Results for 'Carnap sentences'

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  1. On Carnap Sentences.P. Raatikainen - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):245-246.
    The influential proposal that the analytical component of a theory is captured by its ‘Carnap sentence’ is critically scrutinized. A counterexample which makes the suggestion problematic is presented.
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  2.  14
    Carnap Sentences and the Newman Problem.Larisa Ioana Gogianu - 2015 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (1):23-30.
    In this paper I discuss the Newman problem in the context of contemporary epistemic structural realism (ESR). I formulate Newman’s objection in terms that apply to today’s ESR and then evaluate a defence of ESR based on Carnap’s use of Ramsey sentences and Hilbert’s ε-operator. I show that this defence improves the situation by allowing a formal stipulation of non-structural constraints. However, it fails short of achieving object individuation in the context of satisfying the Ramsified form of a (...)
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  3. From Within and From Without. Two Perspectives on Analytic Sentences.Olaf L. Müller - 2002 - In Wolfram Hinzen & Hans Rott (eds.), Belief and meaning: Essays at the interface. Deutsche Bibliothek der Wissenschaften.
    The analytic/synthetic distinction can be conceived from two points of view: from within or from without; from the perspective of one's own language or from the perspective of the language of others. From without, the central question is which sentences of a foreign language are to be classified as analytic. From within, by contrast, the question concerning the synthetic and the analytic acquires a normative dimension: which sentences am I not permitted to reject—if I want to avoid talking (...)
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  4. Carnap and the Tractatus' Philosophy of Logic.Oskari Kuusela - 2012 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (3):1-25.
    This article discusses the relation between the early Wittgenstein’s and Carnap’s philosophies of logic, arguing that Carnap’s position in The Logical Syntax of Language is in certain respects much closer to the Tractatus than has been recognized. In Carnapian terms, the Tractatus’ goal is to introduce, by means of quasi-syntactical sentences, syntactical principles and concepts to be used in philosophical clarification in the formal mode. A distinction between the material and formal mode is therefore already part of (...)
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  5.  14
    Being There and Getting There: A View on the Nature and Application of Models.William M. Goodman - manuscript
    This paper updates (2017) a previously-presented* model of models, which can be used to clarify discussion and analysis in a variety of disputes and debates, since many such discussions hinge on displaying or implying models about how things are related. Knowing about models does not itself supply any new information about our world, but it might help us to recognize when and how information is being conveyed on these matters, or where possibly it is being obscured. If a claim P (...)
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  6. The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language.Rudolf Carnap - 1932 - Erkenntnis:60-81.
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  7. Truth and Confirmation.Rudolf Carnap - 1949 - In Harry Fiegl & Wilfred Sellars (eds.), Readings in Philosophical Analysis. Appleton-Century-Crofts. pp. 119--127.
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  8.  37
    Carnap’s Theory of Descriptions and its Problems.Jan Heylen - 2010 - Studia Logica 94 (3):355-380.
    Carnap's theory of descriptions was restricted in two ways. First, the descriptive conditions had to be non-modal. Second, only primitive predicates or the identity predicate could be used to predicate something of the descriptum. The motivating reasons for these two restrictions that can be found in the literature will be critically discussed. Both restrictions can be relaxed, but Carnap's theory can still be blamed for not dealing adequately with improper descriptions.
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  9. Carnap’s Theory of Descriptions and its Problems.Jan Heylen - 2010 - Studia Logica 94 (3):355-380.
    Carnap's theory of descriptions was restricted in two ways. First, the descriptive conditions had to be non-modal. Second, only primitive predicates or the identity predicate could be used to predicate something of the descriptum . The motivating reasons for these two restrictions that can be found in the literature will be critically discussed. Both restrictions can be relaxed, but Carnap's theory can still be blamed for not dealing adequately with improper descriptions.
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  10. Blurring Boundaries: Carnap, Quine, and the Internal–External Distinction.Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):873-890.
    Quine is routinely perceived as saving metaphysics from Carnapian positivism. Where Carnap rejects metaphysical existence claims as meaningless, Quine is taken to restore their intelligibility by dismantling the former’s internal–external distinction. The problem with this picture, however, is that it does not sit well with the fact that Quine, on many occasions, has argued that metaphysical existence claims ought to be dismissed. Setting aside the hypothesis that Quine’s metaphysical position is incoherent, one has to conclude that his views on (...)
