal judgments can be aggregated into collective causal judgments. First, we consider the aggregation of causal judgments via the aggregation of probabilistic judgments, and identify the limitations of this approach. We then explore the possibility of aggregating causal judgments independently of probabilistic ones. Formally, we introduce the problem of causal-network aggregation. (...)
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  • Group Communication and the Transformation of Judgments: An Impossibility Result.Christian List - 2011 - Journal of Political Philosophy 19 (1):1-27.
    While a large social-choice-theoretic literature discusses the aggregation of individual judgments into collective ones, there is much less formal work on the transformation of judgments in group communication. I develop a model of judgment transformation and prove a baseline impossibility theorem: Any judgment transformation function satisfying some initially plausible conditions is the identity function, under which no opinion change occurs. I identify escape routes from this impossibility and argue that the kind of group communication envisaged by deliberative democats must be (...)
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  • Aggregation Theory and the Relevance of Some Issues to Others.Franz Dietrich - 2015 - Journal of Economic Theory 160:463-493.
    I propose a relevance-based independence axiom on how to aggregate individual yes/no judgments on given propositions into collective judgments: the collective judgment on a proposition depends only on people’s judgments on propositions which are relevant to that proposition. This axiom contrasts with the classical independence axiom: the collective judgment on a proposition depends only on people’s judgments on the same proposition. I generalize the premise-based rule and the sequential-priority rule to an arbitrary priority order of the propositions, instead of a (...)
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  • Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
    In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue for the converse claim. After proving two impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation (using "systematicity" and "independence" conditions, respectively), we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation and prove Arrow’s theorem (stated for strict preferences) as a corollary of our second result. Although we thereby (...)
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  • Majority voting on restricted domains.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2):512-543.
    In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions that guarantee consistent majority outcomes. We introduce several conditions on individual judgments su¢ - cient for consistent majority judgments. Some are based on global orders of propositions or individuals, others on local orders, still others not on orders at all. Some generalize classic social-choice-theoretic domain conditions, others have no counterpart. Our most general condition generalizes Sen’s triplewise value-restriction, itself the most general classic condition. We also prove a (...)
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  • The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications.Franz Dietrich - 2010 - Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2):603-638.
    The new …eld of judgment aggregation aims to …nd collective judgments on logically interconnected propositions. Recent impossibility results establish limitations on the possibility to vote independently on the propositions. I show that, fortunately, the impossibility results do not apply to a wide class of realistic agendas once propositions like “if a then b” are adequately modelled, namely as subjunctive implications rather than material implications. For these agendas, consistent and complete collective judgments can be reached through appropriate quota rules (which decide (...)
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  • Judgment aggregation and the problem of tracking the truth.Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):209-221.
    The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on those propositions has recently drawn much attention. Seemingly reasonable aggregation procedures, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective conclusion. The literature on judgment aggregation refers to that problem as the discursive dilemma. In this paper, we motivate that many groups do not only want to reach a factually right conclusion, but also want to correctly evaluate the reasons for that conclusion. In (...)
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  • Decision framing in judgment aggregation.Fabrizio Cariani, Marc Pauly & Josh Snyder - 2008 - Synthese 163 (1):1 - 24.
    Judgment aggregation problems are language dependent in that they may be framed in different yet equivalent ways. We formalize this dependence via the notion of translation invariance, adopted from the philosophy of science, and we argue for the normative desirability of translation invariance. We characterize the class of translation invariant aggregation functions in the canonical judgment aggregation model, which requires collective judgments to be complete. Since there are reasonable translation invariant aggregation functions, our result can be viewed as a possibility (...)
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  • Judgment aggregation by quota rules: Majority voting generalized.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Journal of Theoretical Politics 19 (4):391-424.
    The widely discussed "discursive dilemma" shows that majority voting in a group of individuals on logically connected propositions may produce irrational collective judgments. We generalize majority voting by considering quota rules, which accept each proposition if and only if the number of individuals accepting it exceeds a given threshold, where different thresholds may be used for different propositions. After characterizing quota rules, we prove necessary and sufficient conditions on the required thresholds for various collective rationality requirements. We also consider sequential (...)
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  • Judgment aggregation with consistency alone.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Maastricht University.
