This article gives an account of Jean‑Luc Marion’s thought concerning the anamorphosis of works of art. The initial considerations regarding the phenomenon of anamorphosis in art are followed by a presentation of the innovative character of Marion’s phenomenological project, together with the characteristics of saturated phenomena. The article examines selected examples of anamorphosis of works of art and also categorizes different varieties of anamorphosis. The author aims mainly at proving that Marion’s phenomenological thought reaches beyond the limits of traditionally understood (...) aesthetics, pointing towards the category of excess of intuition (saturation, saturé) in art. (shrink)

The article considers the problem of the meaning of a musical discourse from the perspec-tive of hermeneutic phenomenology. The analysis is based on the collected essays by Paul Ricoeur, included in the book 'Language, Text, Interpretation'. The author of the article aims at contextualization of such terms as discourse, event, meaning, distance, appropriation, interpretation, self-understanding, projection of ‘the world of work’ and the projection of the possibility of ‘being-in-the-world’ with reference to a musical work of art.

Listening and polyphony lead us directly to reflection on the musical form of the fugue. Starting with M. Heidegger’s considerations about the juncture of beyng, we will phe-nomenologically ask about the essence of the fugue, and the musical work put under analysis will be The Art of Fugue by J.S. Bach. The article aims to show the convergence between Heidegger’s philosophy and the essence of the musical form of fugue as an artis-tic mode of the essential occurrence of beyng as (...) an event. (shrink)

This article addresses the subject of the ekphrastic description of experiencing music. It shows the main differences between ekphrasis and commonly used analysis in music theory and musicology. In approaching the problem of ekphrasis with what is called pure music, I emphasize its ancient understanding, thus differing from Lydia Goehr (2010) and Siglind Bruhn (2000, 2001, 2019). The ekphrastic analysis of the first movement of Arnold Schoenberg’s Six Little Piano Pieces Op. 19 conducted in this article uses the methodology developed (...) by Gottfried Boehm (2014) and Georges Didi-Huberman (2005, 2015, 2017, 2018) in the discipline of art history. This article aims to delineate a new way of researching the art of music, an essential feature of which is the combination of the traditions of analytic philosophy and phenomenology. (shrink)

This is a reply to de Sousa's 'Emotional Truth', in which he argues that emotions can be objective, as propositional truths are. I say that it is better to distinguish between truth and accuracy, and agree with de Sousa to the extent of arguing that emotions can be more or less accurate, that is, based on the facts as they are.

The objective of the paper is a presentation and an interpretation of Władysław Stróżewski’s views on aesthetics. Built upon the foundation provided by classical metaphysics, Stróżewski’s aesthetics is simultaneously a continuation of the tradition of phenomenological interpretation of art. Stróżewski extends Roman Ingarden’s aesthetic theory by including the idea of numinous concretion, largely inspired by the works of Rudolf Otto. As a result, this new phenomenological perspective transcends the narrowly understood ‘aesthetics’ of the work of art towards the inherent dimension (...) of the sacred. Moreover, Stróżewski’s scrutiny of the aspect of art that goes beyond the aesthetic reveals an important relationship obtaining between his insights and the theological aesthetics of Hans Urs von Balthasar. Thus Stróżewski’s ideas turn out to be of significance to contemporary aesthetic and theological debates. In particular, he shows the movement of beauty from aesthetic to transcendental, and ultimately towards the sacred, where numinosum is manifested as Mystery. (shrink)

Roman Ingarden has exerted an immense influence on the development of aesthetics, and his texts in this field continue to inspire in-depth studies on art, despite the passage of several decades since the publication of his major works. At the same time, however, phenomenology – especially in France – brought about crucial changes during the second half of the twentieth century with regard to thinking about art, undermining its own methodological principles and tenets, as well as redefining fundamental phenomenological concepts. (...) In this article, I address the question of the continued relevance of Roman Ingarden’s approach to the musical work within the context of current phenomenological research, in particular that which concerns the subject of aesthetic concretisation. (shrink)

