Catherine The Faithful Queen Dowager -/- Author / Authors : Charles E.J. Moulton Page no. 56 – 68 Discipline : History/Swedish History Script/language : Roman/English Category : Research paper Keywords: Swedish history, Renaissance women, Arranged marriages, 16th century royalty.

Ontology is one strategy for promoting interoperability of heterogeneous data through consistent tagging. An ontology is a controlled structured vocabulary consisting of general terms (such as “cell” or “image” or “tissue” or “microscope”) that form the basis for such tagging. These terms are designed to represent the types of entities in the domain of reality that the ontology has been devised to capture; the terms are provided with logical defi nitions thereby also supporting reasoning over the tagged data. Aim: This (...) paper provides a survey of the biomedical imaging ontologies that have been developed thus far. It outlines the challenges, particularly faced by ontologies in the fields of histopathological imaging and image analysis, and suggests a strategy for addressing these challenges in the example domain of quantitative histopathology imaging. The ultimate goal is to support the multiscale understanding of disease that comes from using interoperable ontologies to integrate imaging data with clinical and genomics data. (shrink)

In his metaphysical summa of 1986, The Plurality of Worlds, David Lewis famously defends a doctrine he calls ‘modal realism’, the idea that to account for the fact that some things are possible and some things are necessary we must postulate an infinity possible worlds, concrete entities like our own universe, but cut off from us in space and time. Possible worlds are required to account for the facts of modality without assuming that modality is primitive – that there are (...) irreducibly modal facts. We argue that on one reading, Lewis’s theory licenses us to assume maverick possible worlds which spread through logical space gobbling up all the rest. Because they exclude alternatives, these worlds result in contradictions, since different spread worlds are incompatible with one another. Plainly Lewis’s theory must be amended to exclude these excluders. But, we maintain, this cannot be done without bringing in modal primitives. And once we admit modal primitives, bang goes the rationale for Lewis’s modal realism. (shrink)

In "Frailty Triage: Is Rationing Intensive Medical Treatment on the Grounds of Frailty Ethical?," Wilkinson (2021) argues that the use of frailty scores in ICU triage does not necessarily involve discrimination on the basis of disability. In support of this argument, he claims, “it is not the disability per se that the score is measuring – rather it is the underlying physiological and physical vulnerability." While we appreciate the attention Wilkinson explicitly pays to disability in this piece, we find the (...) distinction between disability and underlying vulnerability untenable both theoretically and practically. In this peer commentary, we begin with a brief overview of research in philosophy of disability concerning the meaning of the concept itself. We argue that this research demonstrates that many forms of disability do not involve underlying vulnerabilities, and, furthermore, that Wilkinson equivocates between "disability" understood as a medical category vs. "disability" understood as a feature of lived experience. We reject Wilkinson’s distinction on these grounds and offer further considerations to avoid disability discrimination in emergency and crisis standards of care contexts. (shrink)

Teaching at a private, conservative religious institution poses unique challenges for equality, diversity, and inclusivity education (EDI). Given the realities of the student population in the Honors College of a private, religious institution, it is necessary to first introduce students to the contemporary realities of inequality and oppression and thus the need for EDI. This chapter proposes a conceptual framework and pedagogical suggestions for teaching basic concepts of social justice in a team-taught, interdisciplinary social science course. The course integrates four (...) different approaches to justice: theoretical, social scientific, narratological, and experiential. The discussion of the experiential dimension of the course references practical pedagogical strategies for making social justice and inequality real for our students. Understanding the realities of social inequality and its roots can foster a better understanding of the social forces and structures that perpetuate inequality. Furthermore, this approach can plant the intellectual and empathic seeds to challenge in-group bias and hopefully germinate into fruitful interaction with diverse others. Finally, this rich, interdisciplinary encounter with social inequality and justice can prepare students to work for just social structures that will lead to a more inclusive world. (shrink)

This study used a partial least squares structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM) to estimate curriculum management's direct and indirect effects on university graduate programmes' viability. The study also examined the role of institutional effectiveness in mediating the nexus between the predictor and response variables. This is a correlational study with a factorial research design. The study's participants comprised 149 higher education administrators (23 Faculty Deans and 126 HODs) from two public universities in Nigeria. A structured questionnaire designed by the researchers was (...) used for data collection. The questionnaire was duly validated with an acceptable scale and item content validity indices. The dimensionality of the instrument was determined using exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Convergent validity was based on Average Variance Extracted (AVE), whereas discriminant validity was based on Fornell-Lacker criteria and the Hetero-Trait Mono-Trait (HTMT) ratio. Acceptable composite reliability estimates of internal consistency were reached for the three sub-scales. Following ethical practices, the questionnaire was physically administered to respondents and retrieved afterwards. Smart PLS (version 3.2.9) and SPSS (version 26.0) programs were used for all the statistical analyses. This study uncovered significant direct and indirect effects of curriculum management on the viability of graduate programmes. Institutional effectiveness significantly impacted graduate programmes’ viability while mediating the nexus between curriculum management and graduate programmes’ viability. Curriculum management and institutional effectiveness jointly explained a significant proportion of graduate programmes’ viability variance. The result of this study proved that graduate programmes’ viability depends, to a great extent, on how much curriculum is managed and how effective institutions are with their services. The result of this study can enable institutions seeking to run viable graduate programmes to re-evaluate their curriculum management practices and the effectiveness of their services. (shrink)

I have two aims in this paper. In §§2-4 I contend that Moore has two arguments (not one) for the view that that ‘good’ denotes a non-natural property not to be identified with the naturalistic properties of science and common sense (or, for that matter, the more exotic properties posited by metaphysicians and theologians). The first argument, the Barren Tautology Argument (or the BTA), is derived, via Sidgwick, from a long tradition of anti-naturalist polemic. But the second argument, the Open (...) Question Argument proper (or the OQA), seems to have been Moore’s own invention and was probably devised to deal with naturalistic theories, such as Russell’s, which are immune to the Barren Tautology Argument. The OQA is valid and not (as Frankena (1939) has alleged) question-begging. Moreover, if its premises were true, it would have disposed of the desire-to-desire theory. But as I explain in §5, from 1970 onwards, two key premises of the OQA were successively called into question, the one because philosophers came to believe in synthetic identities between properties and the other because it led to the Paradox of Analysis. By 1989 a philosopher like Lewis could put forward precisely the kind of theory that Moore professed to have refuted with a clean intellectual conscience. However, in §§6-8 I shall argue that all is not lost for the OQA. I first press an objection to the desire-to-desire theory derived from Kripke’s famous epistemic argument. On reflection this argument looks uncannily like the OQA. But the premise on which it relies is weaker than the one that betrayed Moore by leading to the Paradox of Analysis. This suggests three conclusions: 1) that the desire-to-desire theory is false; 2) that the OQA can be revived, albeit in a modified form; and 3) that the revived OQA poses a serious threat to what might be called semantic naturalism. (shrink)