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  11. In Carnap’s Defense: A Survey on the Concept of a Linguistic Framework in Carnap’s Philosophy.Parzhad Torfehnezhad - 2016 - Abstracta 9 (1):03-30.
    The main task in this paper is to detail and investigate Carnap’s conception of a “linguistic framework”. On this basis, we will see whether Carnap’s dichotomies, such as the analytic-synthetic distinction, are to be construed as absolute/fundamental dichotomies or merely as relative dichotomies. I argue for a novel interpretation of Carnap’s conception of a LF and, on that basis, will show that, according to Carnap, all the dichotomies to be discussed are relative dichotomies; they depend on (...)
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  12.  39
    Carnap, Explication, and Social History.James Pearson - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (4):741-774.
    A.W. Carus champions Rudolf Carnap’s ideal of explication as a model for liberal political deliberation. Constructing a linguistic framework for discussing social problems, he argues, promotes the resolution of our disputes. To flesh out and assess this proposal, I examine debate about the social institutions of marriage and adoption. Against Carus, I argue that not all citizens would accept the pragmatic principles underlying Carnap’s ideal. Nevertheless, explication may facilitate inquiry in the social sciences and be used to create (...)
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  13. Pietroski on Possible Worlds Semantics for Belief Sentences.Joe Lau - 1995 - Analysis 55 (4):295.
    Pietroski (1993) offers a semantics for belief sentences that is supposed to address the problem of equivalence. This paper argues that his proposal fails to solve the problem.
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  14. Frege, Carnap, and Explication: ‘Our Concern Here Is to Arrive at a Concept of Number Usable for the Purpose of Science’.Gregory Lavers - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (3):225-41.
    This paper argues that Carnap both did not view and should not have viewed Frege's project in the foundations of mathematics as misguided metaphysics. The reason for this is that Frege's project was to give an explication of number in a very Carnapian sense — something that was not lost on Carnap. Furthermore, Frege gives pragmatic justification for the basic features of his system, especially where there are ontological considerations. It will be argued that even on the question (...)
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  15. The Conventional and the Analytic.Manuel García-Carpintero & Manuel Pérez Otero - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):239-274.
    Empiricist philosophers like Carnap invoked analyticity in order to explain a priori knowledge and necessary truth. Analyticity was “truth purely in virtue of meaning”. The view had a deflationary motivation: in Carnap’s proposal, linguistic conventions alone determine the truth of analytic sentences, and thus there is no mystery in our knowing their truth a priori, or in their necessary truth; for they are, as it were, truths of our own making. Let us call this “Carnapian conventionalism”, conventionalismC (...)
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  16. ‘‘Quine’s Evolution From ‘Carnap’s Disciple’ to the Author of “Two Dogmas.Greg Frost-Arnold - 2011 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 1 (2):291-316.
    Recent scholarship indicates that Quine’s “Truth by Convention” does not present the radical critiques of analytic truth found fifteen years later in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” This prompts a historical question: what caused Quine’s radicalization? I argue that two crucial components of Quine’s development can be traced to the academic year 1940–1941, when he, Russell, Carnap, Tarski, Hempel, and Goodman were all at Harvard together. First, during those meetings, Quine recognizes that Carnap has abandoned the extensional, syntactic approach (...)
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  17. Carnap’s Conventionalism in Geometry.Stefan Lukits - 2013 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 88 (1):123-138.
    Against Thomas Mormann's argument that differential topology does not support Carnap's conventionalism in geometry we show their compatibility. However, Mormann's emphasis on the entanglement that characterizes topology and its associated metrics is not misplaced. It poses questions about limits of empirical inquiry. For Carnap, to pose a question is to give a statement with the task of deciding its truth. Mormann's point forces us to introduce more clarity to what it means to specify the task that decides between (...)
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  18. The Confirmation of Singular Causal Statements by Carnap’s Inductive Logic.Yusuke Kaneko - 2012 - Logica Year Book 2011.