In the first part of his magnum opus Hans Urs von Balthasarpresents his project of theological aesthetics where the experience of art becomes an entrance to a religious act and an ennobling way leading to the contemplation of God. Defining the essence of being human as a spiritual being directed towards God bears a deep ethical meaning in this consideration. H.U. von Balthasar’s reflection over the religious dimension of the essence of art is shaped within theology but at the same (...) time in the opposition to aesthetic theology which is de-scribed as ‘aesthetisation’ of the Mystery of Revelation. The art of music occupies a particular place in this reflection. For this reason Mass in B Minor BWV 232 by Johann Sebastian Bach, which is an emblematic example of the revelation of the glory of the Lord (Herrlichkeit), will be analysed not only from the perspective of philosophical or musicological aesthetics, but also theological aesthetics. This article outlines characteristic features of theological aesthetics specifically developed from traditional philosophical aesthetics whose range was extended by the human being’s relation to God. (shrink)

In 'The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity' by Roman Ingarden we are presented with a philosophical theory of the structure of the musical work. The author includes melody, rhythm and harmony among the primary elements of the musical work while dynamics, tempo and colouration (sonoristics) are classified as its secondary elements. The elements designated by the score constitute a schematic prescription for creating a particular work. Still, the scheme also includes numerous gaps and indeterminacies which can (...) be filled in only through performance which makes the work an individualized concretum. However, it is puzzling why the list of the elements of the musical work does not include articulation. In this article I claim that the absence of articulation in the theory of the structure of the musical work indicates its omnipresence, thus the broader we understand the term articulation, the better it penetrates into the remaining elements of the musical work, preserving its distinctiveness at the same time. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger in 'The Origin of the Work of Art' (Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes) developed a whole new way of thinking about art, going beyond traditionally understood aesthetics or even philosophy of art. Some of Heidegger’s thoughts, however, appear to be understated and only signal a huge complexity of both experiencing works of art and the very issue of the origin of the work of art. The analysis of the terms ‘anxiety’ and ‘eyeblink’ from 'Being and Time' presented in this (...) article complement and develop Heidegger’s ideas included in his essay. Linking art to these two crucial phenomena of fundamental ontological analysis of Dasein casts light on the status of art and its existential significance. The author aims mainly at demonstrating the aletheic connection (based on unclosedness) between the experience of ‘originary source’ of a piece of art and ‘anxiety’, and also, in conclusion, he points to the ‘event of beyng’ as the essential, non-metaphysical origin of art. (shrink)

A work of music as an artefact is a particular acoustic material. However, the sounds are not identical with music since they only constitute the external appearance of a musical work and its most explicit layer, while aesthetic perception is certainly not limited to the superficial perception of sounds. Contemporary research in the field of fine arts by Gottfried Boehm and Georges Didi-Huberman showed new possibilities of revealing the hidden inner phenomenality of a work of art. Yet, is it possible (...) to apply the methodology of research on the invisible visuality of a painting to the field of non-acoustic sound of a musical work? What kind of additional research problems does a work of music cause, taking into account the fact that it is not only created by its author-composer, but it also requires a re-creational performance to phenomenally exist? The article provides the critical analysis of Roman Ingarden’s views on the subject of a musical work and indicates the need to expand the research horizon as regards the issue of nonsounding elements of music. The article aims mainly at bringing new research perspectives on a work of music in the light of contemporary phenomenology. (shrink)

Phenomenological reflection on the essence of art goes towards the revelation of its ultimate Source, which is also the Source of spirituality of a man and, finally, of artistic works. Art occupies a prominent place in the works of Martin Heidegger, Hans Urs von Balthasar and Michel Henry, and what they have in common is pointing out the ability of transcending artistic work towards beyond-aesthetic and over-aesthetic dimensions. For those philosophers the work of art is a ‘way’ which may lead (...) human spirit towards Transcendence (the Absolute, God), but also towards the inner self. In this article the reflection over a religious dimension of the essence of art is extended by the analysis of St John Passion, BWV 245 by Johann Sebastian Bach, as a particular example of an artistic realization of phenomenologically rooted philosophical and theological reflection. (shrink)