L’objection la plus ancienne et la plus redoutable à la démocratie fait valoir que le gouvernement par le peuple dessert le gouvernement pour le peuple. Les citoyens manquant pour la plupart de sagesse ou de compétence, le bien commun serait mieux assuré en confiant le pouvoir à un individu éclairé ou à une élite experte. Une réponse commune à cette objection concède la prémisse mais affirme la priorité au gouvernement par le peuple sur le gouvernement pour le peuple : le (...) droit égal à la participation devrait l’emporter sur la promotion de la compétence, même si celle-ci est requise par le bon gouvernement. La démocratie se trouve alors réduite à un ensemble de procédures équitables, traitant les citoyens en égaux ; elle ne se définit plus par la poursuite du bien commun. Il est toutefois une autre réponse à l’objection, qui évite cette dérive vers un procéduralisme étroit. Elle consiste à nier la prémisse et à affirmer la sagesse politique du peuple. Il n’est pas vrai que le gouvernement pour le peuple serait mieux assuré en confiant le pouvoir à un petit nombre de sages ou d’experts, fussent-ils les meilleurs parmi les citoyens. Cette thèse remarquable peut paraître improbable. Sa défense peut pourtant s’appuyer sur l’un des arguments les plus intrigants élaborés par la philosophie politique aristotélicienne, qui inspire et éclaire les controverses philosophiques contemporaines sur la valeur du régime démocratique : l’argument de la sagesse de la multitude. (shrink)

Newton’s impact on Enlightenment natural philosophy has been studied at great length, in its experimental, methodological and ideological ramifications. One aspect that has received fairly little attention is the role Newtonian “analogies” played in the formulation of new conceptual schemes in physiology, medicine, and life science as a whole. So-called ‘medical Newtonians’ like Pitcairne and Keill have been studied; but they were engaged in a more literal project of directly transposing, or seeking to transpose, Newtonian laws into quantitative models of (...) the body. I am interested here in something different: neither the metaphysical reading of Newton, nor direct empirical transpositions, but rather, a more heuristic, empiricist construction of Newtonian analogies. Figures such as Haller, Barthez, and Blumenbach constructed analogies between the method of celestial mechanics and the method of physiology. In celestial mechanics, they held, an unknown entity such as gravity is posited and used to mathematically link sets of determinate physical phenomena (e.g., the phases of the moon and tides). This process allows one to remain agnostic about the ontological status of the unknown entity, as long as the two linked sets of phenomena are represented adequately. Haller et. al. held that the Newtonian physician and physiologist can similarly posit an unknown called ‘life’ and use it to link various other phenomena, from digestion to sensation and the functioning of the glands. These phenomena consequently appear as interconnected, goal-oriented processes which do not exist either in an inanimate mechanism or in a corpse. In keeping with the empiricist roots of the analogy, however, no ontological claims are made about the nature of this vital principle, and no attempts are made to directly causally connect such a principle and observable phenomena. The role of the “Newtonian analogy” thus brings together diverse schools of thought, and cuts across a surprising variety of programs, models and practices in natural philosophy. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt’s politics is aesthetic rather than practical, motivated by enjoyment rather than well-being, and so it should be rejected. I begin with an account of aestheticism as the doctrine according to which seemingly non-aesthetic things are actually aesthetic, parts of a whole dimension of reality that we might simply call “the aesthetic.” We access it by taking a disinterested attitude, one that affirms things for their own sakes, and there are four ways of doing this: disinterested appreciating (e.g., of (...) beautiful art), fun playing, fantasizing, and putting on shows or spectacles. While Arendt’s politics takes a classical republican form that is like a competitive game, an analysis of her conceptions of acting and judging reveals that the modes of disinterested showing and appreciating are also present. Her philosophy has another motivation, however, alongside enjoying the aesthetic: the need to escape the reality of evil. (shrink)

There are two motivations commonly ascribed to historical actors for taking up statistics: to reduce complicated data to a mean value (e.g., Quetelet), and to take account of diversity (e.g., Galton). Different motivations will, it is assumed, lead to different methodological decisions in the practice of the statistical sciences. Karl Pearson and W. F. R. Weldon are generally seen as following directly in Galton’s footsteps. I argue for two related theses in light of this standard interpretation, based on a reading (...) of several sources in which Weldon, independently of Pearson, reflects on his own motivations. First, while Pearson does approach statistics from this "Galtonian" perspective, he is, consistent with his positivist philosophy of science, utilizing statistics to simplify the highly variable data of biology. Weldon, on the other hand, is brought to statistics by a rich empiricism and a desire to preserve the diversity of biological data. Secondly, we have here a counterexample to the claim that divergence in motivation will lead to a corresponding separation in methodology. Pearson and Weldon, despite embracing biometry for different reasons, settled on precisely the same set of statistical tools for the investigation of evolution. (shrink)

The Racial Contract pone la teoría clásica del contrato social occidental, sin ambages, al servicio de un uso radical extraordinario. Con una mirada arrolladora sobre el expansionismo y el racismo europeos de los últimos quinientos años, Charles W. Mills demuestra cómo este peculiar y no reconocido "contrato" ha dado forma a un sistema de dominación europea global: cómo da lugar a la existencia de "blancos" y "no blancos", personas de pleno derecho y subpersonas, cómo influye en la teoría moral (...) y la psicología moral de los blancos; y cómo este sistema se impone a los no blancos mediante el condicionamiento ideológico y la violencia. The Racial Contract sostiene que la sociedad en la que vivimos es un estado continuado de supremacía blanca. Levantando un espejo ante la filosofía dominante, este provocativo libro explica el esquema evolutivo del contrato racial desde la época de la conquista del Nuevo Mundo y el posterior colonialismo, pasando por el contrato escrito de la esclavitud, hasta el sistema de segregación "separados pero iguales" en los Estados Unidos del siglo XX. Según Mills, el contrato ha proporcionado la arquitectura teórica que justifica toda una historia de atrocidades europeas contra los no blancos, desde las afirmaciones de David Hume e Immanuel Kant de que los negros tenían un poder cognitivo inferior, pasando por el Holocausto, hasta el tipo de imperialismo en Asia que se demostró con la guerra de Vietnam. Mills sugiere que la guetización del trabajo filosófico sobre la raza no es accidental. Este trabajo desafía la suposición de que la teoría dominante carece en sí misma de raza. Al igual que la teoría feminista ha revelado el sesgo invisible de la filosofía política hacia los hombres blancos, la explicación de Mills del contrato racial expone sus fundamentos raciales. (shrink)

The concept of self has preeminently been asserted (in its many versions) as a core component of anti-reductionist, antinaturalistic philosophical positions, from Descartes to Husserl and beyond, with the exception of some hybrid or intermediate positions which declare rather glibly that, since we are biological entities which fully belong to the natural world, and we are conscious of ourselves as 'selves', therefore the self belongs to the natural world (this is characteristic e.g. of embodied phenomenology and enactivism). Nevertheless, from Cudworth (...) and More’s attacks on materialism all the way through twentieth-century argument against naturalism, the gulf between selfhood and the world of Nature appears unbridgeable. In contrast, my goal in this paper is to show that early modern materialism could yield a theory of the self according to which (1) the self belongs to the world of external relations (Spinoza), such that no one fact, including supposedly private facts, is only accessible to a single person; (2) the self can be reconstructed as a sense of “organic unity” which could be a condition for biological individuality (a central text here is Diderot’s 1769 Rêve de D’Alembert); yet this should not lead us to espouse a Romantic concept of organism as foundational or even ineffable subjectivity (a dimension present in Leibniz and made explicit in German idealism); (3) what we call 'self' might simply be a dynamic process of interpretive activity undertaken by the brain. This materialist theory of the self should not neglect the nature of experience, but it should also not have to take at face value the recurring invocations of a better, deeper “first-person perspective” or “first-person science.”. (shrink)

