In this paper, I explore a tension between the Law in the novel The Island of Doctor Moreau, by H. G. Wells, and Kant's reciprocity thesis. The Law is a series of prohibitions that Moreau has his beasts recite. Moreau devotes his time to transforming animals through a painful surgery into beings that resemble humans, but the humanized beasts are constantly slipping back into animalistic habits, and so Moreau promulgates the Law to maintain decorum. Kant's reciprocity thesis states that free (...) will is the necessary and sufficient condition of moral practical laws. That is, in order for a moral practical law to be applicable, there must be free will, and, if free will is present, then there will be a moral practical law that sets a standard for the free will. However, in Wells's novel, the humanized beasts seem to lack free will. So, how can a law be applicable to them? By delving deeper into the mystery of Moreau's strange island, I will shed light on the otherwise cumbersome concepts of free will, natural impulses, and practical laws, as well as their interrelationships. The upshot will be a deeper understanding of personhood through an exploration of the instinctual nature of animals, moral law, and free will. (shrink)

Endurantists have recently faced a mereological puzzle in various forms. Here I argue that, instead of presenting a genuine worry, the puzzle actually reveals a common misunderstanding about the endurantist ontology. Furthermore, through this discussion of the alleged problem and the misunderstanding which motivates it, I reveal metaphysical commitments the endurantist has that may not be widely recognized. For instance, she is committed to interesting and perhaps controversial views about shape and location. I highlight these commitments and what they mean (...) for the endurantist. (shrink)

Here I defend the compatibility of presentism and time travel against a few objections. Keller and Nelson argue that, if presentism is at all plausible, presentism and time travel are as compatible as eternalism and time travel. But Miller and Sider are not convinced. I reply that for their concerns to have merit, Miller and Sider must assume presentists are committed to positions they need not be; I explain why presentists are not so committed and, in the process, defend Keller (...) and Nelson’s position that there is no roadblock to presentist time travel that does not also apply to eternalist time travel. (shrink)

Mereological challenges have recently been raised against the endurantist. For instance, Barker and Dowe (2003) have argued that eternalist endurantism entails (1) persisting objects are both 3D and 4D, and that (2) the lives of persisting objects last longer than they actually do. They also argue that presentist endurantism also entails, albeit in a tensed way, that (3) the lives of persisting objects last longer than they actually do. While they’ve further argued (2005) that the objections raised by McDaniel (2003) (...) and Beebee and Rush (2003) fail, here I show that such objections are tenable without requiring further significant metaphysical commitments; I argue that such endurantist defences are tenable, contra to prior analyses. (shrink)

I argue that, according to Just War Theory, those who work as administrative personnel in the private military industry can be permissibly harmed while at work by enemy combatants. That is, for better or worse, a Just War theorist should consider all those who work as administrative personnel in the private military industry either: (i) individuals who may be permissibly restrained with lethal force while at work, or (ii) individuals who may be harmed by permissible attacks against their workplace. In (...) doing so, I also provide some critical analysis of the relevant Just War concepts. (shrink)

We claim that a moral obligation to take climate leadership by means of unilateral mitigation depends on the existence of a plausible follow-the-leader mechanism whereby unilateral mitigation by some increases the probability of sufficient mitigation by others to avert catastrophic climate impacts. By understanding these mechanisms, we can better articulate the obligation for climate leadership across various sectors, from government to individual actors, in the fight against climate change. [Open access].

This is a pdf of a Mathematica calculation that supplements the paper "Presentist Fragmentalism and Quantum Mechanics" forthcoming in Foundations of Physics. In that paper the Born rule (or at least a progenitor) is derived from experimental conditions on the mutual observations of two fragments. In this pdf the experimental conditions are applied to Hilbert space dimensions 3, 4, and 5. It turns out each of these have a 1-dimensional solution space which, it is hoped, can be interpretated as the (...) phase. (shrink)

Through engagement with key informants and review of ethical theories applicable to refugee policy, this paper examines the ethical and policy considerations that policy-level stakeholders believe should factor into setting the refugee resettlement ceiling. We find that the ceiling traditionally has been influenced by policy goals, underlying values, and practical considerations. These factors map onto several ethical approaches to resettlement. There is significant alignment between U.S. policy interests and ethical obligations toward refugees. We argue that the refugee ceiling should be (...) restored to historical norms, and that there exists a corresponding obligation to counter negative public perceptions about refugees and the costs of resettlement. (shrink)

We present evidence from a pre-registered experiment indicating that a philosophical argument––a type of rational appeal––can persuade people to make charitable donations. The rational appeal we used follows Singer’s well-known “shallow pond” argument (1972), while incorporating an evolutionary debunking argument (Paxton, Ungar, & Greene 2012) against favoring nearby victims over distant ones. The effectiveness of this rational appeal did not differ significantly from that of a well-tested emotional appeal involving an image of a single child in need (Small, Loewenstein, and (...) Slovic 2007). This is a surprising result, given evidence that emotions are the primary drivers of moral action, a view that has been very influential in the work of development organizations. We did not find support for our pre-registered hypothesis that combining our rational and emotional appeals would have a significantly stronger effect than either appeal in isolation. However, our finding that both kinds of appeal can increase charitable donations is cause for optimism, especially concerning the potential efficacy of well-designed rational appeals. We consider the significance of these findings for moral psychology, ethics, and the work of organizations aiming to alleviate severe poverty. (shrink)

This paper presents five studies on the development and validation of a scale of intellectual humility. This scale captures cognitive, affective, behavioral, and motivational components of the construct that have been identified by various philosophers in their conceptual analyses of intellectual humility. We find that intellectual humility has four core dimensions: Open-mindedness (versus Arrogance), Intellectual Modesty (versus Vanity), Corrigibility (versus Fragility), and Engagement (versus Boredom). These dimensions display adequate self-informant agreement, and adequate convergent, divergent, and discriminant validity. In particular, Open-mindedness (...) adds predictive power beyond the Big Six for an objective behavioral measure of intellectual humility, and Intellectual Modesty is uniquely related to Narcissism. We find that a similar factor structure emerges in Germanophone participants, giving initial evidence for the model’s cross-cultural generalizability. (shrink)