Interest in “the flesh” (Leib, la chair) in phenomenological research leads to revealing the original (ursprünglich) and non-phenomenal essence of the very appearance. Contemporary phenomenological aesthetics is heading in the same direction. While describing the intentional content of particular, i.e. subjectively “embodied” aesthetic objects, it reveals the ultimate origin (Ursprung) thanks to which the appearance of phenomena is possible at all. At the same time, revealing the ultimate origin — differently named but always meaning the furthest horizon of the possibility (...) of the appearance of phenomena — sometimes claims to be called “first philosophy”. However, such ambitious cognitive aspirations of phenomenological aesthetics may arouse suspicion. This is why, first, we should ask about its differentia specifica and its position among other types of aesthetics, and then consider whether its most significant essential statements are not just as insightful as questionable. I argue for admitting that phenomenological aesthetics has the broadest cognitive horizon and at the same time for limiting its validity for individual actualizations (concretions) of potentiality (potentia) of given phenomena. I also point out that the basic cognitive procedure within phenomenological aesthetics is reductive reasoning, which goes in the opposite direction to logical entailment. (shrink)

In the field of phenomenology philosophers more and more frequently show interest in early Christian thought – including apophatic theology – which, in result, affects the understanding of the role and significance of art. „Invisibility” in art and the manifestation of God through the work of art is a mystery which cannot be satisfactorily explained by traditional philosophical aesthetic models. Negative theology, together with its key apophatic way brings a new perspective of understanding art into contemporary aesthetic debates. Its 'reductive' (...) application can be found especially in the theory of the icon. Paweł Florenski's icon analysis and Jean-Luc Marion's category of the ‘saturated phenomenon’ converge in many points. Henry Dume ry’s henological reduction which is complementary to, but at the same time exceeds Edmunda Husserl's reductions, extends the horizon of the 'invisible' dimension of art by the relation the Spirit (intelligibility) makes with Transcendence. In the article I will show the cohesion of contemporary phenomenological thought, early Christian apophatics and the theory of the icon. I will also consider whether an aesthetic and theological framework so structured could be valid and useful as a general philosophical theory of art. (shrink)

In the article I analyse the phenomenological possibilities of sanctioning a religious revelation through the experience of art. First, I present the context for reflections on the religious dimension of art on the grounds of contemporary phenomenological research. Next, I analyse the main methodological problems within the research area under consideration. I also propose an interdisciplinary approach to the issue of art and revelation, which allows for a complementary presentation of this complex research problem at the intersection of aesthetics, phenomenology, (...) philosophy of religion and theology. (shrink)

In his late works, Maurice Merleau-Ponty attempts to show the direction for the development of a new phenomenology. While analysing the intertwining of the visible and the invisible, he raises a question about the way we participate in Being. For Merleau-Ponty, experiencing a work of art is a representative example of our participation in the flesh (la chair). This article will analyse the broadly understood idea of visibility in art and its ability to transcend its apparent aesthetics into its invisible (...) side, which is the source of all appearance and self-knowledge of existence. (shrink)

The article discusses the problem of musical time presented in Edmund Husserl’s 'The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness'. The author of this article aims to describe the basic properties of immanent time on the basis of an analysis of the musical, resp. sound examples given by Husserl. Husserl’s reflections on inner time-consciousness – preceding Roman Ingarden’s examination of musical time included in 'The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity' – constitute an important stage in the reflections on immanent (...) time in a musical work. The article, as a study belonging to the phenomenology of music, is a critical analysis of the basic terms of phenomenology of time, such as original impressions, retention, protention, consciousness, perception, and intentionality. (shrink)

Exclusionary defeat is Joseph Raz’s proposal for understanding the more complex, layered structure of practical reasoning. Exclusionary reasons are widely appealed to in legal theory and consistently arise in many other areas of philosophy. They have also been subject to a variety of challenges. I propose a new account of exclusionary reasons based on their justificatory role, rejecting Raz’s motivational account and especially contrasting exclusion with undercutting defeat. I explain the appeal and coherence of exclusionary reasons by appeal to commonsense (...) value pluralism and the intermediate space of public policies, social roles, and organizations. We often want our choices to have a certain character or instantiate a certain value and in order to do so, that choice can only be based on a restricted set of reasons. Exclusion explains how pro tanto practical reasons can be disqualified from counting towards a choice of a particular kind without being outweighed or undercut. (shrink)

