Abstract: We examine how trustworthy behaviour can be achieved in the financial sector. The task is to ensure that firms are motivated to pursue long-term interests of customers rather than pursuing short-term profits. Firms’ self-interested pursuit of reputation, combined with regulation, is often not sufficient to ensure that this happens. We argue that trustworthy behaviour requires that at least some actors show a concern for the wellbeing of clients, or a respect for imposed standards, and that the behaviour of these (...) actors is copied in such a way that it becomes a behavioural norm. We briefly suggest what such behavioural norms might need to be if trustworthy behaviour is to be achieved, and consider how they might be supported; we describe the research that is necessary in order to understand these norms in more detail. We argue that the norms of traders are different from the norms of those engaged in other activities, since they are inevitably self-interested, and we consider the risk that traders’ norms might undermine those of other actors. We analyse the task for governance in dealing with this problem, and the role which leadership by a corporate board and management might play in doing this. We describe the need for further research in to describe how this might be done. (shrink)

Przedmowa Problematyka związana z zależnościami przyczynowymi, ich modelowaniem i odkrywa¬niem, po długiej nieobecności w filozofii i metodologii nauk, budzi współcześnie duże zainteresowanie. Wiąże się to przede wszystkim z dynamicznym rozwojem, zwłaszcza od lat 1990., technik obli¬czeniowych. Wypracowane w tym czasie sieci bayesowskie uznaje się za matematyczny język przyczynowości. Pozwalają one na daleko idącą auto¬matyzację wnioskowań, co jest także zachętą do podjęcia prób algorytmiza¬cji odkrywania przyczyn. Na potrzeby badań naukowych, które pozwalają na przeprowadzenie eksperymentu z randomizacją, standardowe metody ustalania zależności przyczynowych (...) opracowano na początku XX wieku. Zupełnie inaczej sprawa przedstawia się w przypadku badań nieeksperymentalnych, gdzie podobne rozwiązania pozostają kwestią przyszłości. Zadaniem tej książki jest podanie warunków, które powinny być spełnione przez te rozwiązania, oraz sformułowanie proceduralnego kryterium zależności przy¬czynowych jako szczegółowej realizacji tych warunków. Pociąga ono waż¬kie konsekwencje dla filozofii i metodologii nauk, które ujawnia – podany w Części II – zarys me-todolo¬gii proceduralnej. W literaturze przedmiotu brakuje w miarę wszechstronnego i systema¬tycznego omówie¬nia najnowszych filozoficznych i metodologicznych dys¬kusji na temat przy¬czynowości, co niech będzie wytłumaczeniem, dlaczego w niektórych punktach obecnej książki szczegółowo referuję trudno dos¬tępne teksty źró¬dłowe. Przymiotnik „proceduralny” używam tu w znaczeniu węższym niż Huw Price (w którego pracach właściwszy byłby termin „kryterialny”) dla podkre¬ślenia – zgodnie z łacińskim źródłosłowem procedo – że dla ustalenia przy¬czyny niezbędne jest podjęcie przez uczonych określonych interakcji z ba¬daną rzeczywistością. Zalążki zamysłu prezentowanego w tej książce przedstawiłem podczas warsztatów filozoficznych „Philosophy and Probability” w roku 2002, zor¬ganizowanych przez Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu w Konstancji. Wdzięczny jestem uczestnikom tych warsztatów za uwagi, a przede wszyst¬kim następującym osobom: Luc Bovens, Brandon Fitelson, Alan Hájek, Stephan Hartmann oraz Jon Williamson. Podczas międzynarodowej konferencji „Analytical Pragmatism”, zorgani¬zowanej w Lublinie w roku 2003 przez Wydział Filo¬zofii Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, odniosłem swoją koncepcję do prac Nancy Cartwright. Szczególnie inspirujący okazał się komentarz Huw Price’a do mojego referatu i przeprowadzona z nim dysku¬sja. Ujęcie koncepcji metodologii proceduralnej na szerszym tle współ-czes¬nego nurtu empirystycznego w filozofii nauki przedstawiłem w roku 2004 podczas konferencji „5th Quadrennial Fellows Conference”, zorgani¬zowanej przez Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego oraz Centrum Filozofii Nauki w Pittsburghu. Szczególnie pomocne w dalszych moich pra¬cach były uwagi Jamesa Bogena, Janet Kourany, Jamesa Lennoxa, Johna Nortona, Thomasa Bonka, Jana Woleńskiego i Johna Worralla, za które wyra¬żam swoją wdzięczność. Korpus książki powstał podczas mojego stażu w Centrum Filozofii Nauki w Pittsburghu, który odbyłem jako stypendysta Fundacji na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej w roku akademickim 2004-2005. Uczestniczyłem w tym czasie w życiu naukowym Centrum i w pracach badawczych zespołu z Instytutu Filozofii Uniwersytetu Carnegie-Mellon w Pittsburghu kierowanego przez Clarka Glymoura. Na jego ręce składam podziękowanie za wiele po¬mocnych uwag do moich wy¬stąpień oraz tekstów i za dyskusje przede wszystkim z nim samym i z jego najbliższymi współpracownikami: Peterem Spirtesem oraz Richardem Scheinesem, a także pozostałymi członkami tego zes¬połu, doktorantami i uczestnikami seminarium badawczego „Causality in the Social Sciences”. Za wieloletnie wsparcie, wielopłaszczyznowe inspiracje towarzyszące pi¬saniu tej książki, a także liczne pomocne uwagi do jej wcześniejszych wersji dziękuję przede wszystkim Księdzu Profesorowi Andrzejowi Bronkowi oraz Księdzu Profesorowi Józefowi Herbutowi, współprowadzącemu seminarium doktorskie w Katedrze Metodologii Nauk Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubel¬skiego im. Jana Pawła II, jak również pozostałym uczestnikom tego semina¬rium. Dziękuję mojej Żonie, dr Annie Kawalec za wiele wysiłku włożonego w ulepszenie redakcji – językowej i merytorycznej – obecnej książki. Książkę tę można czytać na kilka sposobów. Czytelnikom zainteresowa¬nym przede wszystkim prowadzeniem badań empirycznych polecałbym rozpoczęcie od Rozdziału 2. i kontynuację pozostałych rozdziałów Części I, a następnie Dodatków. Czytelnikom zainteresowanym problemami filozo¬fii i metodologii nauk polecałbym rozpoczęcie lektury książki od Części II i uzupełniającą lekturę Rozdziału 2., a następnie Wprowadzenia i Zakończenia. Czytelnikom mniej zainteresowanym zagadnieniami teoretycznymi pole¬całbym zapoznanie się z fascynującymi dziejami odkrycia przyczyn cholery przez Johna Snowa, które rekonstruuję w Rozdziale 1. W dalszej części nato¬miast polecałbym przejście do Wprowadzenia i Zakończenia, które w mniej specjalistyczny sposób przybliżają proponowane tu rozstrzygnięcia. Tekst książki nie był dotąd publikowany. Wyjątkiem są pewne fragmenty Rozdziału 8. oraz 9., które w zmienionej postaci ukazały się w Rocznikach Filozoficznych (Kawalec 2004). -/- Lublin, luty 2006 r. (shrink)

