This study aims to investigate the relationship between job burnout and employee performance in the feed industry during the ASF outbreak. Further, the researchers employed a descriptive-correlational research design in order to analyze the acquired data and produce pertinent findings. Thus, the researchers gathered data from one hundred two (102) feed industry employees. The Maslach Burnout Inventory (MBI) and Individual Work Performance Questionnaire (IWPQ) were employed to ascertain the extent of job burnout experienced by the respondents and evaluate employee performance, (...) respectively. Based on the statistical analysis, there is a significant relationship between job burnout and employee performance. Moreover, the study's findings were thoroughly analyzed and discussed. (shrink)

The abrupt shift in learning mode demands students to adjust from the comfort of their homes, as well as the challenges of face-to-face learning. As a result, as the pandemic fades, institutions in the Philippines have begun to reopen their doors to students. Hence, this study employed a correlational design to investigate the relationship between procrastination and academic burnout among 150 first-year college students in a state university. Based on the statistical analysis, the r coefficient of 0.67 indicates a moderate (...) positive correlation between the variables. The p-value of 0.00, which is less than 0.05, leads to the decision to reject the null hypothesis. Hence, a significant relationship exists between procrastination and academic burnout among first-year college students. Implications and recommendations were discussed in the study. (shrink)

The precarious rights of senior citizens, especially those who are highly educated and who are expected to counsel and guide the younger generations, has stimulated the creation internationally of advocacy associations and opinion leader groups. The strength of these groups, however, varies from country to country. In some countries, they are supported and are the focus of intense interest; in others, they are practically ignored. For this is reason we believe that the creation of a network of all these associations (...) is essential. The proposed network would act as a support for the already-existing policies of the United Nations’ High Commission for Human Rights, of independent experts, and of the Global Alliance for the Rights of Older People. All three have long ago recommended the creation of a recognized instrument for uniting presently scattered efforts. The proposed network, therefore, will seek to promote the international exchange of relevant expertise, and it will reinforce the commitments and actions that single countries are currently taking to meet these objectives. For example, informative public events can be organised to promote particular support initiatives and to provide an opportunity for new members of the network to be presented. The network will promote health for senior citizens, disease prevention, senior mobility, safe free time for seniors, alimentary education, protection against new risks and dangers, as well as equity in the services necessary for seniors to adopt new information and communication technologies. In the case of retired academic members, the network will promote equality with respect to continuing use of digital technologies (particularly email), continuing access to research libraries, and the guaranteed ability for seniors to fund their own research programs and to deliver free seminars. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the influence of Cambridge Platonism and materialist philosophy on Mary Astell's early feminism. More specifically, I argue that Astell co-opts Descartes's theory of regulating the passions in his final publication, The Passions of the Soul, to articulate a comprehensive, Enlightenment and body friendly theory of feminine self-esteem that renders her feminism modern. My analysis of Astell's theory of feminine self-esteem follows both textual and contextual cues, thus allowing for a reorientation of her early feminism vis-a-vis contemporary feminist (...) theory . An entire chapter in the dissertation is devoted to Astell's use of Descartes's theory of regulating the passions to render women more substantial and inherently worthy. This rendering becomes more concrete in Astell's feminist framework as she employs the language of the social contract in her fourth publication, Reflections Upon Marriage, to depict wives as contractual slaves. I argue that her assertion concerning women's slavery is theoretically consistent when read in light of her theory of feminine self-esteem, since this theory is based on the Enlightenment principles of self-mastery, independence and self-preservation. Further, I align Astell's early feminism in a dialogic sense with the Continental "querelle des femmes," especially as presented in writings by Christine de Pizan and Agrippa. Astell, I argue, contributes to the "querelle" by framing the feminist problem she wishes to solve concerning women's equality in a robust , philosophical manner that uncannily prefigures Wollstonecraft's call for the universalization of human virtues and the reform of of women's education. (shrink)

Feminism and Tradition in Aesthetics takes a fresh look at the history of aesthetics and at current debates within the philosophy of art by exploring the ways in which gender informs notions of art and creativity, evaluation and interpretation, and concepts of aesthetic value. Multiple intellectual traditions have formed this field, and the discussions herein range from consideration of eighteenth century legacies of ideas about taste, beauty, and sublimity to debates about the relevance of postmodern analyses for feminist aesthetics. Forward (...) by Arthur C. Danto, 20 authors include Paul Mattick, Jr., Caroline Korsmeyer, Timothy Gould, Christine Battersby, Mary Devereaux, bell hooks, REnee Lorraine, Trinh T. Minh-ha, Elizabeth Ann Dobie, Adrian Piper, Anita Silvers, Susan Feagin, Mary D. Garrard, Ellen Handler Spitz, Noel Carroll, Joanne Waugh, Joseph Margolis, Rita Felski, and Hilde Hein, as well as Peg Brand's essay, "Revising the Aesthetic-Nonaesthetic Distinction: The Aesthetic Value of Activist Art.". (shrink)

