- Calibration: A Frequency Justification for Personal Probability.Bas van Fraassen - 1983 - In Robert S. Cohen & Larry Laudan (eds.), Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: Essays in Honor of Adolf Grünbaum. D. Reidel.details
|
|
Evident, but rationally unacceptable.Earl Conee - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):316 – 326.details
|
|
Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.details
|
|
Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.details
|
|
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.details
|
|
Epistemic Self-respect.David Christensen - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):319-337.details
|
|
Conservatism in epistemology.David Christensen - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):69-89.details
|
|
Clever bookies and coherent beliefs.David Christensen - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):229-247.details
|
|
Distorted reflection.Rachael Briggs - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):59-85.details
|
|
Defeaters and higher-level requirements.Michael Bergmann - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):419–436.details
|
|
Conservatism and tacit confirmation.Jonathan E. Adler - 1990 - Mind 99 (396):559-570.details
|
|
Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
|
|
The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. pp. 167-196.details
|
|
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.details
|
|
Methodological conservatism.Lawrence Sklar - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (3):374-400.details
|
|
On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers.Roger White - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):233-250.details
|
|
Level-Confusions in Epistemology.William P. Alston - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):135-150.details
|
|
Justified Inference.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):273-295.details
|
|
Deontology and Descartes’s Demon.Brian Weatherson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):540-569.details
|
|
Have your cake and eat it too: The old principal principle reconciled with the new.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):368–382.details
|
|
Reliabilism Leveled.Jonathan Vogel - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602.details
|
|
I believe it, but soon I'll not believe it any more: Scepticism, empiricism, and reflection.John M. Vickers - 2000 - Synthese 124 (2):155-174.details
|
|
Belief and the problem of Ulysses and the sirens.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):7-37.details
|
|
Two principles of bayesian epistemology.William Talbott - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (2):135-150.details
|
|
Anti-expertise, instability, and rational choice.Roy Sorensen - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):301 – 315.details
|
|
Self-doubts and dutch strategies.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):56 – 81.details
|
|
Respecting all the evidence.Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.details
|
|
Moore’s paradox and self-knowledge.Sydney Shoemaker - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):211-28.details
|
|
Calibration, coherence, and scoring rules.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (2):274-294.details
|
|
Second Guessing: A Self-Help Manual.Sherrilyn Roush - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):251-268.details
|
|
Knowledge of Our Own Beliefs.Sherrilyn Roush - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):45-69.details
|
|
Ideal rationality and hand waving.Reed Richter - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):147 – 156.details
|
|
Epistemic Akrasia.David Owens - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):381-397.details
|
|
Evidence one does not possess.William G. Lycan - 1977 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (2):114 – 126.details
|
|
New Rational Reflection and Internalism about Rationality.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
|
|
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
|
|
Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
|
|
Access externalism.John Gibbons - 2006 - Mind 115 (457):19-39.details
|
|
Epistemic conservatism.Richard Foley - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 43 (2):165 - 182.details
|
|
Respecting the evidence.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.details
|
|
The puzzle of the unmarked clock and the new rational reflection principle.Adam Elga - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):127-139.details
|
|
I Can’t Believe I’m Stupid.Andy Egan & Adam Elga - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):77–93.details
|
|
Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality.Robert C. Koons - 1992 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays.David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Higher order degrees of belief.Brian Skyrms - 1980 - In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Prospects for Pragmatism. Cambridge University Press. pp. 109--137.details
|
|
Improbable knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism.David Christensen - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.details
|
|
Rational Epistemic Akrasia.Allen Coates - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24.details
|
|