In this essay, we draw on John Haugeland’s work in order to argue that Burge is wrong to think that exercises of perceptual constancy mechanisms suffice for perceptual representation. Although Haugeland did not live to read or respond to Burge’s Origins of Objectivity, we think that his work contains resources that can be developed into a critique of the very foundation of Burge’s approach. Specifically, we identify two related problems for Burge. First, if (what Burge calls) mere sensory responses are (...) not representational, then neither are exercises of constancy mechanisms, since the differences between them do not suffice to imply that one is representational and the other is not. Second, taken by themselves, exercises of constancy mechanisms are only derivatively representational, so merely understanding how they work is not sufficient for understanding what is required for something, in itself, to be representational (and thereby provide a full solution to the problem of perceptual representation). (shrink)

Recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) has drawn attention to the technology’s transformative potential, including what some see as its prospects for causing large-scale harm. We review two influential arguments purporting to show how AI could pose catastrophic risks. The first argument — the Problem of Power-Seeking — claims that, under certain assumptions, advanced AI systems are likely to engage in dangerous power-seeking behavior in pursuit of their goals. We review reasons for thinking that AI systems might seek power, that (...) they might obtain it, that this could lead to catastrophe, and that we might build and deploy such systems anyway. The second argument claims that the development of human-level AI will unlock rapid further progress, culminating in AI systems far more capable than any human — this is the Singularity Hypothesis. Power-seeking behavior on the part of such systems might be particularly dangerous. We discuss a variety of objections to both arguments and conclude by assessing the state of the debate. (shrink)

The cosmological constant problem stems from treating quantum field theory and general relativity as an effective field theory. We argue that the problem is a reductio ad absurdum, and that one should reject the assumption that general relativity can generically be treated as an EFT. This marks a failure of naturalness, and an internal signal that EFT methods do not apply in all spacetime domains. We then take an external view, showing that the assumptions for using EFTs are violated in (...) general relativistic domains where Λ is relevant. We highlight some ways forward that do not depend on naturalness. (shrink)

I assess Churchland's views on folk psychology and conceptual thinking, with particular emphasis on the connection between these topics.

Many favor representationalism about color experience. To a first approximation, this view holds that experiencing is like believing. In particular, like believing, experiencing is a matter of representing the world to be a certain way. Once you view color experience along these lines, you face a big question: do our color experiences represent the world as it really is? For instance, suppose you see a tomato. Representationalists claim that having an experience with this sensory character is necessarily connected with representing (...) a distinctive quality as pervading a round area out there in external space. Let us call it “sensible redness” to highlight the fact that the representation of this property is necessarily connected with the sensory character of the experience. Is this property, sensible redness, really co-instantiated with roundness out there in the space before you? (shrink)

What makes democracy valuable? One traditional answer holds that participating in democratic self-government amounts to a kind of autonomy: it enables citizens to be the authors of their political affairs. Many contemporary philosophers, however, are skeptical. We are autonomous, they argue, when important features of our lives are up to us, but in a democracy we merely have a say in a process of collective choice. In this paper, we defend the possibility of democratic autonomy, by advancing a conception of (...) it which is impervious to this objection. At the core of our account is the idea of joint authorship. You are a joint author of something when that thing expresses your joint intentions. Democracy may not make any one of us sole author of our political affairs, but it can make us their joint authors. It is in such joint authorship, we claim, that the intrinsic value of democratic self-government consists. (shrink)

In this chapter, Pautz raises a puzzle about spatial experience for phenomenal internalists like Ned Block. If an accidental, lifelong brain-in-the-void (BIV) should have all the same experiences as you, it would have an experience as of items having various shapes, and be able to acquire concepts of those shapes, despite being cut off from real things with the shapes. Internalists cannot explain this by saying that BIV is presented with Peacocke-style visual field regions having various shapes, because these would (...) have to be non-physical sense data. They might instead explain this by saying that BIV “phenomenally represents” various shape properties. But since BIV lacks any interesting physical relations to shapes, this would imply that phenomenally representation is an irreducible relation. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