During its first four congresses, held annually under Lenin, the Communist International went through two distinct phases: while the first two congresses focused on programmatic and organisational aspects of the break with Social-Democratic parties, the third congress, meeting after the putsch known as the ‘March Action’ of 1921 in Germany, adopted the slogan ‘To the masses!’, while the fourth codified this new line in the ‘Theses on the Unity of the Proletarian Front’. The arguments put forward by the first two (...) congresses were originally drafted by leaders of the Russian Communist Party, but the initiative for the adoption of the united-front policy came from the German Communist Party under the leadership of Paul Levi. This article explores the historical circumstances that turned the German Communists into the pioneers of the united-front tactic. In the documentary appendix we add English versions of two documents drafted by Levi: the ‘Letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany’ on the Kapp Putsch, dated 16 March 1920, and thekpd’s ‘Open Letter’ of 8 January 1921, which gave rise to the united-front tactic. (shrink)

The objective of Working Group 4 of the COST Action NET4Age-Friendly is to examine existing policies, advocacy, and funding opportunities and to build up relations with policy makers and funding organisations. Also, to synthesize and improve existing knowledge and models to develop from effective business and evaluation models, as well as to guarantee quality and education, proper dissemination and ensure the future of the Action. The Working Group further aims to enable capacity building to improve interdisciplinary participation, to promote knowledge (...) exchange and to foster a cross-European interdisciplinary research capacity, to improve cooperation and co-creation with cross-sectors stakeholders and to introduce and educate students SHAFE implementation and sustainability. To enable the achievement of the objectives of Working Group 4, the Leader of the Working Group, the Chair and Vice-Chair, in close cooperation with the Science Communication Coordinator, developed a template to map the current state of SHAFE policies, funding opportunities and networking in the COST member countries of the Action. On invitation, the Working Group lead received contributions from 37 countries, in a total of 85 Action members. The contributions provide an overview of the diversity of SHAFE policies and opportunities in Europe and beyond. These were not edited or revised and are a result of the main areas of expertise and knowledge of the contributors; thus, gaps in areas or content are possible and these shall be further explored in the following works and reports of this WG. But this preliminary mapping is of huge importance to proceed with the WG activities. In the following chapters, an introduction on the need of SHAFE policies is presented, followed by a summary of the main approaches to be pursued for the next period of work. The deliverable finishes with the opportunities of capacity building, networking and funding that will be relevant to undertake within the frame of Working Group 4 and the total COST Action. The total of country contributions is presented in the annex of this deliverable. (shrink)

This is a contribution to a Book symposium on The Limits of Free Will: Selected Essays by Paul Russell. Russell provides replies to three critics of The Limits of Free Will. The first reply is to Robert Wallace and focuses on the question of whether there is a conflict between the core compatibilist and pessimist components of the "critical compatibilist" position that Russell has advanced. The second reply is to Angela Smith's discussion of the "narrow" interpretation of moral responsibility (...) responsibility (as defended by R. Jay Wallace) and how best to respond to it. The third and last reply is concerned with Christopher Bennett's criticism of Russell's views concerning "motivational scepticism" and the possibility of pure practical reasons. (shrink)

Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word 'water' in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. (...) Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism. (shrink)

This essay introduces the transcription and translation of Paul Feyerabend's "Der Begriff der Verständlichkeit in der modernen Physik" [The concept of intelligibility in modern physics] (1948), which is an early essay written by Paul Feyerabend in 1948 on the topic of intelligibility (Verständlichkeit) and visualizability (Anschaulichkeit) of physical theories. The existence of such essay was likely. It is listed in his bibliography as his first publication. Yet the content of the essay was unknown, as no original or copy (...) is extant in Feyerabend's Nachlass and no known published version was available to the community—until now. The essay has both historical and philosophical interest: it is, as far as our current knowledge goes, Feyerabend's earliest extant publication. It documents Feyerabend's philosophical interest as a physicist-to-be, in what he himself called his “positivist” phase; and it gives a rare if fragmentary insight into the early discussions of the ‘Third Vienna Circle’ and, more generally, the philosophical culture of discussion in Vienna. (shrink)

Paul Feyerabend once made a remark to the effect that his pragmatic theory of observation can be traced back to proposals put forward by leading Logical Empiricists during the height of the protocol sentence debate. In this paper I want to vindicate the systematic side of Feyerabend’s remark and show that a pragmatic theory of observation can in fact be found in Rudolf Carnap’s writings of 1932. I first proceed to dispel a misunderstanding concerning the term “pragmatic” raised by (...) Thomas Oberdan. Following Morris’ and Carnap’s documented usage, I show that the intended meaning of “pragmatic” refers to a specific semiotic relation between users of a language and their environment describable by empirical means. I reconstruct such a pragmatic theory in terms of a detector model that interprets observation sentences as bodily dispositions indicating physical events in the surroundings of the detector. I then proceed to show how Feyerabend’s later theory of observation picks up central features of Carnap’s account and also shares some of the motivations. I conclude by noting how an empirical theory of observation sentences offers a bootstrapping solution to the “basis problem”. (shrink)

We might describe the philosophical issue of human freedom and moral responsibility as an existential metaphysical problem. Problems of this kind are not just a matter of theoretical interest and curiosity: They address issues that we care about and that affect us. They are, more specifically, relevant to the significance and value that we attach to our lives and the way that we lead them. According to the orthodox view, there is a tidy connection between skepticism and pessimism. Skepticism threatens (...) a wide range of interests and concerns that themselves rest on the foundation of our self-conception as responsible moral agents. From this perspective, whereas skepticism licenses a degree of pessimism about our human predicament, the defeat of skepticism serves to vindicate optimism. In recent years this orthodox view of the relationship between skepticism and pessimism has been challenged. It has been argued, for example, that skepticism may be defended in much more optimistic terms. While we have reason to accept skepticism, we have no reason to draw any bleak or depressing consequences from this. Another way of severing the orthodox connection between skepticism and pessimism is to reject skepticism but deny that this will serve to secure or salvage any unqualified form of optimism. This chapter reviews and contrasts these various positions and approaches, beginning with an account of P. F. Strawson’s particularly influential statement of the relationship between the skeptical challenge and pessimism. (shrink)

Norman Daniels’s theory of health justice is the most comprehensive and systematic such theory we have. In one of the few articles published so far on Daniels’s new book, Just Health, Benjamin Sachs argues that Daniels’s core “principle of equality of opportunity does not do the work Daniels needs it to do.” Yet Sachs’s objections to Daniels’s framework are deeply flawed. Where these arguments do not rely on significant misreadings of Daniels, they ignore sensible strands in Just Health that considerably (...) dull their force. After disarming Sachs’s arguments against Daniels’s theory, I explain why I agree with Sachs’s conclusion: Daniels’s equality of opportunity-based account of health justice rests on shaky foundations. (shrink)