This paper explains and defends the idea that metaphysical necessity is the strongest kind of objective necessity. Plausible closure conditions on the family of objective modalities are shown to entail that the logic of metaphysical necessity is S5. Evidence is provided that some objective modalities are studied in the natural sciences. In particular, the modal assumptions implicit in physical applications of dynamical systems theory are made explicit by using such systems to define models of a modal temporal logic. Those assumptions (...) arguably include some necessitist principles. -/- Too often, philosophers have discussed ‘metaphysical’ modality — possibility, contingency, necessity — in isolation. Yet metaphysical modality is just a special case of a broad range of modalities, which we may call ‘objective’ by contrast with epistemic and doxastic modalities, and indeed deontic and teleological ones (compare the distinction between objective probabilities and epistemic or subjective probabilities). Thus metaphysical possibility, physical possibility and immediate practical possibility are all types of objective possibility. We should study the metaphysics and epistemology of metaphysical modality as part of a broader study of the metaphysics and epistemology of the objective modalities, on pain of radical misunderstanding. Since objective modalities are in general open to, and receive, natural scientific investigation, we should not treat the metaphysics and epistemology of metaphysical modality in isolation from the metaphysics and epistemology of the natural sciences. -/- In what follows, Section 1 gives a preliminary sketch of metaphysical modality and its place in the general category of objective modality. Section 2 reviews some familiar forms of scepticism about metaphysical modality in that light. Later sections explore a few of the many ways in which natural science deals with questions of objective modality, including questions of quantified modal logic. (shrink)

