This chapter argues that Gilbert Ryle’s account of misleading expressions, which is rightly considered a milestone in the history of analytic philosophy, is continuous with Brentano’s. Not only did they identify roughly the same classes of misleading expressions, but their analyses are driven by a form of ontological parsimony which sharply contrasts with rival views in the Brentano School, like those of Meinong and Husserl. Section 1 suggests that Ryle and Brentano share a similar notion of analysis. Section 2 spells (...) out the notion of misleading expression by means of the surface-grammar/truth-conditions distinction, which I argue is implicit in their accounts. Section 3 zooms in on a specific class of misleading expressions, namely expressions about ficta. Finally, Section 4 draws the consequences of what precedes for a correct understanding of the notion of meaning. (shrink)

This chapter offers a phenomenological interpretation of Brentano’s view of mentality. The key idea is that mental phenomena are not only characterized by intentionality; they also exhibit a distinctive way of appearing or being experienced. In short, they also have a distinctive phenomenology. I argue this view may be traced back to Brentano’s theory of inner perception. Challenging the self-representational reading of IP, I maintain the latter is best understood as a way of appearing, that is, in phenomenological terms. Section (...) 1 addresses Brentano’s claim that IP is one mark of the mental alongside intentionality. Sections 2 and 3 present support for a phenomenological interpretation of IP. And Section 4 briefly discusses two objections. (shrink)

This article argues that Brentano’s classification of mental phenomena is best understood against the background of the theories of natural classification held by Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill. Section 1 offers a reconstruction of Brentano’s two-premise argument for his tripartite classification. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the reception and historical background of the classification project. Section 3 addresses the question as to why a classification of mental phenomena is needed at all and traces the answer back to (...) Mill’s view that psychological laws are class-specific. Section 4 and 5 connect the second premise of Brentano’s argument to Comte’s principle of comparative likeness and Mill’s insistance that class membership is determined by the possession of common characteristics. And section 6 briefly discusses the evidence Brentano provides for the first premise. (shrink)

In this article I want to create a presumption in favor of a nonreductive analysis of emotional phenomenology. The presumption relies on the claim that none of the nonemotional elements which are usually regarded as constitutive of emotional phenomenology may reasonably be considered responsible for the evaluative character of the latter. In section 1 I suggest this is true of cognitive elements, arguing that so-called ‘evaluative’ judgments usually result from emotional, evaluative attitudes, and should not be conflated with them. In (...) section 2 I argue the same holds true for conative attitudes. And in section 3 I briefly mention some salient aspects of the version of nonreductive analysis I lean toward. (shrink)

Call metaphysical optimism the view that this world is the best of all possible worlds. This article addresses Franz Brentano’s case for metaphysical optimism. I argue that, although Brentano does not offer any conclusive argument in favour of the latter, he disentangles many related issues which are interesting in their own right. The article has five sections corresponding to five claims, which I argue are central to Brentano’s view, namely: metaphysical optimism is best spelled out as the view that this (...) world is the only good among all possible worlds; the notion of “correct”—or “fitting”—love offers a criterion of the good and the test of inverted love offers a means to identify that which is good; pessimism has to be distinguished from pejorism, viz. the view that the non-existence of this world is preferable to its existence; there is something good involved in every “bad” thing, to the effect that pejorism is false; it is wrong to consider the value of something in isolation. (shrink)

According to the transparency thesis, some conscious states are transparent or “diaphanous”. This thesis is often believed to be incompatible with an inner‐awareness account of phenomenal consciousness. In this article, I reject this incompatibility. Instead, I defend a compatibilist approach to transparency. To date, most attempts to do so require a rejection of strong transparency in favor of weak transparency. In this view, transparent states can be attended to by attending (in the right way) to the presented world: that is, (...) they are merely translucent. Here, I first argue that this understanding of transparency is too weak to qualify as a compatibilist view. Drawing on insights from Franz Brentano, I then describe a middle road between strong and weak transparency. The crucial idea is that, although transparent states cannot be attended to, they can be noticed (under suitable conditions). This view, I submit, allows supporters of inner awareness to commit themselves to a more interesting understanding of transparency—moderate transparency—that preserves the initial intuition underlying the transparency metaphor. (shrink)