DESENVOLVIMENTO EMBRIONÁRIO E DIFERENCIAÇÃO SEXUAL -/- E. I. C. da Silva Departamento de Agropecuária – IFPE Campus Belo Jardim Departamento de Zootecnia – UFRPE sede -/- 1.1 INTRODUÇÃO O sexo foi definido como a soma das diferenças morfológicas, fisiológicas e psicológicas que distinguem o macho da fêmea permitindo a reprodução sexual e assegurando a continuidade das espécies. Os processos de diferenciação sexual são realizados durante o desenvolvimento embrionário, onde ocorre a proliferação, diferenciação e maturação das células germinativas e primordiais, precursoras (...) de ovócitos e espermatozoides em fêmeas e machos, respectivamente. Assim, os embriões machos e fêmeas iniciam o seu desenvolvimento de forma semelhante, de modo que em ambos os sexos se estabelecem em estruturas idênticas a partir das quais se formarão os órgãos reprodutores correspondentes a cada sexo. O conhecimento da origem e do desenvolvimento do aparelho genital é indispensável para entender sua função e as alterações que produzem infertilidade ou esterilidade. 1.2 DETERMINAÇÃO DO SEXO CROMOSSÔMICO Nos mamíferos, o sexo cromossômico é determinado no momento da fertilização, quando um óvulo, que contém um cromossomo X, é fecundado por um espermatozoide portador de um cromossomo X ou um cromossomo Y. No primeiro caso, o complemento cromossômico seria XX, o que originaria uma fêmea (sexo homogamético), e no segundo daria como resultado um macho com a fórmula cromossômica XY (sexo heterogâmico). 1.3 A GÔNADA INDIFERENCIADA A primeira manifestação das gônadas se aprecia no embrião em forma de um par de eminências longitudinais chamadas cristas ou dobras gonodais, situadas em ambos os lados da linha média entre os mesonefros (rins em desenvolvimento) e do mesentério dorsal. Nos embriões dos mamíferos, as células germinativas primordiais (CGP) manifestam-se em estágios precoces do desenvolvimento, podendo ser detectadas pela primeira vez na metade da gastrulação. As CGP são células grandes, de citoplasma claro e núcleo grande e redondo, localizadas na parede do saco vitelino, perto do alantoide. Essas células possuem grande capacidade de proliferação e vão migrar desde o endoderma do intestino e o epitélio do saco vitelino, através do mesentério, até as cristas gonodais. Isso ocorre por volta do 26° dia da gestação no bovino. Sua migração realiza-se graças aos movimentos de translocação passiva e deslocamento ameboide ativo. Desconhece-se o mecanismo pelo qual estas células são dirigidas para as cristas gonodais, porém foram estudadas algumas moléculas que se expressam durante sua migração e que poderiam desempenhar um papel importante na diferenciação deste tipo celular. A fosfatase alcalina é uma enzima que tem sido usada como marcador de CGP para determinar a sua origem e migração. Num estudo recente, foi inserido um marcador fluorescente que se exprime unicamente nas células germinativas primordiais de embriões transgênicos, e utilizando este marcador e a fosfatase alcalina determinou-se a origem e o padrão de migração destas células. O primeiro sinal de diferenciação das células germinativas primordiais é a expressão de fosfatase alcalina, e esta apareceu pela primeira vez na parte mais posterior da linha primitiva. No sétimo dia de desenvolvimento no embrião do camundongo, o endoderma visceral (AF+) é substituído pelo endoderma definitivo (AF-) originado na parte anterior da linha primitiva. O fator de transcrição Oct-4 é expresso nas CGP de ambos os sexos, pelo que acredita-se estar envolvido na mantença a totipotêncialidade das células. O receptor tirosina quinase, cujo ligante é o fator de Steel, é outra das moléculas que expressam as CGP. Tem sido demonstrado que este receptor possui um papel muito importante na sobrevivência deste tipo celular. Existem outros fatores que promovem a sobrevivência e/ou proliferação de CGP in vitro. Em experiências realizadas com o fator de transformação beta I (TGFβ-I), observou-se que este tem um efeito negativo sobre a proliferação das CGP. Outra atividade que tem sido postulada a este fator é o de um agente quimioatraente que possivelmente possa direcionar a migração destas células para a gônada. a) Um formado pelas células germinativas primordiais (precursoras dos gametas masculinos ou femininos), rodeadas de células somáticas das quais posteriormente se derivarão as células de Sertoli no macho e as células da granulosa na fêmea. b) O tecido que formará o estroma da gônada: tecido conjuntivo, vasos sanguíneos e as células intersticiais com atividade esteroidogênica (células de Leydig no testículo e a teca interna do ovário). As células somáticas do primórdio gonodal originam-se do mesoderma. Inicialmente são de três tipos: mesenquimáticas, mesoteliais e endoteliais. As células mesenquimáticas e mesoteliais iniciam grande atividade proliferativa ao chegar as CGP. Observa-se então uma condensação de células de origem mesotelial e mesenquimatoso que forma um agregado compacto denominado "blastema gonodal". A partir deste primórdio embrionário, diferenciam-se dois tecidos gonodais: os cordões sexuais e o estroma. Os cordões sexuais são arranjos epiteliais que se encontram delimitados por uma folha basal, e dentro deles encontramos as CGP. Por sua vez, no estroma encontram-se células do tipo mesenquimático e vasos sanguíneos. Neste momento, as gônadas são indiferenciadas e bipotencialmente sexuais, sendo impossível diferenciar, morfologicamente, uma gônada masculina de uma feminina, mas no caso dos machos genéticos já existe uma diferenciação da gônada a nível molecular. Nesta fase já se encontram presentes as estruturas das quais se desenvolvem os dutos mesonéfricos ou de Wolff precursores do aparelho genital masculino e os dutos paramesonéfricos ou de Müller que darão origem ao aparelho reprodutor feminino. Há uma série de fatores envolvidos no desenvolvimento precoce da gônada, entre os quais o fator esteroidogênico I (SFI: Steroidogenic fator l), que é um membro da subfamília de receptores nucleares, receptores órfãos. Este fator de transcrição tem um local de ligação ao DNA composto por dois dedos-de-Zinc. O SFI foi identificado como um ativador de genes envolvidos na biossíntese de esteroides em diferentes células. O SFI está presente durante o desenvolvimento embrionário em regiões associadas com funções endócrinas como gônadas, adrenais, pituitárias e hipotálamos. Os animais homozigotos para o gene SFI defeituoso, necessitam de gônadas e adrenais e têm a função gonadotrófica alterada. Os ratos sem SFI carecem de gonadotrofos e têm um desenvolvimento anormal do núcleo ventro-medial do hipotálamo; em particular as gônadas deixam de se desenvolver entre os dias 11 a 15 e degeneram-se por apoptose. No entanto, a crista genital forma-se e é colonizada pelas células germinativas, o que indica que estas continuam a receber o sinal adequado para a sua migração. Portanto, o SFI não está envolvido no desenvolvimento precoce da gônada e do sistema urogenital, mas parece estar envolvido na manutenção do crescimento das células somáticas presentes na gônada indiferenciada. O gene associado ao tumor de Wilms (WTI: Wilm's tumor Associated) está envolvido no desenvolvimento da gônada e do rim. Durante o desenvolvimento embrionário, WTI se expressa em todo o mesoderma intermediário e posteriormente na gônada indiferenciada, bem como no rim em formação. WTI regula o sinal indutivo do mesênquima para o epitélio celômico dos mesonefros. Se este for o caso, então WTI é responsável pelo crescimento da crista genital ao dirigir a entrada do epitélio celômico. Dado que estas células darão origem às células de Sertoli, a carência de WTI pode causar o desenvolvimento de embriões XY como fêmeas simplesmente porque não se formam as células de Sertoli. Em geral, todos os genes importantes na diferenciação do mesoderma intermediário e do sistema urogenital intervêm no desenvolvimento da gônada precoce. 1.4 DIFERENCIAÇÃO GONODAL O desenvolvimento das gônadas e ductos genitais descritos até o momento, é o mesmo para ambos os sexos. Igualmente, os genes descritos, que estão envolvidos no desenvolvimento das gônadas, ductos genitais e migração das células germinativas, afetam igualmente os embriões com genótipo XX ou XY. A gônada primitiva consiste anatomicamente de uma medula (interna) e uma crosta (externa), e de acordo com o local onde ocorre a colonização das células germinativas, diferenciara em testículo ou um ovário, respectivamente. Nos mamíferos, a primeira manifestação estrutural de diferenciação sexual é detectada na gônada dos machos, onde as células germinativas estão localizadas na medula. A diferenciação do testículo inicia-se quando os cordões sexuais se separam do epitélio celômico como consequência dos arranjos produzidos por uma invasão do mesênquima e vasos sanguíneos que provoca a compactação dos cordões, agora denominados cordões testiculares. As células que rodeiam os cordões se achatam e formam as células mioides, que são responsáveis pela formação das membranas basais. As células do epitélio interno, ou seja, as células de Sertoli, têm duas funções principais: o suporte das CGP e a síntese da hormona antimulleriana, responsável pela regressão dos ductos de Müller e secretada durante o período de diferenciação sexual. As células do estroma que rodeiam os cordões testiculares diferenciam-se para formar vários tipos de células: células mioides, fibroblastos, endotélio e células de Leydig, que são as mais importantes pela sua atividade endócrina. Posteriormente, os cordões testiculares dão origem aos túbulos seminíferos, que contêm o epitélio que produzirá os espermatozoides ao chegar à puberdade. Na fêmea, durante os estágios iniciais de diferenciação gonodal, não se observam mudanças em relação à gônada indiferenciada, só pode-se observar um certo crescimento devido à proliferação de células somáticas e germinativas. As células germinativas iniciam um período de proliferação, que termina com o início da meiose. Iniciada a meiose, dá-se o processo de foliculogênese; neste momento os cordões epiteliais se fragmentam, de tal maneira que cada ovócito fica rodeado de células epiteliais cobertas por uma folha basal fina (figura 1). Para que a gônada primitiva se desenvolva em testículo é indispensável a presença do cromossoma Y, independentemente do número de cromossomas X que contenha o genoma de um indivíduo. O gene determinante do testículo encontra-se localizado no cromossoma Y, denominado sry em ratos e SRY em humanos. O gene sry se expressa durante o desenvolvimento embrionário na crista genital de embriões de camundongos. A expressão é detectável no dia 10,5, pouco depois do aparecimento das cristas genitais, atinge o seu máximo durante o dia 11,5 e mantém-se até pouco depois de ocorrerem os primeiros sinais morfológicos de diferenciação testicular no dia 12,5. Este padrão de expressão é compatível com a teoria de que sry atua induzindo a ativação dos genes (figura 2) que conduzem ao desenvolvimento testicular, sem que exista a necessidade da expressão contínua de sry para manter a diferenciação do testículo após o dia 12,5. Como mencionado anteriormente, a gônada primitiva é composta por vários tipos de células. No entanto, as células germinativas primordiais não são o local de expressão do sry, já que os embriões que necessitam de células germinativas mantêm a expressão de sry e desenvolvem o sexo gonodal normalmente. As células somáticas na gônada em desenvolvimento incluem também as células de suporte. Sabe-se que é nestas células que o sry é expresso para que se diferenciem em células de Sertoli, e a expressão transitória de sry indica que deve ativar a outros genes para a manutenção das células de Sertoli. Uma vez diferenciadas as células de Sertoli, elas se encarregarão da diferenciação do resto das células na gônada. -/- Figura 1: Representação da diferenciação dos órgãos genitais internos. Adaptado de BRONSON, 1989. Figura 2: Cascada de genes envolvidos na diferenciação sexual, adaptado de KOOPMAN, 1999. O fator sry é necessário para a diferenciação do testículo. Embora não se conheçam os genes que provavelmente regulam esse gene, estudos realizados em camundongos demonstram que este gene parece coordenar-se com certos genes autossômicos. Entre estes genes autossômicos, o sox9, que é produzido pelas células de Sertoli uma vez que são estimuladas por sry, de modo que sox9 é um dos genes relacionados estruturalmente com sry. O Sox9 funciona como um fator de transcrição, mas não se sabe se a proteína tem qualquer outra função estrutural; este gene exprime-se abundantemente nos condrócitos e está relacionado com defeitos do aparelho ósseo chamados displasia campomélica. Curiosamente, os pacientes XY com esta condição sofrem frequentemente de reversão do sexo. O Sox9 é um dos poucos genes, além do SRY, do qual as mutações demonstraram interferir com a determinação sexual masculina. No entanto, apenas 75% dos pacientes com anomalias esqueléticas de tipo displasia campomélica têm reversão sexual e não foram encontrados casos de reversão sexual devido a um defeito de Sox9 que não seja acompanhado de defeitos esqueléticos. Isso indica que o Sox9 é apenas um membro da rede de genes que são ativados para determinar a diferenciação sexual, enquanto a rota que rege a condrogênese é mais sensível a perturbações deste. O momento em que se detecta a expressão do gene Sox9 (11dpc em ratos) coincide com a máxima expressão de sry, o que poderia indicar a possibilidade de que sry regule positivamente a Sox9. De fato, na região do promotor de Sox9 há um local de união ao que potencialmente se pode unir o sry. A expressão de Sox9 durante a diferenciação sexual sugere um papel abaixo de sry na diferenciação das células de Sertoli. O cromossoma X também é importante na diferenciação gonodal. O gene DAX-I foi isolado do lócus DSS (Dosage sensitive sex reversal) do cromossoma X. DAX-I é parte da cascata de determinação sexual, mas não é necessário para a formação do testículo. DAX-I é um membro dos receptores nucleares conhecidos como receptores órfãos. Este gene demonstrou ser um poderoso repressor da transcrição de SFI e de vários genes. Os padrões de expressão de DAX-I são complementares daqueles de SFI, ambos expressos nas cristas genitais. Em resumo, dada a evidência exposta, desenvolveu-se a hipótese de que DAX-I é um antagonista de sry; esse antagonismo é dependente dos níveis relativos de DAX-I e sry e de um limiar que varia de espécie para espécie. A DAX-I foi classificada como o gene antitestículo. Na fêmea (cariótipo XX) é importante que ocorra a inativação de um dos cromossomas sexuais X para que se mantenha o equilíbrio genético ao igualar o conteúdo de DNA dos cromossomas. Esse cromossoma inativado constitui o chamado corpúsculo de Barr. No entanto, para que a meiose se realize, é necessário dos dois cromossomas X ativos nos ovócitos para assegurar a diferenciação ovárica e a fertilidade. 