This paper strengthens and defends the pluralistic implications of Einstein's successful, quantitative predictions of Brownian motion for a philosophical dispute about the nature of scientific advance that began between two prominent philosophers of science in the second half of the twentieth century (Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend). Kuhn promoted a monistic phase-model of scientific advance, according to which a paradigm driven `normal science' gives rise to its own anomalies, which then lead to a crisis and eventually a scientific revolution. (...) Feyerabend stressed the importance of pluralism for scientific progress. He rejected Kuhn's model arguing that it fails to recognize the role that alternative theories can play in identifying exactly which phenomena are anomalous in the first place. On Feyerabend's account, Einstein's predictions allow for a crucial experiment between two incommensurable theories, and are an example of an anomaly that could refute the reigning paradigm only after the development of a competitor. Using Kuhn's specification of a disciplinary matrix to illustrate the incommensurability between the two paradigms, we examine the different research strategies available in this peculiar case. On the basis of our reconstruction, we conclude by rebutting some critics of Feyerabend's argument. (shrink)

Throughout much of the first half of the twentieth century, the free-will debate was largely concerned with the question of what kind of freedom was required for moral responsibility and whether the kind of freedom required was compatible with the thesis of determinism. This issue was itself addressed primarily with reference to the question of how freedom is related to alternative possibilities and what the relevant analysis of “could have done otherwise” comes to. The discussion of these topics made little (...) advance on the basic strategies and positions already developed and defended on either side of the compatibilist/incompatibilist divide in the preceding two centuries. When P. F. Strawson’s published his seminal article “Freedom and Resentment” in 1962 the dynamics of this debate were fundamentally altered. This is true both in respect of Strawson’s general methodology, which demands a more empirically informed approach, and in terms of his core conceptual framework, which identifies a different set of considerations and issues at the heart of this debate. In particular, whereas the traditional or classical debate focused on the problem of (moral) freedom, Strawson directed his attention to the role of moral sentiments or “reactive attitudes” as the key to understanding and resolving the core problems lying at the heart of this debate. This essay is devoted to a critical assessment of Strawson’s project and an analysis of the current debate concerning its prospects. (shrink)

The argument and discussion in this paper begins from the premise that Hume was an atheist who denied the religious or theist hypothesis. However, even if it is agreed that that Hume was an atheist this does not tell us where he stood on the question concerning the value of religion. Some atheists, such as Spinoza, have argued that society needs to maintain and preserve a form of “true religion”, which is required for the support of our ethical life. Others, (...) such as D’Holbach have argued that religion is not only false it is pernicious and it should be eradicated. This paper argues that Hume rejected both these proposals, on the ground that they rest, in different ways, on excessively optimistic assumptions. The sensible, practical form of atheism that Hume defends has a more modest and realistic aim, which is simply to restrict and limit the most pernicious forms of religion. Understood this way, Hume’s practical atheism is very different from the forms of “old” atheism associated with Spinoza and D’Holbach, as well as from the “new atheism” of thinkers such as Dawkins and Dennett. -/- Reprinted in Paul Russell, "Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy: Selected Essays" (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021): 340-383. (shrink)

In this paper I defend the claim that Paul Feyerabend held a robust metaphilosophical position for most of his philosophical career. This position I call Decision-Based Epistemology and reconstruct it in terms of three key components: a form of epistemic voluntarism concerning the justification of philosophical positions and a behaviorist account of philosophical beliefs, which allows him to cast normative arguments concerning philosophical beliefs in scientific methodology, such as realism, in terms of means-ends relations. I then introduce non-naturalist and (...) naturalist variants of his conception of normativity, which I trace back to his mentors Viktor Kraft and Karl Popper, respectively. This distinction, introduced on the metaphilosophical level, can can be put to use to explain key changes in Feyerabend’s philosophical proposals, such as the viability of his methodological argument for realism. I conclude that this Decision-Based Epistemology should be further explored by historically embedding Feyerabend’s metaphilosophy in a voluntarist tradition of scientific philosophy. (shrink)

Berkeley's immaterialism has more in common with views developed by Henry More, the mathematician Joseph Raphson, John Toland, and Jonathan Edwards than those of thinkers with whom he is commonly associated (e.g., Malebranche and Locke). The key for recognizing their similarities lies in appreciating how they understand St. Paul's remark that in God "we live and move and have our being" as an invitation to think to God as the space of discourse in which minds and ideas are identified. (...) This way of speaking about God, adapted by Karl Barth and Paul Tillich, opens up new ways to think about the relation between God and finite minds. (shrink)

THE aim of this chapter is to offer a critical examination of some recent contributions to compatibilist literature on freedom and responsibility that aim to provide broadly reasons-responsive accounts of moral agency. Although the views of several authors will be considered, discussion will be organized primarily around Daniel Dennett's "Elbow Room" (1984), an important work in the evolution of the "new compatibilism.".

The origins of the Transitional Programme in Trotsky’s writings have been traced in the secondary literature. Much less attention has been paid to the earlier origins of the Transitional Programme in the debates of the Communist International between its Third and Fourth Congress, and in particular to the contribution of its largest national section outside Russia, the German Communist Party, which had been the origin of the turn to the united-front tactic in 1921. This article attempts to uncover the roots (...) of the Transitional Programme in the debates of the Communist International. This task is important because it shows that the Transitional Programme’s slogans are not sectarian shibboleths, but the result of the collective revolutionary experience of the working class during the period under consideration, from the Bolshevik Revolution to the founding conference of the Fourth International. (shrink)