Some philosophers argue that martial arts training is maladaptive, contributes to psychological illness, and provides a social harm, whereas others argue that martial arts training is adaptive, contributes to psychological wellness, and provides a social benefit. This debate is important to scholars and the general public since beliefs about martial arts training can have a real impact on how we evaluate martial artists for job opportunities and career advancement, and in general, how we treat martial artists from different cultures in (...) our communities. This debate is also important for children and adults that have considered enrolling in martial arts training programs but remain uncertain about potential outcomes of training due to the lack of research in this area. This article therefore contributes to the literature on martial arts by (1) outlining a framework that characterizes psychological well-being in terms of five elements, (2) discussing how results from empirical research support the hypothesis that Muay Thai training can contribute to psychological well-being by contributing to all five component elements, (3) discussing the psychological benefits of martial arts training from the perspective of an Everlast Master Instructor, and (4) discussing how martial arts training involves the cultivation of combat-relevant affordances. (shrink)

Politics is full of people who don't care about the facts. Still, while not caring about the facts, they are often concerned to present themselves as caring about them. Politics, in other words, is full of bullshitters. But why? In this paper I develop an incentives-based analysis of bullshit in politics, arguing that it is often a rational response to the incentives facing different groups of agents. In a slogan: bullshit in politics pays, sometimes literally. After first outlining an account (...) of bullshit, I discuss the incentives driving three different groups of agents to bullshit: politicians, the media, and voters. I then examine several existing proposals to combat bullshit in politics, arguing that each will fail because they ignore the relevant underlying incentives. I conclude somewhat pessimistically that a certain amount of bullshit in politics is inevitable. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new theory of the nature of hypocritical blame and why it is objectionable, arguing that hypocritical blame is a form of dishonest signaling. Blaming provides very important benefits: through its ability to signal our commitments to norms and unwillingness to tolerate norm violations, it greatly contributes to valuable norm-following. Hypocritical blamers, however, are insufficiently committed to the norms or values they blame others for violating. As allowing their blame to pass unchecked threatens the signaling system, our (...) strong interest in maintaining valuable norm-following by tracking who has what commitments justifies objecting to hypocritical blame. This theory has a number of strengths over competing accounts: it delivers intuitive verdicts about when blame is objectionable across a range of cases, it is a naturalistic explanation, it is consistent with a leading theory of the nature of blame, it explains why hypocritical pronouncements that don’t feature blame are similiarly objectionable, it does not rely on contentious analyses of the nature of ‘standing’, and it preserves the common intuition that hypocrites are in some way dishonest. (shrink)

In this paper I will present a puzzle about visual appearance. There are certain necessary constraints on how things can visually appear. The puzzle is about how to explain them. I have no satisfying solution. My main thesis is simply that the puzzle is a puzzle. I will develop the puzzle as it arises for representationalism about experience because it is currently the most popular theory of experience and I think it is along the right lines. However, everyone faces a (...) form of the puzzle, including the naïve realist. In §1 I explain representationalism about experience. In §§2-3 I develop the puzzle and criticize a response due to Ned Block and Jeff Speaks and another response based on a novel form of representationalism (“sensa representationalism”). In §4 I argue that defenders of “perceptual confidence” (Morrison, Munton, my earlier self) face an instance of the puzzle. In §5 I suggest that everyone faces a form of the puzzle. (shrink)

Formula One isn’t very important. You can't care about it too much. The refugee crisis is more important. You can care about it much more. In this paper we investigate how important something is. By ‘importance’ we mean how much it is fitting to care about a thing. We explore a view about this which we call Proportionalism. This view says that a thing’s importance depends on that thing’s share of the world’s total value. The more of what matters there (...) is, the less you can care about each thing in particular. The less of what matters there is, the more you can care about each thing in particular. We argue that, in many respects, Proportionalism is superior to its competitors. It captures some intuitions they leave out and it has a powerful motivation. So, we suggest, you should keep things in proportion. (shrink)

