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  1. Involuntary Sins.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):3-31.
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  • Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life.Angela M. Smith - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):236-271.
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  • The Toxin Puzzle.Gregory S. Kavka - 1983 - Analysis 43 (1):33-36.
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  • A Theory of Human Action.Alvin I. Goldman - 1970 - Princeton University Press.
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  • Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
    What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did? We may call such explanations rationalizations, and say that the reason rationalizes the action. In this paper I want to defend the ancient - and common-sense - position that rationalization is a species of ordinary causal explanation. The defense no doubt requires some redeployment, but not more or less complete abandonment of the position, as (...)
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  • Paradoxien der Autonomie. Freiheit Und Gesetz I.Thomas Khurana & Christoph Menke (eds.) - 2019, 2nd ed. - Berlin, Germany: August Verlag.
    Der Gedanke, der sich in der modernen Idee der Autonomie verdichtet, ist ein doppelter: Die Figur der Autonomie enthält zugleich eine neue Auffassung von Normativität und eine eigene Konzeption von Freiheit. Dem Gedanken der Autonomie zufolge ist ein Gesetz, das wahrhaft normativ ist, eines, als dessen Urheber wir uns selbst betrachten können; und eine Freiheit, die im vollen Sinne wirklich ist, drückt sich in Gestalt eben solcher selbstgegebener Gesetze aus. Die Idee der Autonomie artikuliert so die Einsicht, dass man Freiheit (...)
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  • Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity.David Owens - 2000 - Routledge.
    We call beliefs reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified. What does this imply about belief? Does this imply that we are responsible for our beliefs and that we should be blamed for our unreasonable convictions? Or does it imply that we are in control of our beliefs and that what we believe is up to us? Reason Without Freedom argues that the major problems of epistemology have their roots in concerns about our control over and responsibility for belief. David Owens (...)
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  • Deciding to Believe.Bernard Williams - 1970 - In Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.
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  • Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
    In this book Jonathan Adler offers a strengthened version of evidentialism, arguing that the ethics of belief should be rooted in the concept of belief--that...
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  • Freedom to Act.Donald Davidson - 1973 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Routledge.
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  • A Theory of Human Action.Myles Brand - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (9):249-257.
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  • The Individuation of Action.Alvin I. Goldman - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (21):761-774.
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  • Controlling Attitudes.Pamela Hieronymi - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.
    I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will.
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  • Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility.James A. Montmarquet - 1993 - Rowman & Littlefield.
    A detailed account of certain traits of intellectual character—the epistemic virtues—and of their relation to the responsibility for one's beliefs.
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  • Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):970-973.
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  • A Theory of Human Action.Les Holborow - 1973 - Philosophical Quarterly 23 (91):180-182.
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  • Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity.Eugene Mills - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):462-466.
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  • Belief's Own Ethics.[author unknown] - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):269-272.
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  • The Ethics of Belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.
    In this paper I will address a few of the many questions that fall under the general heading of “the ethics of belief.” In section I I will discuss the adequacy of what has come to be known as the “deontological conception of epistemic justification” in the light of our apparent lack of voluntary control over what we believe. In section II I’ll defend an evidentialist view about what we ought to believe. And in section III I will briefly discuss (...)
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  • On Belief and the Captivity of the Will.Dion Scott-Kakures - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (1):77-103.
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  • The Analogy Argument for Doxastic Voluntarism.Nikolaj Nottelmann - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):559-582.
    An influential version of doxastic voluntarism claims that doxastic events such as belief-formations at least sometimes qualify as actions. William Alston has made a simple response to this claim by arguing on empirical grounds that in normal human agents intentions to form specific beliefs are simply powerless. However, despite Alston’s observation, various authors have insisted that belief-formations may qualify as voluntary in perfect analogy to certain types of actions or even to actions in general. I examine three analogy arguments of (...)
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  • Responsibility for Believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.
    Many assume that we can be responsible only what is voluntary. This leads to puzzlement about our responsibility for our beliefs, since beliefs seem not to be voluntary. I argue against the initial assumption, presenting an account of responsibility and of voluntariness according to which, not only is voluntariness not required for responsibility, but the feature which renders an attitude a fundamental object of responsibility (that the attitude embodies one’s take on the world and one’s place in it) also guarantees (...)
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  • Paradoxien der Autonomie.Thomas Khurana & Christoph Menke (eds.) - 2011 - Berlin: August.
    Der Gedanke, der sich in der modernen Idee der Autonomie verdichtet, ist ein doppelter: Die Figur der Autonomie enthält zugleich eine neue Auffassung von Normativität und eine eigene Konzeption von Freiheit. Dem Gedanken der Autonomie zufolge ist ein Gesetz, das wahrhaft normativ ist, eines, als dessen Urheber wir uns selbst betrachten können; und eine Freiheit, die im vollen Sinne wirklich ist, drückt sich in Gestalt eben solcher selbstgegebener Gesetze aus. Die Idee der Autonomie artikuliert so die Einsicht, dass man Freiheit (...)
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  • The Ethics of Belief.William Clifford - 1879 - In Brian Davies (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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  • Why is Belief Involuntary?O. Bennett - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):87-107.
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  • ``The Ethics of Belief".W. K. Clifford - 1877 - In The Ethics of Belief and Other Essays. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books. pp. 70-97.
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  • The Ethics of Belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.
    In this paper I will address a few of the many questions that fall under the general heading of “the ethics of belief.” In section I I will discuss the adequacy of what has come to be known as the “deontological conception of epistemic justification” in the light of our apparent lack of voluntary control over what we believe. In section II I’ll defend an evidentialist view about what we ought to believe. And in section III I will briefly discuss (...)
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  • Why is Belief Involuntary?Jonathan Bennett & Alonso Church - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):87.
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  • A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief.Allan Hazlett - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    Allan Hazlett challenges the philosophical assumption of the value of true belief. He critiques the view that true belief is better for us than false belief, and the view that truth is "the aim of belief". An alternative picture is provided, on which the fact that some people love truth is all there is to "the value of true belief".
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  • Attitudes, Tracing, and Control.Angela M. Smith - 2015 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 32 (2):115-132.
    There is an apparent tension in our everyday moral responsibility practices. On the one hand, it is commonly assumed that moral responsibility requires voluntary control: an agent can be morally responsible only for those things that fall within the scope of her voluntary control. On the other hand, we regularly praise and blame individuals for mental states and conditions that appear to fall outside the scope of their voluntary control, such as desires, emotions, beliefs, and other attitudes. In order to (...)
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  • Why Is Belief Involuntary?Jonathan Bennett - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):87 - 107.
    This paper will present a negative result—an account of my failure to explain why belief is involuntary. When I announced my question a year or so ahead of time, I had a vague idea of how it might be answered, but I cannot make it work out. Necessity, this time, has not given birth to invention. Still, my tussle with the question may contribute either towards getting it answered or showing that it cannot be answered because belief can be voluntary (...)
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  • Responsibility Especially for Beliefs.Michael Stocker - 1982 - Mind 91 (363):398-417.
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  • Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility.James Montmarquet - 1992 - American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (4):331-341.
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  • Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility.James A. Montmarquet - 1999 - Mind 108 (431):596-598.
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  • The Will to Believe.William James - 1896 - The New World 5:327--347.
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  • Deciding to Believe.Carl Ginet - 2001 - In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth and Duty. Oxford University Press. pp. 63-76.
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