A growing body of research has examined how people judge the persistence of identity over time—that is, how they decide that a particular individual is the same entity from one time to the next. While a great deal of progress has been made in understanding the types of features that people typically consider when making such judgments, to date, existing work has not explored how these judgments may be shaped by normative considerations. The present studies demonstrate that normative beliefs do (...) appear to play an important role in people's beliefs about persistence. Specifically, people are more likely to judge that the identity of a given entity remains the same when its features improve than when its features deteriorate. Study 1 provides a basic demonstration of this effect. Study 2 shows that this effect is moderated by individual differences in normative beliefs. Study 3 examines the underlying mechanism, which is the belief that, in general, various entities are essentially good. Study 4 directly manipulates beliefs about essence to show that the positivity bias regarding essences is causally responsible for the effect. (shrink)

There has been a call for a potentially revolutionary change to our existing understanding of the psychological concept of personal identity. Apparently, people can psychologically represent people, including themselves, as multiple individuals at the same time. Here we ask whether the intransitive judgments found in these studies truly reflect the operation of an intransitive concept of personal identity. We manipulate several factors that arbitrate between transitivity and intransitivity and find most support for transitivity: in contrast to prior work, most participants (...) do not make intransitive judgments when there is any reason to favor one individual over another. People change which single individual they personally identify with, depending on which individual competes more strongly or weakly for identity, rather than identifying with both individuals. Even when two individuals are identical and therefore both entitled to be the same person, we find that people make more transitive judgments once they understand the practical commitments of their responses (Experiment 4), and report not being able to actually imagine two perspectives simultaneously when reasoning about the scenario (Experiment 5). In short, we suggest that while people may make intransitive judgments, these do not reflect that they psychologically represent identity in an intransitive manner. (shrink)

Peter Achinstein has argued at length and on many occasions that the view according to which evidential support is defined in terms of probability-raising faces serious counterexamples and, hence, should be abandoned. Proponents of the positive probabilistic relevance view have remained unconvinced. The debate seems to be in a deadlock. This paper is an attempt to move the debate forward and revisit some of the central claims within this debate. My conclusion here will be that while Achinstein may be right (...) that his counterexamples undermine probabilistic relevance views of what it is for e to be evidence that h, there is still room for a defence of a related probabilistic view about an increase in being supported, according to which, if p > p, then h is more supported given e than it is without e. My argument relies crucially on an insight from recent work on the linguistics of gradable adjectives. (shrink)

People sometimes explain behavior by appealing to an essentialist concept of the self, often referred to as the true self. Existing studies suggest that people tend to believe that the true self is morally virtuous; that is deep inside, every person is motivated to behave in morally good ways. Is this belief particular to individuals with optimistic beliefs or people from Western cultures, or does it reflect a widely held cognitive bias in how people understand the self? To address this (...) question, we tested the good true self theory against two potential boundary conditions that are known to elicit different beliefs about the self as a whole. Study 1 tested whether individual differences in misanthropy—the tendency to view humans negatively—predict beliefs about the good true self in an American sample. The results indicate a consistent belief in a good true self, even among individuals who have an explicitly pessimistic view of others. Study 2 compared true self-attributions across cultural groups, by comparing samples from an independent country and a diverse set of interdependent countries. Results indicated that the direction and magnitude of the effect are comparable across all groups we tested. The belief in a good true self appears robust across groups varying in cultural orientation or misanthropy, suggesting a consistent psychological tendency to view the true self as morally good. (shrink)

This paper elaborates a new solution to the lottery paradox, according to which the paradox arises only when we lump together two distinct states of being confident that p under one general label of ‘belief that p’. The two-state conjecture is defended on the basis of some recent work on gradable adjectives. The conjecture is supported by independent considerations from the impossibility of constructing the lottery paradox both for risk-tolerating states such as being afraid, hoping or hypothesizing, and for risk-averse, (...) certainty-like states. The new proposal is compared to views within the increasingly popular debate opposing dualists to reductionists with respect to the relation between belief and degrees of belief. (shrink)

The paper states a hypothesis concerning Thomas Reid's moderation in his reply to skepticism. It is initially argued that commonsense beliefs, though due to reliable faculties, are doubtful, fallible, and correctable. They are not completely immune to skeptical attack. It is further argued that Reid intends to reply only to one form of skepticism, the partial one – the skepticism of authors who accept at least one mental faculty as a reliable source of knowledge. Reid does not intend to argue (...) with the skeptic who equally denies his assent to the reliability of all faculties – that is, the radical skeptic. This radical form of skepticism is harmless to practical life and philosophy and, for that reason, is not a threat. Finally, the hypothesis advanced is discussed considering other interpretations of Reid’s reply to skepticism. (shrink)

According to the good reasoning view of normative reasons, p is a reason to F, just in case p is a premise of a good pattern of reasoning. This article presents two counterexamples to the most promising version of the good reasoning view.