Recent work in epistemology and philosophy of science has argued that understanding is an important cognitive state that philosophers should seek to analyse. This paper offers a new perspective on understanding by looking to work in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Understanding is normally taken to be inside the head. I argue that this view is mistaken. Often, understanding is a state that criss-crosses brain, body and world. To support this claim, I draw on extended cognition, a burgeoning framework (...) in cognitive science that stresses the crucial role played by tools, material representations and the wider environment in our cognitive processes. I defend an extended view of understanding against likely objections and argue that it has important consequences for questions concerning the nature of understanding and its relationship to explanation. (shrink)

In order to predict and explain behavior, one cannot specify the mental state of an agent merely by saying what information she possesses. Instead one must specify what information is available to an agent relative to various purposes. Specifying mental states in this way allows us to accommodate cases of imperfect recall, cognitive accomplishments involved in logical deduction, the mental states of confused or fragmented subjects, and the difference between propositional knowledge and know-how .

People’s beliefs about normality play an important role in many aspects of cognition and life (e.g., causal cognition, linguistic semantics, cooperative behavior). But how do people determine what sorts of things are normal in the first place? Past research has studied both people’s representations of statistical norms (e.g., the average) and their representations of prescriptive norms (e.g., the ideal). Four studies suggest that people’s notion of normality incorporates both of these types of norms. In particular, people’s representations of what is (...) normal were found to be influenced both by what they believed to be descriptively average and by what they believed to be prescriptively ideal. This is shown across three domains: people’s use of the word ‘‘normal” (Study 1), their use of gradable adjectives (Study 2), and their judgments of concept prototypicality (Study 3). A final study investigated the learning of normality for a novel category, showing that people actively combine statistical and prescriptive information they have learned into an undifferentiated notion of what is normal (Study 4). Taken together, these findings may help to explain how moral norms impact the acquisition of normality and, conversely, how normality impacts the acquisition of moral norms. (shrink)

Slurs possess interesting linguistic properties and so have recently attracted the attention of linguists and philosophers of language. For instance the racial slur "nigger" is explosively derogatory, enough so that just hearing it mentioned can leave one feeling as if they have been made complicit in a morally atrocious act.. Indeed, the very taboo nature of these words makes discussion of them typically prohibited or frowned upon. Although it is true that the utterance of slurs is illegitimate and derogatory in (...) most contexts, sufficient evidence suggests that slurs are not always or exclusively used to derogate. In fact, slurs are frequently picked up and appropriated by the very in-group members that the slur was originally intended to target. This might be done, for instance, as a means for like speakers to strengthen in-group solidarity. So an investigation into the meaning and use of slurs can give us crucial insight into how words can be used with such derogatory impact, and how they can be turned around and appropriated as vehicles of rapport in certain contexts among in-group speakers. In this essay I will argue that slurs are best characterized as being of a mixed descriptive/expressive type. Next, I will review the most influential accounts of slurs offered thus far, explain their shortcomings, then provide a new analysis of slurs and explain in what ways it is superior to others. Finally, I suggest that a family-resemblance conception of category membership can help us achieve a clearer understanding of the various ways in which slurs, for better or worse, are actually put to use in natural language discourse. (shrink)

In a recent article Steven Cowan defended the claim that female subordination and male authority are merely functional differences. Drawing insights from Natural Law, I argue that complementarianism typically speaks of these as proper functions of male and female designs, thus making men and women metaphysically unequal in being. Furthermore, I maintain that the function "serving as a means to an end" is less valuable than the function "having the authority to direct the end." Hence, Cowan fails to defeat the (...) objection that the claim that women are equal to men in being, but subordinate in role is incoherent. (shrink)

Models as Make-Believe offers a new approach to scientific modelling by looking to an unlikely source of inspiration: the dolls and toy trucks of children's games of make-believe.