Arguments for what consent is often appeal to its functions. For instance, some argue that because consent functions to express the consent-giver’s autonomous control over her normative boundaries, consent must consist in a mental state. In this paper, I argue that consent has an often-overlooked function and that its having this function has consequences for our views of what consent is. I argue that consent has a relationship-shaping function: acts of consent can alter and enable personal relationships. This function grounds (...) an argument for the following claim: some acts of consent cannot be morally transformative unless there is uptake, or acceptance, or cooperation, on the recipient’s part. At least some acts of consent need to be “cosigned” by both parties. This rules out what I call “unilateral” conceptions of consent, according to which consent can always be given by the giver alone and nobody else needs to enter the picture. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss how Causal Decision Theory should be modified to handle a class of problematic cases involving deterministic laws. Causal Decision Theory, as it stands, is problematically biased against your endorsing deterministic propositions (for example it tells you to deny Newtonian physics, regardless of how confident you are of its truth). Our response is that this is not a problem for Causal Decision Theory per se, but arises because of the standard method for assessing the truth of (...) certain counterfactuals. The truth of deterministic laws is `modally fragile' on the standard semantics for counterfactuals: if determinism is true and you were to do otherwise, the laws would be different. We provide two ways of avoiding this problem: 1) supplement the standard semantics for counterfactuals with impossible worlds, or 2) introduce rigid designators into the description of problematic decision situations. We argue that both of these approaches are well-motivated and can be readily incorporated into Lewisian Causal Decision Theory. (shrink)

The paper aims to explain how Paul Ricœur’s phenomenological and hermeneutic approach offers an original theory of the self as self-attestation. Considering useful an approach that combines the psychological uses of the notion of self with a reflection on one’s capacity to design himself/herself as a person, the paper offers a thorough analysis of Ricœur’s work Soi-même comme un autre / Oneself as Another. The main purpose of this analysis is to highlight that, drawing a clear distinction between two forms (...) of identity (la mêmeté/sameness and l’ipséité/selfhood) and proposing a dialectic between the self and the other, Ricœur grounds his theory on a notion of self which includes one’s acceptance of the other. (shrink)

In this chapter we introduce concepts for analyzing proofs, and for analyzing undergraduate and beginning graduate mathematics students’ proving abilities. We discuss how coordination of these two analyses can be used to improve students’ ability to construct proofs. -/- For this purpose, we need a richer framework for keeping track of students’ progress than the everyday one used by mathematicians. We need to know more than that a particular student can, or cannot, prove theorems by induction or contradiction or can, (...) or cannot, prove certain theorems in beginning set theory or analysis. It is more useful to describe a student’s work in terms of a finer-grained framework that includes various smaller abilities that contribute to proving and that can be learned in differing ways and at differing periods of a student’s development. (shrink)

Evidential Pluralism maintains that in order to establish a causal claim one normally needs to establish the existence of an appropriate conditional correlation and the existence of an appropriate mechanism complex, so when assessing a causal claim one ought to consider both association studies and mechanistic studies. Hitherto, Evidential Pluralism has been applied to medicine, leading to the EBM+ programme, which recommends that evidence-based medicine should systematically evaluate mechanistic studies alongside clinical studies. This paper argues that Evidential Pluralism can also (...) be fruitfully applied to the social sciences. In particular, Evidential Pluralism provides (i) a new approach to evidence-based policy; (ii) an account of the evidential relationships in more theoretical research; and (iii) new philosophical motivation for mixed methods research. The application of Evidential Pluralism to the social sciences is also defended against two objections. (shrink)