In this article I focus on some unduly neglected common-sense considerations supporting the view that one's evidence is the propositions that one knows. I reply to two recent objections to these considerations.

This paper aims to discuss the philosophical roles of common sense in Thomas Reid’s thought. I argue that there is not only one way of appealing to common sense in attempt of discovering truth and allowing knowledge. According to my understanding, Reid makes at least three distinct uses of common sense: (1) the foundational use, in which common sense is taken as the foundation upon which knowledge must be built; (2) the methodological use, in which common sense arises as a (...) source of methodo-logical presuppositions of philosophical investigations; (3) the instrumental use, in which common sense, in the light of the emotion of ridicule, is used as an instrument to refute philosophical principles and conclusions. (shrink)

In a recent publication Travis Timmerman has claimed that sometimes it is morally permissible to not prevent something bad from happening, even if it is in one’s power to do so without sacrificing anything nearly as important.1 To defend his point, he has proposed a thought experiment and based his claims on putative common-sense morality intuitions. To aid in the subsequent discussion, Timmerman’s case is reproduced as follows.

In this paper, I argue against recent versions of justification norms of action and practical deliberation . I demonstrate that these norms yield unacceptable results in deception cases. However, a further modification of justification norms in the light of these results appears to be ad hoc. Hence, I claim, we should reject justification norms of action and practical deliberation.

The paper presents and discusses how Thomas Reid's philosophy of common sense replies to the skepticism about the epistemic reliability of the faculties of mind. The hypothesis presented establishes that Reid’s reply has three arguments. First, Reid shows why it is impossible to prove the reliability of the faculties of mind and why philosophers may begin their investigations by accepting the truth of the beliefs due to these faculties. Secondly, Reid shows that it is inconsistent to choose one of these (...) faculties as the only source of true beliefs. This is arbitrary. Those authors, who choose, for example, consciousness as the only source of reliable knowledge, only reinforce the claim that all faculties of mind are equally reliable. Thirdly, if the faculties of the mind operate properly, that is, when our mind is not affected by any disorder or disease, there is no good reason to call them into question and to doubt the truth of their beliefs. (shrink)

The aim of the present article is to accomplish two things. The first is to show that given some further plausible assumptions, existing challenges to the indispensability of knowledge in causal explanation of action fail. The second is to elaborate an overlooked and distinct argument in favor of the causal efficacy of knowledge. In short, even if knowledge were dispensable in causal explanation of action, it is still indispensable in causal explanation of other mental attitudes and, in particular, some reactive (...) attitudes and factive emotions. Taking into account this sort of causal efficacy in determining which mental states are genuine mental states opens up new perspectives for defending the view that knowledge is the most general factive and genuine mental state. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to outline an interpretation of the philosophical understanding of the concept of the good in pre-Platonic thought. The interpretation is based on those fragments only in which the concept actually appears. As a result of the adopted assumption, the ideas of the first philosophers, i.e. Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes, were outside the scope of the investigation, as well as those of Xenophanes, Eleatics, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Leucippus. In the case of the first philosophical systems (...) of the pre-Platonic philosophy one notices a connection between the good and the One. It can also be found that understanding of the ‘the Best’ is depended on, and results from, ‘the good’. This is true also in Heraclitus, though, at the same time, he introduces an significant reversal in this respect, for he abolishes the absolute difference between the good and evil, and turns it to a subjective relation. The good has no ontological basis in the Democritus’ system as well, though the good’s connection with truth, accessible for every human being, allows to interpret him as arguing for an objectivistic conception of the good. The objectivity of good has subsequently been denied by the Sophists. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Williamson’s (2000) claim that all evidence is propositional. I propose to reject this claim. I give two objections to two premises of Williamson’s argument. The first is a critique of Williamson’s claim that we choose between hypotheses on the basis of our evidence. The second objection is that Williamson’s claim that evidence is an explanandum of an hypothesis leads to counter-intuitive consequences and thus is not central to what evidence is, at least on an ordinary (...) understanding. (shrink)

According to recently popular pragmatist views it may be rational for one to believe p when one’s evidence doesn’t favour p over not-p. This may happen according to pragmatists in situations where one can gain something practically important out of believing p. In this paper I argue that given some independently plausible assumptions about the argumentative nature of philosophy and the irrelevance of bribes for good arguments, pragmatism leads to a contradiction.