    The aim of this paper is to apply inductive logic to the field that, presumably, Carnap never expected: legal causation. Legal causation is expressible in the form of singular causal statements; but it is distinguished from the customary concept of scientific causation, because it is subjective. We try to express this subjectivity within the system of inductive logic. Further, by semantic complement, we compensate a defect found in our application, to be concrete, the impossibility of two-place predicates (for causal (...)
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  19. Carnap's Aufbau in the Weimar Context.Thomas Mormann - 2016 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 18:115-136.
    Quine’s classical classic interpretation succinctly characterized characterizes Carnap’s Aufbau as an attempt “to account for the external world as a logical construct of sense-data....” Consequently, “Russell” was characterized as the most important influence on the Aufbau. Those times have passed. Formulating a comprehensive and balanced interpretation of the Aufbau has turned out to be a difficult task and one that must take into account several disjointed sources. My thesis is that the core of the Aufbau rested on a problem (...)
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  20. A Pragmatic Treatment of Simple Sentences.Alex Barber - 2000 - Analysis 60 (4):300–308.
    Semanticists face substitution challenges even outside of contexts commonly recognized as opaque. Jennifer M. Saul has drawn attention to pairs of simple sentences - her term for sentences lacking a that-clause operator - of which the following are typical: -/- (1) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Superman came out. (1*) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Clark Kent came out. -/- (2) Superman is more successful with women than Clark Kent. (2*) Superman is (...)
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  21. On the Copernican Turn in Semantics.Cesare Cozzo - 2008 - Theoria 74 (4):295-317.
    Alberto Coffa used the phrase "the Copernican turn in semantics" to denote a revolutionary transformation of philosophical views about the connection between the meanings of words and the acceptability of sentences and arguments containing those words. According to the new conception resulting from the Copernican turn, here called "the Copernican view", rules of use are constitutive of the meanings of words. This view has been linked with two doctrines: (A) the instances of meaning-constitutive rules are analytically and a priori (...)
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  22. Null Sentences.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1999 - Iyyun, The Jewish Philosophical Quarterly 48:23-36.
    In Tractatus, Wittgenstein held that there are null sentences – prominently including logical truths and the truths of mathematics. He says that such sentences are without sense (sinnlos), that they say nothing; he also denies that they are nonsensical (unsinning). Surely it is what a sentence says which is true or false. So if a sentence says nothing, how can it be true or false? The paper discusses the issue.
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  23. BELIEF IN CAUSATION: ONE APPLICATION OF CARNAP's INDUCTIVE LOGIC.Yusuke Kaneko - 2012 - Academic Research International 3 (1).
    This paper takes two tasks. The one is elaborating on the relationship of inductive logic with decision theory to which later Carnap planned to apply his system (§§1-7); this is a surveying side of this article. The other is revealing the property of our prediction of the future, subjectivity (§§8-11); this is its philosophical aspect. They are both discussed under the name of belief in causation. Belief in causation is a kind of “degree of belief” born about the causal (...)
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  24. Godel Meets Carnap: A Prototypical Discourse on Science and Religion.Alfred Gierer - 1997 - Zygon 32 (2):207-217.
    Modern science, based on the laws of physics, claims validity for all events in space and time. However, it also reveals its own limitations, such as the indeterminacy of quantum physics, the limits of decidability, and, presumably, limits of decodability of the mind-brain relationship. At the philosophical level, these intrinsic limitations allow for different interpretations of the relation between human cognition and the natural order. In particular, modern science may be logically consistent with religious as well as agnostic views of (...)
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  25. Carnap and Kuhn on linguistic frameworks and scientific revolutions.Gilson Olegario - 2013 - Manuscrito 36 (1):190.