Franz Brentano’s works are not just full of deep and innovative insights into mind, world and values. His views also turned out to be highly influential upon several generations of students, who made them the basis of their own philosophical investigations, giving rise to what is known as the Brentano School (Albertazzi et al. 1996; Fisette & Fréchette 2007). In this chapter, I give a bird’s eye view of the Brentano School from a rather historical perspective. My leading hypothesis is (...) that one crucial factor explaining the rise of the school is Brentano’s unique strategy, within the academic context of the time, to promote the revival of philosophy as a rigorous science. After a brief introduction, I reconstruct the three main phases in the school’s development, namely Brentano’s teaching in Würzburg (1866-73), his teaching in Vienna (1874-95), and Anton Marty’s teaching in Prague (1880-1913). (shrink)

This article compares and contrasts the reception of Comte’s positivism in the works of William Whewell, John Stuart Mill and Franz Brentano. It is argued that Whewell’s rejection of positivism derives from his endorsement of a constructivist account of the inductive sciences, while Mill and Brentano’s sympathies for positivism are connected to their endorsement of an empiricist account. The mandate of the article is to spell out the chief differences between these two rival accounts. In the last, conclusive section, Whewell’s (...) anti-positivist argument is briefly assessed, and rebutted. (shrink)

This article argues that Meinong’s analysis of assumption, while exploring the variety of phenomenological primitives in a more promising way than Brentano did, nevertheless fails to adequately account for the noncommittal character of assumptive attitudes and the difference between assumptive and other neighbouring attitudes. Section 1 outlines an overall framework for the philosophical analysis of assumptions and cognitive attitudes. Section 2 gives an overview of Brentano’s analysis of cognitive attitudes and some difficulties thereof. Section 3 offers a critical examination of (...) Meinong’s rival analysis. Eventually, Section 4 suggests an alternative route, according to which assumptive attitudes are best analysed in taking as a phenomenological primitive besides. (shrink)

In this paper, we apply the perspective of intra-organismal ecology by investigating a family of ecological models suitable to describe a gene therapy to a particular metabolic disorder, the adenosine deaminase deficiency (ADA-SCID). The gene therapy is modeled as the prospective ecological invasion of an organ (here, bone marrow) by genetically modified stem cells, which then operate niche construction in the cellular environment by releasing an enzyme they synthesize. We show that depending on the chosen order (a choice that cannot (...) be made on \textit{a priori} assumptions), different kinds of dynamics are expected, possibly leading to different therapeutic strategies. This drives us to discuss several features of the extension of ecology to intra-organismal ecology. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss the perspective of intra-organismal ecology by investigating a family of ecological models. We consider two types of models. First order models describe the population dynamics as being directly affected by ecological factors (here understood as nutrients, space, etc). They might be thought of as analogous to Aristotelian physics. Second order models describe the population dynamics as being indirectly affected, the ecological factors now affecting the derivative of the growth rate (that is, the population acceleration), possibly (...) through an impact on non-genetically inherited factors. Second order models might be thought of as analogous to Galilean physics. In the joint paper, we apply these ideas to a situation of gene therapy. (shrink)

Misophonia is a disorder of tolerance to specific sounds (i.e. trigger sounds), such as chewing, throat clearing or breathing sounds, produced by humans, which can trigger intense emotional reactions (anger, disgust). This relatively prevalent disorder can cause a reduction in the quality of life. The causes of misophonia are still unclear. In this article, we develop a “social” hypothesis based on the work of Norbert Elias. Misophonia would be an exaggerated reaction to behaviours (of others) that have been subject to (...) rigorous social conditioning, which are supposed to be strictly regulated and repressed. The social rules imposed by society, accompanying the long process of pacification and increasing interdependence between individuals over the centuries, would be at the origin of this conditioning. The function of this conditioning, achieved mainly through shame and disgust, would be to preserve social cohesion, through the strict training of behaviour. It is indeed imperative to control oneself, to act in a thoughtful and balanced way, to spare others by taking into account their expectations, in short to behave in a “courteous” way. Imposed and less spontaneous behaviour creates a sense of modesty and distance between individuals. The obligation to strictly regulate behaviour and affect in public contributes to the creation of an interiority, an "inner self". The feeling of intrusion by others is a collateral effect of this process of distancing and individualisation. The rigorous integration of the social rule by the misophonic subject may account for the fact that any violation of the rule is considered unacceptable. In order to put an end to the unpleasant situation, i.e. to the intrusion generated by the “encroachment” of others, the subject has no other choice but to flee or to attack the author of the sound. (shrink)