We report on an exploratory study of the way eight mid-level undergraduate mathematics majors read and reflected on four student-generated arguments purported to be proofs of a single theorem. The results suggest that mid-level undergraduates tend to focus on surface features of such arguments and that their ability to determine whether arguments are proofs is very limited -- perhaps more so than either they or their instructors recognize. We begin by discussing arguments (purported proofs) regarded as texts and validations of (...) those arguments, i.e., reflections of individuals checking whether such arguments really are proofs of theorems. We relate the way the mathematics research community views proofs and their validations to ideas from reading comprehension and literary theory. We then give a detailed analysis of the four student-generated arguments and finally analyze the eight students' validations of them. (shrink)

This study focuses on undergraduate students' ability to unpack informally written mathematical statements into the language of predicate calculus. Data were collected between 1989 and 1993 from 61students in six small sections of a “bridge" course designed to introduce proofs and mathematical reasoning. We discuss this data from a perspective that extends the notion of concept image to that of statement image and introduces the notion of proof framework to indicate the top-level logical structure of a proof. For simplified informal (...) calculus statements, just 8.5% of unpacking attempts were successful; for actual statements from calculus texts, this dropped to 5%. We infer that these students would be unable to reliably relate informally stated theorems with the top-level logical structure of their proofs and hence could not be expected to construct proofs or evaluate their validity. (shrink)

Rational agents face choices, even when taking seriously the possibility of determinism. Rational agents also follow the advice of Causal Decision Theory (CDT). Although many take these claims to be well-motivated, there is growing pressure to reject one of them, as CDT seems to go badly wrong in some deterministic cases. We argue that deterministic cases do not undermine a counterfactual model of rational deliberation, which is characteristic of CDT. Rather, they force us to distinguish between counterfactuals that are relevant (...) and ones that are irrelevant for the purposes of deliberation. We incorporate this distinction into decision theory to develop ‘Selective Causal Decision Theory’, which delivers the correct recommendations in deterministic cases while respecting the key motivations behind CDT. (shrink)

Being social creatures in a complex world, we do things together. We act jointly. While cooperation, in its broadest sense, can involve merely getting out of each other’s way, or refusing to deceive other people, it is also essential to human nature that it involves more active forms of collaboration and coordination (Tomasello 2009; Sterelny 2012). We collaborate with others in many ordinary activities which, though at times similar to those of other animals, take unique and diverse cultural and psychological (...) forms in human beings. But we also work closely and interactively with each other in more peculiar and flexible practices which are in distinctive ways both species-specific and culturally and historically contingent: from team sports to shared labour, from committee work to mass demonstrations, from dancing to reminiscing together about old times. (shrink)

Social scientists often draw on a variety of evidence for their causal inferences. There is also a call to use a greater variety of evidence in social science research. This topical collection examines the philosophical foundations and implications of evidential diversity in the social sciences. It assesses the application of Evidential Pluralism in the context of the social sciences, especially its application to economics and political science. It also discusses the concept of causation in cognitive science and the implications of (...) evidential diversity for the social sciences. (shrink)

In this largely theoretical article, we discuss the relation between a kind of affect, behavioural schemas and aspects of the proving process. We begin with affect as described in the mathematics education literature, but soon narrow our focus to a particular kind of affect – nonemotional cognitive feelings. We then mention the position of feelings in consciousness because that bears on the kind of data about feelings that students can be expected to be able to report. Next we introduce the (...) idea of behavioural schemas as enduring mental structures that link situations to actions, in other words, habits of mind, that appear to drive many mental actions in the proving process. This leads to a discussion of the way feelings can both help cause mental actions and also arise from them. Then we briefly describe a design experiment – a course intended to help advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate mathematics students improve their proving abilities. Finally, drawing on data from the course, along with several interviews, we illustrate how these perspectives on affect and on behavioural schemas appear to explain, and are consistent with, our students’ actions. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson and Sebastian Sunday-Grève discuss the question of where philosophy starts, and the idea of philosophy as a non-natural science.