    Several recent works in history and philosophy of science have re-evaluated the alleged opposition between the theses put forth by logical empiricists such as Carnap and the so-called "post-positivists", such as Kuhn. Although the latter came to be viewed as having seriously challenged the logical positivist views of science, recent authors (e.g., Friedman, Reisch, Earman, Irzik and Grünberg) maintain that some of the most notable theses of the Kuhnian view of science have striking similarities with some aspects of (...)'s philosophy. Against that reading, Oliveira and Psillos argue that within Carnap's philosophy there is no place for the Kuhnian theses of incommensurability, holism, and theory-ladenness of observations. This paper presents each of those readings and argues that Carnap and Kuhn have non-opposing views on holism, incommensurability, the theory-ladenness of observations, and scientific revolutions. We note at the very end - without dwelling on the point, however - that they come apart on other matters, such as their views on metaphysics and on the context of discovery/justification distinction. (shrink)
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  26. Explicating Explication: Carnap’s Ideal [Review of Carnap’s Ideal of Explication and Naturalism]. [REVIEW]Adam Tamas Tuboly - 2015 - The Berlin Review of Books (10).
    Carnap’s Ideal of Explication and Naturalism is the second book on Rudolf Carnap’s philosophy edited by Pierre Wagner for Palgrave Macmillan’s series The History of Analytic Philosophy. The collection of essays is important for several reasons both for philosophers and historians of philosophy, but some parts of it will also be valuable to anyone interested in general scientific methodologies. I shall first survey the theme in order to locate the collection within the recent philosophical discussion then I will (...)
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  27.  47
    Review of 'Ontology After Carnap' Edited by Stephan Blatti and Sandra Lapointe. [REVIEW]Darren Bradley - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):858-861.
    © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com‘Carnap is not completely unknown to us’ comments Richard Creath in his contribution to this book. ‘We often know just enough to be baffled’. It will be no surprise to anyone when I say that this book will not unbaffle us. But it does give us a collection of rewarding papers that each wrestle with the legacy (...) has left us. The introduction contains a helpful summary of each paper, so rather than giving my own, I will trace one thread of argument that runs through a few of the papers.Perhaps the only feature of Carnap’s views that can be found throughout the book is his distinction between internal and external questions, according to which internal questions are good, external questions are bad and... (shrink)
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  28. Non-Declarative Sentences and the Theory of Descriptions.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2004 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 8 (1).
    A consequence of Russell's Theory of Descriptions is that non-indicative sentences (questions and imperatives) either have meanings that are obviously distinct from their actual meanings, even after all pragmatic and contextual variables are allowed for, or are categorically non-sensical. Therefore, the Theory of Descriptions is false.
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  29.  37
    Reality in Science.E. Ruttkamp - 1999 - South African Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):149-191.
    One way in which to address the intriguing relations between science and reality is to work via the models (mathematical structures) of formal scientific theories which are interpretations under which these theories turn out to be true. The so-called 'statement approach' to scientific theories -- characteristic for instance of Nagel, Carnap, and Hempel --depicts theories in terms of 'symbolic languages' and some set of 'correspondence rules' or 'definition principles'. The defenders of the oppositionist non-statement approach advocate an analysis where (...)
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  30.  31
    An Observation on Carnapʼs Continuum and Stochastic Independencies.J. B. Paris - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):421-429.
    We characterize those identities and independencies which hold for all probability functions on a unary language satisfying the Principle of Atom Exchangeability. We then show that if this is strengthen to the requirement that Johnson's Sufficientness Principle holds, thus giving Carnap's Continuum of inductive methods for languages with at least two predicates, then new and somewhat inexplicable identities and independencies emerge, the latter even in the case of Carnap's Continuum for the language with just a single predicate.
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  31.  51
    Why Fuss About These Quirks of the Vernacular? Propositional Attitude Sentences in Prior’s Nachlass.Giulia Felappi - 2016 - Synthese 193 (11):3521-3534.
    In English, in order to speak about Arthur’s attitudes, we use sentences like “Arthur believes that natural language is messy”. For sentences of this kind we have a standard theory, according to which the ‘that’-clause ‘that natural language is messy’ denotes a proposition. As Prior showed for the first time, the standard theory appears to be at odds with some linguistic data. Geach and Prior both assumed that linguistic data are to be taken as reliable guides to a (...)
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  32.  12
    Probabilities on Sentences in an Expressive Logic.Marcus Hutter, John W. Lloyd, Kee Siong Ng & William T. B. Uther - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):386-420.