To Occamize a nominal expression N is to show that, despite grammatical appearances, N does not name, or denote, an entity. This article argues that the Occamization of ‘meaning,’ which was central to Gilbert Ryle’s meta-philosophy, had already been advanced by Franz Brentano. The core thesis of the article is that Brentano’s notion of ‘content,’ albeit different from that of linguistic rules, does a similar job of eliminating expendable entities. If the meaning of a linguistic expression is not an entity (...) at all, then the question as to what kind of entity it is—what I shall call the Locke-Frege problem—turns out to be a pseudo-problem and is better dispensed with. (shrink)

This paper offers a reconstruction of Franz Brentano’s mereological solution to the problem of the unity of consciousness and explores some implications of this solution for the ontology of the mind. In section 1 I sketch Brentano’s ontological distinctions between things, collectives, and divisives. In section 2 I present Brentano’s mereological solution and in section 3 I review his main pro-arguments. Eventually, in section 4 I consider some Jamesian objections to the mereological approach. I argue the notion of ‘mental parts’ (...) can be given a rather innocuous meaning by being conceived of as the expression of conceptual distinctions grounded in similarity and contrast relations between total mental phenomena. (shrink)

Abstract In initial teacher training, the micro-teaching activities and retroaction have for goals to develop reflexive practitioners and competent professionals with a high professional identity. The double analyze of the teacher’s action – observation of teacher gestures and analysis of retroaction - requires two complementary methods to make the links between interactive and postactive phase. In this article, the authors describe the different training activities, and explain the research approach with an illustration of a concrete case. En formation initiale des (...) enseignants, les activités de micro-enseignement et de rétroaction vidéo ont pour objectif de former des praticiens réflexifs et des professionnels compétents dotés d’une identité forte. La double lecture de l’action, via l’observation des gestes professionnels et l’analyse des traces de réflexivité survenues contenu lors des entretiens de rétroactions, nécessite de mettre en place deux méthodes complémentaires, ceci afin de faire les liens entre phase interactive et phase postactive. Dans cet article, après avoir détaillé le dispositif de formation, les auteurs exposent leurs démarches en les illustrant par le cas concret d’une future enseignante. (shrink)

Objectophilia (also known as Objectum-Sexuality) involves romantic and sexual attraction to specific objects. Objectophiles often develop deep and enduring emotional, romantic, and sexual relations with specific inanimate (concrete or abstract) objects such as trains, bridges, cars, or words. . The determinants of objectophilia are poorly understood. The aim of this paper is to examine the determining factors of objectophilia. We examine four hypotheses about the determinants of objectophilia (pertaining to fetishism, synesthesia, cross-modal mental imagery, and autism) and argue that the (...) most likely determining factors of objectophilia are the social and non-social features of autism. Future studies on the determinants of objectophilia could enhance our understanding and potentially lessen the marginalization experienced by objectophiles. (shrink)

Dans son plus récent ouvrage, Figures du communisme, l’économiste et philosophe Fréderic Lordon s’attaque au problème brûlant de la double crise, économique et environnementale, actuelle. Lordon désigne le coupable : le capitalisme, qui détruit la planète par son exploitation sans vergogne de la nature, et qui détruit la vie par son exploitation des êtres humains. Face à ce système mortifère, une sortie du capitalisme s’impose. Sortir du capitalisme, certes, mais pour le remplacer par quoi ? Lordon nous présente ici son (...) alternative. Contre le capitalisme destructeur de monde, Fréderic Lordon veut la figure du communisme. En s’inspirant des travaux de Bernard Friot, Lordon nous expose son idéal de société communiste : salaire à vie, garantie économique générale, abolition du marché et de la finance, réduction du travail et accès généralisé à la culture et à l’éducation. Il s’en prend également aux obstacles de la révolution communiste, qu’il s’agisse de la bourgeoisie, des grandes institutions financières, des banques, des multinationales, des médias, de l’État, de son armée et de sa police, mais aussi de ceux que Fréderic Lordon appelle « les scouts », les Piketty et consorts, qui espèrent sauver l’humanité et la planète tout en sauvant le capitalisme. Une critique sans concession d’une actualité brûlante. (shrink)