1.5 DIFERENCIAÇÃO DOS DUCTOS SEXUAIS O embrião possui, além das gônadas indiferenciadas, dois sistemas de ductos: os de potencialidade masculina denominam-se ductos de Wolff ou mesonéfricos, e os de potencialidade feminina se chamam ductos de Müller ou paramesonéfricos (figura 1). Se a diferenciação gonodal levou à formação de um testículo, a partir do ducto mesonéfrico ou de Wolff se desenvolverão os ductos eferentes, o epidídimo, os ductos deferentes e as vesículas seminais. As hormonas importantes no desenvolvimento do aparelho genital masculino são a testosterona, produzida pelas células de Leydig, e sua forma 5α reduzida, a 5α di-hidrotestosterona. Acredita-se que a testosterona é responsável pela virilização dos ductos de Wolff, e a di-hidrotestosterona dos órgãos genitais externos. No macho, os canais de Müller atrofiam-se devido à ação de uma hormona fetal de origem testicular denominada hormona inibidora das estruturas de Müller (HIM) ou hormona antimulleriana. Este processo começa assim que os cordões espermáticos se formam e se diferenciam as células de Sertoli. A existência de HIM foi proposta baseada em estudos realizados em bezerras freemartin, devido à existência de uma hormona responsável pela atresia dos ductos de Müller que na fêmea dá origem ao útero e aos ovidutos. Essa hormona provoca a involução do aparelho genital do bovino nas gestações gemelares nas quais os produtos de diferente sexo têm comunicação sanguínea por ter ocorrido a anastomose dos vasos de ambas as placentas (figura 3). A HIM é uma glicoproteína pertencente à subfamília de TGFβ, é expressa pelas células que darão origem às células de Sertoli e é um dos primeiros marcadores de diferenciação nestas células. A HIM é secretada na vida adulta pelas células de Sertoli no testículo e por células da granulosa no ovário. No rato a HIM é expressa-se no 12° dia em um teste padrão que segue muito de perto o aumento na expressão de sry. No macho, esta secreção de HIM continua durante a vida fetal e adulta, contudo os níveis de HIM declinam na puberdade devido a um aumento na secreção de testosterona. Vários fatores intervêm na regulação do gene de HIM, incluindo os acima descritos SFI e Sox9. O gene HIM contém segmentos de DNA que são conservados em várias espécies de vertebrados. Existe um nexo de ligação para SFI, que ativa a transcrição de HIM. A mutação no local de ligação de SFI resulta em reversão do sexo em indivíduos XY incluindo genitais femininos normais, presença de um útero formado enfatizando a importância de SFI na determinação sexual e na expressão de HIM. Embora SFI seja um bom candidato como regulador de HIM, é expresso em outras células, como as de Leydig e adrenais, que não expressam HIM. Em contrapartida, Sox9 é expresso unicamente nas células de Sertoli que são as produtoras de HIM. O gene HIM também tem um nexo de ligação para Sox9. Além disso, Sox9 pode atuar sinergicamente com SFI para promover a secreção de HIM. Ao contrário destes dois fatores de transcrição, DAX-I antagoniza a ação de Sox9 e provavelmente SFI sobre o promotor de HIM. Assim, para que as células de Sertoli secretem HIM, a transcrição de DAX-I deve diminuir. Figura 3: Representação da diferenciação dos órgãos genitais externos. Adaptado de BRONSON, 1989. Os ductos de Wolff tornam-se o sistema de ejaculação do macho. A porção mais próxima dos testículos dá origem ao epidídimo, a parte central ao ducto deferente e a porção mais distal às vesículas seminais. A próstata e a parte membranosa da uretra do macho desenvolvem-se a partir da porção pélvica do seio urogenital. A virilização e diferenciação dos ductos de Wolff dependem da produção de testosterona pelo testículo. Quanto aos órgãos genitais externos do macho, o tubérculo genital é ampliado e as dobras uretrais se fundem para formar a uretra peniana. A fusão das dobras uretrais aproxima os tubérculos genitais para formar o escroto (figura 4). Figura 4: Diferenciação do aparelho genital da fêmea e do macho. Adaptado de KOOPMAN, 1989. A diferenciação dos órgãos genitais da fêmea ocorre de forma passiva, já que a ausência de testículos e por isso da hormona inibidora dos ductos de Müller (HIM), assim como dos andrógenos virilizantes, favorece o desenvolvimento dos ductos de Müller, enquanto os de Wolff sofrem atrofia. A porção cefálica dos ductos de Müller dá origem aos ovidutos, que na sua terminação caudal se fundem com o útero. O contato dos ductos de Müller com o seio urogenital induz uma intensa proliferação celular que resulta na formação da área uterovaginal localizado entre o seio urogenital e os ductos de Müller. As células do prato uterovaginal proliferam e aumentam a distância entre as duas estruturas criando o espaço que formará a vagina quando o prato é canalizado e forma um lúmen. Em contraste com o que ocorre no macho, na fêmea a maior parte do seio urogenital se mantém exposta na superfície da abertura onde desembocam a vagina e a uretra. O tubérculo urogenital da fêmea tem um crescimento limitado e forma o clitóris. A sequência de passos da diferenciação sexual do aparelho genital é resumida na tabela 1. Tabela 1: Destino em desenvolvimento dos rudimentos sexuais dos fetos macho e fêmea dos mamíferos -/- Rudimento sexual Macho Fêmea Gônada Testículo Ovário Ductos de Müller (Paramesonéfricos) Vestígios Útero, parte da vagina, ovidutos Ductos de Wolff (Mesonéfricos) Ductos eferentes deferentes, epidídimo, vesículas seminais Vestígios Seio urogenital Uretra, próstata, glândulas bulbouretrais Parte da vagina, uretra, vestíbulo, glândulas vestibulares Tubérculo genital Pênis Clitóris Pregas vestibulares Escroto Lábios vulvares Fonte: HAFEZ, 2004. 1.6 DIFERENCIAÇÃO SEXUAL DO HIPOTÁLAMO Os processos de diferenciação sexual não se limitam apenas às células somáticas do organismo do feto, mas incluem também os centros nervosos superiores do cérebro. Assim, da mesma maneira que a gônada e os ductos sexuais se desenvolvem para o tipo feminino ou masculino, propôs-se que o cérebro pode ser "masculinizado" ou permanecer "Feminizado". A diferenciação do hipotálamo vai depender do ambiente esteroidal do neonato e ocorre na fase perinatal. Estes eventos serão de grande transcendência na vida reprodutiva do indivíduo. Tanto a fêmea como o macho nascem com a capacidade de secreção de gonadotropinas de acordo com um padrão cíclico; contudo, no macho, a exposição do hipotálamo à ação dos andrógenos testiculares durante os primeiros dias da vida extrauterina provoca a masculinização, com o qual o hipotálamo do macho é programado para que a secreção de gonadotropinas se realize a um ritmo relativamente constante por parte da hipófise (secreção tônica). Na fêmea, tanto a secreção tônica como a cíclica se conservam. No entanto, observou-se que a injeção de testosterona ou o transplante de testículo na rata fêmea durante os primeiros dias de vida, suprime a sua futura atividade estral (secreção cíclica). Por outro lado, se os ovários forem transplantados para o rato macho normal castrado na idade adulta, o animal não desenvolve qualquer atividade cíclica, mas se os machos transplantados forem castrados ao nascer, o ovário é capaz de efetuar mudanças cíclicas e ovulações. Isto foi demonstrado em roedores, mas não em animais domésticos ou na espécie humana. Portanto, o padrão de secreção de gonadotropinas, seja cíclico ou tônico, não depende da hipófise, mas do hipotálamo e sua correta diferenciação. 1.7 CONCLUSÕES A maioria dos conhecimentos no campo da biologia do desenvolvimento e, muito especificamente, dos processos de diferenciação sexual têm sido originados de estudos relacionados com desordens congênitas, que na sua maioria devem-se a defeitos de genes específicos. A análise detalhada destas desordens permitiu entender alguns mecanismos endócrinos, moleculares e genéticos envolvidos na diferenciação sexual. A identificação do gene sry como determinante do testículo foi uma contribuição crucial e abriu as portas à compreensão dos mecanismos moleculares e celulares relacionados com o desenvolvimento do testículo. Se este gene não estiver presente, é criado um programa genético alternativo para levar a cabo a diferenciação gonodal para o ovário. Finalmente, devemos ter presente que é necessária uma correlação entre mudanças morfológicas e expressão de genes durante o desenvolvimento para entender os mecanismos relacionados com a diferenciação. -/- Apoio -/- Realização -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS ANDERSON, Robert et al. The onset of germ cell migration in the mouse embryo. Mechanisms of development, v. 91, n. 1-2, p. 61-68, 2000. AUSTIN, Colin Russell; SHORT, R. V. Reproduction in Mammals: Volume 1, Germ Cells and Fertilization. Londres: Cambridge University Press, 1972. BRONSON, Franklin H. Mammalian reproductive biology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989. BUEHR, Mia. The primordial germ cells of mammals: some current perspectives. Experimental cell research, v. 232, n. 2, p. 194-207, 1997. BYSKOV, Anne G. Differentiation of mammalian embryonic gonad. Physiological reviews, v. 66, n. 1, p. 71-117, 1986. CAPEL, Blanche et al. Migration of mesonephric cells into the mammalian gonad depends on Sry. Mechanisms of development, v. 84, n. 1-2, p. 127-131, 1999. CAPEL, Blanche. The battle of the sexes. Mechanisms of development, v. 92, n. 1, p. 89-103, 2000. DERIVAUX, Jules; BARNABÉ, Renato Campanarut. Reprodução dos animais domésticos. Zaragoza: Acribia, 1980. DOMENICE, Sorahia et al. Aspectos moleculares da determinação e diferenciação sexual. Arquivos Brasileiros de Endocrinologia & Metabologia, v. 46, n. 4, p. 433-443, 2002. DONAHOE, Patricia K. et al. Mullerian inhibiting substance activity in bovine fetal, newborn and prepubertal testes. Biology of reproduction, v. 16, n. 2, p. 238-243, 1977. HAFEZ, Elsayed Saad Eldin; HAFEZ, B. Reprodução animal. São Paulo: Manole, 2004. HANLEY, Neil A. et al. Steroidogenic factor 1 (SF-1) is essential for ovarian development and function. Molecular and cellular endocrinology, v. 163, n. 1-2, p. 27-32, 2000. HIORT, Olaf; PAUL-MARTIN, H. The molecular basis of male sexual differentiation. European journal of endocrinology, v. 142, n. 2, p. 101-110, 2000. HOLY, Lubos; MARTÍNEZ JÚSTIZ, G. Colab. Biología de la reproducción bovina. Havana: Revolucionária, 1975. JOSSO, Nathalie et al. The role of anti-Müllerian hormone in gonadal development. Molecular and cellular endocrinology, v. 145, n. 1-2, p. 3-7, 1998. JOST, Alfred et al. Studies on sex differentiation in mammals. In: Proceedings of the 1972 Laurentian Hormone Conference. Londres: Academic Press, 1973. p. 1-41. KNOBIL, Ernst. Knobil and Neill's physiology of reproduction. EUA: Gulf Professional Publishing, 2006. KOFMAN ALFARO, S.; MERCHANT LARIOS, H.; PEREZ PALACIOS, G. Diferenciacion sexual. I. Bases biologicas del dimorfismo sexual. Rev. invest. clín, p. 349-59, 1982. KOOPMAN, Peter. Sry and Sox9: mammalian testis-determining genes. Cellular and Molecular Life Sciences CMLS, v. 55, n. 6-7, p. 839-856, 1999. MCDONALD, L. E. Veterinary endocrinology. Lea & Febiger, Philadelphia, Pa, 1969. MEIZEL, S.; JOHNSON, M. H. Development in mammals. MH Johnson, Ed, v. 3, p. 1-64, 1978. MELLO, Maricilda Palandi de; ASSUMPÇÃO, Juliana de G.; HACKEL, Christine. Genes envolvidos na determinação e diferenciação do sexo. Arquivos Brasileiros de Endocrinologia & Metabologia, v. 49, n. 1, p. 14-25, 2005. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS MERCHANT-LARIOS, H. Ovarian differentiation. The Vertebrate Ovary, p. 47-81, 1978. MIES FILHO, Antonio. Reprodução dos animais. Porto Alegre: Sulina, 1987. NEF, Serge; PARADA, Luis F. Hormones in male sexual development. Genes & Development, v. 14, n. 24, p. 3075-3086, 2000. PARKER, Keith L.; SCHEDL, Andreas; SCHIMMER, Bernard P. Gene interactions in gonadal development. Annual review of physiology, v. 61, n. 1, p. 417-433, 1999. SWAIN, Amanda; LOVELL-BADGE, Robin. Mammalian sex determination: a molecular drama. Genes & development, v. 13, n. 7, p. 755-767, 1999. WILHELM, Dagmar; PALMER, Stephen; KOOPMAN, Peter. Sex determination and gonadal development in mammals. Physiological reviews, v. 87, n. 1, p. 1-28, 2007. WILSON, Jean D.; GRIFFIN, James E.; GEORGE, Fredrick W. Sexual differentiation: early hormone synthesis and action. Biology of reproduction, v. 22, n. 1, p. 9-17, 1980. -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Belo Jardim, 07 de Maio de 2020. (shrink)