The dominant theory of judgment in 1870 was one or other variety of combination theory: the act of judgment is an act of combining concepts or ideas in the mind of the judging subject. In the decades to follow a succession of alternative theories arose to address defects in the combination theory, starting with Bolzano’s theory of propositions in themselves, Brentano’s theory of judgment as affirmation or denial of existence, theories distinguishing judgment act from judgment content advanced by Brentano’s students (...) Twardowski, Husserl and Meinong, and finally, Adolf Reinach’s addition of a linguistic dimension to the Brentano-Husserlian theory of judgment – an account of judgments as ways of doing things with words in what Reinach called ‘social acts’. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that the account of objective truth taken for granted by logicians at least since the publication in 1933 of Tarski’s “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages” arose out of a tradition of philosophical thinking initiated by Bolzano and Brentano. The paper shows more specifically that certain investigations of states of affairs and other objectual correlates of judging acts, investigations carried out by Austrian and Polish philosophers around the turn of the century, (...) formed part of the background of views that led to standard current accounts of the objectivity of truth. It thus lends support to speculations on the role of Brentano and his heirs in contemporary logical philosophy advanced by Jan Wolenski in his masterpiece of 1989 on the Logic and philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School. (shrink)

Past research has identified a number of asymmetries based on moral judgments. Beliefs about what a person values, whether a person is happy, whether a person has shown weakness of will, and whether a person deserves praise or blame seem to depend critically on whether participants themselves find the agent's behavior to be morally good or bad. To date, however, the origins of these asymmetries remain unknown. The present studies examine whether beliefs about an agent's “true self” explain these observed (...) asymmetries based on moral judgment. Using the identical materials from previous studies in this area, a series of five experiments indicate that people show a general tendency to conclude that deep inside every individual there is a “true self” calling him or her to behave in ways that are morally virtuous. In turn, this belief causes people to hold different intuitions about what the agent values, whether the agent is happy, whether he or she has shown weakness of will, and whether he or she deserves praise or blame. These results not only help to answer important questions about how people attribute various mental states to others; they also contribute to important theoretical debates regarding how moral values may shape our beliefs about phenomena that, on the surface, appear to be decidedly non-moral in nature. (shrink)

The paper aims to discuss the notion of ‘common sense’ in Thomas Reid’s philosophy. It presents two hypotheses. The first hypothesis states that the common sense that Reid uses in philosophical matters is nothing but the set of original principles of the mind that determine human beings in regard to their notions, beliefs and inclinations, as well as the judgments and beliefs that are due to these principles. The second hypothesis states that Reid understands a kind of ‘developed common sense’, (...) a common sense that develops throughout human life by the proper cultivation of the powers of the mind. (shrink)

According to the knowledge view of evidence notoriously defended by Timothy Williamson (2000), for any subject, her evidence consists of all and only her propositional knowledge (E=K). Many have found (E=K) implausible. However, few have offered arguments against Williamson’s positive case for (E=K). In this paper, I propose an argument against Williamson’s positive case in favour of (E=K). Central to my argument is the possibility of the knowledge of necessary truths. I also draw some more general conclusions concerning theorizing about (...) evidence. (shrink)

The dominant theory of judgment in 1870 was one or other variety of combination theory: the act of judgment is an act of combining concepts or ideas in the mind of the judging subject. In the decades to follow a succession of alternative theories arose to address defects in the combination theory, starting with Bolzano’s theory of propositions in themselves, Brentano’s theory of judgment as affirmation or denial of existence, theories distinguishing judgment act from judgment content advanced by Brentano’s students (...) Twardowski, Husserl and Meinong, and finally, Adolf Reinach’s addition of a linguistic dimension to the Brentano-Husserlian theory of judgment – an account of judgments as ways of doing things with words in what Reinach called ‘social acts’. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the role that knowledge plays with regard to rational action. It has been recently argued that knowledge determines appropriate action. I examine this proposal, consider objections against it, and finally propose a defense of it.