Table of contents for MONSTERS AND PHILOSOPHY, edited by Charles T. Wolfe (London 2005) -/- List of Contributors iii Acknowledgments vii List of Abbreviations ix -/- Introduction xi Charles T. Wolfe The Riddle of the Sphinx: Aristotle, Penelope, and 1 Empedocles Johannes Fritsche Science as a Cure for Fear: The Status of Monsters in 21 Lucretius Morgan Meis Nature and its Monsters During the Renaissance: 37 Montaigne and Vanini Tristan Dagron Conjoined Twins and the Limits of our Reason (...) 61 Annie Bitbol-Hespériès Degeneration and Hybridism in the Early Modern Species 109 Debate: Towards the Philosophical Roots of the Creation-Evolution Controversy Justin E. H. Smith Leibniz on the Unicorn and Various other Curiosities 131 Roger Ariew The Creativity of God and the Order of Nature: 153 Anatomizing Monsters in the Early Eighteenth Century Anita Guerrini The Status of Anomalies in the Philosophy of Diderot 169 Annie Ibrahim The Materialist Denial of Monsters 187 Charles T. Wolfe Cerebral Assymetry, Monstrosities and Hegel. 205 On the Situation of the Life Sciences in 1800 Michael Hagner The Lady Knight of the Perilous Place 217 Elfriede Jelinek Monster: More than a Word. . . From Portent to Anomaly, 231 the Extraordinary Career of Monsters Beate Ochsner Index 281 . (shrink)

Phenomenological realism, in the tradition of Dietrich von Hildebrand, is advanced as a promising methodology for a theistic philosophy of divine and human agency. Phenomenological realism is defended in contrast to the practice of historicalism -- the view that a philosophy of mind and God should always be done as part of a thoroughgoing history of philosophy, e.g. the use of examples in analytic theology should be subordinated to engaging the work of Kant and other great philosophers. The criticism of (...) theism based on forms of naturalism that give exclusive authority to the physical sciences is criticized from a phenomenological, realist perspective. (shrink)

In his Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty (1717), the English deist Anthony Collins proposed a complete determinist account of the human mind and action, partly inspired by his mentor Locke, but also by elements from Bayle, Leibniz and other Continental sources. It is a determinism which does not neglect the question of the specific status of the mind but rather seeks to provide a causal account of mental activity and volition in particular; it is a ‘volitional determinism’. Some decades later, (...) Diderot articulates a very similar determinism, which seeks to recognize the existence of “causes proper to man” (as he says in the Réfutation d’Helvétius). The difference with Collins is that now biological factors are being taken into account. Obviously both the ‘volitional’ and the ‘biological’ forms of determinism are noteworthy inasmuch as they change our picture of the nature of determinism itself, but my interest here is to compare these two determinist arguments, both of which are broadly Spinozist in nature – and as such belong to what Jonathan Israel called in his recent book “the radical Enlightenment,” i.e. a kind of underground Enlightenment constituted by Spinozism – and to see how Collins’ specifically psychological vision and Diderot’s specifically biological vision correspond to their two separate national contexts: determinism in France in the mid-1750s was a much more medico-biological affair than English determinism, which appears to be on a ‘path’ leading to Mill and associationist psychology. (shrink)

How does Locke contribute to the development of 18th-century projects for a science of the mind, even though he seems to reject or at least bracket off such an idea himself? Contrary to later understandings of empiricism, Locke goes out of his way to state that his project to investigate and articulate the ‘logic of ideas’ is not a scientific project: “I shall not at present meddle with the Physical consideration of the Mind” (Essay, I.i.2). Locke further specifies that this (...) means his analysis of mental processes will not engage with knowledge of the brain (e.g. in terms of corpuscles and animal spirits), even though he had been the student of Thomas Willis. Now, Kant seemed to make an elementary mistake, given such a clear statement on Locke’s part, when he claimed that Locke’s project was a “physiology of the understanding” (in the Preface to the A edition of the first Critique). One can ask of course what this physiology of the understanding was, and if it existed, in or out of the Lockean intellectual world (as I have sought to investigate in a 2016 paper). This leads me to inquire into the outcome of his empiricism for a scientific treatment of the mind, including in the sense of a ‘naturalization’ of the mind (with implications also for our understanding of empiricism: Anstey’s influential distinction between experimental and speculative philosophy does not seem useful here). Because if Kant made this charge, there were also many 18th-century thinkers who positively treated Locke as their great forerunner in psychology and related fields: Charles Bonnet and Joseph Priestley among them, just as some prominent physicians such as Cabanis claimed to be ‘finishing the job’ that Locke had started in, e.g. their materialist theories of the passions. What one might term ‘the Locke Problem’ here is: how can one reconcile empiricism and claims about cerebral processes, while seeking to remain a Lockean? Differently put, what is the process of naturalization, a naturalization of? (shrink)

The paper examines the loss of African identity within the modern/ contemporary era. African identity has been a recurrent theme in all domains of African studies, serving as a major intellectual concern of many African scholars. Debates on the reality of African Philosophy are anchored on the questions surrounding African identity giving rise to thoughts and contents of that philosophy. Despite the volumes already generated on the theme, the controversial circumstances that engendered the subject of African identity makes its intellectual (...) concern sustainable and almost inexhaustible. The question of African identity is basically an ontological question of the reality of Africa cum the being of an African. The series of infiltration and appraisals of Africa by foreign elements tend to plunge the continent into crises of identity. In addition to the various approaches to the subject, the nature-culture perspective presents the argument that if culture is ideally the product of a people’s nature, African culture represents the objective manifestation of the Africanity of the continent and its organic/holistic content. Such frame of thought embellished with philosophic tools provides further locus for a more feasible and stable definition of African identity as the holistic nature and character of being African. (shrink)

Locke and Leibniz deny that there are any such beings as ‘monsters’ (anomalies, natural curiosities, wonders, and marvels), for two very different reasons. For Locke, monsters are not ‘natural kinds’: the word ‘monster’ does not individuate any specific class of beings ‘out there’ in the natural world. Monsters depend on our subjective viewpoint. For Leibniz, there are no monsters because we are all parts of the Great Chain of Being. Everything that happens, happens for a reason, including a monstrous birth. (...) But what about materialism? Well, beginning with the anatomical interest into ‘monstrous births’ in the French Académie des Sciences in the first three decades of the eighteenth century, there is a shift away from ‘imaginationist’ claims such as those of Malebranche, that if a woman gives birth to a monstrous child it is a consequence of something she imagined. Anatomists such as Lemery and Winslow try to formulate a strictly mechanical explanation for such events, rejecting moral and metaphysical explanations. Picking up on this work, materialist thinkers like Diderot are compelled to reject the very idea of monsters. We are all material beings produced according to the same mechanisms or laws, some of us are more ‘successful’ products than others, i.e. some live longer than others. In his late Eléments de physiologie he says “L’homme est un effet commun, le monstre un effet rare.” Ultimately he arrives at a materialist version of Leibniz’s position: there are no monsters, we are all monsters in each other’s eyes, at one time or another. This conclusion is a pregnant one in light of twentieth century interest in the problem of ‘the normal and the pathological’ (Canguilhem), and the broader question of how materialism relates to the biological world. (shrink)

