- (1 other version)Believing at Will.Kieran Setiya - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):36-52.details
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The unreliability of naive introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.details
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(2 other versions)Against All Reason? Scepticism about the Instrumental Norm.Stephen Finlay - 2010 - In Charles Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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(1 other version)How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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Realism and reduction: The Quest for robustness.Mark Schroeder - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-18.details
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Moral realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.details
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(1 other version)Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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Moral functionalism and moral motivation.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):20-40.details
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Controlling attitudes.Pamela Hieronymi - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.details
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The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Does rationality give us reasons?John Broome - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):321–337.details
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Akratic believing?Jonathan E. Adler - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (1):1 - 27.details
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On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure.Daniel Fogal - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1033-1070.details
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Review Essay: Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric EpistemologyWorking Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology.Marian David & Richard Foley - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):943.details
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(5 other versions)The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 92 (2):280-281.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
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(5 other versions)The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Behaviorism 15 (1):73-82.details
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Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.details
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(2 other versions)Essays on Actions and Events: Philosophical Essays Volume 1.Donald Davidson - 1970 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.details
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Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):89-174.details
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(1 other version)The Language of Morals.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1952 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Impassioned Belief.Michael Ridge - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Are We Luminous?Amia Srinivasan - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):294-319.details
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(1 other version)Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience.Tristram McPherson - 2012 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 7. Oxford University Press. pp. 205.details
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(1 other version)Deciding to believe.Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Problems of the Self. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.details
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The Myth of Instrumental Rationality.Joseph Raz - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (1):28.details
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Problems of rationality.Donald Davidson (ed.) - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Natural reasons: personality and polity.Susan L. Hurley - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Seeing and believing: perception, belief formation and the divided mind.Andy Egan - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (1):47 - 63.details
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Intentional systems.Daniel C. Dennett - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.details
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Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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Who is Fooled.Donald Davidson - 2004 - In Problems of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Naturalism and Prescriptivity.Peter Railton - 1989 - Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (1):151.details
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Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Ethics 117 (4):649-673.details
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(1 other version)Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience.Tristram McPherson - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7.details
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(2 other versions)The Language of Morals.Brian F. Chellas - 1971 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (1):180-181.details
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(1 other version)How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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(1 other version)Rationality, Normativity, and-1 Commitment.Jacob Ross - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7:138.details
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Structural Irrationality.Thomas Scanlon - 2007 - In Geoffrey Brennan (ed.), Common minds: themes from the philosophy of Philip Pettit. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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On overrating oneself... And knowing it.Adam Elga - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):115-124.details
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(1 other version)Rationality, Normativity, and Commitment.Jacob Ross - unknowndetails
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(2 other versions)Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (4):515-519.details
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Believing at will.Barbara Winters - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (5):243-256.details
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