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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Justification and the Truth-Connection.Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.details
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Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu & Mark Schroeder - 2018 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath, Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 181-205.details
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Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.details
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Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - New York: Palgrave Macmillan.details
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The Epistemic Role of Consciousness.Declan Smithies - 2019 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.details
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Normative Externalism.Brian Weatherson - 2019 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):597-632.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In McCain Kevin, Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag.details
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On the epistemic costs of implicit bias.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):33-63.details
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Concepts of Epistemic Justification.William P. Alston - 1985 - The Monist 68 (1):57-89.details
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Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection.Frank Jackson - 1991 - Ethics 101 (3):461-482.details
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Ideal rationality and logical omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.details
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Epistemic partiality in friendship.Sarah Stroud - 2006 - Ethics 116 (3):498-524.details
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Culpability and Ignorance.Gideon Rosen - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1):61-84.details
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(1 other version)Does moral ignorance exculpate?Elizabeth Harman - 2011 - Ratio 24 (4):443-468.details
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Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation.Sabine A. Döring - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):363-394.details
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In defense of moral testimony.Paulina Sliwa - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):175-195.details
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Friendship and Belief.Simon Keller - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (3):329-351.details
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Two Arguments for Evidentialism.Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):805-818.details
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If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.details
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Defeating phenomenal conservatism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (1):35-48.details
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Is reflective equilibrium enough?Thomas Kelly & Sarah McGrath - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):325-359.details
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Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory.Geoffrey Sayre-McCord - 1996 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons, Moral knowledge?: new readings in moral epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Epistemic Function of Higher-Order Evidence.Declan Smithies - 2022 - In Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira, Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on their Nature and Significance. New York: Routledge. pp. 97-120.details
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Moral knowledge by perception.Sarah McGrath - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):209–228.details
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Knowledge First.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 1-10.details
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We Can Have Our Buck and Pass It, Too.Zöe Johnson King - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14.details
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Excuse without Exculpation: The Case of Moral Ignorance.Paulina Sliwa - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 72-95.details
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