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Bayesian Philosophy of Science.Jan Sprenger & Stephan Hartmann - 2019 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.Deborah G. Mayo - 1996 - University of Chicago.details
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Computer simulation and the philosophy of science.Eric Winsberg - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):835-845.details
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An a priori solution to the replication crisis.David Trafimow - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (8):1188-1214.details
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Is frequentist testing vulnerable to the base-rate fallacy?Aris Spanos - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (4):565-583.details
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A contrast between two decision rules for use with (convex) sets of probabilities: Γ-maximin versus e-admissibilty.T. Seidenfeld - 2004 - Synthese 140 (1-2):69 - 88.details
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Scientific self-correction: the Bayesian way.Felipe Romero & Jan Sprenger - 2020 - Synthese (Suppl 23):1-21.details
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Scientific self-correction: the Bayesian way.Felipe Romero & Jan Sprenger - 2020 - Synthese 198 (S23):5803-5823.details
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Having a look at the Bayes Blind Spot.Miklós Rédei & Zalán Gyenis - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3801-3832.details
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The propensity interpretation of probability.Karl R. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):25-42.details
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Experience and Prediction. An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge. [REVIEW]E. N. & Hans Reichenbach - 1938 - Journal of Philosophy 35 (10):270.details
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On indeterminate probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.details
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On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):233--261.details
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Why Most Published Research Findings Are False.John P. A. Ioannidis - 2005 - PLoS Med 2 (8):e124.details
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Probabilistic Logics and Probabilistic Networks.Rolf Haenni, Jan-Willem Romeijn, Gregory Wheeler & Jon Williamson - 2010 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Synthese Library. Edited by Gregory Wheeler, Rolf Haenni, Jan-Willem Romeijn & and Jon Williamson.details
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Justifying conditionalization: Conditionalization maximizes expected epistemic utility.Hilary Greaves & David Wallace - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):607-632.details
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Review. [REVIEW]Barry Gower - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1):555-559.details
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Resurrecting logical probability.James Franklin - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (2):277-305.details
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Scientific method without metaphysical presuppositions.Herbert Feigl - 1954 - Philosophical Studies 5 (2):17 - 29.details
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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science | Vol 73, No 3.Karl R. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (38):171-171.details
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Probability as a Guide in Life.Henry E. Kyburg - 2001 - The Monist 84 (2):135-152.details
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Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory.Ellery Eells & Michael D. Resnik - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (2):272.details
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Science and Reason.Henry E. Kyburg - 1990 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Error and the growth of experimental knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):455-459.details
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Formal learning theory.Oliver Schulte - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Evidential Probability and Objective Bayesian Epistemology.Gregory Wheeler & Jon Williamson - 2011 - In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7: Philosophy of Statistics. Elsevier.details
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The Logic of Chance.John Venn - 1866 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14 (53):73-74.details
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Can Imprecise Probabilities Be Practically Motivated? A Challenge to the Desirability of Ambiguity Aversion.Miriam Schoenfield - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (30):1-21.details
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