Milgram’s experiments, subjects were induced to inflict what they believed to be electric shocks in obedience to a man in a white coat. This suggests that many of us can be persuaded to torture, and perhaps kill, another person simply on the say-so of an authority figure. But the experiments have been attacked on methodological, moral and methodologico-moral grounds. Patten argues that the subjects probably were not taken in by the charade; Bok argues that lies should not be used in (...) research; and Patten insists that any excuse for Milgram’s conduct can be adapted on behalf of his subjects. (Either he was wrong to conduct the experiments or they do not establish the phenomenon of immoral obedience). We argue a) that the subjects were indeed taken in b) that there are good historical reasons for regarding the experiments as ecologically valid, c) that lies (though usually wrong) were in this case legitimate, d) that there were excuses available to Milgram which were not available to his subjects and e) that even if he was wrong to conduct the experiments this does not mean that he failed to establish immoral obedience. So far from ‘disrespecting’ his subjects, Milgram enhanced their autonomy as rational agents. We concede however that it might (now) be right to prohibit what it was (then) right to do. (shrink)

The history of philosophy can be seen either as a contribution to history or a contribution to philosophy or perhaps as a bit of both. Hutchinson fail on both counts. The book is bad: bad in itself (since it quite definitely ought not to be) and bad as a companion to Principia (since it sets students a bad example of slapdash, lazy and pretentious philosophizing and would tend to put them off reading Moore). As a conscientious reviewer I ploughed through (...) every page and I have to say that I resented every minute of my life that I wasted on the book. Don’t waste any of yours. (shrink)

Until very recently the received wisdom on Russell’s moral philosophy was that it is uninspired and derivative, from Moore in its first phase and from Hume and the emotivists in its second. In my view this is a consensus of error. In the latter part of this essay I contend: 1) that Russell’s ‘work in moral philosophy’ had at least three, and (depending how you look at it) up to six ‘main phases’; 2) that in some of those phases, it (...) was not derivative, but on the contrary, highly original; 3) that Russell was a pioneer of two of the chief forms of ethical anti-realism that have dominated debate in this century, emotivism and the error theory (so that if the theory of Human Society was derived from emotivism, it was derived from a family of theories that Russell himself helped to create); 4) that the revolt against Hegelianism, which led to the birth of Analytic Philosophy, had an ethical dimension to it; and 5) that Russell played an important part in the debates that led up to Moore’s Principia Ethica, so that the view form which his own opinions were derived is one that he helped to develop. -/- I also argue that Russell himself pioneered a rather puritanical conception of philosophy which tended to extrude his own writings on politics and practical ethics as not really philosophical. Since this conception has been largely abandoned, it is time to let them back into the fold. I argue that this views of practical affairs are often backed by interesting philosophical arguments, illustrating this thesis with a reconstruction and critique of Russell’s Hobbesian argument for world government. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell was a meta-ethical pioneer, the original inventor of both emotivism and the error theory. Why, having abandoned emotivism for the error theory, did he switch back to emotivism in the 1920s? Perhaps he did not relish the thought that as a moralist he was a professional hypocrite. In addition, Russell's version of the error theory suffers from severe defects. He commits the naturalistic fallacy and runs afoul of his own and Moore's arguments against subjectivism. These defects could be (...) repaired, but only by abandoning Russell's semantics.Russell preferred to revert to emotivism. (shrink)

The brain in its plasticity and inherent 'sociality' can be proclaimed and projected as a revolutionary organ. Far from the old reactions which opposed the authenticity of political theory and praxis to the dangerous naturalism of 'cognitive science' (with images of men in white coats, the RAND Corporation or military LSD experiments), recent decades have shown us some of the potentiality of the social brain (Vygotsky, and more recently Negri 1995 and Negri 2000, Virno 2001). Is the brain somehow inherently (...) a utopian topos? If in some earlier papers I sought to defend naturalism against these reactions, here I consider a new challenge: the recently emerged disciplines of neuronormativity, which seek in their own way to overcome the nature-normativity divide. This is the task of a materialist brain theory today. 1. The setup: horns of a dilemma There is a lingering zone of what one might think of as sore cognitive muscle tissue in the area of materialism. It is an area of both contested territory and in some cases, a kind of pathos of distance of the 'Ugh! Keep that thing away from me!' sort. I have in mind the combination of materialism as an emancipatory socio-political project (which need not be construed in strictly Marx-Engels terms, if we think of Lucretius et al.) and as a cold-hearted 'spontaneous philosophy of the men in white coats', e.g. nefarious neurophilosophers. Faced with this rather massive alternative, this choice between two projects, I have stubbornly been saying since some discussions with Negri in the late 90s. (shrink)

How should we think of the preferences of citizens? Whereas self-optimal policy is relatively straightforward to produce, socially optimal policy often requires a more detailed examination. In this paper, we identify an issue that has received far too little attention in welfarist modelling of public policy, which we name the "hidden assumptions" problem. Hidden assumptions can be deceptive because they are not expressed explicitly and the social planner (e.g. a policy maker, a regulator, a legislator) may not give them the (...) critical attention they need. We argue that ethical expertise has a direct role to play in public discourse because it is hard to adopt a position on major issues like public health policy or healthcare prioritisation without making contentious assumptions about population ethics. We then postulate that ethicists are best situated to critically evaluate these hidden assumptions, and can therefore play a vital role in public policy debates. (shrink)

Public attitudes towards cognitive enhancement––e.g., using stimulants like Adderall and Ritalin to improve mental functioning––are mixed. Attitudes vary by context and prompt ethical concerns about fairness, obligation, and authenticity/character. While people may have strong views about the morality of cognitive enhancement, how these views are affected by the physical characteristics of enhancers is unknown. Visible facial anomalies (e.g., scars) bear negatively on perceptions of moral character. This pre-registered study (osf[dot]io/uaw6c/) tested the hypothesis that such negative biases against people with facial (...) anomalies extend to moral beliefs surrounding their use of cognitive enhancement. In an online survey, 941 participants made moral judgments in response to a vignette about a person who had to decide whether or not to enhance. The vignette was accompanied by a face photograph that ostensibly depicted the potential enhancer and either did or did not have visible anomalies. Participants then learned whether the person ultimately decided to enhance. Next, participants played a modified Trust Game with, they were told, the person from the photograph/vignette. Participants judged enhancement to be less fair and enhancers less authentic if they had facial anomalies, while effects on judgments of moral obligation and on behavior were not detected. These findings extend previous work showing that people with visible differences are subject to an “anomalous-is-bad” stereotype that has negative consequences for perceptions of their moral character. While anomalous faces were judged more harshly, these judgments did not appear to affect behavior. These results are discussed in relation to discrimination and policy. (shrink)

In this paper we suggest a revisionist perspective on two significant figures in early modern life science and philosophy: William Harvey and John Locke. Harvey, the discoverer of the circulation of the blood, is often named as one of the rare representatives of the ‘life sciences’ who was a major figure in the Scientific Revolution. While this status itself is problematic, we would like to call attention to a different kind of problem: Harvey dislikes abstraction and controlled experiments (aside from (...) the ligature experiment in De Motu Cordis), tends to dismiss the value of instruments such as the microscope, and emphasizes instead the privileged status of ‘observed experience’. To use a contemporary term, Harvey appears to rely on, and chiefly value, ‘tacit knowledge’. Secondly, Locke’s project is often explained with reference to the image he uses in the Epistle to the Reader of his Essay, that he was an “underlabourer” of the sciences. In fact, despite the significant medical phase of his career, Locke’s ‘empiricism’ turns out to be above all a practical (i.e. ‘moral’) project, which focuses on the delimitation of our powers in order to achieve happiness, and rejects the possibility of naturalizing knowledge. When combined, these two cases suggest a different view of some canonical moments in early modern natural philosophy. (shrink)