Emotions often misfire. We sometimes fear innocuous things, such as spiders or mice, and we do so even if we firmly believe that they are innocuous. This is true of all of us, and not only of phobics, who can be considered to suffer from extreme manifestations of a common tendency. We also feel too little or even sometimes no fear at all with respect to very fearsome things, and we do so even if we believe that they are fearsome. (...) Indeed, instead of shunning fearsome things, we might be attracted to them. Emotions that seem more thought-involving, such as shame, guilt or jealousy, can also misfire. You can be ashamed of your big ears even though we can agree that there is nothing shameful in having big ears, and even though you judge that having big ears does not warrant shame. And of course, it is also possible to experience too little or even no shame at all with respect to something that is really shameful. Many of these cases involve a conflict between one’s emotion and one’s evaluative judgement. Emotions that are thus conflicting with judgement can be called ‘recalcitrant emotions’. The question I am interested in is whether or not recalcitrant emotions amount to emotional illusions, that is, whether or not these cases are sufficiently similar to perceptual illusions to justify the claim that they fall under the same general heading. The answer to this depends on what emotions are. For instance, the view that emotions are evaluative judgments makes it difficult to make room for the claim that emotional errors are perceptual illusions. Fearing an innocuous spider would simply amount to making the error of judging that the spider is fearsome while it is in fact innocuous. This might involve an illusion of some sort, but it certainly does not amount to anything like a perceptual illusion. In this chapter, I argue that recalcitrant emotions are a kind of perceptual illusion.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Epistemic Leaks and Epistemic Meltdowns: A Response to William Morris on Scepticism with Regard to Reason Mikael M. Karlsson I. In an excellent paper which appeared in the April, 1989 issue of this journal,2 William Morris attemptsto demonstrate thatthe arguments which make up Hume's notorious chapter, "Of scepticism with regard to reason, are, in the first place, coherent—both internally and with the overall strategy of the Treatise—and, in (...) the second place, successful. Morris' paper is an exercise in the noble art of what I style constructive exegesis, an enterprise to which many readers of Hume Studies, and myself as much as any, are committed. It is a guiding principle ofthis art that we donotunderstandaphilosophical textuntil we can interpret it in such a way as to render it both coherent and correct. From this point ofview, coherence and correctness are not as independent of one another as they may seem to be to others who are differently committed. Some texts, such as Hume's chapter, "Ofscepticism with regard to reason," are notoriously resistant to constructive exegesis, despite the formidable bag of tricks which scholars and interpreters have developed; so resistant, that in gloomier moments we may be brought to wonder about our interpretative enterprise itself. Constructive exegesis is indeed a strange, and peculiarly optimistic, enterprise. Someday, I imagine, in a leisurely moment, I will think more reflectively about the principles ofour art. But not now.6 As a fellow practitioner of constructive exegesis, I am in full sympathy with what Morris tries to do in his paper; and I think that he does contribute substantially to our understanding of what Hume is up to in the chapter, "Ofscepticism with regard to reason." The third section of Morris' paper is, in my judgement, particularly successful in showing how Hume's chapter fits into the larger framework of the Treatise: Hume is, we see, attacking both what Morris labels "intellectualist rationalism" and its counterpart, which we may call 'unmitigated scepticism', although the chapter's two main arguments go primarily to the former. I also think that Morris gives very helpful, Volume XVI Number 2 121 MIKAEL M. KARLSSON and to my mind accurate, accounts of these two arguments, which I dub, respectively, the epistemic leak argument, and the epistemic meltdown argument. However, I have personally never found either of these arguments remotely convincing; and I still do not, despite Morris' clarification and defense. In what follows, I shall indicate some ofthe reasons for my dissatisfaction.?. Theepistemicleakargumentpurportsto"prove"(in Hume's sense)that reason or demonstration cannot support knowledge. Morris rightlyreminds us that whatHume meansby knowledge is perfect assurance or conviction: Knowledge is, in short, subjective certainty. This has caused confusion, for this is not what we usually mean nowadays by knowledge; nor was it what people, philosophers included, generally meant prior to Descartes. In Hume itis the product ofthe attempttoresolve all epistemic statesintomental eventsorwhat he calls "perceptions." In any case, we must—as Morris rightly explains—be clear that the epistemic leak argument is aimed at showing that demonstration cannot supportperfect conviction. Inoutline, the argumentissimple: Itworks, asMorrismakes clear, by shifting attention away from the subject-matter or "objects" of demonstration, that is, relations of ideas, to the exercise of demonstrative reason by human agents. The necessity of relations of ideas may suggest to us that we can be certain about them. Against this, one may point out that people do err in the conclusions arrived at by demonstration; this presumably shows that our (rational) understandingis fallible. And once we recognize this, our confidence in any conclusion produced by exercising this facultyislessened—thus do we move from knowledge, or subjective certainty, toprobability: belief, or imperfect conviction. Arguments ofthis general type (we can call them, using Descartes' famous figure, Totten-apple arguments ) were around long before Hume, although they were more commonly directed against the senses than against reason. We find them in antiquity—in Plato and Sextus Empiricus, for instance —and in Descartes, in parallel passages in the Discourse on Method, the First Meditation and the Principles of Philosophy, wherein one can discern a version directed precisely against reason and demonstration.12 To find out what, if anything, Hume has... (shrink)

