- The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate.Blake Roeber - 2016 - Noûs 52 (1):171-195.details
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Accuracy for Believers.Julia Staffel - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):39-48.details
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Précis and replies to contributors for book symposium on accuracy and the laws of credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):1-30.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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(3 other versions)Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Studia Logica 48 (2):260-261.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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(3 other versions)Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, Mass.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Behaviorism 16 (1):93-96.details
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Review of Gilbert Harman: Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. [REVIEW]Howard Margolis - 1986 - Ethics 99 (4):966-966.details
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Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition Advancing the Debate.Jonathan Evans & Keith E. Stanovich - 2013 - Perspectives on Psychological Science 8 (3):223-241.details
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Games, Beliefs and Credences.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):209-236.details
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Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence.Julia Staffel - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1721-1734.details
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The Tale of Bella and Creda.Scott Sturgeon - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.details
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Cognitive Mobile Homes.Daniel Greco - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):93-121.details
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Uncertainty Without All the Doubt.Aaron Norby - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (1):70-94.details
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Belief and cognitive limitations.Weng Hong Tang - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):249-260.details
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Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence.Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:61-96.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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Knowledge in Action.Jonathan Weisberg - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.details
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Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning.Hanti Lin & Kevin Kelly - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):957-981.details
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Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
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The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox.Jennifer Nagel - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11:1-28.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.details
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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
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(1 other version)Contextualism and knowledge attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.details
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Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.details
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(2 other versions)Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW]Richard Feldman - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):211-226.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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How I learned to stop worrying and love probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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Updating beliefs in light of uncertain evidence: Descriptive assessment of Jeffrey's rule.Daniel Osherson & Jiaying Zhao - 2010 - Thinking and Reasoning 16 (4):288-307.details
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Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis.Richard Foley - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 37-47.details
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The frame problem.Murray Shanahan - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Belief in Psyontology.Jonathan Weisberg - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (11).details
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When Obstinacy is a Better Policy.Justin Dallmann - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW]L. Horsten - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and Action.J. Stanley & J. Hawthorne - 2008 - Revista Cultura E Fé 37 (144).details
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The dual-process turn: How recent defenses of dual-process theories of reasoning fail.Joshua Mugg - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):300-309.details
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(1 other version)Implicit and Explicit Representation.David Kirsh - 2003 - Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science 2:478â481.details
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On the provenance of judgments of conditional probability.Jiaying Zhao, Anuj Shah & Daniel Osherson - 2009 - Cognition 113 (1):26-36.details
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Assertion, practical reason, and pragmatic theories of knowledge.Janet Levin - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):359–384.details
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Dutch Book Arguments.Alan Hájek - 2008 - In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and Lotteries.A. Brueckner - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):160-165.details
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(1 other version)Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.details
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Acceptance of empirical statements: A Bayesian theory without cognitive utilities.John C. Harsanyi - 1985 - Theory and Decision 18 (1):1-30.details
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Measuring inconsistency in probabilistic logic: rationality postulates and Dutch book interpretation.Glauber De Bona & Marcelo Finger - 2015 - Artificial Intelligence 227 (C):140-164.details
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Why be coherent?Glauber De Bona & Julia Staffel - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):405-415.details
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Graded Incoherence for Accuracy-Firsters.Glauber De Bona & Julia Staffel - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (2):189-213.details
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(2 other versions)Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW]David Jehle - 2006 - Studia Logica 84 (1):161-165.details
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