In «Mancanze, omissioni, e descrizioni negative»,55 Achille Varzi esplora le conseguenze di una forma comune di ragionamento causale, quella in cui citiamo mancanze od omissioni nel fornire una spiegazione delle cause degli eventi. Tale forma appare di comune uso nei contesti normativi del diritto, nelle spiegazioni tipiche delle scienze sociali e, più in generale, nel ragionamento ordinario. Ciò che accomuna questi casi è l’idea intuitiva secondo cui le cause possono anche consistere in eventi negativi. L’intuizione non è però metafisicamente innocua, (...) poiché per affermare che una spiegazione come "C’è stata un’esplosione perché Gianni non ha spento il gas" sia una buona spiegazione, occorre assumere che gli eventi negativi come “il non aver spento il gas da parte di Gianni” esistano al pari di eventi come l’esplosione e dal momento che, solo se sono entrambi eventi, può tra questi sussistere una relazione casuale. Dovremmo pertanto concludere che (1) è perfettamente intellegibile e rispecchia le nostre pratiche linguistiche. Spesso parliamo assumendo che ci siano cose che le persone non fanno: il gas che Gianni non ha spento, la passeggiata che non abbiamo fatto, il treno che non è arrivato, ecc. La sensatezza di questi usi esige pertanto il dover riconoscere una certa legittimità al vocabolario delle omissioni e delle descrizioni negative. Varzi sostiene che questo modo di parlare solleva tuttavia degli scrupoli ontologici,56 poiché non è possibile assumersi alcun serio impegno ontologico nei confronti di eventi negativi, ancor meno quando le nostre asserzioni richiedono di quantificare su eventi “inesistenti”. Una strategia per ovviare a questo scrupolo è sostenere che queste pratiche linguistiche sono analoghe a quelle in cui parliamo di oggetti “inesistenti”, ossia di oggetti che è come se ci fossero, ma che riconosciamo esistere soltanto in un contesto finzionale. Dunque l’analogia con gli oggetti finzionali può rendere in qualche modo espliciti i vincoli ontologici, giustificando quegli usi linguistici. Sebbene questo argomento abbia la sua plausibilità, Varzi nota che «ad un esame più attento, gli eventi non accaduti si rivelano ben più resistenti al rasoio di Occam di quanto l’analogia con gli oggetti non esistenti suggerisca » poiché il nostro linguaggio causale ci induce spesso a ritenere che «il riferimento o la quantificazione nei confronti di eventi non accaduti sia da intendersi in senso stretto e letterale»,57 in contrasto con quanto suggerisce l’analogia con gli oggetti finzionali. La difficoltà nasce dall’argomento per cui, se la causazione è una relazione tra eventi, occorre prendere sul serio l’idea che gli eventi negativi siano negativi stricto sensu. La tesi di Varzi è che questa tesi sia una contraddizione genuina e che l’unico modo di risolverla sia di rinunciare all’idea che gli eventi negativi esistano in un qualsiasi senso. In questo articolo intendo analizzare un aspetto di questa forma di parsimonia ontologica. Il mio intento è di valutare le conseguenze della tesi di Varzi dal punto di vista della spiegazione causale in contesti controfattuali e nei casi di omissione del diritto. (shrink)

Logique et existenceDeleuze à propos des « conditions du réel »Pour Deleuze, l’un des problèmes fondamentaux d’une théorie de la pensée est de savoir comment la pensée peut quitter la sphère du possible pour penser le réel, c’est-àdire pour penser l’existence elle-même. La position du réel semble être hors du concept. Des pré-kantiens comme Leibniz approchaient ce problème par le biais de la distinction entre vérités d’essence et vérités d’existence, alors que des post-kantiens comme Maimon l’approchaient par la distinction entre (...) les conditions de l’expérience possible et celles de l’expérience réelle. La logique classique définit la sphère du possible par trois principes logiques – l’identité, la non-contradiction et le tiers-exclu – et la présente étude examine les trois grandes trajectoires qui, dans cette histoire de la philosophie, ont tenté d’utiliser l’un de ces trois principes classiques pour pénétrer l’existence ellemême : 1) Leibniz (et les pré-kantiens) cherchait à étendre le principe de d’identité àl’existence entière ; 2) Hegel (et les post-kantiens) cherchait à étendre le principe de non-contradiction à la totalité de l’expérience ; et 3) le groupe des penseurs appelés de manière assez large « existentialistes » cherchait à étendre le principe du tiers-exclu à la totalité de l’existence. La conclusion examine les raisons pour lesquelles Deleuze a été fasciné par chacune de ces tentatives philosophiques pour « penser l’existence », tout en pensant néanmoins qu’elles ont toutes échoué ; et pourquoi aussi il a fini par développer sa propre réponse au problème en faisant appel à un principe de différence.Logica e EsistenzaLe ‘Condizioni del reale’ in DeleuzePer Deleuze, uno dei problemi fondamentali per una teoria del pensiero è: come può il pensiero abbandonare la sfera del possibile per pensare il reale, ossia, pensare l’esistenza stessa? La posizione del reale sembra essere fuori dal concetto. Prekantiani come Leibniz affrontano questo problema in termini di distinzione fra verità dell’essenza e verità dell’esistenza, mentre post-kantiani come Maimon affrontano il problema in termini di distinzione fra condizioni dell’esperienza possibile e condizioni dell’esperienza reale. La logica classica ha definito la sfera del possibile secondo tre principi logici – identità, non-contraddizione, terzo escluso – e questo saggio analizza tre grandi ‘parabole’ della storia della filosofia che hanno tentato di usare uno di questi tre principi della logica per penetrare l’esistenza stessa: (1) Leibniz (e i pre-kantiani) hanno tentato di estendere il principio di identità a tutta l’esistenza; (2) Hegel (ei post-kantiani) hanno tentato di estendere il principio di non-contraddizione a tutta l’esistenza; (3) il gruppo di pensatori (solo approssimativamente legati fra loro) chiamati “esistenzialisti” ha tentato di estendere il principio del terzo escluso all’esistenza. La conclusione analizza sia le ragioni per le quali Deleuze era affascinato da ciascuno di questi tentativi filosofici di “pensare l’esistenza” nonostante fosse convinto che essi avessero fallito, sia i motivi per cui egli in conclusione traccia la propria risposta al problema facendo appello al principio della differenza. (shrink)

It has been claimed that deliberation is capable of overcoming so- cial choice theory impossibility results, by bringing about single- peakedness. Our aim is to better understand the relationship be- tween single-peakedness and collective justifications of preferences.

La teorı́a literaria contemporánea plantea desafı́os complejos para el estudio del lenguaje en su generalidad, sobre todo al tener en cuenta su función referencial, significado y la formulación del conocimiento en un paradigma de mediación. Las premisas de un lenguaje retórico parecen llevar a la teorı́a al más profundo de los pesimismos, poniendo en duda su finalidad y orientación crı́tica. El presente trabajo se propone investigar el carácter del significado y la función referencial a partir de la teorı́a tropológica de (...) Paul de Man, cometido que tiene tras de sı́ la necesidad de fundamentar una teorı́a literaria optimista en el encuentro entre figuración y conocimiento. Por medio de una atenta lectura de la retórica de Paul de Man, el trabajo presenta una solución tentativa al problema del conocimiento en el lenguaje retórico mediante una visión que entraña la inseparabilidad entre contenido y forma. De esa manera, la teorı́a literaria quedarı́a a salvo de ser una corriente contraria a la posibilidad de conocimiento sin traicionar sus propios postulados, como también la  forma  pasarı́a a ser parte del campo de estudio de la epistemologı́a. (shrink)

Following Hume’s lead, Paul Draper argues that, given the biological role played by both pain and pleasure in goal-directed organic systems, the observed facts about pain and pleasure in the world are antecedently much more likely on the Hypothesis of Indifference than on theism. I examine one by one Draper’s arguments for this claim and show how they miss the mark.