In this article we explore an argumentative pattern that provides a normative justification for expected utility functions grounded on empirical evidence, showing how it worked in three different episodes of their development. The argument claims that we should prudentially maximize our expected utility since this is the criterion effectively applied by those who are considered wisest in making risky choices (be it gamblers or businessmen). Yet, to justify the adoption of this rule, it should be proven that this is empirically (...) true: i.e. that a given function allows us to predict the choices of that particular class of agents. We show how expected utility functions were introduced and contested in accordance with this pattern in the 18th century and how it recurred in the 1950s when Allais made his case against the neo-Bernoullians. (shrink)

Martin E. Rosenberg -/- The Gift of Silence: Towards an Anthropology of Jazz Improvisation as Neuro-Resistance. -/- ABSTRACT: -/- This essay addresses how the complex processes that occur during jazz improvisation enact behaviors that resemble the logic of gift exchange first described by Marcel Mauss. It is possible to bring to bear structural, sociological, political economical, deconstructive or even ethical approaches to what constitutes gift exchange during the performance of jazz. Yet, I would like to shift from focusing this analysis (...) of jazz improvisation with reference to the language of music as symbolic action (which all of these approaches require), to grounding improvisation in embodied and distributed cognition, the performance of which begins with a ritual gift of silence. By silence, I refer to the embodied, yet shared pure duration as felt synchrony within an individual performer, that extends to the members of an ensemble. Thus, I refer to both aesthetic and micro-political implications of embodied, yet also distributed musical cognition in real time. -/- For jazz musicians, embodied silence becomes the initial condition for processes of cognitive bifurcation. For it is bifurcation that attracts us to jazz in the first place. Here I expand my previous work establishing similarities in the behavior of bifurcating systems in physical and cognitive sciences to the unfolding of ambiguity in real time during improvisation with respect to polyphony, polytonality and polyrhythms in the history of jazz from Charlie Parker to Ornette Coleman. We can therefore re-conceptualize jazz improvisation as a subversive antidote for processes of determination identified in a sub-discipline of cultural studies called “cognitive capitalism.” By examining silence from this anthropological perspective, we can conceive of jazz performance as a ritualized resistance to top-down cognitive control immanent with social and digital networks. The ritual enactment that is jazz improvisation points towards an aesthetics of bifurcation that is simultaneously a micro-politics of neuro-resistance. In other words, I argue that freedom of thought requires freedom from thought as an initial condition. -/- Yet, I emphasize the empirical rather than mystical grounds to this gift of silence. The valorization of silence by jazz musicians is not simply etiquette, an ethics of reciprocity for performers exchanging “riffs,” but an initial condition that jazz performers (and, I would argue, listeners) experience in their bodies, thus linking embodied cognition to a collective field of cultural production that emerges from each embodied individual, and yet also pervades the ensemble in ways reminiscent of feedback loops in complex systems. The recent and remarkable research on music and the brain has demonstrated that it is now possible to describe jazz improvisation as possessing both embodied and distributed cognitive properties. The emergent neuronal ensemble behavior within the individual that is visible in jazz improvisors, discovered by the neuroscientists at Johns Hopkins led by Charles Limb, bears striking resemblance to the interactive behaviors of the jazz ensemble itself. Thus, it is by recourse to recent research by myself and others into the cognitive neuroscience of music generally, and jazz improvisation specifically, that the empirical grounds for an anthropology of neuro-resistance become visible. (shrink)

The as-structure provided by language, even in the sciences, is always constitutive of experience and never merely designative. “From Saying…it comes to pass that the World is made to appear” (Heidegger 1971 [1957]: 101).

Imagine that you are part of the editorial board of a young bioethics journal committed to publishing open access (OA) and to ensuring accessibility to high quality and innovative scholarship. To support junior and interna- tional scholars who might not otherwise find places for their work in the leading Western bioethics journals, you do not charge author fees. Imagine also that you have no financial resources to pay for a professional website, auto- mated submissions manager, or even a part-time coordina- (...) tor: Your government has cut all grants for journals, you cannot go to industry for private funding because of the evident risk of apparent conflicts of interest, and your strapped-for-cash institution cannot afford to offer you any support. If one of the major publishers were to approach you to sign a deal, the temptation would be strong to accept. However, this would likely mean putting aside your ideals: It would be impossible to stay a “Green OA” publication (i.e., free of author publication charges) or supportive of junior and international scholars (because of pressures to “increase credibility” through artificially high rejection rates, for example). (shrink)

In this paper Peirce's notion of sign is studied to try to characterize the artistic sign as representation. Then, some considerations about the work of art as a sign are developed involving three elements: experience, expression and interpretation. Finally it is concluded that beauty requires for Peirce a peculiar balance, the imaginative conjunction of the sensible and the reasonable in an artistic sign; it requires moreover the expression of something that transcends the sensible; it requires, as a sign, an interpretation (...) which is not exact and which implies growth. It requires, finally, love, because an artist will only reach beauty guided by agape updating and harmonizing possibilities through abduction, that is, creating new signs that give form to what does not have it; the artist only reaches beauty when he loves what he does and when he can express himself freely. -/- En este artículo se estudia, en primer lugar, la noción de signo de Peirce para tratar de caracterizar después el signo artístico como representación. Se desarrollan enseguida algunas consideraciones sobre la obra de arte como signo que como tal conlleva tres elementos: experiencia, expresión e interpretación. Finalmente se concluye que la belleza requiere para Peirce un peculiar equilibrio, la conjunción imaginativa de lo sensible y lo razonable en un signo artístico; requiere además la expresión de algo que trasciende lo sensible; requiere, en tanto signo, de una interpretación que no es exacta y que implica crecimiento. Requiere, por último, amor, pues el artista solo alcanzará lo bello cuando sea guiado por el ágape y a través de la abducción vaya actualizando y armonizando posibilidades, creando nuevos signos que den forma a lo que no la tiene, cuando ame lo que hace y se exprese libremente. (shrink)

This volume contains new and original papers on Martin Heidegger's complex relation to Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy. The authors not only critically discuss the many aspects of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche, they also interpret Heidegger's thought from a Nietzschean perspective. Here is presented for the first time an overview of not only Heidegger's and Nietzsche's philosophy but also an overview of what is alive - and dead - in their thinking. Many authors through a reading of Heidegger and Nietzsche deal with (...) current issues such as technology, ecology, and politics. This volume is of interest for everyone interested in Heidegger's and Nietzsche's thought. Contributors include: Babette Babich, Charles Bambach, Robert Bernasconi, Virgilio Cesarone, Stuart Elden, Michael Eldred, Markus Enders, Charles Feitosa, Véronique Fóti, Luanne T. Frank, Jeffery Kinlaw, Theodore Kisiel, William D. Melaney, Eric Sean Nelson, Abraham Olivier, Friederike Rese, Karlheinz Ruhstorfer, Harald Seubert, Robert Sinnerbrink, Robert Switzer, Jorge Uscatescu Barrón, Nancy A. Weston, Dale Wilkerson, Angel Xolocotzi, Jens Zimmermann. (shrink)

