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Safety-Based Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:33-45.details
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Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.details
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The Argument from Disagreement and the Role of Cross-Cultural Empirical Data.Ben Fraser & Marc Hauser - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (5):541-560.details
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Morality and Mathematics.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2020 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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It Is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, for Anyone, to Believe Anything upon Insufficient Evidence.Peter van Inwagen - 1996 - In Jeff Jordan & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), Faith, Freedom and Rationality. Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 137-154.details
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