A common assumption in contemporary debates about normative reasons is that ‘subjective’ and ‘possessed’ are two names for the same sort of reason. This paper challenges that assumption. Given our cognitive limitations, it is unsurprising that normative reasons that derive from what we know and reasons that we are in a position to use in our deliberation are not always one and the same.

The paper advances the hypothesis that George Berkeley's philosophy does not overcome solipsism. In order to do this, it presents four difficulties on his arguments for other existences: (I) the argument about the existence of an external cause for sensitive ideas faces the difficulty of not eliminating the possibility that the mind itself is the cause of these ideas; (II) the argument present in the Dialogues to prove the existence of God is circular: it presupposes the existence of objects distinct (...) from the mind, however, the argument for the existence of these objects presupposes the existence of God; (III) the argument in favor of the existence of those objects, besides being related to the mentioned circularity, is developed without Berkeley presenting a clear notion of what these objects are; (IV) the argument for the existence of other minds, in what appears to be their most plausible interpretation – which states that it is possible to infer the existence of other minds from the observation of irregular, inconstant, and vicious actions in subjects –, faces the difficulty that, in a scenario where such actions do not exist, Berkeley loses the evidence for the existence of other minds. (shrink)

The paper advances the hypothesis that René Descartes presents a skeptical system of philosophy in Thomas Reid’s reading. There is a sort of ‘involun-tary’ or ‘accidental’ skepticism that results from the adoption by Descartes of both a skeptical method and a skeptical principle. The first section shows to what extent the Cartesian method of doubt – which focuses on the reliability of the faculties of the mind - is a skeptical demand that cannot be satisfied. The second section shows how (...) the principle of the Cartesian system – which establishes that ideas are the immediate objects of the operations of the mind – is not only skeptic but leads exactly and naturally to the most radical form of skepticism, namely, solipsism. The third section discusses the Cartesian sources of the doubt on the existence of external world according to Reid. (shrink)

The paper discusses the notions of ‘consciousness’ and ‘reflection’ in John Locke’s Essay on the Human Understanding. It attempts to present two criteria by means of which it would be possible to distinguish between these mental activities. Firstly, consciousness is a passive, involuntary activity and does not depend on attention to be exerted, unlike reflection, which is, at least in one of its degrees – since Locke conceives the existence of two degrees of reflection –, an active, voluntary, and attentive (...) activity of mind. Second, consciousness may be distinguished from reflection in that it is a mental activity that produces judgments / beliefs, unlike reflection, whose activities only produce ideas. While consciousness allows human beings to know – to judge about and to believe the existence of their mental phenomena –, reflection is only a mental capacity to have ideas and, as such, it is not true or false. (shrink)

According to one line of thought only propositions can be part of one’s evidence, since only propositions can serve the central functions of our ordinary concept of evidence. Ram Neta has challenged this argument. In this paper I respond to Neta’s challenge.

The aim of the present paper is to show how Plato suggested demarcating between knowledge and other kinds of human intellectual activities. The article proposes to distinguish between two ways of such a demarcation. The first, called `the external demarcation', takes place when one differentiates between knowledge and non-knowledge, the rational and non-rational or the reasonable and non-reasonable. The second, called `internal', marks the difference within knowledge itself and could be illustrated by the difference between the so called hard and (...) soft sciences. The analyses lead tothe following conclusions. Plato refers to the whole of human intellectual activity as doxa, which is divided into two spheres. The first of them is knowledge proper whose criterion is phronesis. Three other kinds of doxa are derived from knowledge proper: 1) the traditional peri phuseos investigation (called also sophia); 2) popular doxai concerning virtues; 3) wisdom of the antilogikoi. The difference represents the external demarcation. There may be, however, a difference in the scope of knowledge proper (the internal demarcation). If the peri phuseos investigators were able to explain the field of values, the result of their investigation could be acknowledged as knowledge, although it would still be characterized as inferior due to its being based on senses. What is interesting about knowledge proper is that it is not firm and reliable but only hypothetical. It does not determine the skeptical reading of the Phaedo but it indicates that Plato has just begun his own philosophical project (which is still in progress) and the knowledge presented in the dialogue is his first positive suggestion how to solve the problem of demarcation. (shrink)