Two experiments with undergraduates as subjects were carried out with the aim of replicating and extending previous results showing that the implication of the behavioral life-cycle hypothesis (H. M. Shefrin & R. H. Thaler, 1988) that people classify assets in different mental accounts (current income, current assets, and future income) may explain how consumption choices are influenced by temporary income changes. In both experiments subjects made fictitious choices between paying for a good in cash or according to a more expensive (...) installment plan after they had received an income which was either less, the same, or larger than usual. In Experiment 1 subjects were supposed to have savings so that the total assets were equal, whereas in Experiment 2 the total assets varied. The results of both experiments supported the role of mental accounts in demonstrating that subjects were unwilling to pay in cash after an income decrease even though they had access to saved money. Thus, in effect they chose to pay more for the good than they had to. Indicating a need for further refinement of the concept of mental account, choices to pay in cash after an income decrease tended to be more frequent when the consumption and savings motives were compatible than when they were incompatible. Furthermore, increasing the total assets made subjects more willing to pay in cash after an income decrease. (shrink)

Two experiments with undergraduates as subjects tested explanations of how a prior temporary income change influences choices between buying and deferred buying. In Experiment 1 predictions from the behavioral life-cycle theory (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988), the renewable resources model (Linville & Fischer, 1991) and the loss-sensitivity principle (Garling & Romanus, 1997) were contrasted. The results are inconsistent with the latter two explanations since the framing of buying as positive (buying a new model of a product) or negative (replacing a broken (...) product) did not interact with the income change. Congruent with the behavioral life-cycle theory, willingness to buy was greater when subjects received a temporary income increase than when they received a temporary income decrease although total assets were equal. Further support for the behavioral life-cycle theory is obtained in Experiment 2 where four income-change conditions and durable and nondurable goods are compared. (shrink)

The life-cycle theory of saving behavior (Modigliani, 1988) suggests that humans strive towards an equal intertemporal distribution of wealth. However, behavioral life-cycle theory (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988) proposes that people use self-control heuristics to postpone wealth until later in life. According to this theory, people use a system of cognitive budgeting known as mental accounting. In the present study it was found that mental accounts were used differently depending on if the income change was positive or negative. This was shown (...) both in a representative nationwide sample of households and in a student sample. Respondents were more willing to cut down on their propensity to consume when faced with an income decrease than to raise it when the income increased. Furthermore, contrary to the predictions of behavioral life-cycle theory, it was found that the respondents adjusted their propensity to consume the most when the income increases or decreases took place immediately. Hence, it is suggested that theories of intertemporal choice (e.g., Loewenstein, 1988; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992) provide a better account of the data than does the behavioral lifecycle theory. (shrink)

The moral error theory generally does not receive good press in metaethics. This paper adds to the bad news. In contrast to other critics, though, I do not attack error theorists’ characteristic thesis that no moral assertion is ever true. Instead, I develop a new counter-argument which questions error theorists’ ability to defend their claim that moral utterances are meaningful assertions. More precisely: Moral error theorists lack a convincing account of the meaning of deontic moral assertions, or so I will (...) argue. (shrink)

Mental accounting is a concept associated with the work of Richard Thaler. According to Thaler, people think of value in relative rather than absolute terms. They derive pleasure not just from an object’s value, but also the quality of the deal – its transaction utility (Thaler, 1985). In addition, humans often fail to fully consider opportunity costs (tradeoffs) and are susceptible to the sunk cost fallacy. Why are people willing to spend more when they pay with a credit card than (...) cash (Prelec & Simester, 2001)? Why would more individuals spend $10 on a theater ticket if they had just lost a $10 bill than if they had to replace a lost ticket worth $10 (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984)? Why are people more likely to spend a small inheritance and invest a large one (Thaler, 1985)? According to the theory of mental accounting, people treat money differently, depending on factors such as the money’s origin and intended use, rather than thinking of it in terms of the “bottom line” as in formal accounting (Thaler, 1999). An important term underlying the theory is fungibility, the fact that all money is interchangable and has no labels. In mental accounting, people treat assets as less fungible than they really are. Even seasoned investors are susceptible to this bias when they view recent gains as disposable “house money” (Thaler & Johnson, 1990) that can be used in high-risk investments. In doing so, they make decisions on each mental account separately, losing out the big picture of the portfolio. (See also partitioning and pain of paying for ideas related to mental accounting.) . (shrink)