    All existing impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation require individual and collective judgment sets to be consistent and complete, arguably a demanding rationality requirement. They do not carry over to aggregation functions mapping profiles of consistent individual judgment sets to consistent collective ones. We prove that, whenever the agenda of propositions under consideration exhibits mild interconnections, any such aggregation function that is "neutral" between the acceptance and rejection of each proposition is dictatorial. We relate this theorem to the literature.
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  • Strategy-proof judgment aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2005 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (3):269-300.
    Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem. We also discuss weaker forms of non-manipulability and strategy-proofness. Comparing two frequently discussed aggregation rules, we show that “conclusion-based voting” is less vulnerable to manipulation than “premise-based voting”, (...)
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  • Which worlds are possible? A judgment aggregation problem.Christian List - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (1):57 - 65.
    Suppose the members of a group (e.g., committee, jury, expert panel) each form a judgment on which worlds in a given set are possible, subject to the constraint that at least one world is possible but not all are. The group seeks to aggregate these individual judgments into a collective judgment, subject to the same constraint. I show that no judgment aggregation rule can solve this problem in accordance with three conditions: “unanimity,” “independence” and “non-dictatorship,” Although the result is a (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Judgment aggregation: A survey.Christian List & Clemens Puppe - 2009 - In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.), Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press.
    Our aim in this survey article is to provide an accessible overview of some key results and questions in the theory of judgment aggregation. We omit proofs and technical details, focusing instead on concepts and underlying ideas.
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  • Premise independence in judgment aggregation.Gabriella Pigozzi & L. van der Torre - manuscript
    ment on the same propositions, and is plagued by impossibility re- 2. What is the role of independence in judgment aggregation sults. In this paper we study the central notion of independence in..
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  • Against Corporate Responsibility.Lars J. K. Moen - 2024 - Journal of Social Philosophy 55 (1):44–61.
    Can a group be morally responsible instead of, or in addition to, its members? An influential defense of corporate responsibility is based on results in social choice theory suggesting that a group can form and act on attitudes held by few, or even none, of its members. The members therefore cannot be (fully) responsible for the group’s behavior; the group itself, as a corporate agent, must be responsible. In this paper, I reject this view of corporate responsibility by showing how (...)
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  • Dynamically rational judgment aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - forthcoming - Social Choice and Welfare.
    Judgment-aggregation theory has always focused on the attainment of rational collective judgments. But so far, rationality has been understood in static terms: as coherence of judgments at a given time, defined as consistency, completeness, and/or deductive closure. This paper asks whether collective judgments can be dynamically rational, so that they change rationally in response to new information. Formally, a judgment aggregation rule is dynamically rational with respect to a given revision operator if, whenever all individuals revise their judgments in light (...)
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  • A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2008 - Social Choice and Welfare 31 (1):59-78.
    In the emerging literature on judgment aggregation over logically connected proposi- tions, expert rights or liberal rights have not been investigated yet. A group making collective judgments may assign individual members or subgroups with expert know- ledge on, or particularly affected by, certain propositions the right to determine the collective judgment on those propositions. We identify a problem that generalizes Sen's 'liberal paradox'. Under plausible conditions, the assignment of rights to two or more individuals or subgroups is inconsistent with the (...)
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  • Judgement aggregation in non-classical logics.Daniele Porello - 2017 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 27 (1-2):106-139.
    This work contributes to the theory of judgement aggregation by discussing a number of significant non-classical logics. After adapting the standard framework of judgement aggregation to cope with non-classical logics, we discuss in particular results for the case of Intuitionistic Logic, the Lambek calculus, Linear Logic and Relevant Logics. The motivation for studying judgement aggregation in non-classical logics is that they offer a number of modelling choices to represent agents’ reasoning in aggregation problems. By studying judgement aggregation in logics that (...)
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  • Challenging the Majority Rule in Matters of Truth.Bernd Lahno - 2014 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 7 (2):54-72.
    The majority rule has caught much attention in recent debate about the aggregation of judgments. But its role in finding the truth is limited. A majority of expert judgments is not necessarily authoritative, even if all experts are equally competent, if they make their judgments independently of each other, and if all the judgments are based on the same source of (good) evidence. In this paper I demonstrate this limitation by presenting a simple counterexample and a related general result. I (...)
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  • Modulated logics and flexible reasoning.Walter Carnielli & Maria Cláudia C. Grácio - 2008 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 17 (3):211-249.