Recent work by Brian Skyrms offers a very general way to think about how information flows and evolves in biological networks — from the way monkeys in a troop communicate, to the way cells in a body coordinate their actions. A central feature of his account is a way to formally measure the quantity of information contained in the signals in these networks. In this paper, we argue there is a tension between how Skyrms talks of signalling networks and his (...) formal measure of information. Although Skyrms refers to both how information flows through networks and that signals carry information, we show that his formal measure only captures the latter. We then suggest that to capture the notion of flow in signalling networks, we need to treat them as causal networks. This provides the formal tools to define a measure that does capture flow, and we do so by drawing on recent work defining causal specificity. Finally, we suggest that this new measure is crucial if we wish to explain how evolution creates information. For signals to play a role in explaining their own origins and stability, they can’t just carry information about acts: they must be difference-makers for acts. (shrink)

The Planteome project provides a suite of reference and species-specific ontologies for plants and annotations to genes and phenotypes. Ontologies serve as common standards for semantic integration of a large and growing corpus of plant genomics, phenomics and genetics data. The reference ontologies include the Plant Ontology, Plant Trait Ontology, and the Plant Experimental Conditions Ontology developed by the Planteome project, along with the Gene Ontology, Chemical Entities of Biological Interest, Phenotype and Attribute Ontology, and others. The project also provides (...) access to species-specific Crop Ontologies developed by various plant breeding and research communities from around the world. We provide integrated data on plant traits, phenotypes, and gene function and expression from 95 plant taxa, annotated with reference ontology terms. (shrink)

Selon le Dr Arnaud Cocaul, médecin généraliste, 95 % des régimes échouent. Cette statistique nous amène à remettre en question leur efficacité. Lorsque l’on approfondit le sujet, on s’aperçoit qu’en 2024, l’humain est aliéné par des facteurs extérieurs lorsqu’il s’agit des choix alimentaires. Le projet de recherche porte sur l’alimentation intuitive et sur l’impact de la publicité, de l’éducation, des normes sociales et de la politique sur notre alimentation. Il vise à expliquer pourquoi, en 2024, l’alimentation intuitive est de (...) plus en plus difficile en s’intéressant au concept d’intuition tel que décrit par le philosophe Bergson. Finalement, des pistes de solutions seront abordées tout au long du texte pour envisager le retour à une alimentation plus authentique et écologique. (shrink)

La Logique ou L'Art de Penser (LAP), also known as the Port-Royal Logic, is generally presented as a "logic of ideas" in which the idea, the central epistemological entity, is the starting point of this logic based on Cartesian ontology. Structured around the four main operations of the mind - conceiving, judging, reasoning and ordering - the first part of the LAP contains "reflections on ideas". The idea, "the form by which we represent things [objects]", thus takes the place of (...) the concept in Aristotelian-inspired logic. Some of the chapters in this first part deal with the problems raised in scholasticism by the theory of _proprietates terminorum_, which means that it is also a semantics of terms. The word 'term' itself must be understood in its logical and grammatical dimensions. The analyses of the 'Messieurs' of Port-Royal often have a logico-grammatical character, because, according to the anthropology of the authors, men need to make their thoughts heard by one another through language (institutional signs) and, therefore, "it is necessary in logic to consider ideas joined to words, and words joined to ideas". In this text, we shall endeavour to show the importance and innovative character of the semantics of terms in this logic of ideas which makes LAP a pivotal moment in the evolution of the language sciences, reviving the tradition and allowing dialogue with future developments (extension vs. comprehension, explanation, determination of terms, etc.). We will pay particular attention to the chapters on definition, "a remedy for the confusion that arises in our thoughts and speech from the confusion of words". (shrink)