L’anno appena trascorso è stato dimenticabile (per ovvie ragioni) e i filosofi politici hanno una ragione in più per dimenticarlo data la prematura scomparsa di Gerald Gaus. Tuttavia, essi potrebbero forse trovare una qualche consolazione nel fatto che il 2020 ha visto la pubblicazione di due notevoli opere dedicate alla loro disciplina: 'Utopohobia', di David Estlund e 'What is Political Philosophy?', di Charles Larmore. In questo saggio, dopo aver offerto una sintesi criminalmente breve del nucleo argomentativo dei due volumi, (...) li metterò in dialogo, usando le risorse dell'uno per interrogare e problematizzare alcune tesi dell'altro (e viceversa). (shrink)

book review: Sylvain Lévi, "La dottrina del sacrificio nei Brāhmaṇa. Con tre saggi di Roberto Calasso, Charles Malamoud e Louis Renou", traduzione di Silvia D’Intino. Adelphi, Milano 2009, 224 pp.

Necessity is a touchstone issue in the thought of Charles Peirce, not least because his pragmatist account of meaning relies upon modal terms. We here offer an overview of Peirce’s highly original and multi-faceted take on the matter. We begin by considering how a self-avowed pragmatist and fallibilist can even talk about necessary truth. We then outline the source of Peirce’s theory of representation in his three categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, (monadic, dyadic and triadic relations). These have (...) modal purport insofar as the first category corresponds to possibility, the second to mechanical necessity and the third to a kind of semantic or intentional necessity. We then turn to Peirce’s explicit modal epistemology and show how it began as information-relative, with different modalities (e.g. logical, physical, practical) distinguished in terms of respective ‘designated states of information’, and shifted later in his life towards a more robust realism founded in direct perception of ideas in their relations. We then turn to Peirce’s formal logic, focusing on his diagrammatic system of Existential Graphs where he did his most serious logical research. Finally we discuss Peirce’s modal metaphysics and its implications for determinism and realism about universals. (shrink)

A review of the Collected Writings of T. E. Hulme. Argues that Hulme, a philosopher/journist/poet who was killed in WWI, was a forerunner of the 20th-cent. mind, esp. as reflected in modernist poetry (T. S. Eliot, Imagism, Ezra Pound), aesthetics (Wilhelm Worringer), philosophy (Bergson, Jaspers, Wittgenstein), and politics (Charles Maurras, Georges Sorel).

Este artigo tem por objetivo descrever e comparar as propostas da política de reconhecimento desenvolvidas por Axel Honneth, na obra Luta por reconhecimento, e por Charles Taylor, na obra Argumentos filosóficos. Ambos os pensadores buscam em Hegel uma referência teórica para renovar suas teorias. Em Honneth, a noção de reconhecimento está fortemente ancorada na intersubjetividade dos indivíduos, decorrente de uma luta por reconhecimento: o desrespeito a qualquer uma das formas de reconhecimento pleno – o amor, o direito e a (...) solidariedade – gera demandas sociais de reconhecimento e, consequentemente, a luta pelo mesmo. Em Taylor, o reconhecimento pressupõe uma noção ontológica de bem, prefigurado na linguagem, tradição, valores e costumes. Ambos os autores mantêm um vínculo forte com a ideia hegeliana da intersubjetividade como instância fundamental na formação das identidades, enquanto base coletiva dos movimentos sociais. (shrink)