This essay is devoted to the study of useful ways of thinking about the nature of interpretation, with particular attention being given to the so called normative character of mental explanation. My aim of illuminating the nature of interpretation will be accomplished by examining several views, some of which are common to both Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett, concerning its unique characteristics as a method of prediction and explanation. Moreover, some of the views held by Davidson and Dennett will (...) be adopted, elaborated, and defended. The conclusions of these philosophers do not, however, form an acceptable whole. Thus I will attempt to moderate some of their views. In particular, I will attempt to show up the deficits of Davidson's view of the mental by defending the possibility some sort of psycho-physical reduction. Despite such philosophical pretensions, major parts of this essay will be devoted to sketching the foundations of a method for the interpretation of intentional behaviour which I take to embody the key features of our ordinary practice of interpretation. In particular, I will attempt to sketch the bases for a method of interpretation which is sensitive to the methodological considerations associated with the seemingly unique normative character of mental explanation. To this end, I will also investigate the question of how certain formal measures of coherence can be made to yield models for understanding the actual and possible bases of interpretation. (shrink)

This essay assesses Paul Draper's argument from evolution to atheism.

Panmetaphoricism is the view that our speech about God can only be metaphorical. In this essay, I do not assess the reasons that have been given for the view. Rather, I assess the view itself. My aim is to develop the most plausible version of panmetaphoricism in order to gain a clear view of the God it offers for our consideration.

One of the important questions discussed by philosophers of technology has to do with the moral significance of artefacts in human life. While many philosophers agree that artefacts do have moral significance attached to them, opinions vary as to how it is to be construed. In this paper we deal with the approach of the influential Dutch philosopher of technology Peter Paul Verbeek. He criticizes traditional ethical theories for assuming that whatever relevancy artefacts have for morality is entirely dependent (...) on human beings, since artefacts are mere passive instruments of human agency. In contrast, he develops a view of moral agency that includes artefacts and that ascribes moral agency to human-technology hybrids rather than to humans as such. The goal of this paper is to elucidate Verbeek’s account of moral agency and evaluate it. We also deal with his views on post phenomenology and mediation underlying this account. Although the general gist of our paper is expository, we point out to several problems for Verbeek’s account. (shrink)

In an era of digital revolution, artificial intelligence, big data and augmented reality, technology has shifted from being a tool of communication to a primary medium of experience and sociality. Some of the most basic human capacities are increasingly being outsourced to machines and we increasingly experience and interpret the world through digital interfaces, with machines becoming ever more ‘social’ beings. Social interaction and human perception are being reshaped in unprecedented ways. This book explores this technologisation of the social and (...) the attendant penetration of permanent liminality into those aspects of the lifeworld where individuals had previously sought some kind of stability and meaning. Through a historical and anthropological examination of this phenomenon, it problematises the underlying logic of limitless technological expansion and our increasing inability to imagine either ourselves or our world in other than technological terms. Drawing on a variety of concepts from political anthropology, including liminality, the trickster, imitation, schismogenesis, participation, and the void, it interrogates the contemporary technological revolution in a manner that will be of interest to sociologists, social and anthropological theorists and scholars of science and technology studies with interests in the digital transformation of social life. -/- Table of Contents -/- Introduction: The Technologisation of the Social: A 21st-Century Megamachine? Paul O’Connor -/- 1. Communication as Theatricalisation: Self-Presentation in the Digital Age Arpad Szakolczai -/- 2. Parasites of the Social: Digital Disruptions of the Labour Market Tom Boland -/- 3. Possessed by Technology: The Metastasis of Absence Agnes Horvath -/- 4. Technologisation of the Social: Symbiosis, Parasitism, or Predation? Daniel Gati -/- 5. J'accuse Zéro: The Technology of Zero and the Making of a Personal Void Ray Griffin -/- 6. Digital Affordances and the Liminal Stephen Turner -/- 7. The Smart Womb: Digital Technologies and the Maze of Trickster Politics Marius Ion Benta -/- 8. Brave New Industry? The Dark Side of Dematerialisation and Industry 4.0 Thomas S.J. Smith -/- 9. ‘What Have You Caught?’: Nannycams and Hidden Cameras as Normalised Surveillance of the Intimate Janos Mark Szakolczai -/- 10. Coercive Visibility: Discipline in the Digital Public Arena Paul O’Connor -/- Conclusion: Is There a Way Out of the Technologisation of the Social? Marius Ion Benta. (shrink)

In questo contributo del 2008 si dimostra, attraverso un confronto con le posizioni di Max Scheler, che Alsberg con il disimpegno corporeo (Körperausschaltung) non mira a esonerare l’organismo (nel senso della Entlastung di Gehlen). Per Alsberg l’evoluzione sociale avviene attraverso utensili, ma l’utensile non si limita a essere un’appendice del corpo, bensì rappresenta una logica estranea a quella del corpo. La Körperausschaltung è il killer del corpo. L’errore di Spencer è quello di non comprendere che un’evoluzione basata su utensili non (...) è semplicemente “sovra-organica”, ma piuttosto “extraorganica”. Extra-organico per Alsberg significa che l’utensile è al di fuori della logica del corpo. Ed è proprio l’autonomia dell’utensile dalla biologia a permettere di risolvere il paradosso della duplicità costitutiva dell’uomo: l’essere il motore di un’evoluzione extra-organica che produce contemporaneamente involuzione organica. Il “disimpegno organico” che libera l’uomo dal bisogno è possibile solo perché il problema dell’adattamento e dell’evoluzione viene spostato sul piano extra-organico: tale spostamento è ciò che contraddistingue l’uomo da tutti gli altri esseri viventi, quindi il principio costitutivo dell’esser umano. L' Ausschaltung, come disattivazione del corpo (dal verbo tedesco auschalten, nel senso di spegnere, ad es. una macchina, la luce ecc.) diventa pertanto il principio ultimo per comprendere l'umano nella sua interezza e non solo l'uomo della modernità (l'homo faber). L'eccezionale testo di Alsberg rimarrà praticamente sconosciuto, tuttavia con eccezioni di rilievo: già negli anni '20 ha un impatto decisivo su Max Scheler e sul progetto di fondazione dell'antropologia filosofica. Successivamente, ma con esiti opposti, su Gehlen. Il concetto di Körperausschaltung viene ripreso anche da Dieter Claessens, da Hans Blumenberg e infine da Sloterdijk. (shrink)