Recent debate about the error theory has taken a ‘formal turn’. On the one hand, there are those who argue that the error theory should be rejected because of its difficulties in providing a convincing formal account of the logic and semantics of moral claims. On the other hand, there are those who claim that such formal objections fail, maintaining that arguments against the error theory must be of a substantive rather than a formal kind. In this paper, we argue (...) that formal objections to the error theory cannot be eschewed but must be met head-on. (shrink)

After discussing de Sousa's view of emotion in akrasia, I suggest that emotions be viewed as nonconceptual perceptions of value (see Tappolet 2000). It follows that they can render intelligible actions which are contrary to one's better judgment. An emotion can make one's action intelligible even when that action is opposed by one's all-things-considered judgment. Moreover, an akratic action prompted by an emotion may be more rational than following one's better judgement, for it may be the judgement and not the (...) perception which is in error. By contrast, "cool" akrasia is genuinely puzzling; it is not clear whether it exists. (shrink)

The literature acknowledges a distinction between immoral, amoral and moral management. This paper makes a case for the employee (at any level) as a moral agent, even though the paper begins by highlighting a body of evidence which suggests that individual moral agency is sacrificed at work and is compromised in deference to other pressures. This leads to a discussion about the notion of discretion and an examination of a separate, contrary body of literature which indicates that some individuals in (...) corporations may use their discretion to behave in a socially entrepreneurial manner. My underlying assumption is that CSR isn’t solely driven by economics and that it may also be championed as a result of a personal morality, inspired by employees’ own socially oriented personal values. A conceptual framework is put forward and it is suggested that individuals may be categorized as Active or Frustrated Corporate Social Entrepreneurs; Conformists or Apathetics, distinguished by their individualistic or collectivist personal values. In a discussion of the nature of values, this paper highlights how values may act as drivers of our behavior and pays particular attention to the values of the entrepreneur, thereby linking the existing debate on moral agency with the field of corporate social responsibility. (shrink)

The mathematician Georg Cantor strongly believed in the existence of actually infinite numbers and sets. Cantor’s “actualism” went against the Aristotelian tradition in metaphysics and mathematics. Under the pressures to defend his theory, his metaphysics changed from Spinozistic monism to Leibnizian voluntarist dualism. The factor motivating this change was two-fold: the desire to avoid antinomies associated with the notion of a universal collection and the desire to avoid the heresy of necessitarian pantheism. We document the changes in Cantor’s thought with (...) reference to his main philosophical-mathematical treatise, the Grundlagen (1883) as well as with reference to his article, “Über die verschiedenen Standpunkte in bezug auf das aktuelle Unendliche” (“Concerning Various Perspectives on the Actual Infinite”) (1885). (shrink)

A fallibilist theory of knowledge is employed to make sense of the idea that agents know what they are doing 'without observation' (as on Anscombe's theory of practical knowledge).

Access to surrogacy is often cast in the language of rights. Here, I examine what form such a right could take. I distinguish between surrogacy as a right to assisted procreation, and surrogacy as a contractual right. I find the first interpretation implausible: it would give rise to claims against the state that no state can fulfil, namely the provision of sufficient surrogates to satisfy the need. Instead, I argue that the right to surrogacy can only be plausibly understood as (...) a contractual right. I then investigate two different sets of harms that are often employed to argue against such a contractual interpretation of the right to surrogacy: harm to women's interests in a gendered society, and harm to the sense of self of the surrogate. I assess both of these through the analytical lens of vulnerability. I find neither of them to be convincing arguments against surrogacy contracts. In conclusion, I agree that surrogacy contracts should be carefully regulated, but I disagree with those who call for prohibition of the right to surrogacy as a contractual right. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider the question of whether there exists an essential relation between emotions and wellbeing. We distinguish three ways in which emotions and wellbeing might be essentially related: constitutive, causal, and epistemic. We argue that, while there is some room for holding that emotions are constitutive ingredients of an individual’s wellbeing, all the attempts to characterise the causal and epistemic relations in an essentialist way are vulnerable to some important objections. We conclude that the causal and epistemic (...) relation between emotions and wellbeing is much less strong than is commonly thought. (shrink)

Short piece for The Philosophers' Magazine on why philosophers should pay attention to olfaction.

One difficulty in understanding recent debates is that not only have many terms been used to refer to weakness of will – “akrasia” and “incontinence” have often been used as synonyms of “weakness of will” – but quite different phenomena have been discussed in the literature. This is why the present entry starts with taxonomic considerations. The second section turns to the question of whether it is possible to freely and intentionally act against one’s better judgment.

According to recent suggestions within the global pragmatism discussion, metaethical debate must be fundamentally re-framed. Instead of carving out metaethical differences in representational terms, it has been argued that metaethics should be given an inferentialist footing. In this paper, I put inferentialist metaethics to the test by subjecting it to the following two criteria for success: Inferentialist metaethicists must be able to save the metaethical differences between moral realism and expressivism, and do so in a way that employs understandings of (...) these metaethical accounts which would be acceptable to moral realists or expressivists who endorse an inferentialist theory of meaning. Two results follow from my discussion. The first concerns inferentialist metaethics more narrowly, casting doubts on inferentialists’ ability to fulfil the two criteria for success by showing that proposed metaethical demarcation attempts either meet the first criterion but violate the second, or pass the second criterion but fail the first. The second upshot pertains to the global pragmatism debate more widely, pressing the point that inferentialists have not as yet provided a convincing account of ontological commitment. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a metasemantics for relaxed moral realism. More precisely, I argue that relaxed realists should be inferentialists about meaning and explain that the role of evaluative moral vocabulary is to organise and structure language exit transitions, much as the role of theoretical vocabulary is to organise and structure language entry transitions.

This paper argues for a conception of the natural rights of non-human animals grounded in Kant’s explanation of the foundation of human rights. The rights in question are rights that are in the first instance held against humanity collectively speaking—against our species conceived as an organized body capable of collective action. The argument proceeds by first developing a similar case for the right of every human individual who is in need of aid to get it, and then showing why the (...) situation of animals is similar. I first review some of the reasons why people are resistant to the idea that animals might have rights. I then explain Kant’s conception of natural rights. I challenge the idea that duties of aid and duties of kindness to animals fit the traditional category of “imperfect duties” and argue that they are instead cases of “imperfect right.” I explain how you can hold a right against a group, and why it is legitimate to conceive of humanity as such a group. I then argue that Kant’s account of the foundation of property rights is grounded in a conception of the common possession of the Earth that grounds a right to aid and the rights of animals to be treated in ways that are consistent with their good. Finally, I return to the objections to the idea that animals have rights and offer some responses to them. (shrink)

Within the social sciences, much controversy exists about which status should be ascribed to the rationality assumption that forms the core of rational choice theories. Whilst realists argue that the rationality assumption is an empirical claim which describes real processes that cause individual action, instrumentalists maintain that it amounts to nothing more than an analytically set axiom or ‘as if’ hypothesis which helps in the generation of accurate predictions. In this paper, I argue that this realist-instrumentalist debate about rational choice (...) theory can be overcome once it is realised that the rationality assumption is neither an empirical description nor an ‘as if’ hypothesis, but a normative claim. (shrink)

Evaluative concepts and emotions appear closely connected. According to a prominent account, this relation can be expressed by propositions of the form ‘something is admirable if and only if feeling admiration is appropriate in response to it’. The first section discusses various interpretations of such ‘Value-Emotion Equivalences’, for example the Fitting Attitude Analysis, and it offers a plausible way to read them. The main virtue of the proposed way to read them is that it is well-supported by a promising account (...) of emotions, namely the Perceptual Theory of Emotions, which emphasises the analogies between emotions and sensory perceptual experiences. The second section considers a worry about whether concepts such as admirable are really evaluative. It is maintained that even though the arguments used to show that thick terms and concepts are not inherently evaluative can be transposed to affective concepts, these arguments can be resisted. So there is no need to abandon the intuitive claim that affective concepts are inherently evaluative. (shrink)

The movement of people across borders is one of the most pressing issues of our time. Yet it is still unclear how migration should be regulated to be fair to the sending societies, the host societies and the individual migrant. What is at issue? Are we discussing migration from an ethical or from a political philosophical perspective, or both? Are we discussing migration from a global justice perspective or social justice perspective? Do we consider political legitimacy and democratic self-determination as (...) part of our analysis? How should we balance demands of justice in immigration compared to those of emigration? (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the relationship between Matthew Kramer’s moral realism as a moral doctrine and expressivism, understood as a distinctly non-representationalist metasemantic theory of moral vocabulary. More precisely, I will argue that Kramer is right in stating that moral realism as a moral doctrine does not stand in conflict with expressivism. But I will also go further, by submitting that advocates of moral realism as a moral doctrine must adopt theories such as expressivism in some shape or form. (...) Accordingly, if you do not want to accept positions such as expressivism, you cannot defend moral realism as a moral doctrine. Similarly, if you want moral realism to compete with expressivism, you cannot accept Kramer’s take on moral realism either. Hence, moral realism as a moral doctrine stands and falls with theories such as expressivism, or so I shall argue. (shrink)