Estamos cansados das utopias. Estamos cansados das utopias literárias e dos devaneios sobre a Cidade ideal: as utopias em ação que foram os totalitarismos do século XX nos nausearam. Os horrores reais de uns nos impedem de sonhar com os outros. Nossas antigas utopias De Platão a Thomas More, de Étienne Cabet a Fourier, as utopias falavam da rejeição do presente e do real: “Existe o mal na comunidade dos homens”. Mas não lhe contrapunham o futuro nem o possível; elas (...) descreviam um impossível desejável: “Seria bom viver lá!”. Não eram programas políticos planejando meios de atingir um objetivo racional. Contentavam-se em querer o melhor. E mais valia o Bem nunca obtido a um Mal menor amanhã. As utopias eram revolucionárias, mas em palavras: “Os homens vivem assim, sempre viveram assim, deveriam viver de outra forma”. Todas as utopias comunistas do século XIX foram assim. Quando se tratava de arregaçar as mangas, havia um esforço para criar à distância, e durante um certo período, uma pequena comunidade real mais ou menos em conformidade com o sonho. Os utopistas eram revolucionários quando não eram realistas, e quando eram realistas não eram revolucionários. Nunca visaram a eliminar o Mal para sempre e derrubar as comunidades políticas existentes para instaurar o Bem. Por exemplo, Étienne Cabet, com seu comunismo cristão, imaginou a cidade ideal de Icária e tentou fundar uma colônia icariana em New Orleans, em 1847. Charles Fourier, com seu falanstério, estava em busca de uma harmonia universal que se formaria livremente por afeição de seus membros. O mais realista de todos, Saint-Simon, descreveu uma sociedade fraterna, cujos membros mais competentes (industriais, cientistas, artistas, intelectuais, engenheiros) tinham a tarefa de administrar a França da forma mais econômica possível, a fim de torná-la um país próspero, onde reinariam o interesse geral e o bem comum, a liberdade, a igualdade e a paz; a sociedade seria uma grande fábrica. Mas o sonho de uma associação entre industriais e operários baseada na fraternidade, na estima e na confiança desfez-se na realidade das grandes empresas capitalistas dos saint-simonianos, no Canal de Suez e nos caminhos de ferro franceses. No fundo, aconteceu o mesmo com os teóricos do "comunismo científico" no século XIX, Karl Marx e Friedrich Engels. Eles, é claro, eram autenticamente revolucionários e profundamente realistas, pois fundamentaram seu projeto político em uma análise do funcionamento econômico e histórico do capitalismo, mas a ideia comunista e a abolição da propriedade privada permaneceram em estado de esboço nas obras dos autores do Manifesto, um ideal abstrato e, por assim dizer, vazio, ou, em todo caso, tão utópico quanto nos teóricos franceses. Nos Manuscritos de 1844, a ideia comunista é pura especulação conceitual em torno da "apropriação real da essência humana pelo homem e para o homem" ou "a verdadeira solução da luta entre existência e essência, entre objetivação e afirmação de si mesmo, entre liberdade e necessidade". Em A ideologia alemã, é uma expressão puramente verbal para designar "o movimento real que abole a ordem estabelecida". Em Engels, é "o ensinamento das condições da libertação do proletariado" (Princípios do comunismo). E uma ideia até mais vaga e abstrata nos marxistas do que nos utopistas, pois é dissociada de qualquer tentativa de fundamentação conceitual e qualquer análise concreta dos meios de sua realização. E ainda como um sonho de Cidade ideal, em que "cada um recebe conforme suas necessidades", como circulava entre os utopistas franceses do comunismo no século XIX. Ao contrário de suas predecessoras, as utopias em ação dos totalitarismos do século XX situam-se no cruzamento de um ideal revolucionário ("partir ao meio a História do mundo", segundo Nietzsche em Ecce homo, depois retomado pelos maoístas) e um programa realista de transformação política radical. Enquanto as utopias de Platão a Engels evitavam os meios de se atingir o ideal para preservar sua perfeição, as utopias em ação fazem o inverso: retardam indefinidamente a realização do ideal para empregar da melhor forma os meios capazes de realizá-lo. Não é mais uma questão de sonhar com o Bem, mas de lutar indefinidamente contra o Mal. E, desde a República de Platão,5 o Mal na comunidade política tem duas faces: ou é Impuro ou Desigual. Portanto, a Cidade deve ser: ou uma comunidade de iguais, cuja unidade perfeita é garantida pelo fato de que tudo é comum entre eles; ou uma comunidade pura, cuja unidade perfeita é garantida pelo fato de que todos têm a mesma origem. Define-se ou pelo comum das posses (nada deve pertencer a ninguém, mas a todos) ou pela identidade dos seres (ninguém deve ser estrangeiro): o comum que temos (ou deveríamos ter) ou aquilo que somos (ou deveríamos ser). Naturalmente, nessa união de idealismo revolucionário e realismo programático, o Bem absoluto, o Puro, o Comum, é uma idealidade fora de alcance: o combate mortal contra o Mal torna-se a obsessão dos regimes de terror. O Puro deve começar excluindo. Mas nunca chega a excluir por completo, porque o já purificado nunca é suficientemente puro. A ponto de a ideia se transformar em um delírio infinito de rechaçar e depois expulsar, a fim de exterminar. Os judeus e os ciganos, que encarnavam o micróbio maléfico que ameaça a pureza da raça e do sangue ariano, tinham de ser caçados até nos mais ínfimos recantos do território sob domínio nazista e eliminados como pulgas. O Comum e o comunismo também estão fora de alcance. Começa-se expropriando. Mas ainda há a propriedade e o privado. E, portanto, nunca se chega a expropriar, despossuir, comunizar por completo. As lutas contra as classes (supostamente) proprietárias ou avessas à coletivização, os pequenos proprietários de terra, geram deportações em massa (deskulakização) ou organização sistemática de grandes fomes (Holodomor). Por isso, apesar da formidável esperança de emancipação que o ideal comunista representou durante quase um século para as classes ou povos explorados do mundo inteiro, ele se despedaçou no século XX contra o muro do "socialismo real". Nos antípodas do comunismo imaginado, ao qual se supunha que conduziria infalivelmente, o ideal comunista se transformou em uma máquina tirânica, burocrática e totalitária. A sociedade sem Estado sugerida por Engels na obra Anti- Dühring6 tornou-se seu contrário, uma ditadura do Estado contra a sociedade. O terrível fracasso dessa utopia em ação destruiu os sonhos de libertação coletiva — enquanto "a exploração do homem pelo homem" continua indo muito bem. Infelizmente, não se pode dizer o mesmo das utopias revolucionárias em nome do Puro. Enquanto o ideal comunista quase desapareceu dos programas políticos, a ideologia purista do sangue e da raça, a ilusão da origem comum (seja biológica ou religiosa) e, portanto, o ódio destruidor do estrangeiro continuam a alimentar as utopias coletivas e seus massacres em série: genocídio ruandês contra os tutsis, depuração étnica dos muçulmanos na ex-lugoslávia (em particular na Bósnia), limpeza étnica de cristãos, turcomanos xiitas e no autoproclamado "Estado islâmico" etc. O fim das utopias? Felizmente, parece que somos poupados de tudo isso em nossas "democracias ocidentais", após setenta anos de paz sob as asas da Europa, algumas décadas de relativa prosperidade econômica e tranquilidade política sob a frágil proteção de nossos sistemas representativos. Não acreditamos mais na salvação comum. Nem na salvação nem no comum. Há três razões para isso, todas as três interligadas: o fim do político, a desconfiança em relação ao Bem, o reino dos direitos individuais. As utopias políticas conduziram ao desastre. Não conseguem mais nos fazer sonhar com o futuro como faziam no passado, porque estamos absorvidos por nosso hoje e por nós mesmos. A política parece ter derrotado o político. A política são estratégias coletivas ou táticas individuais, é o império dos "eles" ou o reino dos "eus". O político é a afirmação da existência de um "nós" ("nós, o povo"), além das comunidades de famílias ou amigos, das comunidades regionais ou religiosas, além das identidades de gênero ou origem, e aquém da comunidade humana em geral. As peripécias usuais dos governos representativos sufocaram o sentimento de pertencimento coletivo e a aspiração a um destino comum, que ressurgem apenas quando uma emoção violenta abala o corpo social, quando existe uma ameaça extremista ou ocorre um atentado terrorista. Em situações normais, porém, os acasos da conquista ou do exercício do poder escondem o político, isto é, as condições de unidade da comunidade. Não acreditamos mais no Bem. Não sonhamos mais com uma Cidade bondosa, finalmente livre do Mal. Aspiramos simplesmente a uma sociedade — ou um mundo — menos má. Prova dessas aspirações são as manifestações que mobilizam a juventude dos países ocidentais ou sublevam os povos do planeta de vez em quando. Movimentos altermundialistas contra o capitalismo financeiro, Fórum Social Mundial (Porto Alegre), Occupy Wall Street, Indignados, Nuit Debout etc. Movimentos a favor da democracia nos países da Europa do Sul nos anos 1970, na América Latina e, em outros continentes, lutas de emancipação na praça da Paz Celestial (Pequim), na praça Tahrir (no Cairo), na praça Taksim (Istambul), de Sidi Bouzid (Tunísia), revolução dos guarda-chuvas (Hong Kong) etc. Apesar da diversidade de contextos e objetivos, em todas essas revoltas há uma constante que as distingue das utopias revolucionárias passadas: as pessoas se revoltam contra alguma coisa, elas não se mobilizam por alguma coisa. Sabemos o que elas rejeitam (injustiça, miséria, corrupção, humilhação, arbitrariedade, segregação e repressão), mas desconhecemos a que aspiram. Ou melhor, é como se tudo que desejassem fosse justamente um "menos" — menos injustiça, menos miséria, menos arbitrariedade, menos corrupção, menos segregação, menos repressão etc. —, ou o menos possível, mas nunca o impossível de um horizonte coletivo. Os que almejam em todo o mundo derrubar um poder tirânico ainda sonham com essa nossa "democracia" que não nos encanta mais, porque acreditamos que as liberdades fundamentais em que ela consiste são para sempre e ela se resume a votarmos esporadicamente em políticas que não nos satisfarão. Pois quando não há mais nada contra o que se revoltar, restam apenas motivos para reivindicar. Contudo, ninguém mais sonha com uma Cidade perfeita: nem os que protestam contra sua miséria e servidão nem os que lutam por condições de vida decentes e pela satisfação de seus interesses. Não há mais utopia política. Foi assim que se instalou entre nós o reino dos direitos individuais. Pois não desejamos mais um Estado ideal que nos una e nos faça um nós, um nós inédito, um nós que seja um nós mesmos: esperamos somente que esse Estado nos deixe em paz, cada um por si, e nos permita realizar as aspirações individuais a que acreditamos ter direito. O sonho de emancipação coletiva se estilhaçou em uma multiplicidade dispersa de desejos. Podemos indicar a data recente em que esse "nós" considerado poderoso demais começou a se encolher em "eus" triunfantes. Quando esses "eus" ainda usavam a máscara do antigo "nós" para se legitimar. No último terço do século XX, as reivindicações individualistas ainda tinham uma coloração revolucionária; as pessoas não sonhavam mais com a libertação de uma classe ou de um povo, mas ainda sonhavam com uma libertação política: a dos desejos individuais. O ideal proletário adquiriu um matiz libertário: foram os movimentos de "Maio de 68". O conceito de revolução recuava na história social e progredia nos costumes. Nesses movimentos dos países capitalistas ocidentais, as pessoas acreditavam, apoiavam, afirmavam em textos e discursos que tudo na vida de cada um era político por natureza, para além da própria política. O amor era político: elas acreditavam que as relações entre homens e mulheres, os sentimentos, a sexualidade eram determinados pela existência social — logo eram políticos. A arte também era política: a arte falsa era a arte reacionária, a música tonal, a pintura figurativa, o romance ou o cinema narrativos etc. A "verdadeira arte" era a das vanguardas, revolucionária na forma e messiânica no conteúdo. A moral, por sua vez, era política de um extremo a outro. Ou então era oca, ridícula. (Isso foi antes de tudo virar ética.) Este era o programa: libertação coletiva das aspirações individuais, "viver sem tempo morto e gozar sem obstáculos". Desde o início do século XXI, não existe mais utopia política. Nem sonhos de libertação social; ela se despedaçou contra o muro da realidade totalitária: de suas esperanças restam apenas algumas conquistas, cada vez mais frágeis, do Estado providência. Nem sonhos de realização libertária; eles se chocaram contra o fim das ilusões e o retorno do conservadorismo. Dos primeiros e dos segundos sobrou apenas o império dos direitos. A era do indivíduo não precisa mais se abrigar sob a ideologia da libertação: o vocabulário liberal dos direitos subjetivos é suficiente. De fato, os direitos individuais, na esteira e conforme o modelo muitas vezes infiel dos "direitos humanos", tornaram-se nosso único ideal, depois que perdemos a fé no Ideal. Pois a ideia de "direitos humanos" é a dupla negação de toda utopia política: porque se trata de "direitos" e porque se trata de "humanos". Cópia de: FRANCIS WOLFF. Três Utopias Contemporâneas. São Paulo: Unesp, 2018. (shrink)