Obiettivo di questo articolo sarà presentare l’analisi fenomenologica e teoretica che Sartre propone del concetto di malafede, a partire dal romanzo La Nausea fino all’opera L’essere e il nulla. Ricostruendo il procedimento sartriano, che dall’atteggiamento interrogativo dell’uomo di fronte all’essere porta alla posizione del non-essere, giungeremo alla libertà e all’angoscia, quali caratteri costitutivi dell’essenza umana. Il tentativo di fuggire dalla libertà, a cui per Sartre siamo condannati, e dall’angoscia che da essa deriva, condurrà l’uomo sartriano all’autoinganno, ad una vita inautentica… (...) alla malafede. (shrink)

The study of John Locke’s theological thought has yet to be combined with emerging historical research, pioneered by Jean-Louis Quantin, into the apologetic uses of Christian antiquity in the Restoration Church of England. This article will address this historiographical lacuna by making two related arguments. First, I will contend that Locke’s Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul (1705–1707) marked a definitive shift in his critique of the appeal to Christian antiquity. Prior to 1700, Locke had largely (...) contested these references to the precedent of the early Christian Church by making a narrowly philosophical case against arguments from authority in general. However, the controversial reception of Locke’s theological writings in the 1690s, compelled him to develop historical and methodological arguments in the Paraphrase against the witness of Christian antiquity. Secondly, I will argue that Locke’s repudiation of the witness of Christian antiquity was the primary motivation for the diverse responses to the Paraphrase by early eighteenth-century Anglican writers, such as Robert Jenkin, Daniel Whitby, William Whiston, Winch Holdsworth and Catharine Cockburn. (shrink)

Horwich gibt eine feine Analyse von Wittgenstein (W) und ist ein führender W-Stipendiat, aber meinerMeinung nach sind sie alle hinter einer vollen Wertschätzung zurück, wie ich in dieser Rezension und vielen anderen ausführlich erkläre. Wenn man W (und vorzugsweise auch Searle) nicht versteht, dann sehe ich nicht, wie man mehr als ein oberflächliches Verständnis von Philosophie und höherem Denken und damit von allem komplexen Verhalten (Psychologie, Soziologie, Anthropologie, Geschichte, Literatur, Gesellschaft) haben könnte. Kurz gesagt, W hat gezeigt, dass, wenn Sie (...) gezeigt haben, wie ein Satz im Zusammenhang mit Interesse verwendet wird, es nichts mehr zu sagen gibt. Ich beginne mit ein paar bemerkenswerten Zitaten und gebe dann, was ich denke, sind die minimalen Überlegungen notwendig, um Wittgenstein zu verstehen, Philosophie und menschliches Verhalten. Zunächst könnte man feststellen, dass es verdächtig sein sollte, "Meta" vor jedes Wort zu stellen. W bemerkte z.B., dass Metamathematik Mathematik wie jede andere ist. Die Vorstellung, dass wir aus der Philosophie austreten können (d.h. die beschreibende Psychologie des Denkens höherer Ordnung), ist selbst eine tiefe Verwirrung. Eine weitere Irritation hier (und während des akademischen Schreibens in den letzten 4 Jahrzehnten) ist der ständige umgekehrte sprachliche Sexismus von "ihrem" und "ihr" und "sie" oder "er/sie" usw., wo "sie" und "ihre" und "sie" gut machen würden. Ebenso, wird die Verwendung des französischen Wortes "Repertoire", bei dem das englische "Repertoire" recht gut funktioniert. Der größte Mangel ist das (wenn auch sehr häufige) völlige Versäumnis, das zu verwenden, was ich als die enorm leistungsfähige und intuitive Zwei-System-Ansicht von HOT und Searles Framework betrachte, die ich oben skizziert habe. Dies ist besonders ergreifend im Kapitel über die Bedeutung p111 ff. (besonders in den Fußnoten 2-7), wo wir in sehr schlammigem Wasser ohne den Rahmen von automatisierten echten nur S1, propositional DispositionS, COS usw. schwimmen. Man kann auch einen besseren Blick auf das Innere und das Äußere bekommen, indem man z.B. Johnston oder Budd liest (siehe meine Rezensionen). Horwich macht jedoch viele einschneidende Kommentare. Besonders gefiel mir seine Zusammenfassung der Bedeutung von Wes antitheoretischer Haltung auf P65. Er muss "On Certainty" stärker in den Vordergrund stellen, das kürzlich von Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva und anderen mit viel Aufwand beworfen und in meinen jüngsten Artikeln zusammengefasst wurde. Horwich ist erstklassig und seine Arbeit lohnt sich. Man hofft, dass er (und alle) Searle und einige moderne Psychologie sowie Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker und Baker etc. studieren werden, um eine breite moderne Sicht des Verhaltens zu erreichen. Die meisten ihrer Papiere sind auf academia dot edu und philpapers dot org, aber für PMS Hacker siehe http slash slash info dot sjc dot ox dot ac dot uk slash scr slash hacker slash DownloadPapers dot html Er gibt eine der schönsten Zusammenfassungen, wo uns ein Verständnis von Wittgenstein hinterlässt, das ich je gesehen habe. "Es darf keinen Versuch geben, unsere sprachliche/konzeptionelle Tätigkeit (PI 126) zu erklären, wie in Freges Reduktion der Arithmetik auf logik; kein Versuch, ihr erkenntnistheoretische Grundlagen zu geben (PI 124), wie sie auf der Grundlage von Berichten über ein vormethodikes Wissen beruhen; kein Versuch, idealisierte Formen davon (PI 130) als in gewissem Sinne Logiken zu charakterisieren; kein Reformversuch (PI 124, 132) wie in Mackies Fehlertheorie oder Dummetts Intuitionismus; kein Versuch, sie zu straffen (PI 133) wie in Quines Existenzbericht; kein Versuch, es konsistenter zu machen (PI 132) wie in Tarskis Antwort auf die Lügner-Paradoxien; und kein Versuch, es vollständiger zu machen (PI 133) wie bei der Klärung von Fragen der persönlichen Identität für bizarre hypothetische 'Teleportation'-Szenarien." Abschließend möchte ich vorschlagen, dass W mit der Perspektive, die ich hier gefördert habe, im Zentrum der zeitgenössischen Philosophie und Psychologie steht und nicht obskur, schwierig oder irrelevant ist, sondern schillernd, tiefgründig und kristallklar ist und dass es ist, eines der größten intellektuellen Abenteuer zu verpassen, das möglichist. Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Diejenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) und andere sehen . (shrink)

