- Curiosity was Framed.Dennis Whitcomb - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):664-687.details
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Judgment's aimless heart.Matthew Vermaire - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Epistemic Value and Epistemic Compromise, A Reply to Moss.Amir Konigsberg - 2013 - Episteme 10 (1):87-97.details
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Disagreement and the value of self-trust.Robert Pasnau - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2315-2339.details
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No Justification for Smith’s Incidentally True Beliefs.Alfred Schramm - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (2):273–292.details
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Epistemic anxiety and adaptive invariantism.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.details
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Preface Writers are Consistent.Roger Clarke - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3):362-381.details
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Evidentialist Reliabilism.Juan Comesaña - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):571-600.details
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Probabilistic stability, agm revision operators and maximum entropy.Krzysztof Mierzewski - 2020 - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-38.details
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What is Structural Rationality?Wooram Lee - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):614-636.details
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Credence and Correctness: In Defense of Credal Reductivism.Matthew Brandon Lee - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):273-296.details
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Why believe the truth? Shah and Velleman on the aim of belief.José L. Zalabardo - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):1 - 21.details
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Does doxastic transparency support evidentialism?Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):541-547.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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Objective Bayesianism, Bayesian conditionalisation and voluntarism.Jon Williamson - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):67-85.details
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Deliberation, judgement and the nature of evidence.Jon Williamson - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (1):27-65.details
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Can we do without pragmatic encroachment.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.details
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Probabilité conditionnelle et certitude.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1997 - Dialogue 36 (1):69-.details
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The joint aggregation of beliefs and degrees of belief.Paul D. Thorn - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5389-5409.details
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Against Deductive Closure.Paul D. Thorn - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):103-119.details
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An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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The Normative Role of Knowledge.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2):265-288.details
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Knowledge, Justification and Normative Coincidence1.Martin Smith - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):273-295.details
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Rational social and political polarization.Daniel J. Singer, Aaron Bramson, Patrick Grim, Bennett Holman, Jiin Jung, Karen Kovaka, Anika Ranginani & William J. Berger - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2243-2267.details
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Epistemically self-defeating arguments and skepticism about intuition.Paul Silva - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):579-589.details
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Conhecimento e justificação: a origem de debate entre internalismo vs. externalismo.João Batista Scieczkowski - 2008 - Filosofia Unisinos 9 (3):228-242.details
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The intelligibility of moral intransigence: A dilemma for cognitivism about moral judgment.Richard Rowland - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):266-275.details
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Rational requirements for suspended judgment.Luis Rosa - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):385-406.details
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A New Argument for Pragmatism?Anthony Robert Booth - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (2):227-231.details
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Fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596.details
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Strong internalism, doxastic involuntarism, and the costs of compatibilism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):3171-3191.details
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Feldman on the Epistemic Value of Truth.Timothy Perrine - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):515-529.details
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Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4947-4973.details
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Sceptical Theism and the Paradox of Evil.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):319-333.details
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Uncertainty Without All the Doubt.Aaron Norby - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (1):70-94.details
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Must Good Reasoning Satisfy Cumulative Transitivity?Shyam Nair - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):123-146.details
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Full Belief and Loose Speech.Sarah Moss - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):255-291.details
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Epistemology Formalized.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.details
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Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.details
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Epistemic virtues, metavirtues, and computational complexity.Adam Morton - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):481–502.details
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Epistemic Virtues, Metavirtues, and Computational Complexity.Professor Adam Morton - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):481-502.details
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Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.details
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A new puzzle about belief and credence.Andrew Moon - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291.details
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Caveat Auditor: Epistemic Trust and Conflicts of Interest.Justin P. McBrayer - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.details
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Unifying Group Rationality.Matthew Kopec - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:517-544.details
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The epistemic features of group belief.Kay Mathiesen - 2006 - Episteme 2 (3):161-175.details
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Epistemic Risk and Community Policing.Kay Mathiesen - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):139-150.details
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Epistemic Internalism.Bjc Madison - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.details
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Moore's paradox and epistemic norms.Clayton Littlejohn - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.details
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