It is commonly held that political ignorance is rational, a response to the high costs and low benefits of acquiring political information. But many recent critics of the claim that political ignorance is rational instead urge that it is a simple consequence of agents not concerning themselves with the acquisition of political information whatsoever. According to such critics, political ignorance is inadvertent radical ignorance rather than a rational response to the incentives faced by agents in democracies. And since political ignorance (...) is not a response to incentives, these critics urge, it cannot be ameliorated by incentivizing the acquisition of political information. This paper has two goals. First, I show that these seemingly competing accounts of political ignorance are in fact complementary, together explaining much political ignorance. Indeed, there is a sense in which political ignorance can be both rational and radical at the same time. Second, I more closely examine the relationship between incentives, kinds of political ignorance, and the acquisition of political information. On the one hand, from the fact that political ignorance is rational it does not follow that it can be overcome by incentivizing the acquisition of information. On the other hand, from the fact that political ignorance is radical it does not follow that it cannot be overcome by incentivizing the acquisition of information. Lastly, the complexity of the information in question is more relevant to determining whether ignorance can be overcome than whether such ignorance is rational or radical. (shrink)

The biophilosophic justification for the idea that “brain death” is death needs to support two claims: that what dies in human death is a human organism, not merely a psychological entity distinct from it; that total brain failure signifies the end of the human organism as a whole. Defenders of brain death typically assume without argument that the first claim is true and argue for the second by defending the “integrative unity” rationale. Yet the integrative unity rationale has fallen on (...) hard times. In this article, I give reasons for why we should think of ourselves as organisms, and why the “fundamental work” rationale put forward by the 2008 President’s Council is better than the integrative unity rationale, despite persistent objections to it. (shrink)

Support for the biological concept of race declined slowly but steadily during the second half of the twentieth century. However, debate about the validity of the race concept has recently been reignited. Genetic-clustering studies have shown that despite the small proportion of genetic variation separating continental populations, it is possible to assign some individuals to their continents of origin, based on genetic data alone. Race naturalists have interpreted these studies as empirically confirming the existence of human subspecies, and by extension (...) biological races. However, the new racial naturalism is not convincing. The continental clusters appealed to by race naturalists are arbitrary and superficial groupings, which should not be elevated to subspecies status. Moreover, the criteria applied to humans are not consistent with those used to define subspecies in nonhuman animals, and no rationale has been given for this differential treatment. (shrink)

There seem to be many kinds of moral duties. We should keep our promises; we should pay our debts of gratitude; we should compensate those we’ve wronged; we should avoid doing or intending harm; we should help those in need. These constitute, some worry, an unconnected heap of duties: the realm of commonsense morality is a disorganized mess. In this paper, we outline a strategy for unifying commonsense moral duties. We argue that they can be understood in terms of contact (...) with value. You are in contact with a value when you are manifest in it or when it is manifest in you. You have reason to get in contact with the good and avoid contact with evil. And when you’re in contact with a value, the weight of the reasons it grounds are amplified for you. These ideas, we argue, can bring order to the chaos of commonsense morality. (shrink)

Proponents of epistocracy worry that high levels of voter ignorance can harm democracies. To combat such ignorance, they recommend allocating comparatively more political power to more politically knowledgeable citizens. In response, some recent critics of epistocracy contend that epistocratic institutions risk causing even more harm, since much evidence from political psychology indicates that more politically knowledgeable citizens are typically more biased, less open-minded, and more prone to motivated reasoning about political matters than their less knowledgeable counterparts. If so, perhaps epistocratic (...) institutions will perform worse epistemically than corresponding democratic institutions. Call this 'the problem of epistocratic irrationality'. This paper argues that the problem of epistocratic irrationality can be overcome. First, I argue that critics of epistocracy have overlooked several complications regarding the psychological data they claim shows that more knowledgeable citizens are less politically rational. Second, I argue that appropriately designed epistocratic institutions could overcome the problem of epistocratic irrationality even if such critics have interpreted the data correctly. I first explore whether refined selection mechanisms could allow epistocrats to avoid empowering less rational citizens, before assessing the prospects of implementing only those epistocratic institutions with a solid track record of reliable performance. (shrink)