Experiences of embodied remembering are familiar and diverse. We settle bodily into familiar chairs or find our way easily round familiar rooms. We inhabit our own kitchens or cars or workspaces effectively and comfortably, and feel disrupted when our habitual and accustomed objects or technologies change or break or are not available. Hearing a particular song can viscerally bring back either one conversation long ago, or just the urge to dance. Some people explicitly use their bodies to record, store, or (...) cue memories. Others can move skilfully, without stopping to think, in complex and changing environments thanks to the cumulative expertise accrued in their history of fighting fires, or dancing, or playing hockey. The forms of memory involved in these cases may be distinct, operating at different timescales and levels, and by way of different mechanisms and media, but they often cooperate in the many contexts of our practices of remembering. (shrink)

Sebastian Sunday-Grève and Timothy Williamson discuss the question of where philosophy starts and the idea of philosophy as a non-natural science.

Sebastian Sunday-Grève and Timothy Williamson discuss the relationship between curiosity and common sense.

This article presents the results of research conducted with secondary school teachers in Quebec, specifically in the Mauricie region. The authors propose a reflection on the construction of professional identity in a context of institutional crisis. They argue that in this context, the teacher can not rely on stable and social frameworks to build up a strong professional identity and that work experience that becomes the primordial material from which that identity is developed. Therefore, the teacher has to build its (...) identity from a set of rational narrative experience of professional practice.contrastée des attentes et des représentations d'étudiants en formation initiale à l'enseignement secondaire en fonction de leur engagement ou non dans un établissement scolaire Cet article présente les résultats d’une recherche menée auprès d’enseignants du niveau secondaire au Québec, plus spécifiquement dans la région de la Mauricie. Les auteurs proposent une réflexion sur la construction de l’identité professionnelle dans un contexte de crise des institutions. Ils soutiennent que dans ce contexte l’enseignant ne peut compter sur des cadres sociaux stables et solides pour se constituer une identité professionnelle et que c’est l’expérience au travail qui devient le matériau primordial à partir duquel s’élabore cette identité. Par conséquent, l’enseignant a à construire son identité à partir d’une mise en récit rationnelle de son expérience de la pratique professionnelle. (shrink)

Nicole Hassoun and Uriah Kriegel defend the position that infanticide is morally permissible because an infant a few days old does not have a self-concept and thus is not a person. I argue their position is flawed and cannot principally rule out the possible permissibility of slavery.

We investigate the firms’ specific attributes that determine the difference in speed of adjustment (SOA) towards the cash holdings target in the Scandinavian countries: Denmark, Norway and Sweden. We examine whether Scandinavian firms maintain an optimal level of cash holdings and determine if the active cash holdings management is associated with the firms’ higher SOA and lower adjustment costs. Our findings substantiate that a higher level of off-target cost induces professional managers to rebalance their cash level towards the optimal balance (...) of cash holdings. Our results reveal that Scandinavian firms accelerate SOA towards cash targets primarily for the precautionary motive. Moreover, our results show that SOA is heterogeneous across Scandinavian firms based on adjustment cost and deviate cash holdings towards the target mainly with the support of internal financing. Furthermore, our empirical findings show that the SOA of Norwegian firms is significantly higher than the Danish and Swedish firms. (shrink)

John Rawls is arguably the most important political philosopher of the past century. His theory of justice has set the agenda for debate in mainstream political philosophy for the past forty years, and has had an important influence in economics, law, sociology, and other disciplines. However, despite the importance and popularity of Rawls's work, there is no clear picture of what a society that met Rawls's principles of justice would actually look like. This article sets out to explore that question.

L'évaluation des écosystèmes est l'un des pivots essentiels pour l'élaboration de moyens adap- tés permettant de lutter contre la diminution massive de la biodiversité. Pour la première fois, elle a fait l'objet d'une analyse à l'échelle mondiale dans le cadre de l'Evaluation des écosys- tèmes en début de millénaire (EM). Le rassemblement de plus d’un millier de chercheurs et de plusieurs organismes internationaux durant quatre années ont permis de dessiner la carte nécessaire à toute action efficace. L'article expose les éléments (...) principaux de l'EM : l'évaluation des écosystèmes en tant que tels, mais surtout des services écosystémiques, dans toutes leurs dimensions, en ce que leur évolution affecte le bien-être humain. Il analyse ensuite les quatre points principaux de l'apport de l'EM, des avantages de l'utilisation croissante des services éco- logiques à sa non viabilité. Des scénarios, modèles et outils sont proposés pour inverser la courbe négative d'appauvrissement de la biodiversité et des services écosystémiques dans un premier bilan des retombées de l'EM. (shrink)