Horwich donne une belle analyse de Wittgenstein (W) et est un érudit W de premier plan, mais à mon avis, ils sont tous en deçà d’une pleine appréciation, comme je l’explique longuement dans cet examen et beaucoup d’autres. Si l’on ne comprend pas W (et de préférence Searle aussi) alors je ne vois pas comment on pourrait avoir plus qu’une compréhension superficielle de la philosophie et de la pensée de l’ordre supérieur et donc de tout comportement complexe (psychologie, sociologie, anthropologie, (...) histoire, littérature, société). En un mot, W a démontré que lorsque vous avez montré comment une phrase est utilisée dans le contexte d’intérêt, il n’y a rien de plus à dire. Je vais commencer par quelques citations notables, puis donner ce que je pense sont les considérations minimales nécessaires pour comprendre Wittgenstein, la philosophie et le comportement humain. Tout d’abord, on pourrait noter que mettre "meta" en face de n’importe quel mot devrait être suspect. W a fait remarquer par exemple, que la métamathématique est mathématiques comme les autres. L’idée que nous pouvons sortir de la philosophie (c’est-à-dire la psychologie descriptive de la pensée de haut ordre) est elle-même une profonde confusion. Une autre irritation ici (et tout au long de l’écriture académique pour les 4 dernières décennies) est le sexisme linguistique inverse constant de «elle» et «la sienne» et «elle» ou «il / elle», etc, où «ils» et «leur» et «eux» ferait bien. De même, l’utilisation du mot Français «répertoire» où le «répertoire» anglais se portera plutôt bien. La lacune majeure est l’échec complet (bien que très commun) d’employer ce que je considère comme la vue extrêmement puissante et intuitive de deux systèmes de HOT et Searle cadre que j’ai décrit ci-dessus. C’est particulièrement poignant dans le chapitre sur le sens p111 et seq. (en particulier dans les notes de bas de page 2-7), où nous nageons dans l’eau très boueuse sans le cadre de l’automatisé vrai seul S1, propositionnelle dispositionnelle S2, COS etc. On peut également avoir une meilleure vue de l’intérieur et de l’extérieur en lisant par exemple, Johnston ou Budd (voir mes commentaires). Horwich fait cependant beaucoup de commentaires incisifs. J’ai particulièrement aimé son résumé de l’importation de la position anti-théorique de W sur p65. Il doit mettre davantage l’accent sur 'On Certainty', récemment l’objet de beaucoup d’efforts de Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva et d’autres et résumé dans mes récents articles. Horwich est de premier ordre et son travail vaut bien l’effort. On espère qu’il (et tout le monde) étudiera Searle et une certaine psychologie moderne ainsi que Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker et Baker, etc. pour atteindre une large vision moderne du comportement. La plupart de leurs papiers sont sur academia dot edu et philpapers dot org, mais pour PMS Hacker voir http : info dot sjc dot ox dot ac dot uk/ scr / hacker / DownloadPapers dot html. Il donne l’un des plus beaux résumés de l’endroit où une compréhension de Wittgenstein nous laisse que j’ai jamais vu. « Il ne doit y avoir aucune tentative d’expliquer notre activité linguistique/conceptuelle (PI 126) comme dans la réduction de l’arithmétique à la logique de Frege ; aucune tentative de lui donner des fondations épistémologiques (PI 124) comme dans les comptes basés sur le sens d’une connaissance a priori; aucune tentative de caractériser des formes idéalisées de celui-ci (PI 130) comme dans le sens logique; aucune tentative de réforme (PI 124, 132) comme dans la théorie de l’erreur de Mackie ou l’intuitionnisme de Dummett; aucune tentative de rationaliser (PI 133) comme dans le récit de Quine de l’existence; aucune tentative pour le rendre plus cohérent (PI 132) comme dans la réponse de Tarski aux paradoxes menteurs; et aucune tentative pour le rendre plus complet (PI 133) comme dans le règlement des questions d’identité personnelle pour des scénarios hypothétiques bizarres de « téléportation ». Enfin, permettez-moi de suggérer qu’avec la perspective que j’ai encouragée ici, W est au centre de la philosophie et de la psychologie contemporaines et n’est pas obscure, difficile ou non pertinente, mais scintillante, profonde et limpide et que de lui manquer est de manquer l’une des plus grandes aventures intellectuelles possibles. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deuxemssyst peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