It would be good to have a Bayesian decision theory that assesses our decisions and thinking according to everyday standards of rationality — standards that do not require logical omniscience (Garber 1983, Hacking 1967). To that end we develop a “fragmented” decision theory in which a single state of mind is represented by a family of credence functions, each associated with a distinct choice condition (Lewis 1982, Stalnaker 1984). The theory imposes a local coherence assumption guaranteeing that as an agent's (...) attention shifts, successive batches of "obvious" logical information become available to her. A rule of expected utility maximization can then be applied to the decision of what to attend to next during a train of thought. On the resulting theory, rationality requires ordinary agents to be logically competent and to often engage in trains of thought that increase the unification of their states of mind. But rationality does not require ordinary agents to be logically omniscient. (shrink)

This paper defends the concept of racialization against its critics. As the concept has become increasingly popular, questions about its meaning and value have been raised, and a backlash against its use has occurred. I argue that when “racialization” is properly understood, criticisms of the concept are unsuccessful. I defend a definition of racialization and identify its companion concept, “racialized group.” Racialization is often used as a synonym for “racial formation.” I argue that this is a mistake. Racial formation theory (...) is committed to racial ontology, but racialization is best understood as the process through which racialized – rather than racial – groups are formed. “Racialization” plays a unique role in the conceptual landscape, and it is a key concept for race eliminativists and anti-realists about race. (shrink)

Unlike identity physicalism, ground physicalism does not achieve the physicalist dream. It faces the T-shirt problem for ground physicalism (Pautz 2014; Schaffer this volume; Rubenstein ms). In the case of insentient nature, it may be able to get by with small handful of very general ground laws to explain the emergence of nonfundamental objects and properties – for example, a few “principle of plenitude”. But I argue that for the case consciousness it will require a separate huge raft of special, (...) anomalous psychophysical ground laws. So it is just as complex and nonuniform as dualism. (shrink)

I investigate whether heuristics similar to those studied by Gigerenzer and his co-authors can apply to the problem of finding a suitable heuristic for a given problem. I argue that not only can heuristics of a very similar kind apply but they have the added advantage that they need not incorporate specific trade-off parameters for balancing the different desiderata of a good decision-procedure.

One of the most widely recognised intuitions about knowledge is that knowing precludes believing truly as a matter of luck. On Pritchard’s highly influential modal account of epistemic luck, luckily true beliefs are, roughly, those for which there are many close possible worlds in which the same belief formed in the same way is false. My aim is to introduce a new challenge to this account. Starting from the observation—as documented by a number of recent EEG studies—that our capacity to (...) detect visual stimuli fluctuates with the phase of our neural oscillations, I argue that there can be very close possible worlds in which an actual-world detectable stimulus is undetectable. However, this doesn’t diminish our willingness to attribute knowledge in the case that the stimulus is detectable, even when undetectability would result in the same belief formed in the same way being false. As I will argue at length, the modal account appears unable to accommodate this result. (shrink)

I discuss Frege's argument - later called the slingshot - that if a construction is extensional and preserves logical equivalence then it is truth-functional. I consider some simple apparent counterexamples and conclude that they are not sentence-embedding in the required way.

Contents: Danuta Ługowska, Incommensurability of Paradigms Exemplified by the Differences Between the Western and Eastern European Image of the Human Person ; Maria-Magdalena Weker, Light, Body and Soul – the Issues Fundamental for Theories of Vision. A Historical Survey ; Dariusz Kucharski, The Conception of Sensory Perception and Scientific Research. (The Theory of Sign within Philosophy of G. Berkeley and T. Reid) ; Grzegorz Bugajak, Causality and Determinism in Physics ; Anna Lemańska, Truth in Mathematics ; Anna Latawiec, Troubles with (...) the Philosophy of Medicine ; Adam Świeżyński, Values, Axiological Experience, and Scientific Research ; Grzegorz Bugajak, Fears of Science. Nature and Human Actions ; Adam Świeżyński, Some Remarks on the Human Search for Sense in the Context of Human Actions. (shrink)