    This paper studies a family of monotonic extensions of first-order logic which we call modulated logics, constructed by extending classical logic through generalized quantifiers called modulated quantifiers. This approach offers a new regard to what we call flexible reasoning. A uniform treatment of modulated logics is given here, obtaining some general results in model theory. Besides reviewing the “Logic of Ultrafilters”, which formalizes inductive assertions of the kind “almost all”, two new monotonic logical systems are proposed here, the “Logic of (...)
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  • Complexity of Judgment Aggregation.Ulle Endriss, Umberto Grandi & Daniele Porello - 2012 - Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 45:481--514.
    We analyse the computational complexity of three problems in judgment aggregation: (1) computing a collective judgment from a profile of individual judgments (the winner determination problem); (2) deciding whether a given agent can influence the outcome of a judgment aggregation procedure in her favour by reporting insincere judgments (the strategic manipulation problem); and (3) deciding whether a given judgment aggregation scenario is guaranteed to result in a logically consistent outcome, independently from what the judgments supplied by the individuals are (the (...)
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  • Recognition-primed group decisions via judgement aggregation.Marija Slavkovik & Guido Boella - 2012 - Synthese 189 (S1):51-65.
    We introduce a conceptual model for reaching group decisions. Our model extends a well-known, single-agent cognitive model, the recognition-primed decision (RPD) model. The RPD model includes a recognition phase and an evaluation phase. Group extensions of the RPD model, applicable to a group of RPD agents, have been considered in the literature, however the proposed models do not formalize how distributed and possibly inconsistent information can be combined in either phase. We show how such information can be utilized by aggregating (...)
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  • A solution to the discursive dilemma.Ruth Weintraub - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):181 - 188.
    An impossibility result pertaining to the aggregation of individual judgements is thought by many to have significant implications for political theory, social epistemology and metaphysics. When members of a group hold a rational set of judgments on some interconnected questions, the theorem shows, it isn't always (logically) possible for them to aggregate their judgements into a collective one in conformity with seemingly very plausible constraints. I reject one of the constraints which engender the dilemma. The analogy with the lottery paradox, (...)
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  • Judgment aggregation: A short introduction.Christian List - 2012 - In Uskali Mäki (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics.
    The aim of this article is to introduce the theory of judgment aggregation, a growing interdisciplinary research area. The theory addresses the following question: How can a group of individuals make consistent collective judgments on a given set of propositions on the basis of the group members' individual judgments on them? I begin by explaining the observation that initially sparked the interest in judgment aggregation, the so-called "doctinal" and "discursive paradoxes". I then introduce the basic formal model of judgment aggregation, (...)
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  • Duhem on Good Sense and Theory Pursuit: From Virtue to Social Epistemology.Jamie Shaw - 2020 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 33 (2):67-85.
    ABSTRACT The emerging consensus in the secondary literature on Duhem is that his notion of ‘good sense’ is a virtue of individual scientists that guides them choosie between empirically equal rival theories : 149–159; Ivanova 2010. “Pierre Duhem’s Good Sense as a Guide to Theory Choice.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 : 58–64; Fairweather 2011. “The Epistemic Value of Good Sense.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 : 139–146; Bhakthavatsalam. “Duhemian Good (...)
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  • Judgement aggregation in scientific collaborations: The case for waiving expertise.Alexandru Marcoci & James Nguyen - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 84:66-74.
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  • Judgment aggregation in nonmonotonic logic.Xuefeng Wen - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3651-3683.
    Judgment aggregation studies how to aggregate individual judgments on logically correlated propositions into collective judgments. Different logics can be used in judgment aggregation, for which Dietrich and Mongin have proposed a generalized model based on general logics. Despite its generality, however, all nonmonotonic logics are excluded from this model. This paper argues for using nonmonotonic logic in judgment aggregation. Then it generalizes Dietrich and Mongin’s model to incorporate a large class of nonmonotonic logics. This generalization broadens the theoretical boundaries of (...)
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  • Collective Wisdom: Lessons from the Theory of Judgment Aggregation.Christian List - 2012 - In J. Elster & H. Landemore (eds.), Collective Wisdom: Principles and Mechanisms. Cambridge University Press.