The paper discusses Thomas Reid's objection to David Hume's theory of personal identity. The hypothesis states that this criticism is not effective because it is based on a misunderstanding of Hume’s theory, namely, that Hume would have admitted a negative ontological thesis - the inexistence of a mind beyond perceptions - and a positive ontological thesis - a mind reduced to a bundle of perceptions. After explaining in what measures Reid’s objection is based upon this misunderstanding, the paper shows why (...) Hume does not accept those theses,. (shrink)

The paper advances the hypothesis that, in Thomas Reid's reading, David Hume's skepticism of the Treatise on Human Nature is not solely due to his acceptance of the ‘ideal hypothesis’ – the principle according to which ideas are the immediate objects of the mental operations –, but it has another source, namely, that doubt on the reliability of the faculties of the senses, memory, and reason. Moreover, the paper argues that the suggested distinction between two roots for Hume’s skepticism allows (...) a more exact view on Reid’s reading of Hume and solve some misinterpretations. (shrink)

The paper covers the discussion of three aspects of Thomas Reid’s political thought. Initially, it presents and discusses Reid’s understanding of Politics. Secondly, it is argued that, unlike the first principles of other branches of knowledge, such as Mathematics, Philosophy of Mind and Morals, the first principles of Politics are not the first principles of common sense. Politics is founded on a form of empirical knowledge that cannot be identified with common sense, with the judgments and beliefs due to the (...) original constitution of mind that are shared by most humans. Finally, it is argued, from a parallel with the philosophy of nature, that common sense has only a methodological role in Politics. (shrink)

I intend to discuss Hume’s theory of personal identity in Books I and II of the Treatise of Human Nature. First, I intend to argue that Hume’s distinction between a ‘personal identity with regard to thought and imagination’ and a ‘personal identity with regard to passions and self-interest’ is only methodological, not radical. That is, the philosopher does not sug-gest the existence of two distinct ideas of personal identity in mind. Secondly, I try to show the contribution of the passions (...) of pride and humility to the production of a belief in personal identity. Pride and humility contribute to the liveliness of this belief by producing the person’s interest in his sensations and actions of the past and the future. Thirdly, I want to show how passions and self-interest make it possible to explain the corporeal aspect of the belief in personal identity. I propose to discuss how the body and its qualities can be understood as constituent elements of the notion of personal identity. (shrink)

The paper covers the discussion of three aspects of Thomas Reid’s political thought. Initially, it presents and discusses Reid’s understanding of Politics. Secondly, it is argued that, unlike the first principles of other branches of knowledge, such as Mathematics, Philosophy of Mind and Morals, the first principles of Politics are not the first principles of common sense. Politics is founded on a form of empirical knowledge that cannot be identified with common sense, with the judgments and beliefs due to the (...) original constitution of mind that are shared by most humans. Finally, it is argued, from a parallel with the philosophy of nature, that common sense has only a methodological role in Politics. (shrink)

Series of articles about Plato's dialogue "Theaetetus".

Series of articles about Plato's dialogue "Theaetetus".

I maintain that among the main views concerning the central questions of epistemology (in particular, the question of justified belief) are evidentialism, (Pyrrhonian) scepticism and fideism. In this paper, I first present the arguments in favour of a form of evidentialism, according to which no false belief can be epistemically justified on the basis of evidence. Second, I consider the historical emergence of evidentialism during the period of the early Enlightenment. In particular, I explore the disagreement between Pierre Bayle and (...) Jean-Pierre de Crousaz, which demonstrates the emergence of the modern opposition between evidentialism and fideism. (shrink)

Tristan Augusta von Platena jako jedyny utwór biedermeierowskiego poety znalazł się w ścisłym kanonie liryki niemieckiej. Wiersz doczekał się jednak do tej pory niewielu wnikliwych analiz; nadto zarówno starsze, jak i najnowsze propozycje interpretacyjne koncentrowały się głównie na kontekście biograficznym. Artykuł jest próbą poszerzenia istniejącej literatury przedmiotowej o nowe aspekty. Stawia on przede wszystkim pytanie o obecność mitu w strukturze utworu. Szczegółowa analiza formalna oraz rozważania o warstwie filozoficzno-estetycznej wiersza konsekwentnie ukazują indywidualny gest, z jakim autor adaptuje mityczny topos o (...) transgresywnej miłości. W tym kontekście średniowieczny motyw Tristana jawi się w wierszu wzbogacony o antyczny motyw Orfeusza. Owa oryginalna kontaminacja świadczy o antycypacji przez PIatena niemieckiej poezji modernistycznej, szczególnie zaś wskazuje na powinowactwo jego Tristana z Sonetami do Orfeusza Rilkego. (shrink)