The philosophical study of irrationality can yield interesting insights into the human mind. One provocative issue is self-defeating behaviours, i.e. behaviours that result in failure to achieve one’s apparent goals and ambitions. In this paper I consider a self-defeating behaviour called choking under pressure, explain why it should be considered irrational, and how it is best understood with reference to skills. Then I describe how choking can be explained without appeal to a purely Freudian subconscious or ‘sub-agents’ view of mind. (...) Finally, I will recommend an alternative way to understand self-defeating behaviour which comes from a synthesis of Peter Strawson’'s explanation of ‘self-reactive attitudes’, Mark Johnston’'s notion of ‘mental tropisms’, and revised Freudian descriptions of the causes of self-defeating behaviour. (shrink)

It is generally accepted that there are two kinds of normative concepts : evaluative concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. The question that is raised by this distinction is how it is possible to claim that evaluative concepts are normative. Given that deontic concepts appear to be at the heart of normativity, the bigger the gap between evaluative and deontic concepts, the less it appears plausible to say that evaluative concepts are normative. After having presented the (...) main differences between evaluative and deontic concepts, and shown that there is more than a superficial difference between the two kinds, the paper turns to the question of the normativity of evaluative concepts. It will become clear that, even if these concepts have different functions, there are a great many ties between evaluative concepts, on the one hand, and the concepts of ought and of reason, on the other. (shrink)

The recent trend toward privately owned and operated prisons calls attention to a variety of issues involving human rights. The growing number of corporatized correctional institutions is especially notable in the United States, but it is also a global phenomenon in many countries. The reasons cited for privatizing prisons are usually economic; the opportunity to outsource prison services enables local political leaders to save tax revenue, and local communities are promised a chance to create new jobs and bring in a (...) new industry. This article will address the history of prisons and the recent trend toward privatizing prisons and the perception of prisons as a for-profit enterprise. This new economic order brings with it a set of human rights concerns, including the relationship of for-profit prisons to increased numbers of incarcerated persons and increased sentences, racism and classism. The contractual relationship between political leaders and prison corporations will be addressed, noting that conditions of liability frequently mean that prison administrations lack motivation to safeguard the human rights of prisoners. The human rights issues often extend outside of the private prison itself, having a negative effect on the local community. (shrink)

Democracy is the central political issue of our age, yet debates over its nature and goals rarely engage with feminist concerns. Now that women have the right to vote, they are thought to present no special problems of their own. But despite the seemingly gender-neutral categories of individual or citizen, democratic theory and practice continues to privilege the male. This book reconsiders dominant strands in democratic thinking - focusing on liberal democracy, participatory democracy, and twentieth century versions of civic republicanism (...) - and approaches these from a feminist perspective. Anne Phillips explores the under-representation of women in politics, the crucial relationship between public and private spheres, and the lessons of the contemporary women's movement as an experience in participatory democracy. (shrink)

A wide variety of sources, including the Huntington literature and popular mass media, show that Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” idea actually has very little value in understanding the current global political context. The central assumption of Huntington’s view, that cultural kinship ties influence loyalties and agreements on a global scale, has little to do with the daily lives of American citizens and little to do with the decisions made by the current presidential administration. The mass media evidence from the United (...) States shows that the most important “kinship” ties are not religious or cultural, but economic. The argument involves a deeper analysis of the current trend towards religious programs on American television, a timeline of events relating to the Halliburton – Cheney relationship, and views expressed by members of the United States military in Stars and Stripes. (shrink)

As with all other moral realists, so-called relaxed moral realists believe that there are moral truths. Unlike metaphysical moral realists, they do not take themselves to be defending a substantively metaphysical position when espousing this view, but to be putting forward a moral thesis from within moral discourse. In this paper, I employ minimalism about truth to examine whether or not there is a semantic analysis of the claim ‘There are moral truths’ which can support this moral interpretation of one (...) of moral realism’s key theses. My results are both discouraging and encouraging: Whilst I will argue that the claim ‘There are moral truths’ cannot be shown to be both moral and capable of demarcating relaxed realism from irrealism on the basis of a convincing semantic analysis that would be compatible with relaxed commitments, the moral interpretation of moral realism can be secured by modifying our understanding of what distinguishes relaxed realism from error-theoretic irrealism. Yet, we will see that this moral interpretation of moral realism does not ‘tumble out’ of the semantics provided for its central claims. Rather, hard work needs to be done before we can fully relax. (shrink)

We show how an epistemology informed by cognitive science promises to shed light on an ancient problem in the philosophy of mathematics: the problem of exactness. The problem of exactness arises because geometrical knowledge is thought to concern perfect geometrical forms, whereas the embodiment of such forms in the natural world may be imperfect. There thus arises an apparent mismatch between mathematical concepts and physical reality. We propose that the problem can be solved by emphasizing the ways in which the (...) brain can transform and organize its perceptual intake. It is not necessary for a geometrical form to be perfectly instantiated in order for perception of such a form to be the basis of a geometrical concept. (shrink)

Aesthetic theorists often interpret and understand works of art through the social and political context that creates and inspires the work. The recent economic recessions, and the accompanying austerity measures in many European countries, provide an interesting test case for this contextual understanding. Economists debate whether or not spending on entertainment and arts drops during times of recession and austerity. Some economists assume that spending will decline in times of austerity, but others point to evidence that spending on creative arts (...) and entertainment remains steady and even increases during a recession because of the relief and escapism that the arts provide. Tax incentives and production rights are often given to filmmakers in the United States; in hopes that such projects will enliven a local economy and provide work for a local creative community. In the context of recent austerity measures in Greece and Spain, new and creative ways for members of the arts community to bring about new projects, and fund them in ways that critique political leadership, have emerged. Following Richard Wollheim’s classic aesthetic theory of “criticism as retrieval,” we should be mindful of the cultural values that are at stake in the creativity-culture market now being created. In any case, some scholars estimate that austerity measures in many countries will last until 2020, giving us ample opportunity to be even more “creative” with both financial incentives and artistic achievements. Keywords: Austerity, Cultural Economy, Creative Class, Tax Incentives, Aesthetics, Microtheatres, Entertainment. (shrink)

Jean Hyppolite describes Hegel’s project in the Phenomenology of Spirit as “the development and formulation of natural consciousness and its progression to science, that is to say, to philosophic knowledge, to knowledge of the absolute” (Hyppolite 1974, 4). This development or progression is the “work of consciousness engaged in experience,” as phenomenal knowledge necessarily leads to absolute knowledge. Thus from the very nature of consciousness one is led toward the absolute, which is both substance as well as subject. This paper (...) will argue that Hegel’s account of the development of consciousness and its progression towards knowledge has certain commonalities with feminist philosophy of science. Frequently, feminist theorists cite Hegel specifically in reference to his discussion of the master/slave relationship, or his discussion of ethics, two sections of the Phenomenology of Spirit in which Hegel explicitly attempts to delineate a role or place for women. Many of these sections do have decidedly antifeminist implications, as has been correctly pointed out by many scholars. Especially in the section on Antigone, where Hegel ascribes the private sphere of life in the home to woman and the public sphere of life in the polis to man, Hegel is clearly unconcerned with the subordination of women, prescribing means of resistance, or finding alternatives to promote the removal of women’s oppression.1 Although Hegel’s political and moral theory does not reflect a feminist perspective, in this paper I will argue that Hegel’s theory of knowledge, the progress towards absolute knowledge described above, has much in common with recent feminist epistemology and philosophy of science. A central implication of this conclusion is that feminist theorists would do well to regard Hegel not merely politically, as an example of another “dead white male” philosopher who participated in the oppression of women; but also epistemologically, as a possible ally in the creation of better theories of knowledge that will regard the experience of culturally situated subjects as important sources of knowledge.2 This conclusion will be argued in two ways. First, I will illustrate how Hegel reconceptualizes the relationship between subject and object, and subject and community, and the related notion of objectivity. This type of objectivity will be shown to be a variety of “dialectical objectivity,” following Allan Megill’s delineation of four senses of objectivity. This reading of Hegelian subject-object relations and objectivity will then be compared to Sandra Harding’s concept of “strong objectivity,” a very similar type of dialectical objectivity which stands as an excellent example of current feminist epistemology and standpoint theory. From this similarity, it will be shown that Hegelian and feminist epistemology have much more in common than previously thought. (shrink)