This dissertation investigates the concept of law in Rousseau, analyzing if he defends the idea of natural law or if he is a conventionalist. Some commentators, like Robert Derathé, conceive Rousseau as a naturalist, as opposed to others, like Charles Vaughan, who think that he is a conventionalist. Here we will critically assess those positions and try to see if they exclude each other or if Rousseau can be read, somehow, as defending fundamental aspects of those two positions.

Objectivo principal do presente artigo é mostrar até que ponto o evolucionismo darwinista inclui proposições centrais testáveis, para além de várias proposições acessórias também elas testáveis. Nesse sentido, o autor constrói um argumento no sentido de mostrar que as alegações de Karl Popper, segundo as quais não pode ser concedido estatuto de cientificidade ao darwinismo, carecem de fundamento. O autor defende também a necessidade de um questionamento firme em relação a todo e qualquer argumento fornecido pela ciência, pois nem a (...) capacidade de previsão nem a universalidade das leis são garantia de que a ciência, também ela, nunca caia em erro. /// Aim of the present article is to show that the doctrine of evolution defended by Charles Darwin is grounded on propositions that are verifiable, as are verifiable many of its secondary propositions. The author builds up an argument that goes in the direction of showing how the allegations by Karl Popper against the scientific nature of Darwinism are not grounded in reality. The author of the article also defends the necessity of a firm questioning in relation to each and every argument advanced by the practitioners of science, since nor its anticipatory capacity nor the universality of its laws are warrant enough that the science never falls into error. (shrink)

Rosenthal descreve a consciência de criatura como o simples fato de uma criatura estar desperta e atenta aos estímulos externos da natureza. Estas criaturas conscientes possuem determinados estados mentais que representam os fenômenos da natureza, isto é, uma certa propriedade mental que estabelece uma relação entre o fenômeno da natureza, e aquilo que percebemos desse fenômeno. Estes estados mentais podem ou não estarem presentes na consciência de criatura. O que é responsável por tornar esses estados mentais conscientes? Para tentar responder (...) a essa pergunta, Rosenthal propõe uma teoria baseada em estados mentais de ordem superior. Estes estados mentais, não representam fenômenos externos, mas outros estados mentais,tornando estes últimos em estados mentais conscientes. Entretanto, Charles Siewert (1996) afirma que Rosenthal comete o mesmo erro de Brentano ao responder esse problema da consciência com o uso de estados mentais de ordem superior. Porém, não é verdade que Brentano se utiliza da ordem superior para elaborar sua teoria sobre a consciência, Brentano (1874) utiliza estados mentais internos que se autorrepresentam de determinada forma. Outros autores, como Dan Zahavi (2004), Rocco Gennaro (1996) entre outros, também estabelecem uma ligação entre Rosenthal e Brentano, alguns afirmando que suas teorias são equivalentes, outros negando. Devido a essa recorrente confusão, o objetivo do trabalho é não só uma análise das teorias dos dois autores, mas também uma comparação entre os fundamentos, as argumentações e as características de ambas as teorias. Dessa forma, pretendo ao final deste dissertação mostrar que as teorias da consciência de Rosenthal e de Brentano são profundamente diferentes. Além disso, pretendo mostrar com base tanto no funcionamento da teoria, quanto em estudos empíricos, a teoria de Rosenthal parece estar mais adequada para explicar o fenômeno da consciência. (shrink)

O debate fomentado nos anos oitenta entre liberais e “comunitaristas” tende a contrastar radicalmente as concepções teóricas de John Rawls e Charles Taylor, sendo o primeiro o representante principal da vertente liberal e o segundo do “comunitarismo”. Ao contrário do que sustenta essa distinção, neste artigo proponho ir para além dela, a fim de defender que há convergências dos autores no que tange à discussão sobre o pluralismo. Em um primeiro momento, apresento os diagnósticos de Rawls e de Taylor (...) quanto ao fato do pluralismo nas sociedades modernas como uma característica contextual irreversível (I). Em um segundo momento, diante da tensão ética insuperável entre divergentes concepções bem, a saída mais viável caminha para a justiça. Para tanto, desenvolvo a concepção de “justiça política” de Rawls em “O Liberalismo Político” e as publicações mais recentes de Charles Taylor como em “Secularism and Freedom of Conscience”, “A Secular Age” e “Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism?”, que parecem sustentar certa “virada liberal-rawlsiana” no pensamento do autor (II). Em um terceiro momento, efetuo uma distinção entre o fato do pluralismo (razoável) e o valor do pluralismo, para finalmente concluir o artigo argumentando que tanto Rawls como Taylor tendem a defender o pluralismo como um valor político para as instituições e não como um valor moral abrangente para os indivíduos. (shrink)

The article intends to analyse the problem of the coexistence of opposite and alternative “comprehensive doc- trines” in today's Western society, on the basis of a comparison between the thought of Schmitt, Böckenförde, Habermas, Rawls and Charles Taylor. In this regard the article proposes a possible solution to avoid, on the one hand, the intolerant goal of a total homogeneity, and on the other a naive and aproblematic acceptance of a relativistic multiculturalism.