    Can collectives be wise? The thesis that they can has recently received a lot of attention. It has been argued that, in many judgmental or decision-making tasks, suitably organized groups can outperform their individual members. In this paper, I discuss the lessons we can learn about collective wisdom from the emerging theory of judgment aggregation, as distinct from the literature on Condorcet’s jury theorem.
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  • Collective argumentation: A survey of aggregation issues around argumentation frameworks.Gustavo Bodanza, Fernando Tohmé & Marcelo Auday - 2017 - Argument and Computation 8 (1):1-34.
    Dung’s argumentation frameworks have been applied for over twenty years to the analysis of argument justification. This representation focuses on arguments and the attacks among them, abstracting away from other features like the internal structure of arguments, the nature of utterers, the specifics of the attack relation, etc. The model is highly attractive because it reduces most of the complexities involved in argumentation processes. It can be applied to different settings, like the argument evaluation of an individual agent or the (...)
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  • Reliable Methods of Judgment Aggregation.Stephan Hartmann, Gabriella Pigozzi & Jan Sprenger - 2007 - Journal for Logic and Computation 20:603--617.
    The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on the same propositions has recently drawn much attention. Seemingly reasonable aggregation procedures, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective conclusion. The literature on judgment aggregation refers to such a problem as the \textit{discursive dilemma}. In this paper we assume that the decision which the group is trying to reach is factually right or wrong. Hence, we address the question of how good (...)
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  • Aggregating incoherent agents who disagree.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2737-2776.
    In this paper, we explore how we should aggregate the degrees of belief of a group of agents to give a single coherent set of degrees of belief, when at least some of those agents might be probabilistically incoherent. There are a number of ways of aggregating degrees of belief, and there are a number of ways of fixing incoherent degrees of belief. When we have picked one of each, should we aggregate first and then fix, or fix first and (...)
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  • Judgment aggregation and minimal change: a model of consensus formation by belief revision.Marcel Heidemann - 2018 - Theory and Decision 85 (1):61-97.
    When a group of agents attempts to reach an agreement on certain issues, it is usually desirable that the resulting consensus be as close as possible to the original judgments of the individuals. However, when these judgments are logically connected to further beliefs, the notion of closeness should also take into account to what extent the individuals would have to revise their entire belief set to reach an agreement. In this work, we present a model for generation of agreement with (...)
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  • (1 other version)Aggregation of value judgments differs from aggregation of preferences.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2016 - In . pp. 9-40.
    My focus is on aggregation of individual value rankings of alternatives to a collective value ranking. This is compared with aggregation o individual prefrences to a collective preference. While in an individual preference ranking the alternatives are ordered in accordance with one’s preferences, the order in a value ranking expresses one’s comparative evaluation of the alternatives, from the best to the worst. I suggest that, despite their formal similarity as rankings, this difference in the nature of individual inputs in two (...)
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  • Equilibria in social belief removal.Richard Booth & Thomas Meyer - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):97 - 123.
    In studies of multi-agent interaction, especially in game theory, the notion of equilibrium often plays a prominent role. A typical scenario for the belief merging problem is one in which several agents pool their beliefs together to form a consistent "group" picture of the world. The aim of this paper is to define and study new notions of equilibria in belief merging. To do so, we assume the agents arrive at consistency via the use of a social belief removal function, (...)
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  • Logical Disagreement and Aggregation.Diego Tajer - 2017 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 32 (1).
    In this paper, I explore the possibility of applying the methods and results of Judgement Aggregation to the problem of logical disagreement. I develop and evaluate different ways in which individuals who logically disagree can generate a collective logic. I prove a version of the discursive paradox, where the majority voting of a group of structural logicians can give rise to a substructural logic; then I develop a more general impossibility result. After this, I analyze different ways to avoid the (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Theory of Judgment Aggregation: An Introductory Review.Christian List - 2010 - LSE Choice Group Working Paper Series 6 (1).
    This paper provides an introductory review of the theory of judgment aggregation. It introduces the paradoxes of majority voting that originally motivated the field, explains several key results on the impossibility of propositionwise judgment aggregation, presents a pedagogical proof of one of those results, discusses escape routes from the impossibility and relates judgment aggregation to some other salient aggregation problems, such as preference aggregation, abstract aggregation and probability aggregation. The present illustrative rather than exhaustive review is intended to give readers (...)
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