The article discusses the nature and significance of metaphilosophical knowledge on the ground of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. The purpose of the article is to show metaphilosophical knowledge as an essential and immanent factor of philosophical reflection. The above mentioned goal is achieved by presenting connection, occurring within the fundamental ontology, between this knowledge and theoretical philosophical reflection, both in its descriptive (defining being of philosophy) and normative (indicating how philosophical reflection should be carried out) dimension. The descriptive dimension of the (...) connection indicates a circular nature of the interactions between metaphilosophical and theoretical aspects of philosophy. The theoretical reflection on specific phenomena is, at the same time, a determination of being of the philosophy; whereas the metaphilosophical knowledge, arising from the theoretical reflection, determines character and direction of further considerations. Furthermore, the normative dimension implies that philosophical considerations should take into account this connection and deliberately practice it through systematic metaphilosophical reflection. As the source of the connection between metaphilosophical knowledge and theoretical reflection, the article indicates Heidegger’s concept of philosophy, according to which philosophy is a way of being of Dasein, consisting of ontological, conceptual interpretation of being of beings and reflecting the structures of Dasein’s existence and its pre-ontological understanding of being. -/- Keywords: fundamental ontology, metaphilosophy, philosophical reflection, grounding of philosophy, Dasein, understanding of being. (shrink)

The dominant theory of judgment in 1870 was one or other variety of combination theory: the act of judgment is an act of combining concepts or ideas in the mind of the judging subject. In the decades to follow a succession of alternative theories arose to address defects in the combination theory, starting with Bolzano’s theory of propositions in themselves, Brentano’s theory of judgment as affirmation or denial of existence, theories distinguishing judgment act from judgment content advanced by Brentano’s students (...) Twardowski, Husserl and Meinong, and finally, Adolf Reinach’s addition of a linguistic dimension to the Brentano-Husserlian theory of judgment – an account of judgments as ways of doing things with words in what Reinach called ‘social acts’. (shrink)

The paper investigates the issue of historicity of existence and self-understanding within Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. The purpose of the paper is to answer the question of how the author of Truth and method argues and interprets the unity of existence in the context of recognizing historicity as the fundamental characteristics of human being and the world. The paper shows that the historicity excludes the possibility of basing this unity on an absolute metaphysical foundation or on a reflective self-consciousness of transcendental (...) subjectivity. On the ground of philosophical hermeneutics, being-one of a human has the character of historical continuity, constituted in the process of incessant, interpretive transcending and uniting oneself. The paper shows what roles the inherited tradition and community in which one lives play in this process. Furthermore, the paper points out that for proper understanding of Gadamer’s interpretation of the unity of existence, it is necessary to take into account two issues: firstly, its departure from the concept of empty time, which is a stream of the past, present and future moments of the “Now”, in favour of ful-filled time and secondly, how general-individual relations are interpreted in philosophical hermeneutics. (shrink)

According to a widely held view epistemic justification is a normative notion. According to another widely held assumption, epistemic justification comes in degrees. Given that gradability requires a context-sensitivity that normativity seems to lack, these two assumptions stand in tension. Giving up the assumption of gradability of justification represents a lesser theoretical cost.