    Automated reasoning about uncertain knowledge has many applications. One difficulty when developing such systems is the lack of a completely satisfactory integration of logic and probability. We address this problem directly. Expressive languages like higher-order logic are ideally suited for representing and reasoning about structured knowledge. Uncertain knowledge can be modeled by using graded probabilities rather than binary truth-values. The main technical problem studied in this paper is the following: Given a set of sentences, each having some probability of (...)
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  33.  52
    Rudolf Carnap.Logan Paul Gage - 2017 - In Paul Copan, I. I. I. Tremper Longman, Christopher L. Reese & Michael G. Strauss (eds.), Dictionary of Christianity and Science: The Definitive Reference for the Intersection of Christian Faith and Contemporary Science. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Academic. pp. 79-80.
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  34.  75
    The Limits and Basis of Logical Tolerance: Carnap’s Combination of Russell and Wittgenstein.Adam Tamas Tuboly - forthcoming - In Peter Stone (ed.), Bertrand Russell: Life and Legacy. Vernon Press.
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  35.  34
    Der Frühe Carnap Im Ideologischen Umfeld des Serakreises.Thomas Mormann - manuscript
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  36. Philosophy as Conceptual Engineering: Inductive Logic in Rudolf Carnap's Scientific Philosophy.Christopher F. French - 2015 - Dissertation, University of British Columbia
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  37.  39
    Logical Positivism and Carnap's Confirmability on the Meaningfulness of Religious Language.Alberto Oya - 2018 - Espíritu 67 (155):243-249.
    Due to their acceptance of the verifiability principle, the only way left for logical positivists to argue for the meaningfulness of religious language was to accept some sort of emotivistic conception of it or to reduce it to the description of religious attitude. The verifiability principle, however, suffers from some severe limitations that make it inadequate as a criterion for cognitive meaning. To resolve these problems, logical positivists gave up the requirement of conclusive verifiability and defended a sort of ‘liberalization’ (...)
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  38.  49
    Practical Moore Sentences.Matthew Mandelkern - forthcoming - Noûs.
    I discuss what I call practical Moore sentences: sentences like ‘You must close your door, but I don’t know whether you will’, which combine an order together with an avowal of agnosticism about whether the order will be obeyed. I show that practical Moore sentences are generally infelicitous. But this infelicity is surprising: it seems like there should be nothing wrong with giving someone an order while acknowledging that you do not know whether it will obeyed. I (...)
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  39. Carnap's Boundless Ocean of Unlimited Possibilities : Between Enlightenment and Romanticism.Thomas Mormann - 2012 - In Pierre Wagner (ed.), Carnap's Ideal of Explication and Naturalism. Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  40.  18
    Carnap: An Open Framework for Formal Reasoning in the Browser.Graham Leach-Krouse - 2018 - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 267:70-88.
    This paper presents an overview of Carnap, a free and open framework for the development of formal reasoning applications. Carnap’s design emphasizes flexibility, extensibility, and rapid prototyping. Carnap-based applications are written in Haskell, but can be compiled to JavaScript to run in standard web browsers. This combination of features makes Carnap ideally suited for educational applications, where ease-of-use is crucial for students and adaptability to different teaching strategies and classroom needs is crucial for instructors. The paper (...)
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  41. Carnap’s Epistemological Critique of Metaphysics.Darren Bradley - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2247-2265.
    Many who take a dismissive attitude towards metaphysics trace their view back to Carnap’s ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’. But the reason Carnap takes a dismissive attitude to metaphysics is a matter of controversy. I will argue that no reason is given in ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’, and this is because his reason for rejecting metaphysical debates was given in ‘Pseudo-Problems in Philosophy’. The argument there assumes verificationism, but I will argue that his argument survives the rejection of verificationism. (...)
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  42.  47
    A Note on Carnap’s Result and the Connectives.Tristan Haze - forthcoming - Axiomathes 28:1-4.
    Carnap’s result about classical proof-theories not ruling out non-normal valuations of propositional logic formulae has seen renewed philosophical interest in recent years. In this note I contribute some considerations which may be helpful in its philosophical assessment. I suggest a vantage point from which to see the way in which classical proof-theories do, at least to a considerable extent, encode the meanings of the connectives (not by determining a range of admissible valuations, but in their own way), and I (...)