Horwich dà una bella analisi di Wittgenstein (W) ed è uno studioso W leader, ma a mio parere, tutti non sono al di sotto di un pieno apprezzamento, come spiego a lungo in questa recensione e molti altri. Se non si capisce W (e preferibilmente anche Searle) allora non vedo come si possa avere più di una comprensione superficiale della filosofia e del pensiero di ordine superiore e quindi di tutti i comportamenti complessi (psicologia, sociologia, antropologia, storia, letteratura, società). In (...) poche parole, W ha dimostrato che quando hai dimostrato come una frase viene usata nel contesto di interesse, non c'è più nulla da dire. Inizierò con alcune citazioni degne di nota e poi darò quelle che penso siano le considerazioni minime necessarie per capire Wittgenstein, la filosofia e il comportamento umano. La prima si potrebbe notare che mettere "meta" davanti a qualsiasi parola dovrebbe essere sospetto. W ha osservato ad esempio, che la metamatematica è matematica come qualsiasi altra. L'idea che possiamo uscire dalla filosofia (cioè la psicologia descrittiva del pensiero di ordine superiore) è di per sé una profonda confusione. Un'altra irritazione qui (e per tutta la scrittura accademica negli ultimi 4 decenni) è il costante sessismo linguistico inverso di "lei" e "suo" e "lei" o "lui/ lei" ecc., dove "loro" e "loro" e "loro" farebbero bene. Allo stessomodo, l'uso della parola francese "repertorio" in cui l'inglese "repertorio" farà abbastanza bene. La carenza principale è il fallimento completo (anche se molto comune) di impiegare quello che vedo come la vista di due sistemi estremamente potente e intuitiva del quadro di HOT e Searle che ho delineato sopra. Questo è particolarmente toccante nel capitolo sul significato p111 et seq. (soprattutto nelle note a piè di pagina 2-7), dove nuotiamo in acqua molto fangosa senza la struttura di vero automatizzato solo S1, proposizionale disposizionale S2, COS ecc. Si può anche ottenere una migliore vista dell'interno e dell'esterno leggendo ad esempio, Johnston o Budd (vedi le mie recensioni). Horwich però fa molti commenti incisivi. Mi è piaciuto soprattutto il suo riassunto dell'importazione della posizione anti-teorica di W su p65. Ha bisogno di dare più enfasi a 'On Certainty', recentemente oggetto di grande sforzo di Daniele Moyal- Sharrock, Coliva e altri e riassunto nei miei recenti articoli. Horwich è di prim'ordine e il suo lavoro vale la pena. Si spera che lui (e tutti) studierà Searle e un po 'di psicologia moderna così come Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker e Baker ecc per raggiungere una vasta visione moderna del comportamento. La maggior parte dei loro documenti sono su academia dot edu e philpapers dot org etc. Egli dà uno dei più bei riassunti di dove una comprensione di Wittgenstein ci lascia che io abbia mai visto. "Non ci deve essere alcun tentativo di spiegare la nostra attività linguistico/concettuale (PI 126) come nella riduzione dell'aritmetica di Frege alla logica; nessun tentativo di dargli basi epistemologiche (PI 124) come nei resoconti basati sul significato di una conoscenza a priori; nessun tentativo di caratterizzarne le forme idealizzate (PI 130) come nelle logiche del senso; nessun tentativo di riformarlo (PI 124, 132) come nella teoria degli errori di Mackie o nell'intuizione di Dummett; nessun tentativo di snellirla (PI 133) come nel racconto dell'esistenza di Quine; nessun tentativo di renderlo più coerente (PI 132) come nella risposta di Tarski ai paradossi bugiar; e nessun tentativo di renderlo più completo (PI 133) come nel sistemare le questioni di identità personale per bizzarri scenari ipotetici di 'teletrasporto'." Infine, lasciatemi suggerire che con la prospettiva che ho incoraggiato qui, W è al centro della filosofia contemporanea e della psicologia e non è oscura, difficile o irrilevante, ma scintillante, profonda e cristallina e che permane lo è mancare una delle più grandi avventure intellettualipossibili. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'TalkingMonkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions nel 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Horwich dá uma boa análise de Wittgenstein (W) e é um estudioso w líder, mas na minha opinião, todos eles estão aquém de uma apreciação plena, como eu explicar em comprimento nesta revisão e muitos outros. Se um não compreende W (e preferivelmente Searle também) então eu não ver como um poderia ter mais do que uma compreensão superficial da filosofia e do pensamento mais elevado da ordem e assim de todo o comportamento complexo (psychologia, sociologia, antropologia, história, literatura, sociedade (...) civil). Em poucas palavras, W demonstrou que quando você tem mostrado como uma sentença é usada no contexto de interesse, não há nada mais a dizer. Vou começar com algumas citações notáveis e, em seguida, dar o que eu acho que são as considerações mínimas necessárias para entender Wittgenstein, filosofia e comportamento humano. Primeiro pode-se notar que colocar "meta" na frente de qualquer palavra deve ser suspeito. W comentou, por exemplo, que a metamatemática é matemática como qualquer outra. A noção de que podemos pisar fora da filosofia (ou seja, a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior) é em si uma profunda confusão. Outra irritação aqui (e ao longo da escrita acadêmica para as últimas 4 décadas) é o sexismo linguístico reverso constante de "ela" e "dela" e "ela" ou "ele/ela", etc, onde "eles" e "deles" e "eles" faria bem. Da mesma forma, o uso da palavra francesa ' repertório ', onde o repertório Inglês ' vai fazer muito bem. A maior deficiência é a falha completa (embora muito comum) para empregar o que eu vejo como a visão de dois sistemas extremamente poderoso e intuitivo de HOT e Searle ' s estructura que eu esboçou aqui. Isto é especialmente comovente no capítulo sobre o significado P111 et seq (especialmente nas notas de rodapé 2-7), onde nadamos em água muito enlameada, sem o quadro de automatizado verdadeiro apenas S1, proposicional mudança de caráter S2, cos etc. Um pode igualmente começ uma vista melhor do interno e do exterior lendo por exemplo, Johnston ou Budd (veja meus comentários). Horwich, no entanto, faz muitos comentários incisivos. Eu gostei especialmente de seu resumo da importação da postura antiteórica de W em p65. Ele precisa dar mais ênfase a "on certeza", recentemente o tema de muito esforço por Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Coliva e outros e resumidos em meus artigos recentes. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. (shrink)

ROUDAUT (François) & STOFFEL (Jean-François), Avant-propos (pp. 371-372). BLAY (Michel), Soleil de Copernic et soleil de Galilée (pp. 373-389). MEHL (Édouard), Le Soleil au cinquième concile du Latran (1512-1516) : Copernic et la réforme du calendrier julien (pp. 391-408). STOFFEL (Jean-François), «Qui choisirait de poser ce flambeau dans un lieu autre ou meilleur que celui d’où il peut illuminer le tout simultanément ?»: examen de la pertinence d’un argument copernicien de convenance (pp. 409-458). ROUDAUT (François), Le Soleil chez quelques lexicographes (...) et vulgarisateurs (pp. 459-485). CÉARD (Jean), Le Soleil selon les physiciens de la Renaissance (pp. 487-498). MÉNAGER (Daniel), Le soleil dans les fêtes de cour sous les derniers Valois (pp. 499-510). SEIDENGART (Jean), La parenté du Soleil et des étoiles fixes dans la cosmologie de Giordano Bruno (pp. 511-529). ŠPELDA (Daniel), Les soleils et leurs observateurs au XVIIe siècle (pp. 531-577). MELLINGHOFF-BOURGERIE (Viviane), Connivences héliologiques entre théologie et astronomie chez François de Sales et Bérulle: le cas du barnabite Redento Baranzano (pp. 579-610). NEJESCHLEBA (Tomáš), De la métaphysique de la lumière à l’héliocentrisme: la vision du Soleil selon Valérien Magni (pp. 611-627). Les auteurs (pp. 629-630). (shrink)