This is the report on the XVI BRAZILIAN LOGIC CONFERENCE (EBL 2011) held in Petrópolis, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil between May 9–13, 2011 published in The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic Volume 18, Number 1, March 2012. -/- The 16th Brazilian Logic Conference (EBL 2011) was held in Petro ́polis, from May 9th to 13th, 2011, at the Laboratório Nacional de Computação o Científica (LNCC). It was the sixteenth in a series of conferences that started in 1977 with the aim of (...) congregating logicians from Brazil and abroad, furthering interest in logic and its applications, stimulating cooperation, and contributing to the development of this branch of science. EBL 2011 included more than one-hundred and fifty participants, all of them belonging to prominent research institutes from Brazil and abroad, especially Latin America. The conference was sponsored by the Academia Brasileira de Ciências (ABC), the As- sociation for Symbolic Logic (ASL), Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP), Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Sciences (CLE), Laboratório Nacional de Computação o Científica (LNCC), Pontif ́ıcia Universidade Cato ́lica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC- Rio), Sociedade Brasileira de Lógica (SBL), and Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF). Funding was provided by Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cient ́ıfico e Tecnolo ́ gico (CNPq), Fundac ̧a ̃o de Amparo `a Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP), Fundação Euclides da Cunha (FEC), and Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF). The members of the Scientific Committee were: Mário Folhadela Benevides (COPPE- UFRJ), Fa ́bio Bertato (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Jean-Yves Béziau (UFRJ), Ricardo Bianconi (USP), Juliana Bueno-Soler (UFABC), Xavier Caicedo (Universidad de Los An- des), Walter Carnielli (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Oswaldo Chateaubriand Filho (PUC-Rio), Marcelo Esteban Coniglio (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Newton da Costa (UFSC, President), Antonio Carlos da Rocha Costa (UFRG), Alexandre Costa-Leite (UnB), I ́tala M. Loffredo D’Ottaviano (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Marcelo Finger (USP), Edward Hermann Haeusler (PUC-Rio), Décio Krause (UFSC), João Marcos (UFRN), Ana Teresa de Castro Martins (UFC), Maria da Paz Nunes de Medeiros (UFRN), Francisco Miraglia (USP), Luiz Car- los Pereira (PUC-Rio and UFRJ), Elaine Pimentel (UFMG), and Samuel Gomes da Silva (UFBA). The members of the Organizing Committee were: Anderson de Araujo (UNICAMP), Walter Carnielli (CLE-IFCH-UNICAMP), Oswaldo Chateaubriand Filho (PUC-Rio, Co- chair), Marcelo Correa (UFF), Renata de Freitas (UFF), Edward Hermann Haeusler (PUC- RJ), Hugo Nobrega (COPPE-UFRJ), Luiz Carlos Pereira (PUC-Rio e IFCS/UFRJ), Leandro Suguitani (UNICAMP), Rafael Testa (UNICAMP), Leonardo Bruno Vana (UFF), and Petrucio Viana (UFF, Co-chair). (shrink)

In this paper, we intend to offer an interpretation about the explanation of the (relative) idea of pure substance in general on John Locke’s philosophy, from Thomas Reid’s notion of ‘natural suggestion’. To achieve this aim, after contextualizing Locke’s notion of pure substance in general and distinguishing it from the idea of particular substance (section 1), we explicit that Locke’s words about the source of the idea of the former in the mind (either empirical or rational) are ambiguous and inconclusive (...) (section 2). Then, we argue that the parallels between this idea and that of ‘relation’, as well as of ‘power’ do not assist in that answer, due to some problems we identify on them (section 3). Finally, we argue that the Reidian explanation for the source of the idea of ‘mind’, from the notion of ‘natural suggestion’ allows us to i) avoid those problems and ii) inasmuch as, according to this interpretation, the idea of pure substance in general would have an empirical source, Lockian empiricism would remain intact (section 4). (shrink)

In a theoretical reflection, the aim of this paper is primarily to discuss alterity in journalism. We believe that journalism plays a fundamental role in the construction of knowledge on similarities and differences between human beings, stressing social diversity as one of its purposes. We associate the concept of otherness, understood as a singular mode of existence of the “other”, with the purpose of journalism and with actions of empathy, sympathy and compassion. Based on a phenomenological perspective, we discuss the (...) importance of the meeting between the "self" and the "other", as well as the ability of journalists to perceive and narrate on the aspects that shape the identities of human beings. Moreover, we discuss otherness in journalistic narratives, approaching the relation between the lifeworld and the world of text... (shrink)

According to strong pluralism, objects distinct by virtue of their modal properties can coincide. The most common objection towards such view invokes the so-called Grounding Problem according to which the strong pluralist needs to explain what the grounds are for supposed modal differences between the coincidents. As recognized in the literature, the failure to provide an answer to the Grounding Problem critically undermines the plausibility of strong pluralism. Moreover, there are strong reasons to believe that strong pluralists cannot provide an (...) explanation of the Grounding Problem. In this paper, we argue that strong pluralism can be motivated independently of the successful answer to the Grounding Problem. In order to achieve that aim, we provide a haecceitistic interpretation of strong pluralism according to which strong pluralism should be read as a position committed to the existence of primitive individuals, i.e., the individuals that have their criteria of individuation independently of their qualitative profiles. That said, we do not aim at defending haecceitism. Instead, our aim is rather modest: we want to provide a new way for the strong pluralist to supplement his view to make it more watertight. (shrink)