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  43. Non-Descriptive Negation for Normative Sentences.Andrew Alwood - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):1-25.
    Frege-Geach worries about embedding and composition have plagued metaethical theories like emotivism, prescriptivism and expressivism. The sharpened point of such criticism has come to focus on whether negation and inconsistency have to be understood in descriptivist terms. Because they reject descriptivism, these theories must offer a non-standard account of the meanings of ethical and normative sentences as well as related semantic facts, such as why certain sentences are inconsistent with each other. This paper fills out such a solution (...)
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  44. Enlightenment and Formal Romanticism - Carnap’s Account of Philosophy as Explication.Thomas Mormann - 2010 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 14:263 - 329.
    Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as En lighten ment is the first book in the English language that seeks to place Carnap's philosophy in a broad cultural, political and intellectual context. According to the author, Carnap synthesized many different cur rents of thought and thereby arrived at a novel philosophical perspective that remains strik ing ly relevant today. Whether the reader agrees with Carus's bold theses on Carnap's place in the landscape of twentieth-century philosophy, and his (...)
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  45. Toward a Theory of the Pragmatic A Priori. From Carnap to Lewis and Beyond.Thomas Mormann - 2012 - Rudolf Carnap and the Legacy of Logical Empiricism 16:113 - 132.
    The aim of this paper is make a contribution to the ongoing search for an adequate concept of the a priori element in scientific knowledge. The point of departure is C.I. Lewis’s account of a pragmatic a priori put forward in his "Mind and the World Order" (1929). Recently, Hasok Chang in "Contingent Transcendental Arguments for Metaphysical Principles" (2008) reconsidered Lewis’s pragmatic a priori and proposed to conceive it as the basic ingredient of the dynamics of an embodied scientific reason. (...)
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  46. Identificational Sentences.Friederike Moltmann - 2013 - Natural Language Semantics 21 (1):43-77.
    Based on the notion of a trope, this paper gives a novel analysis of identificational sentences such as 'this is Mary','this is a beautiful woman', 'this looks like Mary', or 'this is the same lump of clay, but not the same statue as that'.
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  47. Geometrical Leitmotifs in Carnap’s Early Philosophy.Thomas Mormann - 2007 - In Richard Creath & Michael Friedman (eds.), Cambridge Companion to Rudolf Carnap. Cambridge University Press.
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  48. Making Sense of Questions in Logic and Mathematics: Mill Vs. Carnap.Esther Ramharter - 2006 - Prolegomena 5 (2):209-218.
    Whether mathematical truths are syntactical (as Rudolf Carnap claimed) or empirical (as Mill actually never claimed, though Carnap claimed that he did) might seem merely an academic topic. However, it becomes a practical concern as soon as we consider the role of questions. For if we inquire as to the truth of a mathematical statement, this question must be (in a certain respect) meaningless for Carnap, as its truth or falsity is certain in advance due to its (...)
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  49. Carnap's Metrical Conventionalism Versus Differential Topology.Thomas Mormann - 2004 - Proc. 2004 Biennial Meeting of the PSA, vol. I, Contributed Papers 72 (5):814 - 825.
    Geometry was a main source of inspiration for Carnap’s conventionalism. Taking Poincaré as his witness Carnap asserted in his dissertation Der Raum (Carnap 1922) that the metrical structure of space is conventional while the underlying topological structure describes "objective" facts. With only minor modifications he stuck to this account throughout his life. The aim of this paper is to disprove Carnap's contention by invoking some classical theorems of differential topology. By this means his metrical conventionalism turns (...)
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  50. Description, Construction and Representation. From Russell and Carnap to Stone.Thomas Mormann - 2006 - In Guido Imagire & Christine Schneider (eds.), Untersuchungen zur Ontologie.
    The first aim of this paper is to elucidate Russell’s construction of spatial points, which is to be <br>considered as a paradigmatic case of the "logical constructions" that played a central role in his epistemology and theory of science. Comparing it with parallel endeavours carried out by Carnap and Stone it is argued that Russell’s construction is best understood as a structural representation. It is shown that Russell’s and Carnap’s representational constructions may be considered as incomplete and sketchy (...)
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