The epistemic theory of causality views causality as a tool that helps us to predict, explain and control our world, rather than as a relation that exists independently of our epistemic practices. In this chapter, we first provide an introduction to the epistemic theory of causality. We then outline four considerations that motivate the epistemic theory: the failure of standard theories of causality; parsimony; the epistemology of causality; and neutrality. We illustrate these four considerations in the contexts of the social (...) sciences and the cognitive sciences. We argue that the epistemic theory provides a very natural account of causality across these contexts. (shrink)

The success of the mission of the school based largely on teachers, it is important to understand exactly how they see their role in the actualization of this mission. So this article initiates a reflection on how secondary school teachers in Quebec think their educational mission. More specifically, we analyze how the educational mission takes shape in their professional practice. La réussite de la mission de l’école reposant en grande partie sur les enseignants, il importe de cerner avec précision comment (...) ces derniers conçoivent leur rôle dans l’actualisation de cette mission. Ainsi cet article amorce une réflexion sur la manière dont les enseignants du secondaire au Québec, pensent leur mission éducative. Plus particulièrement, nous analysons ici comment cette mission éducative prend forme dans leur pratique professionnelle. (shrink)

In this study we examine how different organizations communicate their commitments to sustainability and corporate social responsibility on their websites, and the different ways stakeholders could interpret this communication. We do this by examining several case studies and reflecting on those cases with the help of a theoretical framework. Our main findings are that there is a growing concern amongst stakeholders regarding environmental values and that unsubstantiated sustainability claims issued in corporate publicity can be interpreted as greenwashing. We identify a (...) conflict between goals of growth versus environmental sustainability in some of the cases. We also discover that organizations appear to be more transparent with their intentions by communicating their environmental values based on firm-serving motives rather than public-serving ones. (shrink)

In this paper we will examine the influence digital media has had on political dialogue in the public sphere. We will explore the phenomenon through an example case, namely the global feminist #MeToo movement which started in 2017. Within the framework of the #MeToo Movement, we introduce and examine the challenges digital media poses to the political dialogue in the public sphere. We start by going through concepts and theories utilized in this research paper. Then we will discuss the relationship (...) between digital media and #MeToo, after which we will assess the negative and positive outcomes of the #MeToo movement. Finally, an overall assessment concerning the movement and phenomenon around it is given. Our main argument is that while making the public sphere more inclusive, digital media has also made public debate and political discussion more polarized and antagonistic. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson has fruitfully exploited formal resources to shed considerable light on the nature of knowledge. In the paper under examination, Williamson turns his attention to Gettier cases, showing how they can be motivated formally. At the same time, he disparages the kind of justification he thinks gives rise to these cases. He favors instead his own notion of justification for which Gettier cases cannot arise. We take issue both with his disparagement of the kind of justification that (...) figures in Gettier cases and the specifics of the formal motivation. (shrink)

A counterpossible conditional is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Common sense delivers the view that some such conditionals are true, and some are false. In recent publications, Timothy Williamson has defended the view that all are true. In this paper we defend the common sense view against Williamson’s objections.

Timothy Williamson has defended the claim that the semantics of the indicative ‘if’ is given by the material conditional. Putative counterexamples can be handled by better understanding the role played in our assessment of indicatives by a fallible cognitive heuristic, called the Suppositional Procedure. Williamson’s Suppositional Conjecture has it that the Suppositional Procedure is humans’ primary way of prospectively assessing conditionals. This paper raises some doubts on the Suppositional Procedure and Conjecture.

Williamson has a strikingly economical way of showing how justified true belief can fail to constitute knowledge: he models a class of Gettier cases by means of two simple constraints. His constraints can be shown to rely on some unstated assumptions about the relationship between reality and appearance. These assumptions are epistemologically non-trivial but can be defended as plausible idealizations of our actual predicament, in part because they align well with empirical work on the metacognitive dimension of experience.

This special issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy is dedicated to Timothy Williamson's work on modality. It consists of a new paper by Williamson followed by papers on Williamson's work on modality, with each followed by a reply by Williamson. -/- Contributors: Andrew Bacon, Kit Fine, Peter Fritz, Jeremy Goodman, John Hawthorne, Øystein Linnebo, Ted Sider, Robert Stalnaker, Meghan Sullivan, Gabriel Uzquiano, Barbara Vetter, Timothy Williamson, Juhani Yli-Vakkuri.