Dog whistling—speech that seems ordinary but sends a hidden, often derogatory message to a subset of the audience—is troubling not just for our political ideals, but also for our theories of communication. On the one hand, it seems possible to dog whistle unintentionally, merely by uttering certain expressions. On the other hand, the intention is typically assumed or even inferred from the act, and perhaps for good reason, for dog whistles seem misleading by design, not just by chance. In this (...) paper, I argue that, to understand when and why it’s possible to dog-whistle unintentionally (and indeed, intentionally), we’ll need to recognize the structure of our linguistic practices. For dog whistles and for covertly coded speech more generally, this structure is a pair of practices, one shared by all competent speakers and the other known only to some, but deployable in the same contexts. In trying to identify these enabling conditions, we’ll discover what existing theories of communicated content overlook by focusing on particular utterances in isolation, or on individual speakers’ mental states. The remedy, I argue, lies in attending to the ways in which what is said is shaped by the temporally extended, socio-politically structured linguistic practices that utterances instantiate. (shrink)

This paper examines three specific issues raised by The Ethical Project. First, I discuss the varieties of altruism and spell out the differences between the definitions proposed by Kitcher and the ways altruism is usually conceived in biology, philosophy, psychology, and economics literature. Second, with the example of Kitcher’s account, I take a critical look at evolutionary stories of the emergence of human ethical practices. Third, I point to the revolutionary implications of the Darwinian methodology when it is thoughtfully applied (...) to ethics. (shrink)

This paper addresses the project of philosophical autobiography, using two different perspectives. On the one hand, the societal, economic, and family contexts of William James are addressed, and connected a modern academic context of business ethics research, marketing and purchasing decision making, and the continuing financial crisis. The concepts of “stream of consciousness” and “acting as-if” are connected to recent literature on William James. On the other hand, the significance of family context, and the possible connection between the William James (...) family and the author, is addressed through shared family narratives interspersed throughout the paper. (shrink)

Despite the widespread use of the notion of moral intuition, its psychological features remain a matter of debate and it is unclear why the capacity to experience moral intuitions evolved in humans. We first survey standard accounts of moral intuition, pointing out their interesting and problematic aspects. Drawing lessons from this analysis, we propose a novel account of moral intuitions which captures their phenomenological, mechanistic, and evolutionary features. Moral intuitions are composed of two elements: an evaluative mental state and a (...) feeling of rightness (FOR). We illustrate the phenomenology of the FOR with examples of non-moral and moral cases, and provide a biological and mechanistic account: the emergence of human reasoning capacities created a need for the co-evolution of a psychological system producing the feeling of rightness (the FORs). This system is triggered when we experience conflicting evaluations. The FORs renders evaluations resulting from rational deliberation less compelling than the evaluations produced by simple evolved systems. It thus facilitates optimal decision-making, preventing excessive interference by rational deliberation. Our account sheds light on why moral intuitions are so frequently experienced and why they are so compelling and resistant to argument. In addition, the account fuels interesting speculations about common metaethical intuitions. (shrink)

Over the last few years, there has been a surge of work in a new field called “moral psychology”, which uses experimental methods to test the psychological processes underlying human moral activity. In this paper, I shall follow this line of approach with the aim of working out a model of how people form value judgements and how they are motivated to act morally. I call this model an “affective picture”: ‘picture’ because it remains strictly at the descriptive level and (...) ‘affective’ because it has an important role for affects and emotions. This affective picture is grounded on a number of plausible and empirically supported hypotheses. The main idea is that we should distinguish between various kinds of value judgements by focusing on the sort of state of mind people find themselves in while uttering a judgement. “Reasoned judgements” are products of rational considerations and are based on preliminary acceptance of norms and values. On the contrary, “basic value judgements” are affective, primitive and non-reflective ways of assessing the world. As we shall see, this analysis has some consequences for the traditional internalism-externalism debate in philosophy; it highlights the fact that motivation is primarily linked to “basic value judgements” and that the judgements we openly defend might not have a particular effect on our actions, unless we are inclined to have an emotional attitude that conforms to them. (shrink)

Much thought has been devoted to how metaethical disagreement between moral realism and expressivism can be saved once minimalism starts creeping. Very little thought has been given to how creeping minimalism affects error-theories’ disagreement with their metaethical competitors. The reason for this omission, I suspect, is found in the belief that whilst locating distinctive moral realist and expressivist positions within a minimalist landscape poses a severe challenge, no such difficulties are encountered when differentiating error-theories from moral realism and expressivism. In (...) the first part of this paper, I show that this belief is mistaken: Insofar as moral realists and error-theorists are still taken to disagree, creeping minimalism renders their disagreement moral, but makes these positions metaethically indistinguishable. In the second part of the paper, I present a modified inferentialist solution to the problem of creeping minimalism which seeks to put error-theories back on the metaethical map. Yet, this too comes at a cost, in that it significantly modifies our interpretation of error-theories. Whichever way we turn, then, creeping minimalism not only forces us to re-phrase metaethical positions in a way that is compatible with minimalism, but also requires us to change our very understanding of these positions. (shrink)

Most of those who hold that emotions involve appraisals also accept that the content of emotions is nonconceptual. The main motivation for nonconceptulism regarding emotions is that it accounts for the difference between emotions and evaluative judgements. This paper argues that if one assumes a broadly Fregean account of concepts, there are good reasons to accept that emotions have nonconceptual contents. All the main arguments for nonconceptualism regarding sensory perception easily transpose to the case of emotions. The paper ends by (...) responding to two important objections: firstly, that nonconceptualism rules out the possibility that emotions justify evaluative judgements and secondly, that nonconceptualism cannot account for the fact that some emotions have conceptually articulated cognitive bases. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper I defend a form of epistocracy I call limited epistocracy – rule by institutions housing expertise in non-political areas that become politically relevant. This kind of limited epistocracy, I argue, isn't a far-off fiction. With increasing frequency, governments are outsourcing political power to expert institutions to solve urgent, multidimensional problems because they outperform ordinary democratic decision-making. I consider the objection that limited epistocracy, while more effective than its competitors, lacks a fundamental intrinsic value that its competitors have; (...) namely, political inclusion. After explaining this challenge, I suggest that limited epistocracies can be made compatible with robust political inclusion if specialized institutions are confined to issuing directives that give citizens multiple actionable options. I explain how this safeguards citizens’ inclusion through rational deliberation, choice, and contestation. (shrink)

This article revisits, analyzes and critiques Bruce Chatwin’s 1987 bestseller, The Songlines,1 more than three decades after its publication. In Songlines, the book primarily responsible for his posthumous celebrity, Chatwin set out to explore the essence of Central and Western Desert Aboriginal Australians’ philosophical beliefs. For many readers globally, Songlines is regarded as a—if not the—definitive entry into the epistemological basis, religion, cosmology and lifeways of classical Western and Central Desert Aboriginal people. It is argued that Chatwin’s fuzzy, ill-defined use (...) of the word-concept “songlines”2 has had the effect of generating more heat than light. Chatwin’s failure to recognize the economic imperative underpinning Australian desert people’s walking praxis is problematic: his own treks through foreign lands were underpropped by socioeconomic privilege. Chatwin’s ethnocentric idée fixe regarding the primacy of “walking” and “nomadism,” central to his Songlines thématique, well and truly preceded his visits to Central Australia. Walking, proclaimed Chatwin, is an elemental part of “Man’s” innate nature. It is argued that this unwavering, preconceived, essentialist belief was a self-serving construal justifying Chatwin’s own “nomadic” adventures of identity. Is it thus reasonable to regard Chatwin as a “rogue author,” an unreliable narrator? And if so, does this matter? Of greatest concern is the book’s continuing majority acceptance as a measured, accurate account of Aboriginal belief systems. With respect to Aboriginal desert people and the barely disguised individuals depicted in Songlines, is Chatwin’s book a “rogue text,” constituting an act of epistemic violence, consistent with Spivak’s usage of that term? (shrink)

As common experience confirms, procrastination seems not only possible, but widespread. However, procrastination should not be taken for granted. Often, the procrastinator harms herself knowingly. It thus clearly seems that such a person lacks the self-concern that usually characterises us. After having spelled out what procrastination is, and having explored its main varieties, I consider the relation between procrastination and risk-taking. After this, I discuss the implications of this phenomenon for the debates about personal identity. The upshot, I argue, is (...) that reductionist accounts, according to which identity is a matter of psychological continuity, are in a better position as might have been thought. (shrink)