I attempt to meet some criticisms that Williamson makes of my attempt to carry out Prior's project of reducing possibility discourse to actualist discourse.

In this paper I examine Williamson’s (2000) claim that all evidence is propositional. I propose to reject this claim. I give two objections to two premises of Williamson’s argument. The first is a critique of Williamson’s claim that we choose between hypotheses on the basis of our evidence. The second objection is that Williamson’s claim that evidence is an explanandum of an hypothesis leads to counter-intuitive consequences and thus is not central to what evidence is, at (...) least on an ordinary understanding. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits has been highly influential since the beginning of this century. It can be read as a systematic response to scepticism. One of the most important notions in this response is the notion of «evidence,» which will be the focus of the present paper. I attempt to show primarily two things. First, the notion of evidence invoked by Williamson does not address the sceptical worry: he stipulates an objective notion of evidence, but this (...) begs the question against his opponent. Second, his related thesis «Evidence equals Knowledge» does not sit well with his own content externalism: he promises to relate epistemology to philosophy of mind, but he fails to live up to this commitment in his crucial chapter on scepticism. Other minor problems concerning evidence will also be discussed in due course. (shrink)

In May 1999, David Lewis sent Timothy Williamson an intriguing letter about knowledge and vagueness. This paper has a brief discussion of Lewis on evidence, and a longer discussion of a distinctive theory of vagueness Lewis puts forward in this letter, one rather different from standard forms of supervaluationism. Lewis's theory enables him to provide distinctive responses to the challenges to supervaluationism famously offered in chapter 5 of Timothy Williamson's 1994 book Vagueness. However these responses bring out a (...) number of very surprising features of Lewis's own view. -/- The letter from Lewis itself is available on the blog of The Age of Metaphysical Revolution Project, University of Manchester. (shrink)

According to many philosophers, psychological explanation canlegitimately be given in terms of belief and desire, but not in termsof knowledge. To explain why someone does what they do (so the common wisdom holds) you can appeal to what they think or what they want, but not what they know. Timothy Williamson has recently argued against this view. Knowledge, Williamson insists, plays an essential role in ordinary psychological explanation.Williamson's argument works on two fronts.First, he argues against the claim (...) that, unlike knowledge, belief is``composite'' (representable as a conjunction of a narrow and a broadcondition). Belief's failure to be composite, Williamson thinks, undermines the usual motivations for psychological explanation in terms of belief rather than knowledge.Unfortunately, we claim, the motivations Williamson argues against donot depend on the claim that belief is composite, so what he saysleaves the case for a psychology of belief unscathed.Second, Williamson argues that knowledge can sometimes provide abetter explanation of action than belief can.We argue that, in the cases considered, explanations that cite beliefs(but not knowledge) are no less successful than explanations that citeknowledge. Thus, we conclude that Williamson's arguments fail both coming andgoing: they fail to undermine a psychology of belief, and they fail tomotivate a psychology of knowledge. (shrink)

I draw attention to how Annie Saumont’s “You Should Have Changed at Dol” provides a solution to the paradox. With appropriate background knowledge, Saumont’s story, despite its modern form, displays various convergences with Descartes’ meditations; likewise the Bisa dance may feature convergences with traditional dance.

If Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology (1922) serves as a sort of ‘ground zero’ of political theological questions, at least in the disciplinary framework of political and legal theory, today’s debate has managed to look beyond Schmitt’s analysis of political authority, public law and the prerogatives of sovereign power. Schmitt’s genealogical and analogical methods have thus been redeployed to trace not only the modern concept of power back to Christian theology between the second and the fifth centuries, but to expose a (...) systemic relation between the Trinitarian idea of ‘oikonomia’ and modern forms of biopolitical governance. This chapter contributes to contemporary reflections on economic theology. Drawing on Schmitt’s early attempts to elaborate a concept of ‘neutralization’, it makes the case for a theological-based analysis of ‘neoliberalization’ after the Great Crash of 2008. (shrink)